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LI HUNG-CHANG IN 1896.

# THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS OF THE CHINESE EMPIRE

BY

HOSEA BALLOU MORSE, LL.D.

AUTHOR OF "THE TRADE AND ADMINISTRATION OF CHINA"  
"THE GILDS OF CHINA," ETC.

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VOLUME III

THE PERIOD OF SUBJECTION

1894-1911

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# The International Relations of the Chinese Empire

## VOL. III

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§ 1. KOREA, Kaoli, Chosen, the "Land of Morning Calm," the "Hermit Kingdom," was now to become the bone of contention between China and Japan. For centuries Korea had been vassal to China ; and both courts fully recognised the reciprocal obligation, by which the one gave protection against external aggression and internal disorder, and the other paid tribute and solicited recognition and investiture for each new ruler. In 1592, under the Ming emperor Wanli, the vassal country was invaded by the Japanese under Hideyoshi. Having over-run the country Hideyoshi crossed the Yalu and entered Manchuria ; after a first reverse, he defeated the Chinese armies sent against him, but they rallied and he was forced to retire from Manchuria ; in 1598, on the death of Hideyoshi, the Japanese withdrew from Korea, except the port of Fusan, which they continued to hold. The Manchus began in 1618 a campaign which brought under their dominion southern Manchuria ; and in 1637 they brought Korea into subjection. The Manchu ruler mounted the throne of China in 1644, and the subject kingdom of Korea resumed its position of vassalage to the Chinese emperor which was not disturbed for more than two centuries.

§ 2. Roman Catholic missionaries entered Korea in 1794. In 1839 three French priests suffered martyrdom by decapitation, and several native priests in the following fourteen years. In 1866 nine French priests were decapitated, three only being saved. A naval expedition consisting of seven ships, under Admiral Roze, was despatched in October to Kianghwa, and, a landing party having established itself on shore, a blockade of the approaches to Seoul, the capital, was proclaimed. The Korean court showed no inclination to open negotiations ; the French

admiral dared not quit the coast; and, at the end of November, the French forces returned to Chefoo, having obtained no satisfaction, and not even an answer to their demands.[1]

§ 3. In June, 1866, the American schooner *Surprise* was wrecked on the coast of Korea, and her crew was kindly treated.[2] In July of the same year, while the American schooner *General Sherman* was anchored in a Korean port, her crew became involved in a row on shore owing to their brutal conduct, but were rescued; the vessel was then attacked by the populace, who killed eight of the crew and made prisoners of the rest.[3] The American corvette *Wachusett* undertook a fruitless inquiry in January, 1867; and in March, 1868, the frigate *Shenandoah* visited Korea, but "learned nothing to corroborate the reports . . . that some of the crew of the *General Sherman* are still living, and that the government is disposed to send an embassy to Western states." [4]

§ 4. The reports referred to were communicated to the American authorities by an American citizen, F. B. Jenkins; and in the spring of 1868 he, together with a Prussian merchant, Ernst Oppert, and a French priest, the Abbé Féron, went to Korea in the chartered German steamer *China*, with the avowed purpose of investigating their truth. On their return to Shanghai it became known that their actual object in planning the expedition was to rifle the tombs of certain former kings of Korea; either in order that they might obtain gold and other treasures supposed to be buried in the tombs; or that they might carry off the bodies and hold them for a money ransom; or, as they themselves alleged, that, by holding possession of the bodies, they might favorably dispose the Korean court to negotiate commercial treaties with their respective countries. The American, Jenkins, was charged before his consular court at Shanghai on six counts, but the prosecution failed to connect him directly with the case, though it was proved that he had advanced money to its actual promoter, Oppert, and had accompanied the

[1] Cordier, "Rélations," i, pp. 265 seq.

[2] Mr. G. F. Seward (Consul-General at Shanghai) to Mr. W. H. Seward (Sec. State), Oct. 14th, 1868, U.S. For. Rel., 1870, p. 337.

[3] Same to same, April 24th, 1868, *ibid.*, p. 336.

[4] *Ibid.*, May 25th, 1868, *ibid.*, p. 337.

expedition. "The consuls of the other powers concerned await the result of my [the American consul's] action before determining whether to proceed against their nationals." No such proceedings were taken; but the French priest was deported to France, and subsequently returned to mission work at Pondichéry. The Prussian Oppert wrote a book.[5]

§ 5. So far the relations of Western nations with Korea had consisted of an armed expedition which had been repelled, a friendly inquiry which had been cold-shouldered, and a piratical raid which had failed. In 1868 it was proposed to the American government that a mission should be sent with a double object: first to inquire into the fate of the crew of the *General Sherman* and obtain satisfaction in case of their wrongful treatment, and at the same time to "assure the Koreans of our appreciation of their kindness to the wrecked crew of the *Surprise*"; the second object should be to obtain a commercial treaty. It was also pointed out that the United States might well take the initiative in negotiating a treaty: "France has been unfortunate in Korea; Great Britain has hardly a greater interest at stake than we, and has no grievances to redress; North Germany . . . has yet no determined policy in the East." [6] The American envoy at Peking was accordingly commissioned to make the proposed inquiry, and, "should the opportunity seem favorable for obtaining commercial advantages in Korea," to negotiate a treaty to that effect. He was to be accompanied by the admiral on the station, "with a display of force adequate to support the dignity of this government." [7]

§ 6. In the meantime the German government, in June 1869, made an attempt to open negotiations through the agency of a Japanese official who accompanied the German envoy. The Korean officials at Fusan "thought it exceedingly impudent that a message of this kind had been delivered through a Japanese"; and relations between the Koreans and the Japanese factory were

[5] Same to same, July 3rd, 1868, *ibid.*, p. 337; *North-China Herald*, July 11th, 1868; Cordier, "Rélations," i, p. 274; Oppert, "A Forbidden Land," London, 1880.

[6] Mr. G. F. Seward to Mr. W. H. Seward, Oct. 14th, 1868, U.S. For. Rel., 1870, p. 337.

[7] Mr. Fish to Mr. Low, April 20th, 1870, *ibid.*, p. 334.

broken off. "until the Japanese on board the foreign vessel had left the country." The condition of the Japanese station was described as being miserable—it was "inhabited by half-a-dozen officials and thirty or forty coolies, who are not allowed to absent themselves farther than half a mile from their lodgings, and are altogether very badly treated by the Koreans." [8] A Russian gun-boat engaged in surveying on the coast of Korea was fired on and driven off in May, 1869. [9]

§ 7. In none of these expeditions had there been any suggestion of the suzerainty of China. Mr. Fish, the American Secretary of State, had indeed warned the envoy that "some political connexion exists between China and Korea, which may make it advisable for you to secure in advance the good will and, possibly, the good offices of the Peking government" [10]; but Mr. Low brushed this suggestion aside—"Korea is substantially an independent nation. To be sure, it sends tribute to China annually, but the tribute is sent rather as a *quid pro quo* for the privilege of trading with the Chinese than as a governmental tribute." [11] He made no reference to investiture or to the relations which had existed for centuries between the two countries, and might easily have found himself involved in a diplomatic tangle at Peking. But China had not yet learned the lesson of Formosa, [12] and Li Hung-chang had only recently taken the reins at Tientsin; and the Chinese ministers refused to assume any responsibility. They went so far as to declare that, "although Korea is regarded as a country subordinate to China, yet she is wholly independent in everything that relates to her government, her religion, her prohibitions, and her laws; in none of these things has China hitherto interfered." [13] Mr. Low had asked for the loan of the services of Mr. E. B. Drew, an American and commissioner of Chinese customs, to act as interpreter to his mission, a

[8] Herr v. Brandt to Baron v. Rehfüss, cited in Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, Nov. 22nd, 1870, U.S. For. Rel., 1871, p. 74.

[9] Cordier, "Rélations," i, p. 392.

[10] Mr. Fish to Mr. Low, *ubi sup.*

[11] Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, July 16th, 1870, U.S. For. Rel., 1870, p. 362.

[12] Cf. "Submission," chap. xiii, §§ 7-13.

[13] Tsungli Yamen to Mr. Low, March 28th, 1871, U.S. For. Rel., 1871, p. 112.

post of the highest importance in oriental negotiations. Mr. Hart referred the request to the Tsungli Yamen and was informed that, "the relations that exist between Korea and China being considered, the Yamen could not authorise a commissioner of customs to go there, but that, if Mr. Drew wanted leave of absence, he could have that leave of absence"; and he was then granted "six weeks' leave in the usual way." [14]

§ 8. The American squadron under Admiral John Rodgers, consisting of one frigate, two corvettes and two gunboats, having Mr. Low and his staff on board, arrived off Kianghwa on May 30th, 1871. The envoy was encouraged by the prompt receipt of a letter asking the object of the expedition; a written reply and verbal explanations by Mr. Drew informed the writers that the object would be declared when officials of sufficiently high standing had been deputed to meet the envoy, and that meantime parties would be sent to survey the bay and river. [15] Mr. Low's hopes of a diplomatic result from his mission were soon dispelled, for, on June 1st, the surveying ships were fired on from concealed batteries. [16] While the envoy was "not unmindful of the fact that the general policy of the government is peace and that hostile operations in a distant portion of the world are to be most carefully avoided," he and the admiral were agreed that such an "uncalled-for attack on a peaceful mission" demanded prompt action, [17] without which "the dignity of the government of the United States would be seriously compromised." [18] There was then an exchange of letters, one of which communicated a copy of a despatch from the Korean king to the ministry of Rites at Peking, in which the king appealed for the help of his suzerain in his diffi-

[14] R. Hart to E. B. Drew, March 7th, 1871. The letter continues very characteristically: "I hope you won't get shot, or be otherwise mauled—but I am very much of opinion that the Koreans will fight; if they do fight the United States will have the honour and glory of asserting Republican principles, and of opening the last sublunary lock *vi et armis*. Admiral Rodgers believes in the sword, and, as far as I can see, it is quite as holy an instrument to work with as diplomatic chicanery or any of the other hundred and one ways people have of converting others to their own views."

[15] Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, May 31st, 1871, U.S. For. Rel., 1871, p. 116.

[16] Same to same, June 2nd, 1871, *ibid.*, p. 121.

[17] *Ibid.*

[18] Same to same, June 20th, 1871, *ibid.*, p. 126.

culty—"A minister of the emperor must not have relations with a foreign state." He begged that "the emperor will issue a special edict to exhort and instruct the [American] envoy, so that . . . each of us be left to himself without trouble." And he hinted that the suzerain authority should answer the envoy's despatch: "The ruler of a vassal state dare not commit such a breach as to trouble the ministry of Rites to send a reply [to the envoy]." [19]

§ 9. It was determined beforehand to silence and take the forts on Kianghwa island, and to withdraw, after holding them for twenty-four hours—"long enough to demonstrate our ability to punish such offences at pleasure." [20] The expedition (two gunboats and twenty armed launches) left the fleet on June 10th and returned on the 12th, having, with small loss to the Americans, taken and destroyed five forts mounting 481 guns, captured 50 flags, killed over 250 Korean soldiers and wounded many others. Mr. Low then again tried to open negotiations; but, though, in his opinion, "the operations were more significant than those of the English and French in 1858 when the capture of the Taku forts caused the government of China to immediately send ministers and conclude treaties at Tientsin," [21] the analogy failed. The magistrates refused to transmit his letters to the capital, no answers were returned to his demands, and he was compelled to report a failure. He had been warned of the trouble resulting from imperfect negotiations [22]; but the trouble now was that no negotiations were possible, and the envoy reported—"Recent demonstration produced no effect upon negotiations. Nothing can be effected short of the capital. Force insufficient to go there without great risk. If peaceful means fail shall withdraw and wait instructions." [23] The envoy and the fleet then withdrew on July 3rd, and those who had hoped for a peaceful

[19] Enclosed in *ibid*.

[20] Adm. Rodgers to Commander Blake, June 9th, 1871, *ibid.*, p. 135.

[21] Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, June 20th, *ubi sup*.

[22] "In negotiation mind one thing: all the trouble in China has resulted from imperfect negotiations. . . . Restrictions stipulated for are the hardest things in the world to knock over in the end—especially in these countries."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, June 9th, 1871.

[23] Mr. Low to Mr. Fish, telegram, June 22nd, 1871, U.S. For. Rel., 1871, p. 149.



opening of the Korean barriers—peaceful in intention, even if supported by force—were disappointed.[24]

§ 10. It was at this time that the first treaty was signed between China and Japan. This treaty,[25] signed September 13th, 1871, was made, more or less, as between two equal powers. The commercial provisions were generally on the same basis as those in the treaties with the Western powers; but there was no “most-favored nation” clause; and, instead of the full status of extra-territoriality granted to the subjects of Western powers, it was provided that offenders were to be tried on criminal charges before the consul and the territorial official sitting together[26]; but it was further provided[27] that, “the system of government and the laws of the two countries being different, each country shall be free to conduct its own administration independently.” By omission, civil cases were to be judged by the officials and according to the laws of the country in which the cause arose. Reciprocal rights of trade were conceded such as had been given by China to the subjects of Western powers, except that [28] in neither country might the subjects of the other carry imports into the interior or buy produce in the interior; imports so carried and produce so bought were to be confiscated; trade was to be limited strictly to the treaty ports.

§ 11. After the expedition to Formosa,[29] Japan began to look outside for other fields in which to engage the attention of her disarmed samurai. In 1874 a claim was advanced to the undivided suzerainty over the Liuchiu islands,[30] conceded by China finally in 1881. In 1875 a Japanese ship of war was sent cruising along the coast of Korea; in December some of her sailors were fired on while on shore on Kianghwa island. A naval demonstration was made at Fusan in January, 1876; and, after

[24] “If America goes no further in the matter, Korea will ripen like a pear, and then drop into the jaws of Russia.”—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Dec. 23rd, 1871.

[25] Treaties, ii, p. 1235.

[26] Art. xiii.

[27] Art. iii. The words quoted are as given, on p. 1300, in a translation of the Japanese text.

[28] Trade Regulations, arts. xiv, xv.

[29] Cf. “Submission,” chap. xiii, §§ 7-13.

[30] Ibid., chap. xv. § 17.

ascertaining that China would stand aloof as she had in 1871, Japan imposed on the reluctant king of Korea a treaty of amity and commerce, signed at Kianghwa on February 26th.[31] Article i declared that "Korea being an independent state, enjoys the same sovereign rights as Japan"; and the treaty opened to Japanese trade the ports of Fusan, Jenchuan (Chemulpo), and Yuensan (Wonsan).

§ 12. There had been commercial dealings between the two peoples for centuries, though restricted to one of these ports, and but little attention was paid to the assertion of independence made rather by Japan than by Korea; and the Korean policy of vassalage to China and isolation from the world remained unchanged. When once in 1878, and once in 1879, a French priest was arrested in Korea and in danger of his life, it was to the Tsungli Yamen in Peking that the French representative appealed, and it was the Chinese government that secured the release of the prisoners.[32] The Japanese were, however, obviously working at Seoul to weaken the relation of vassal to suzerain; and, in 1879, Li Hung-chang gave the considered advice to a high Korean official that "as poison must be met by antidote," the only way to combat Japanese intrigue was to conclude treaties with the Western powers. Later, when the American envoy asked the good offices of the Chinese government in opening relations with Korea, he was advised to apply direct to the court of Seoul. Treaties were thereupon negotiated by Korea with the United States, signed May 22nd, 1882; with England and Germany, November 26th, 1883; with Italy, June 26th, 1884; with Russia, June 25th (July 7th N.S.), 1884; with France, June 4th, 1886. The European powers evaded a settlement of the question of Korean independence by commissioning their envoy at Peking to be also their representative, under various titles, at Seoul; but the United States, influenced by the waiving of responsibility at Peking, followed Japan in commissioning to Korea a minister plenipotentiary independent of the legations at Peking and Tokyo, a procedure which was highly gratifying to Japan.[33]

[31] Treaties between Korea and other powers, 1891.

[32] Cordier, "Relations," ii, p. 583.

[33] Mr. Bingham to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Tokyo, April 14th, 1883, U.S. For. Rel., 1883, p. 603.

§ 13. The signature of the American treaty startled the party of reaction in Korea, led by the Regent, the Tai-wen-kün, father of the king.[34] Anti-foreign rumours began to circulate, and, on July 23rd, 1882, a mob attacked the Japanese legation at Seoul and killed several of its occupants; but the Japanese envoy escaped. The next day the mob invaded the royal palace and demanded the life of the queen, whom they held responsible for the weakness of the government. Both China and Japan sent forces to restore order. The Japanese force obtained in September an undertaking to punish the rioters and to pay an indemnity of \$500,000; but, of this sum, \$400,000 was two years later remitted by Japan.[35] China arrested the Tai-wen-kün and carried him off to Paotingfu, where he was interned until September, 1885.

§ 14. China then decided to intervene more actively in the affairs of Korea. Li Hung-chang, in whose hands the matter was placed, sent as Resident at Seoul one of his most trusted secretaries, Yuen Shih-kai. Besides this he resolved to place by the side of the king a foreign adviser, who should be to Korea what Sir R. Hart was to China; and for this post he selected Mr. P. G. von Möllendorff, who had come to China for the Chinese customs service, and was then in the German consular service. He arrived in Korea in the spring of 1883, and it was expected of him that he would, by his advice, shape affairs in the interests of China and maintain the recognition of China's suzerain rights. His first step was to organise a customs service, with himself at its head. A ministry of Foreign Affairs having been then formed, he was appointed one of its vice-presidents, and took an active part in its deliberations and decisions. He identified himself with Korea, adopting the national dress and conforming in many respects to national customs. Outside his proper duties he was active in introducing reforms for the industrial, commercial and fiscal improvement of the country, and for bettering its means of communication. Many of these were desirable and reasonable, though some were premature; but none of them were

[34] The last king died childless in 1864; his widow adopted as his heir the son of Li Kan-ying (so called by the Chinese) who thereupon usurped the regency.

[35] Mr. Kuki to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Washington, Jan. 9th, 1885, U.S. For. Rel., 1885, p. 567.

financial successes, none having sufficient funds for their proper launching. He constantly appealed to Li Hung-chang for his sympathy, approval and aid; of sympathy he obtained a fair amount, but the viceroy was not disposed to expend his energies or funds on Korean affairs more than was necessary.[36]

§ 15. One of Mr. von Möllendorff's schemes was the organisation of a postal service; and, on December 4th, 1884, a banquet was given to celebrate its inauguration. A riot broke out in the street, in which one of the Korean officials present at the dinner was killed. The other Korean officials present then rushed to the palace, alarmed the king, and with him took shelter with the Japanese guard stationed in Seoul since 1882. The next morning, December 5th, there was an "oriental general election," seven members of the ministry were killed, and the opposition formed an administration. The Chinese Resident, Yuen Shih-kai, with the Chinese guard stationed there since 1882, proceeded to the palace to protect the king, but found it occupied by the Japanese envoy and the Japanese troops. The Chinese troops opened fire on the Japanese, and a general commotion followed, in which the civil inhabitants of Seoul joined. The Japanese then fought their way out of the city and down to Chemulpo, where they were received on a Japanese steamer. China was then in the midst of the Tongking trouble, and could not oppose Japan, whose special ambassador, Count Inouyé Kaoru, supported by a strong naval force, obtained full reparation by a convention signed on January 9th, 1885. By this Korea agreed to apologise and punish the rioters; to pay \$30,000 indemnity; and to construct barracks for the Japanese legion guard.[37]

§ 16. By the spring it was clear that the Tongking difficulty would be put to one side, and that China's hands would soon be free; and neither China nor Japan was too much inclined to force an immediate settlement of the Korean question. At Tientsin, on April 18th, 1885, Count Ito Hirobumi accordingly agreed with Li Hung-chang on

[36] Mainly derived from memorandum written on Feb. 16th, 1910, for the author by Mr. H. F. Merrill. Cf. *postea*, § 18.

[37] Cordier, "Rélations," ii, p. 588; Mr. Bingham to Mr. Frelinghuysen, Tokyo, Dec. 22nd, 1884, U.S. For. Rel., 1885, p. 553.

a convention, by which the two powers were, within four months, to withdraw all their troops from Korea ; Korea was to be urged to organise her own army, under instructors who should be neither Chinese nor Japanese ; and each nation was to inform the other of its intention to send troops to Korea to suppress any disorder which might arise, and troops so sent were to be withdrawn as soon as their object was attained.[38]

§ 17. The reorganisation of the Korean army had been one of Mr. von Möllendorff's projects, and before the end of 1884 he had solicited Li Hung-chang to nominate instructors ; but, either because of his absorption in Tongking affairs, or from a wish to discourage all military organisation in Korea, the viceroy took no action. Japanese aggression was the visible danger, and Mr. von Möllendorff then moved the ministry of Foreign Affairs to negotiate a convention with Russia, by which that power agreed to lend Russian officers to Korea to train her army ; in addition to any ulterior motives the Russian ministers may have had, Russia was to receive at once the usufruct of Port Lazareff.[39] The possession of this port (lat. 39° N.) would give Russia a comparatively ice-free naval base, whereas Vladivostock was ice-bound for four months of the year. Japan saw in it a threat directly across the Sea of Japan ; to China it appeared to endanger the independent existence of Korea, and therefore China's suzerainty over the kingdom ; and England had to face a disturbance of the Asiatic equilibrium in favour of her principal rival in Asia, while at the same time France was still occupying the Pescadores, and relations between China and Japan were strained.

§ 18. To meet the situation as it affected England, the British naval forces, on May 12th, 1885, occupied Port Hamilton, an anchorage in a group of islets off the southern end of Korea, strategically placed to watch the movements of Russia, Japan, and China, as they might affect Korea ; and this occupation continued until February 27th, 1887.[40] China and Japan agreed, for this and other reasons, to compose their disputes by the Tientsin conven-

[38] Treaties, ii, p. 1316.

[39] Mr. Merrill's memorandum ; North-China Herald, July 3rd, 1885.

[40] Our. resp. temp'y occupation of Port Hamilton, pres. 1887.

tion.[41] But China, now thoroughly aroused to the danger, struck at its root in Korea; and Li Hung-chang ordered the king to denounce the convention with Russia, and to dismiss Möllendorff without delay. The king was by this time instructed as to his danger, and he obeyed; he repudiated the Russian agreement, and he dismissed Möllendorff from his post as vice-president of the ministry of Foreign Affairs. He left him, however, for the time at the head of the customs, but he requested the viceroy to nominate an American to succeed him in that post. The request was referred to Sir R. Hart, who nominated Mr. Henry F. Merrill, of the Chinese customs service; and he assumed charge of the Korean customs in October, 1885.[42]

§ 19. The Korean customs was by degrees officered in the higher grades by men drafted from the Chinese customs. Their experience was, of course, an important consideration; but of greater importance was the connexion with China—"the demonstration that Korea is China's tributary." [43] Sir R. Hart insisted on "keeping steadily in view the possibility of union between Korean and Chinese customs—such a result will be best for both Korea and China"; and he hoped that the Korean ministers would "find the system of drafting men from the Chinese customs work so well, that they will steadily father it afterwards" [44]; but at the same time he warned Mr. Merrill to "take care that I am well informed and quickly of all that goes on, as you will find in the long run that the best holding-ground is in this office—so do not be tempted to hook on, or drop your moorings, elsewhere," [45] as in fact Mr. von Möllendorff had done. The "junction"

[41] Cf. *antea*, § 16.

[42] Mr. Merrill's memorandum.

The viceroy provided Mr. von Möllendorff with a small post at Tientsin; after three years, in the spring of 1889, he again joined the Chinese customs service in the rank held by him when he left it twenty years before; he ultimately rose to the rank of commissioner, but was not placed in any position of responsibility and authority.

[43] Sir R. Hart to H. F. Merrill, Sept. 25th, 1885.

In the same letter he urges on Mr. Merrill that "we should neither lose touch, nor allow the junction now struggling from embryo into form to suffer from abortion, miscarriage, or anything else likely to prevent it from arriving at maturity."

[44] Same to same, Nov. 30th, 1885.

[45] *Ibid.*, Sept. 25th, 1885.

was never effected, but the true relations between China and Korea were openly demonstrated; for the Korean customs was administered as a service subsidiary to, though independent of, the Chinese customs. Mr. Merrill, American, was succeeded in 1889 by Mr. J. F. Schoenicke, German; and he in 1893 by Mr. John McLeavy Brown, British; both were from the Chinese customs. The last was also given the power of drawing tight the purse-strings of the treasury, all orders for payments requiring his counter-signature, and he held on in his post until 1905.

§ 20. Mr. Merrill was appointed chief commissioner of the Korean customs only, whereas his predecessor had been a vice-president of the ministry of Foreign Affairs as well. Such a dual position was held actually by Sir R. Hart in Peking, who, while being only the titular head of a revenue department, was also the unofficial adviser of the Chinese ministers in their international difficulties; and who, in 1885, was at the height of his influence in the latter capacity. It was hoped that Mr. Merrill might also be called on to give similar advice to the Korean ministers [46]; though only in his thirty-third year, he was a cool thinker and of sound judgment, and his advice to Korea would be helpful, while his loyalty to China and his wish to maintain the existing relations between the two countries were beyond question. But Li Hung-chang was already suspicious of Sir R. Hart's influence at Peking in diplomatic questions, and he had no desire to see that influence extended to Korean affairs through a member of the service of which Sir R. Hart was the head. The viceroy had, moreover, at his side at Tientsin a member of that service, Mr. G. Detring, who, while entirely loyal to China, was not generally subservient to the plans of his own chief. The viceroy then solved his political difficulty by nominating as adviser to the Korean ministry of Foreign Affairs Mr. Owen N. Denny, who had formerly been American consul at Tientsin. [47]

[46] "D's presence in Korea has been a mistake from first to last, and there will be no quiet as long as he remains or if he has a special successor. For all the advice the king requires the chief commissioner of customs is quite strong enough."—Same to same, Feb. 19th, 1889.

[47] The procedure seems to have been that Yuen Shih-kai put it into the head of the Korean ministry, which then wrote to the viceroy, who then directed Mr. Detring, who cabled to Mr. Denny at his home in Portland, Oregon.—G. Detring to H. F. Merrill, Dec. 6th, 1885.

§ 21. Russian plans were not entirely abandoned, and Japanese aims continued to be pressed during the ensuing years; and it was China's principal object to checkmate both. In placing Mr. Denny at the king's side Li Hung-chang hoped for loyal support to his policy; but he did not realise that one who had never been in the Chinese service would not be likely to feel loyalty to China, but would, on the contrary, feel that his first duty was to the country in whose service he was. Mr. Denny, instead of striving to maintain the dependence of Korea on China, sought in every way to set Korea on her own feet. At one time, in the summer of 1886, it was believed that the protection of Russia had been invoked; but, if the report was true, the resolute front presented by China stopped the intrigue.[48] In the spring of 1888 other projects were manifest, leading more or less to independence—but to independence under a foreign protectorate; on this occasion Mr. von Möllendorff was drawn from his obscurity and sent to Korea “to checkmate Denny, who appears to have kicked over the vice-regal shaft, and he is to get the king back into Chinese harness again.”[49]

§ 22. In these twelve years, from 1883 to 1894, China's agent in Korea was Yuen Shih-kai, who had been nominated by Li Hung-chang to the post of Resident at Seoul. It was his mission, in its simplest aspect, to confirm the dependence of Korea on China, and to combat all efforts of the Korean king to assert his independence, whether those efforts were designed to lead him into the protecting arms of Russia or of Japan, or even to be a sovereign state under American inspiration.[50] He was active in urging

[48] “The viceroy believes, or appears to believe, that the king has actually applied for Russian protection. . . . The Chinese minister at St. Petersburg has been instructed to persuade the Russians not to accept the task if imposed upon them, because, if they do, the viceroy will have to take measures, once for all, to frustrate such a scheme. The fleet has been ordered to Chemulpo, and an army is kept in readiness to embark at a moment's notice.”—Same to same, Aug. 20th, 1886.

[49] R. Hart to H. F. Merrill, May 29th, 1888.

[50] In face of a possible breakdown owing to insomnia, Sir R. Hart wrote :

“In all that concerns Korea, the one point to start from is that Korea is China's tributary and that China *will not only* fight anybody rather than give up her suzerainty, *but will* be forced to asserb Korea if troublesome scheming goes on there. It is useless for America to say ‘assert your independence!’ It is useless for Japan to say ‘come to my arms!’ There is as little logic in the one word *independence* without the rest of the syllogism



on the decrepit government of Korea the adoption of useful reforms, but he constantly insisted on her dependence on China.[51] In carrying out his policy he held advanced views, which were shared by others, and he would have hastened the day when China should cut the Gordian knot by declaring the annexation of Korea, and the transformation of the kingdom into a province of the empire. But he went further; with or without the knowledge and sanction of his superiors,[52] he was

as there is religion in 'that blessed word Mesopotamia' without the etceteras. The backing that your people [the Americans] are giving the King and the temptations the Japanese are putting in his path, are alike pitfalls: His Majesty will come a cropper! But worse than this—such plotting is only too likely to disturb the peace of this quarter of the globe and set the outside dogs by the ears over the Korean bone. It is natural for you, as I once before wrote, to find your sympathy with Korean aspirations and angry over China's interference and system of vetoing: but you are the Suzerain's man and must keep the tributary right as far as is in your power—you can point the danger of irritating China, the futility of aiming at independence, and the practical good sense and quiet comfort of siding with the suzerain openly: if Korea 'flirts' she will lose all her lovers after falling a prey to the monetary power of one of them; but, if she boldly proclaims her engagement to China, other suitors will draw off and the right man, China, will secure her welfare."—R. Hart to H. F. Merrill, May 29th, 1888.

[51] "Among the many advisers of the King none play as active a part as the Chinese representative here. I forward translation of a memorial which he presented to the King in September last, in which . . . he makes suggestions on ten urgent measures of reform. . . . He furthermore urges the King to rely solely on the help of China, which alone can protect Korea from the insulting treatment of foreign nations."—Mr. W. W. Rockhill to Mr. Bayard, Seoul, Jan. 28th, 1887, U.S. For. Rel., 1887, p. 256.

[52] "As to Yuen: I too feel that Yuen is there with instructions and to carry out a policy, but I know nothing of either—and perhaps it's best I don't. When I spoke to the Viceroy about him, the reply was that those who criticise Yuen don't know *what* he is doing or *why* he does it: H. E. did not put it in so many words, but what he said gave that net impression. China cannot afford to recognise Korea's independence, and the longing looks other Powers cast in that direction *must force* China eventually to incorporate and rule the place like a province. Shufeldt's doings may make him the 'Hero' of the occasion: if he gets Korea to flourish independence before the world, China will soon follow it with a demonstration to the contrary! Your present *raison d'être* and my connection with the Korean Customs have one and the same foundation—*Korea's dependence* and the necessity there is to tell the world that China is Korea's suzerain: don't forget this! And it is only by *acquiescing* in this that Korea will escape the rough handling sure to follow any scramble for territory. If you have anything to say in this connection to Koreans, take the line of telling them that, of the two, the independent will endanger Korea more than the dependent condition: China will fight all-comers to keep Korea, and she will win—and then she will chastise Korea for causing the row. My own personal opinion is that China would act wisely were she to incorporate Korea openly and boldly and in thorough-going fashion—all the same, I cannot say that Yuen's mission is to carry out any such policy: but.

believed to be bent on forcing the issue and making annexation inevitable.[53]

§ 23. Korea had coquetted with Russia and had eluded the inviting arms of Japan; and in 1887 a Korean mission was sent to Washington. The Chinese government ordered that the mission must be presented by the Chinese envoy and must always follow his advice [54]; but the American government held that "as the United States have no privity with the inter-relations of China and Korea, we shall treat both as separate governments customarily represented here by their respective and independent agents" [55]; and the mission was presented to the president on January 17th, 1888, without the open intervention of the Chinese legation.[56] There had long been friction between the Chinese Resident and the American adviser to the king [57]; now there was no longer room for the two at the same court. Each demanded the dismissal of the other; but one represented a mighty empire, not yet shorn of all its prestige, and it was obviously the private American citizen, without any government backing, serving the Asiatic king, who had to go. China took the matter in hand and, after negotiations in December, 1888, with the Taotai at Shanghai, Mr. Denny consented to withdraw from Korea on four conditions: 1°. that the king should consent to his going; 2°. that Yuen Shih-kai should be recalled; 3°. that Denny

depend upon it, he has his instructions—knows what he's about—and is supported from China's side."—R. Hart to H. F. Merrill, Dec. 4th, 1886.

[53] "I have repeatedly, and again this morning, warned the Viceroy against placing too much belief in Yuen's statements, and told him that I feel convinced that Yuen, instead of pacifying Korea, is bent upon making mischief. The Viceroy, although he has as yet not made up his mind with regard to Yuen, suspects him of playing an underhand game, and I dare say that very shortly somebody will be despatched from here to proceed to Korea and look closely into the state of affairs there. Be on the look out: I have a presentiment as if something serious was going to happen. The Peking gov't have placed the treatment of Korean matters entirely in the Viceroy's hands. He wishes quiet, but will not hesitate to effect a radical change in the executive, once he sees that temporising is a bad policy."—G. Detring to H. F. Merrill, Aug. 20th, 1886.

[54] Telegram Li Hung-chang to Yuen Shih-kai, in Mr. Dinsmore to Mr. Bayard, Seoul, Nov. 17th, 1887, U.S. For. Rel., 1888, i, p. 441.

[55] Mr. Bayard to Mr. Dinsmore, Jan. 26th, 1888, *ibid.*, p. 443.

[56] *Ibid.*

[57] "You do not refer to the last Yuen-Denny incident: why did the secretaries bolt? And what did they take with them? And what will Denny do with it?"—R. Hart to H. F. Merrill, Oct. 3rd, 1888.

should be free to return if summoned by the king; and 4°. that his arrears of salary, \$30,000, should be paid [by China].<sup>[58]</sup> On these terms he withdrew, having, with the best intentions and from the most loyal motives, wrought much mischief. The recall of Yuen was confidently expected<sup>[59]</sup>; but reasons of state were imperative and the danger from Japan too pressing to permit it, and he remained at his post.

§ 24. During the five years, from 1889 to 1894, Russian plans were in abeyance, the Platonic support given by America to Korean dreams of independence was no longer in evidence,<sup>[60]</sup> and China and Japan were left face to face at the court of Seoul. The party of content, those who supported the existing administration, who desired to maintain the Chinese connexion, who wished to keep things as they were, found their support at the Chinese residency; the party of discontent, the "Young Korea" party who demanded reform, those who wished to break away from the Chinese connexion in any direction whatsoever, those who leaned towards Japan as a country which had modernised her outward form, and away from China and her antiquated system, all these found support at the Japanese legation. All the forms of oriental intrigue were adopted—demonstrations, denunciations, palace cabals, assassinations of ministers, revolts in the provinces—but in none was any proof ever obtainable of the agency of the side which would be benefited. Plotting and counter-plotting, charge and counter-charge, advice and counter-advice, all were poured into the ears of the distracted puppet king, until nothing was left but the final arbitra-

[58] H. B. Morse to H. F. Merrill, Dec. 20th and 29th, 1888. The author conducted the negotiations at Shanghai.

[59] "I think the viceroy has called upon the Korean government to dismiss Denny. Yuen is likely to come soon over here on sick leave, and not to return to Korea."—G. Detring to H. F. Merrill, Sept. 13th, 1888.

In Sept. 1893 an imperial edict appointed Yuen taotai at Wenchow, a promotion since a taotaihip was in the official hierarchy of China, while his post of Resident led of itself to nothing and carried with it no extra-official emoluments; his successor at Seoul even was named, but the change was not carried out. Cf. North-China Herald, Jan. 5th, 1894.

[60] No correspondence with the American legation in Korea was included in the U. S. Dec. R. L. from 1889 to 1893 inclusive.

Russian plans, though in abeyance, still lurked in the background, even up to the outbreak of the war. Cf. North-China Herald, Jan. 5th, March 30th, June 29th, 1894.

ment of war. Both sides were confident of the result: China, that she could maintain her ancient suzerainty, substituting for its passive exercise a more active interference in Korean affairs; Japan, that she could expel China from Korea, and could establish herself there as the predominant power. With guns fully loaded, a spark at the touch-hole was all that was needed to bring about a settlement of the status of Korea.

§ 25. On March 18th, 1894, the legations at Seoul were informed that "the Tonghak were coming, many tens of thousands strong, and that an article of their creed was the expulsion of foreigners." [61] The Tonghak ["Society of] Eastern Learning" (the Orient for Orientals, Korea for Koreans), was a society founded in 1859, somewhat on the lines of the Triad Society of China, or of the Taiping outbreak, with a creed composed of the elements common to the Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist cults; and, as it demanded innovations its members were naturally persecuted wherever found. A delegation of the society came to the palace gates on March 29th, and waited there patiently until, on the 31st, a hearing of their petition was denied. During the following days anti-foreign placards appeared. [62] Yuen Shih-kai at once informed the legations that two Chinese men-of-war were on their way, and accepted full "responsibility for the safety of foreigners and foreign property." [63] The Japanese residents were warned by their consul that the situation was full of danger for their families, as special anti-Japanese placards had appeared. [64] For some time the rumours of impending trouble were not verified, but in May it was reported that large bodies of Tonghak men were assembled in the southern provinces in revolt, bearing an ensign inscribed "Down with the Japanese and all foreigners." Troops sent against them were defeated, and the revolt seemed likely to develop into a serious rebellion [65]; but the political situation was obscure—

[61] Mr. Augustine Heard to Mr. Gresham, Seoul, April 4th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 5.

[62] Ibid.

[63] Ibid., April 7th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 10.

[64] Ibid., April 20th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 10.

[65] Ibid., May 16th; Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Seoul, May 17th, June 1st, 1894; *ibid.*, pp. 16, 17, 18.

"The whole [movement] may be, and probably is, under the control of a political party, bent on making trouble for the government, but who this party is, and what its strength, we have as yet no knowledge." [66] China's interest lay chiefly in causing no trouble to the Korean government, and such political aims as there were in the Tonghak movement may fairly be said to have been in the interest of Japan.

§ 26. In the same month of March occurred another act of oriental intrigue. The leader in the riot and *coup d'état* of December, 1884, [67] was Kim Ok-kiun. When China re-established a semblance of her old authority over the Korean court, he fled to Japan for shelter and remained there for nine years, during which time at least one attempt to assassinate him was made. In March, 1894, he was "decoyed" to Shanghai, arriving there on the 27th, in the company of Hong Cheong-wu, a Korean of the Young Korea party, who had been educated in Paris, Wu Po-jen, interpreter to the Chinese legation in Tokyo, and a Japanese servant. The next day, March 28th, Kim Ok-kiun was murdered by Hong Cheong-wu in a Japanese hotel in the American settlement at Shanghai. Simultaneously at Tokyo another Korean refugee, Po Cheng-siu, informed the Japanese police of a plot against his life by a Korean, named Li Tsi-che; the accused man fled for shelter to the Korean legation; from which he was forcibly taken by the Japanese police. At Shanghai the murderer Hong Cheong-wu fled to Wusung where he was arrested by the Shanghai municipal police, by whom he was handed to the Chinese authorities for trial. He, together with the body of his victim, were then sent in a Chinese ship-of-war to Koréa, a request to that effect having come from the Korean king, and arrived at Chemulpo on April 12th. The body of Kim Ok-kiun was covered with a cloth inscribed "Ok-kiun, arch rebel and heretic," and on the 14th it was decapitated and quartered, the head being exposed at Seoul, while the quarters, again subdivided, were sent to the eight provinces. Hong Cheong-wu was conducted in all honour to Seoul, and was there set at liberty. [68]

[66] Mr. Heard to Mr. Gresham, May 16th, 1894, ubi sup.

[67] Cf. ante, § 15.

[68] Cordier, "Relations," iii, p. 228; Mr. Allen to Mr. Gresham, Seoul, April 6th, 17th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., App. i, p. 16. Mr. Allen had

If the Tonghak movement might be considered as adverse to the interests of China, the murder of Kim Ok-kiun and the course subsequently followed must be considered a challenge to Japan.

§ 27. This murder and the subsequent treatment of the murderer and of Kim Ok-kiun's body excited a profound sensation in Japan, but it gave rise to no direct action by that country; but the successes of the Tonghak rebels, continued through May, caused the Korean government to appeal to the suzerain power. Yuen Shih-kai in May urged intervention; but Li Hung-chang "insisted on an express request for assistance from the king of Korea, so that the responsibility for the movement should rest upon him." The appeal came and, in response to it, 1500 Chinese troops were on June 6th despatched from Tientsin on steamers to Yashan (Asan), 725 more following shortly after, and three additional war-ships were sent to Chemulpo. "The viceroy has formally assured the Japanese government that these troops shall be withdrawn immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, and he has made the same assurances to the Russian minister [at Peking]. He has also stated to Japan that he would be pleased to have that government send one or two gunboats to Korea to protect its subjects there." [69] Japan took corresponding action. On June 10th 500 Japanese marines came to Seoul; on June 13th a force of 1000 soldiers arrived in Seoul; on June 16th a further body of 3000 soldiers landed at Chemulpo; and it was "reported [in Seoul] that Japan is sending large numbers of troops to Fusan and Wönsan." [70] Meantime, before the arrival of these troops, Chinese or Japanese, the Korean forces had defeated the Tonghak rebels and captured their leaders [71]; but the rival forces remained watching each other.

§ 28. China, in her action, had conformed exactly to her obligations as suzerain, and to the requirements of

requested the American consul at Shanghai to deliver the murderer to the Korean authorities, for which the State Department very properly rebuked him.—Mr. Uhl to Mr. Sill, Washington, May 31st, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 18.

[69] Mr. C. Denby, Jr., to Mr. Gresham, Peking, June 9th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 20.

[70] Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Seoul, June 18th, 1894, *ibid.*

[71] *Ibid.*

the Tientsin convention of 1885; Japan stood on the convention and rejected China's claim to suzerainty, as she had rejected it in 1876.[72] In informing the Japanese envoy of the intention to send Chinese troops to Korea, the Tsungli Yamen based its action on the principle that "it is in harmony with our constant practice to protect our tributary states by sending out troops to assist them." The reply, on June 7th, declared that "although the words 'tributary state' appear in your note, the imperial [Japanese] government has never recognised Korea as a state tributary to China"; and this declaration was repeated in a despatch of June 12th—"The imperial Japanese government has never recognised Korea as a state tributary to China." Japan then, on June 17th, proposed joint action by China and Japan in reorganising and reforming the Korean administration. The Chinese reply declared that, on the basis of Korea's dependence on China, the suzerain had not the habit of interfering with the internal affairs of the vassal; but, if Korea were to be considered independent, neither country had a right to interfere. The Japanese government then, on June 22nd, informed China of its intention to undertake the task alone [73]; and, on June 28th, the Japanese envoy at Seoul demanded of the king that he should declare that Korea was an independent state, and not a vassal of China.[74]

§ 29. Of Chinese troops there were now, at the end of June, 3000 at Yashan, and guards of a few hundred at Seoul and Chemulpo. Japan had sent larger numbers; 5000 encamped with batteries around Seoul, and some thousands more at Chemulpo, while large bodies were reported to be entering at Fusan [75]; about 18,000 in all on Korean soil.[76] The representatives at Seoul of the United States, Russia, France and England united in a joint note to those of China and Japan, requesting the "simultaneous withdrawal of Chinese and Japanese troops

[72] Cf. *antea*, § 11.

[73] These despatches cited in H. Norman, "The Peoples and Politics of the Far East," p. 362; also in *North-China Herald*, Nov. 9th, 1894.

[74] Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Seoul, July 2nd, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 28.

[75] Same to same, June 25th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 22.

[76] *Ibid.*, July 18th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 31.

from Korean territory.”[77] Each of the rivals insisted on the other making the first move, though one so normally friendly to Korean independence as the American representative at Seoul reported—“Neither of them will withdraw first; in their presence there is much danger; Chinese are in favour of simultaneous departure; Japanese stubborn; ulterior purpose suspected; she seems to desire war; Korean integrity menaced.”[78] Somewhat later the American representative at Peking telegraphed—“Korean situation critical; hostilities imminent; Chinese government shows conciliatory attitude in spite of aggressive attitude of Japan.”[79] China was during this time soliciting the intervention of the Western powers, which Japan was unwilling to accept.[80]

§ 30. The situation was indeed critical. The national attitude of Japan was reflected in the bearing of her troops then in Korea: before a shot had been fired, they assumed the manner of a conquering host. On July 15th the British consul-general, Mr. C. T. Gardner, while walking on a public road with his wife and two friends, was assaulted twice by Japanese soldiers in uniform, and on the second occasion “recognised some of them as men who had previously assaulted” him; and the redress he looked for was not accorded.[81] It was not as conqueror, however, so she declared, that Japan had come, but as a friend; and the Japanese representative laid before the king’s council a scheme of reorganisation under twenty-six heads, of which it is enough to say that one head, under the category “to be decided and put into operation within ten days,” provided for the making of roads, and the construction of railways and telegraphs. Working by diplomatic methods proving too slow, “the Japanese forces broke into and took possession of the royal palace” at 4 a.m. on July 23rd, carried off the queen and her children prisoners to the Japanese legation, and appointed, as regent over the

[77] Joint note, June 25th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 23.

[78] Mr. Sill to Mr. Uhl, telegram, June 24th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 22.

[79] Mr. Denby, Jr., to Mr. Gresham, tel., July 3rd, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 30.

[80] Same to same, July 6th, 8th; Mr. Gresham to Mr. Bayard (ambassador at London), July 20th; Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Seoul, Oct. 12th, 1894; *ibid.*, pp. 30, 36, 72.

[81] Mr. Gardner to Mr. Otori, July 15; Mr. Otori to Mr. Gardner, July 17th, 1894; *ibid.*, p. 33.



king, the aged Tai-wen-kün, the king's father, then in his eightieth year. On the 27th the regent declared war on his suzerain and called upon the Japanese to expel the Chinese troops from the kingdom.[82]

§ 31. China had in Korea only a weak force at Yashan, a small town, south of Chemulpo, at the head of Prince Jerome Gulf; reinforcements, which left the Peiho in two steamers on July 21st, brought them up to about 4500. A third ship, the British steamer *Kowshing*, chartered for the purpose, left Taku at 10 a.m. on July 23rd, with 1220 men and 12 guns, arrived in the gulf on the morning of the 25th, and was there met by the Japanese squadron. A boat from the cruiser *Naniwa* came alongside and the ship's papers were examined, and some hesitation was then shown as to the best way to deal with a ship which, while serving as a hostile transport, was rightly flying a neutral flag and claimed to have left port before a declaration of war. The *Naniwa* then signalled "follow me"; but meantime the troops on board, in a panic, had mutinied and declared their intention to resist, and they refused to allow the non-combatants on board to obey an order to "leave the ship." On this the *Naniwa* raised the red flag, and then discharged a torpedo, which missed, and then opened fire with all her guns. The *Kowshing* went down in less than half-an-hour, and of the 1300 on board, about 170 escaped by swimming ashore, including Major C. von Hanneken, military instructor to the Chinese army; and the master, Captain Galsworthy, and the first officer, Mr. Tamplin, with some Chinese, were rescued by boats from the *Naniwa*. The Japanese fired on the swimmers in the water.[83] The British Foreign Office decided that war had already broken out at 4 a.m. on July 23rd, by the Japanese invasion of the royal palace at Seoul; accepting this decision, it must also be accepted that the Japanese were within their rights in sinking a transport on which enemy troops refused to surrender.

§ 32. Leaving a brigade to cover Seoul and Chemulpo, General Oshina, with the 5th Division of 13,500 men

[82] Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, July 24th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 40; Cordier, "Rélations," iii, p. 235.

[83] Sworn statement of C. von Hanneken, U. S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 45; Note of Protest of Capt. Galsworthy and Mr. Tamplin, Aug. 17th, in North-China Herald, Aug. 24th, 1894.

and the 9th Brigade of mixed troops, a force of about 20,000 of all arms, marched against the Chinese under General Yeh at Yashan: he struck them at daybreak on July 29th, and, after a battle of five hours, obtained a complete victory; the Chinese lost 500 (the Japanese put it at 1200) killed and wounded, and four guns, and the Japanese 75.[84] The remnants of the Chinese force joined the main body at Pingyang, surrendering to the Japanese the whole of Korea from Seoul to the south. The issue was joined. A declaration of the causes of the war was at once, on August 1st, made by both China and Japan.[85]

[84] Cordier, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

[85] Text of Chinese decree in Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Peking, Aug. 5th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 53; text of Japanese decree in Nagao, "La Guerre Sino-Japonaise," p. 20.

## CHAPTER II

### THE WAR WITH JAPAN

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§ 1. ON the cut-and-dried lines of Western practice, China must be considered to have failed in her duty to Korea. She was the suzerain power, and as such was bound to protect her vassal from external aggression and internal disorder. This duty she never renounced; but the Chinese empire had been unable to protect its own domain from external aggression, and had for forty years been the prey of internal disorder; and the emperor was not able to give to Korea what he could not secure for his own dominions. The Chinese policy in Korea, repeatedly expressed, was, nominally, to give this protection, but in all other respects to interfere as little as possible in the administration of the kingdom; and, wisely or unwisely, this policy of non-interference was carried so far that Korea was left free to make her own treaty arrangements with foreign powers. In the same spirit China decided that "reform" must not be imposed on Korea by superior force. The administration of Korea was probably the most corrupt in the world, and a larger proportion of its population were pensioners of the government than in any other country; but any incitement to reform would have come with a bad grace from the suzerain empire, of which the administration was honeycombed with speculation, and the resources of which seemed to exist for little more than the maintenance of the officials. Coupled with the policy of protection and non-interference, China had the resolve to maintain Korea as a buffer state; Liuchiu, Annam, Siam and, in effect, Burma had, one after the other, renounced her suzerainty; now only Korea remained to keep Russia and Japan at arm's length.

§ 2. China made some mistakes in her Korean policy at first; but after Korean affairs had been placed in the hands of Li Hung-chang, and from the time when he had recognised his first false step and had replaced Mr. von Möllendorff by Mr. Merrill, the mistakes were fewer.[1] The East must not be judged by the principles of the West; it must be recognised that Chinese statesmen are opportunists, and are seldom able to follow a consistent policy; and care must be taken not to be led astray by

[1]. "Nothing could have been more correct of late years than the attitude of the viceroy Li and the resident Yuen towards both Japan and Russia."—Editorial, North-China Herald, June 22nd, 1894.

the inherent merits of "reform." With this proviso it may be said that the viceroy's course in Korean affairs was wise; Yuen Shih-kai had long wished to force an issue, but he was restrained by his superior. When, on the outbreak of the Tonghak rebellion, Chinese troops were sent to maintain order, due notice was given to Japan as required by the convention of 1885; and when the rival forces were face to face in Korea, China consented to simultaneous withdrawal, which was refused by Japan. China asked only that the *status quo* should be maintained; and, to maintain it, was driven to fight, though much against her wish.

§ 3. Japan showed no such reluctance. Of a fighting race, her soldiers in Korea showed the spirit which animated the nation, even before the outbreak of hostilities [2]; and this spirit reflected the intentions of the government.[3] Her one reasonable cause for going to war was the refusal of China to co-operate in imposing reforms on the Korean government. Japan had herself remodelled her own administration, but that gave no valid ground for requiring another and more backward nation to accept over-night a complete transformation of the fabric of government. Moreover Japan was estopped by her own action: in the Japan-Korean treaty of 1876 Japan had imposed on Korea the assertion that Korea was an independent state; and at no time, surely, in the history of the world have such drastic reforms been imposed on an independent state. The reform of Korea was, however, only a pretext. Japan was resolved on aggressive action in order to establish her position among the nations, and, specifically, to transfer from China to herself the predominant position in Korea. Before the war broke out a statement of some significance was made by a leader among the Japanese statesmen, Count Okuma, who was head of the Treasury from 1873 to 1881, was minister of Foreign Affairs in 1888 and again in 1896, and in 1894 was leader of the opposition which was pushing the government into war. He declared—"The time has at last arrived for Japan to wipe out the

[2] Cf. chap. i, § 30.

[3] "To escape a conflagration at home, she [Japan] steps jauntily forward to invite a veritable holocaust abroad."—Corresp. from Japan, in North-China Herald, July 20th, 1894.

disgrace of 1884. . . . By making a judicious use of the present unique opportunity, it will be possible for the Japanese government to retrieve all past errors, and make the empire respected and feared, not only by Korea, but also by the rest of the world.”[4] When the war was actually impending, a Japanese diplomatic representative in Europe stated—“This at least I can tell you for certain, we neither can nor will leave Korea again until our aim has been attained in one way or another. We are fighting in Korea for our own future—I might also say for our independence. Once let Korea fall into the hands of a European power, and our independence will be threatened.”[5] The motives of Japan in Korea were those influencing Edward III in Aquitaine, Friedrich II in Silesia, and Napoleon in Italy and Spain.

§ 4. A special reason moving Japan to take action against China at this particular moment is to be found in the problems of extraterritoriality. Western powers have generally, during the nineteenth century, claimed this exceptional privilege [6] for their subjects commorant in independent oriental states—Turkey, Persia, Siam, China, Japan, etc.; but for some time Japan had been restive in this position of subordination, and had since 1886 been taking diplomatic steps to have the privilege abrogated. These efforts were finally successful; and, on July 16th, 1894, a treaty between England and Japan was signed at London, providing for the abolition of extraterritoriality, and for a moderate increase in the customs tariff of duties; *per contra* British subjects were to be permitted to travel and trade freely throughout Japan, and no longer to be restricted to the treaty ports. The new tariff was to come into force at once, and the other provisions after five years.[7] This treaty was signed, it should be noted, at a time when it was generally thought that Japan could not possibly succeed in her enterprise against China. Similar proposals had been made to

[4] Count Okuma in *Hochi Shimbun* (a newspaper which was his official organ), cited in *North-China Herald*, June 29th, 1894.

[5] *Kölnischer Zeitung*, July 25th, from its London correspondent, cited in *ibid.*, Sept. 7th, 1894.

[6] Cf. H. B. Morse, “The Trade and Administration of China,” chap. vii, “Extraterritoriality.”

[7] Text of treaty in *North-China Herald*, Sept. 14th, 1894.

America, France, Russia, and Germany, but all except the first made technical objections.[8] The United States was ready to follow the English lead, and a treaty to the same effect was signed at Washington on November 22nd, 1894; and the other Western powers then acceded; in all these treaties the abolition of extraterritoriality and the grant of free movement were deferred until 1899. In her greatly improved position among nations, it was, however, important to Japan that the privilege of extraterritoriality should be claimed for Japanese subjects in China and should be denied to Chinese in Japan, and that Japan should be able to demand free movement for her own subjects in China and deny it to Chinese in Japan. This could only be attained by Japan if she could take her place alongside the nations of the West, and success in a war with China was the only way to accomplish this end.

§ 5. The war disturbed the calculations of all the Western powers. Russia made the first move alone. Early in July the *Novoe Vremya* declared in an inspired article that "Russia must uphold the autonomy of Korea, and, if Japan attempts to uphold her supremacy, Russia will establish a Russo-Chinese protectorate." [9] Nothing more was heard of this move. China, desirous of avoiding war, appealed to the powers. Their representatives at Seoul had, on June 25th, urged simultaneous withdrawal of the Chinese and Japanese troops in Korea [10]; and, on July 8th, the viceroy Li Hung-chang requested the good offices of the American government, [11] and the British Foreign Office asked if that government would co-operate [12] in the same object. The American Secretary of State declined to intervene—"this government cannot join another power even in a friendly intervention"—but he suggested arbitration of the questions at issue. [13]

§ 6. On the approach of war, the status of Shanghai was a matter of concern to the commercial nations. On July 23rd the Taotai informed the consuls of his "intention

[8] Hinckley, "American Consular Jurisdiction in the Orient," p. 187.

[9] Telegram, London, July 10th, North-China Herald, July 13th, 1894.

[10] Cf. chap. i. § 29.

[11] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, July 8th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 30.

[12] Mr. Gresham to Mr. Bayard, July 20th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 36.

[13] *Ibid.*

to take measures, if it became necessary, to block the Wusung bar." There were general protests against this threat to stop the entire trade of this port, of which the direct foreign trade in 1894 was valued at Tls. 155,083,750 [14]; and the British representative at Tokyo obtained from the Japanese government an undertaking to "regard Shanghai as outside the sphere of its warlike operations." [15] The Wusung bar was, notwithstanding, partially blocked, [16] and, in a panic, the Chinese constructed barriers across the approaches to other ports—Canton, Foochow, Ningpo, etc. The Japanese authorities soon repented their decision to respect Shanghai, and for this there was good cause: the principal Chinese arsenal was there, and the port was freely used to ship munitions of war, supplies, and even troops; but, though "the Japanese government has shown a decided inclination to withdraw from the promise that Shanghai would not be attacked," no immediate action was taken by Japan. The American government intervened in conjunction with England and France. [17] The agitation continued, however, in the Japanese press, and, in January, the British admiral was instructed "to use what means he deems necessary to ensure the proper observance" of the neutrality agreement. [18]

§ 7. The Chinese were much stirred over the sinking of the *Kowshing*, which they characterised as an act of barbarity, committed without warning in time of peace. On the declaration of war the Japanese residents in Peking and Tientsin were taken on the British steamer *Chunking*, and she proceeded to Tangku, at the mouth of the river, to await the staffs of the legation and consulate. There, at 1 a.m. on August 2nd, she was raided by a mob of Chinese soldiers, without uniform but armed, crying, "*Kowshing, Kowshing*," and the Japanese on board were robbed and hustled about. [19] The Chinese authorities for a long time evaded their responsibility; but finally,

[14] This was 53 per cent. of the entire foreign trade of China in 1894.

[15] North-China Herald, July 27th, 1894; Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Aug. 6th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 54.

[16] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, *ubi sup.*

[17] Same to same, Sept. 15th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 58.

[18] North-China Herald, Jan. 11th, 1895.

[19] *Ibid.*, Aug. 10th, 1894.



on November 14th, on the insistent demand of the British envoy, Mr. N. O'Connor, the steamer, with the British ensign at the fore, received a salute of twenty-one guns from the Taku forts as a recognition of the wrong committed.

§ 8. Of the Chinese force at Yashan, a portion left the camp before the action of July 29th, and joined the Chinese army of Korea at Pingyang, mid-way from Seoul to the Yalu. From this point the army reached out in the direction of Seoul, but, one after the other, the outposts were driven in. In September it was stated that, with estimates ranging from 20,000 to 108,000, the Chinese force at Pingyang probably numbered 40,000, and that the Japanese troops in Korea numbered about 80,000 [20]; a more precise calculation gives 14,500 as the actual number of Chinese troops brought into action at Pingyang.[21] Three Japanese columns converged on Pingyang; one of these columns made a premature attack on September 15th, and was repulsed after a combat lasting twelve hours. The next day the attack was renewed, and, after a struggle of some hours, the Chinese were completely routed; their loss was 6,600 and that of the Japanese was declared to have been 632. Only one of the Chinese generals, Tso Pao-kwei, showed any personal courage, and none manifested any capacity for leadership; one, General Yeh, with his force from Yashan, wished to raise the white flag on the evening of the first day. The Chinese soldiers behaved no better than their leaders; those who made some stand were thereby made late in retreating, and suffered heavy loss. The Japanese occupied Pingyang, and the remnants of the Chinese force hastened to withdraw across the Yalu.

§ 9. Meantime the main Chinese army was forming along the Yalu, and troops and supplies were despatched to Tatungkow, at the mouth of that river. The transports carrying them were convoyed by the Peiyang squadron, China's only effective fleet, under the command of Admiral Ting Ju-chang. He had been in supreme command since 1880, and, under the tutelage of Vice-Admiral W. M. Lang (captain R.N., "lent" by the British Admiralty for the

[20] Mr. Sill to Mr. Gresham, Sept. 17th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894; App. i, p. 59.

[21] Cordier, "Relations," iii, p. 246.

purpose), had brought it to a relatively high degree of efficiency. With Admiral Ting on this occasion were several foreigners, including Messrs. von Hanneken, W. F. Tyler, McGiffin and others; and under his command were two iron-clad battle-ships, and ten unarmoured cruisers, a total of twelve ships of 35,070 tons, besides four torpedo-boats. At noon on September 17th the Japanese fleet under Admiral Ito Sukenori came into sight off the mouth of the Yalu; under his command were twelve ships of about 40,000 tons. The Chinese were strong in the two battle-ships, but the Japanese fleet was more homogeneous, and had the advantage in speed and in the number of quick-firing guns. The first shot was fired at 12.45, and the battle continued until 5 p.m., when both fleets were short of ammunition. On the Japanese side 239 were killed and wounded; and on the Chinese about 600, including those drowned; among the wounded was the Chinese admiral. The Japanese flagship was seriously injured; four Chinese ships were sunk or driven on shore, and one turned tail and ran out of the action. The tactical victory at the Battle of the Yalu (or of Haiyang) remained in a sense with the two Chinese battle-ships; for it was the Japanese fleet which withdrew at night-fall, and the Chinese transports discharged their troops and supplies; but from that day the mastery of the sea remained with the Japanese.[22]

§ 10. The result of these two battles produced a great effect on China. Before this the ruling powers could make light of the war, and go on with their preparations for a fitting celebration of the empress dowager's sixtieth birthday [23]; but now all was alarm. An act of justice was first performed in the decapitation of Captain Fang of the small cruiser *Tsiyuen*, who had shown the white feather once on the day the *Kowshing* was sunk, and a second time at the Yalu. The perturbation of mind in the nation was manifested against Li Hung-chang and his family and protégés. The ammunition of the fleet was proved, by the

[22] Cordier, op. cit., p. 248; Inouyé Jukichi, "The Battle of Haiyang"; North-China Herald, Sept. 21st, Oct. 5th, 1894, Jan. 18th, 1895.

[23] "The fates are not precisely smiling on the Empress Dowager's birthday preparations, and, if Japan undertakes a march on Peking, I doubt if there will be any celebration; of course the Court ignores the war ostensibly and lives its life as usual."—E. Hart to H. Kopsch, Aug. 17th, 1894.

test of battle, to be defective; for this the viceroy's son-in-law, Chang Pei-lun, and his nephew, both holding important posts in the ordnance department, were cashiered and sent to trial for peculation. The viceroy himself was held accountable for the outbreak of the war, for its conduct, and for its unsuccessful prosecution, and against him now rose the host of enemies he had inevitably made in twenty-five years of masterful rule as viceroy and as Grand Secretary; he was, however, still left in his office and in possession of his titles, but he was admonished of his errors and deprived of his two highest decorations, the "yellow riding-jacket" which he had received for services in the Taiping rebellion, and the "three-eyed peacock's feather" granted for the campaign against the Nienfei.[24] In the nation the feelings of the people were shown by many hostile manifestations against foreigners at the ports; and at Peking the Chinese attitude was considered so threatening that the married members of the customs Inspectorate staff were replaced by unmarried men, in wise precaution against what the winter might bring about.[25]

§ 11. China now made a second attempt to obtain the intervention of the Western powers to secure peace on the basis "that the independence of Korea should be guaranteed by the powers, and that Japan should receive an indemnity for the expense of the war." On October 6th this proposal was submitted by the British Foreign Office to the American, French, German and Russian governments; the American government replied that "the president can not join England, Germany, Russia and France in an intervention as requested"; and, after it had been pointed out that "the intervention contemplated would be limited to diplomatic action," the proposal was dropped.[26]

§ 12. After the occupation of Pingyang the Japanese forces advanced and, by September 30th, had cleared Korea as far as the Yalu. The crossing of that river was

[24] Imp. decree Sept. 17th, 1894, in Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Sept. 18th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 61.

[25] North-China Herald, Oct. 12th, 1894.

[26] Mr. Goschen to Mr. Gresham, Oct. 6th; Mr. Gresham to Mr. Goschen, Oct. 12th; Mr. Goschen to Mr. Gresham, Oct. 14th, 1894; U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 70.

effected on October 24th, and the Chinese troops were forced back to Kiuliencheng, and thence two days later to Fenghwangcheng, and thence to Motienling, a mountain range which was forced by the Japanese after a fairly obstinate defence. The two armies again met at Hsümencheng, ten miles south-east of Haicheng, on December 11th, and, after a battle lasting two days, the Chinese were again defeated. The invading force then took Haicheng. Meantime, on October 24th, a second Japanese army under Count Oyama landed at Pitzewo, to the north-east of Port Arthur, scornfully disregarding the fortress and the Chinese fleet; on November 6th it occupied Talienswan (later, in succession, Dalny and Dairen), and completed the investment of Port Arthur.

§ 13. The alarm felt at Peking was greater than ever. An unprecedented event occurred in the summons to Peking of Mr. (General) von Hanneken and Mr. Detring; the former had at least one audience with the emperor, and both were called to frequent conferences with the ministers of state,[27] and it is certain that by both the actual facts were bluntly declared.[28] The empress dowager's sixtieth birthday, November 7th (10th day of the 10th moon), for the celebration of which an imperial grant of ten million taels had been allocated, passed almost without notice[29]; and already, in October, Prince Kung had been recalled to his former post, charged with the task of "piecing together the cup which the present ministers have smashed to the floor." [30] On November 3rd he appealed to the American government, by virtue of the treaty of Tientsin (art. i), to solicit its good offices in intervening between China and Japan [31]; and the next day he summoned a conference of the American, British, German, French and Russian envoys to ask the

[27] Tel., Tientsin, Oct. 29th, North-China Herald, Nov. 2nd; Peking corresp., Nov. 8th, *ibid*, Nov. 16th, 1894.

[28] From his acquaintance with both, the author does not hesitate to assert this.

[29] "There were no public rejoicings or fêtes of any kind."—Peking corresp. North-China Herald, *ubi sup*.

[30] Prince Kung's own phrase, cited in Peking corresp., Oct. 27th, *ibid*, Nov. 9th, 1894.

[31] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, tel., Nov. 3rd, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 73. Mr. Charles Denby, senior, had now returned to his post as American envoy at Peking.

joint intervention of their governments ; the proposal in each case was to take as the basis of negotiation the independence of Korea and an indemnity to Japan.[32] England was willing, but would not again take the initiative ; Russia and France were willing ; Germany considered intervention useless at present.[33] Before receiving this request the American government had inquired if its intervention would be acceptable to both China and Japan [34] ; and after its receipt, its envoy at Peking was informed that, " while the president prefers to act alone, he will not decline request to act jointly with other powers simply in determining amount of indemnity if Japan's consent is obtained." [35] The Japanese government declined all proposals for intervention—" The imperial [Japanese] government have no wish to press their victories beyond the limits which will guarantee to them the just and reasonable fruits of the war ; these limits cannot, however, be said to have been reached until China finds herself in a position to approach Japan directly on the subject of peace." [36]

§ 14. The Chinese fleet, after the battle of the Yalu, had proceeded without further molestation to Port Arthur, and went thence to Weihaiwei, taking no share in the defence of Port Arthur. Upon the occupation of Talienwan, General Sung led a force of 8,000 Chinese troops south from Motienling to harass the Japanese ; arriving at Kinchow, he attacked the enemy on November 21st and was defeated. The defence of Port Arthur (Lüshunkow) was directed by General Wei Ju-cheng, commanding the best-trained division of China's best army ; but the measures adopted by him were no more effective than the rest of the Chinese conduct of this campaign, and the final assault, delivered on November 21st, gave to the Japanese full possession of fortress, port and town. This victory was sullied by a massacre of many Chinese, the number of those killed after

[32] Same to same, Nov. 4th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 74.

[33] Tel. London, Nov. 6th, 10th, in *North-China Herald*, Nov. 9th, 16th, 1894.

[34] Mr. Gresham to Mr. Denby and Mr. Dun [Tokyo], tel., Nov. 6th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 76.

[35] Mr. Gresham to Mr. Denby, Nov. 8th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 77.

[36] Note verbale, Tokyo, Nov. 17th, in Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Nov. 29th, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 79.

the occupation being put by some as high as two thousand. The massacre occurred, though its extent is denied; it is explained by the uncontrollable fury of the Japanese assaulting forces when they came across the mutilated bodies and detached heads of their comrades who had been taken prisoners, and by the general custom of Chinese soldiers in defeat of throwing off their loose uniform coats and appearing in the ordinary undress garb of the rustic labourer.[37] It was undoubtedly true that "a great many more Chinese have been killed than there was any real need for"[38]; but it is at least supposable that, in the heat of a contested assault and under the same provocation, the soldiery of most other nations might have acted in the same way.

§ 15. Meantime two independent attempts at negotiation had been initiated, which crossed and interfered with each other. On November 17th the Japanese government informed the American government that it "requests in the event of China desiring to approach Japan upon the subject of peace it shall be done through the legation of the United States at Peking." [39] The American envoy at Peking thereupon telegraphed—"Yesterday [November 22nd] China made through me direct overtures to Japan for peace: basis, independence Korea; war indemnity." [40] A day or two before this step was taken, and at least five days before it was known in Peking, an imperial decree, in answer to a memorial from Li Hung-chang, directed the viceroy to despatch Mr. G. Detring to Japan to request a suspension of hostilities and to ask on what conditions Japan would consent to make peace.[41] Mr. Detring arrived at Kobe on November 26th and was informed that, "as he was not properly accredited by the

[37] Mr. James Creelman, tel. Yokohama, Dec. 11th, to New York World; Nagao, "La Guerre Sino-Japonaise," pp. 80, 83 seq.; explanation by Viscount Mutsu in Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Dec. 20th; Lieut. M. J. O'Brien [U.S. military attaché] to Mr. Dun, Dec. 28th, 1894, in Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Jan. 7th, 1895; U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, pp. 85, 88.

[38] Lieut. O'Brien's words, Dec. 3rd, in Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Dec. 29th, 1894, *ubi sup.*

[39] Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Nov. 17th; Mr. Gresham to Mr. Denby, Nov. 19th; same to Mr. Yang Yü, Nov. 20th, 1894; *ibid.*, p. 80.

[40] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Nov. 23rd, 1894, *ibid.*, p. 81.

[41] Li Hung-chang to Count Ito, Nov. 18th, 1894, in Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Jan. 14th, 1895, *ibid.*, p. 92; North-China Herald, Nov. 30th, Dec. 7th, 28th, 1894.

government of China, he could not be received or recognised in any way.”[42] Mr. Detring was, in fact and in form, an envoy commissioned by Li Hung-chang and “was not clothed with the power of a plenipotentiary.”[43] In any case, immediately on reporting his arrival at Kobe, Mr. Detring was recalled by a telegram from Prince Kung, who was then (November 26th) basing his hopes on the American intervention.[44] But this too fell through owing to the doubts suggested to the Japanese by the informality of Mr. Detring’s mission.

§ 16. The Chinese court manifested its alarm at the fall of Port Arthur in other ways as well. On December 22nd an imperial decree allowed three of the generals to retrieve their conduct; they were deprived of rank and titles, and permitted to remain with the army, but “if they show cowardice in the future Sungking [the general commanding] is ordered . . . to behead these three men at once in accordance with martial law.”[45] A decree of December 26th rejected the application of Fuyü, the civil governor designate of Mukden, to resign; and another of the same date transferred the supreme command from Li Hung-chang to Liu Kun-yi, then viceroy at Nanking.[46] The latter evaded compliance with this order, and on February 19th Wang Wen-shao assumed the office of viceroy at Tientsin. A decree of December 27th ordered that Admiral Ting Ju-chang, the Taotai Kung Chao-yü [in civil command at Port Arthur], and General Wei Ju-chang [in military command there] be sent for trial; the first was not brought to trial, General Wei was cashiered, and the Taotai Kung was condemned to decapitation, but the execution of his sentence was deferred.[47] The general’s brother, Wei Ju-kwei, who commanded a division of the Peiyang army and had been in the battle of Pingyang, was decapitated on January 17th, 1895.[48] In short the court and the administration were rent by the

[42] Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Dec. 7th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 83.

[43] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Jan. 14th, 1895, *ubi sup.*

[44] North-China Herald, Dec. 28th, 1894.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] *Ibid.*, Jan. 4th, 1895.

[47] *Ibid.*, Jan. 4th, Feb. 22nd, 1895.

[48] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, Jan. 18th, 1895, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 96.

struggle between the supporters and the enemies of Li Hung-chang, the latter having at this time the upper-hand.[49]

§ 17. The Japanese continued their military progress. Tengchowfu in Shantung was bombarded by ships of war on January 18th, again on the 19th, and again on the 26th.[50] This apparently eccentric movement was carried out with complete disregard of the Chinese fleet, which had been shut in Weihaiwei by a belt of contact mines, laid by the Chinese for the protection of the port; and it was, presumably, designed to distract attention from another movement a hundred miles further east. On January 20th a force of 20,000 Japanese troops, with 10,000 transport coolies, under Marshal Kuroda, landed at Yungcheng Bay on the south side of the Shantung North-east Promontory, about thirty miles east of Weihaiwei. After taking the city of Yungcheng, they advanced to the siege of the fortress, where, under the shelter of its guns, lay the Chinese fleet. The government had decided that this fleet should not go out and fight. Its ammunition had not been suitably replenished and the experience of the Yalu battle had indicated the hopelessness of another attempt against the better organised Japanese. The hope lay in the success of the peace proposals now being made and the possibility that thereby China might be allowed to retain what remained of her fleet; but in this hope the Chinese were disappointed. The forts lining the south shore of the harbour were attacked on January 26th. The resistance by the Chinese soldiers, who were disheartened and short of pay, was negligible. That these mainland forts would fall an easy prey to the Japanese was known to Admiral Ting, and arrangements were made by means of parties of naval men to blow up the magazines and destroy the guns as soon as possession by the Japanese was imminent. These arrangements were successful as far as they went, but spare parts brought by the Japanese from Port Arthur soon put some of the guns in order and they commenced a bombardment of the Island of Liukung-tao by these guns, as well as by the Japanese fleet. One Chinese vessel was sunk by gunfire and several others,

[49] North-China Herald, Jan. 25th, 1895.

[50] Ibid., Feb. 1st, 8th, 1895.



including the flagship, the *Tingyueh*, by torpedo boats which managed to get inside the defences. Surrender was inevitable. Admiral Ting Ju-chang handed over command of the fleet to his second in command, Liu Pu-chin, and committed suicide; the latter transferred the command to the third, and also committed suicide; on Liukungtao, the general commanding the forts, Chang Ta-san, and his second, General Tai, also committed suicide; in this way they redeemed their reputation from that of poltroon to that of hero,[51] and saved themselves from decapitation and their families from death and confiscation of their estates.[52] What was left of the fortress surrendered on February 12th, together with one iron-clad and four cruisers. One iron-clad and four cruisers had been sunk in the torpedo-boat attack.[53]

§ 18. Before the beginning of the advance on Weihaiwei China launched another peace mission, to make good the failure of the Detring mission of inquiry and of the American intervention. An imperial edict of December 21st appointed Chang Yin-hwan and Shao Yu-lien joint ambassadors "to inquire what terms Japan will demand to bring the present war to an end." The former was at one time envoy to America, Spain and Peru, and was now senior vice-president of the Ministry of Revenue; the latter had once been chargé d'affaires at St. Petersburg, and on the outbreak of the war was governor of Formosa. In this capacity the latter was charged with the defence of the island, having under his command upwards of 50,000 troops; and, to incite his troops to action, he issued a proclamation offering a money reward for the destruction of enemy ships and for the heads of enemy officers and soldiers.[54] A gentleman and a learned

[51] Cf. "Conflict," chap. x, § 36.


[52] "The Chinese officials [at Shanghai] and others stoutly maintain their disbelief of the news of Admiral Ting's surrender to the Japanese, declaring that it is impossible that he would risk the lives of so many people belonging to his own family and the families of the officers under him, who would be surely put to death in that case . . . but even the Chinese government . . . would not dare to carry into effect the cruel law of the country."—North-China Herald, Feb. 15th, 1895.

[53] North-China Herald, Feb. 8th, 15th, 22nd, March 15th, 1895.

[54] Text of Proclamation in Mr. C. Denby, Jr., to Mr. Gresham, Sept. 6th, 1894, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 57.



ADMIRAL TING JU-CHANG.



scholar, with a quiet and courteous manner, he but followed the immemorial custom of China in entering on a war [55]; he could see nothing wrong in his action, but it was an anachronism, and it was condemned by the entire Western world. To include him in the peace mission was a stupid blunder of the Chinese administration, and it was fully expected that Japan would refuse to receive it on that ground [56]; but Japan was out for bigger game and did not stand on a technicality. The Japanese desire was that China should, before the whole world, own herself defeated, and should give her representative the fullest powers to sue for peace.

§ 19. The two Chinese envoys were conscious that they had no genuine Chinese backing, and that their reception in Japan was likely to be cool. They loitered on their way, under various pretexts, and arrived at Kobe on January 30th, being met there by Mr. J. W. Foster.[57] On the nomination of the mission he had been invited to join it, the invitation stating that "the emperor desires that you should meet the mission in Japan and aid it by your wise counsel" [58]; he acted as legal and diplomatic adviser to this mission and to that which succeeded it; and his acting in that capacity was, as was publicly stated by Count Mutsu, to the entire satisfaction of the Japanese ministers.[59] He was not hopeful of any success; he wrote—"The Japanese are greatly elated over their successes and feel very keenly the contemptuous treatment which China has extended to them in the past, and are inclined to humiliate her as much as possible." [60] He also informed the Chinese envoys that their credentials were not in the form usual among nations, and that, if they were disposed to be critical, the Japanese might deny

[55] Cf. "Conflict," chap. x, § 7; chap. xvi, §§ 13, 18; "Submission," chap. xvii, § 23.

[56] North-China Herald, Jan. 11th, 18th, Feb. 15th, 1895.

[57] John Watson Foster, born 1836, rose to the rank of colonel in the American civil war; was, 1873-85, successively U.S. envoy to Mexico, Russia and Spain; 1893, agent of the U.S. in Bering Sea arbitration; 1898, member of U.S.-Anglo-Canadian commission; 1903, agent of the U.S. in Alaskan Boundary tribunal; in 1892-93 was Secretary of State in President Harrison's cabinet.

[58] Col. Foster received this telegram in Washington on Dec. 23rd, 1894.—J. W. Foster, "Diplomatic Memoirs," ii, p. 102.

[59] Ibid., p. 105.

[60] To his wife, Jan. 22nd, 1895, *ibid.*, p. 112.

their full power to negotiate.[61] The credentials ostensibly appointed the two to be "Our Plenipotentiaries to meet and negotiate with the Plenipotentiaries appointed by Japan"; but with this was coupled an instruction that "You shall, however, telegraph to the Tsungli Yamen and obtain instructions by which you will abide." [62] The Japanese were very much disposed to be critical, and, at the meeting between the two parties on February 2nd, the Chinese envoys were informed that the insufficiency of their powers showed that "it may be taken for granted that the Chinese court is not yet sincere in its wish for peace"; they were further informed that "if China wishes for peace in good faith and sincerity, and invests her envoys with genuine full powers, and sends one whose official rank and high esteem by the public is a sufficient guarantee for the enforcement of the treaty, Japan will not refuse to treat with him." [63] A proposal by the Chinese envoys, made the next day, to reopen negotiations was summarily rejected.[64]

§ 20. The rejection of this plea for peace gave the Japanese time to consolidate their position in Manchuria, and to make further progress there. From their central post at Haicheng they seized Kaichow on January 10th. The Chinese under General Sung Wa-sui then advanced on Haicheng, but were repulsed on February 16th, and driven back on Yingkow, the port of Newchwang. On March 4th the Japanese occupied Liaoyang, the city of Newchwang on the 5th, the port of Yingkow on the 6th, and Tienchwangtai on the 9th; the Chinese forces were driven back one after the other, and there was now nothing between the Japanese and Shanhaikwan. This pass between the mountains and the sea was the last barrier between Manchuria and Chihli, and, this stronghold once in Japanese hands, there was nothing to oppose their march on Tientsin and Peking.

§ 21. On February 15th all the titles and honours of which he had been deprived were restored to Li Hung-

[61] To his wife, Jan. 22nd, 1895, *ibid.*, p. 114.

[62] *North-China Herald*, Feb. 22nd, 1895.

[63] Count Ito's address to Chinese envoys, *ibid.*; Mr. Dun to Mr. Gresham, Feb. 15th, 1895, U.S. For. Rel., 1894, App. i, p. 99.

[64] Foster, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 116.

chang, and he was appointed ambassador extraordinary to negotiate peace with Japan; his viceroyalty and his post of imperial High Commissioner of the Peiyang he handed over, on the 19th, to Wang Wen-shao.[65] Warned by the previous experience, the ambassador telegraphed the text of his credentials to Tokyo through the American legations, and, on March 4th, the Chinese government was notified that their form was acceptable.[66] Japan was now satisfied. China sued for peace by the person of her greatest statesman, who had for many years controlled her foreign policy and negotiated her treaties, and who had sufficient backing at court and in the empire to carry into effect what he might undertake. He left Peking on March 5th and Taku on the 15th,[67] accompanied by Mr. Foster, Li Ching-fang (the viceroy's son, known in England as Lord Li, as being the son of an earl), Lo Feng-loh, Wu Ting-fang, and a suite of 135 persons; of the three Chinese named the first was later appointed associate ambassador, and all three were in a few years to represent their country as envoys abroad. The mission arrived at Shimonoseki on March 19th. The plenipotentiaries for Japan were Count Ito Hirobumi, who had signed the convention of Tientsin in 1885,[68] now Minister President, and Count Mutsu Munemitsu, now Minister for Foreign Affairs.

§ 22. The first meeting was held on March 20th, when the credentials were exchanged and accepted on both sides; the Chinese plenipotentiary then asked for a complete suspension of hostilities. At the meeting of March 21st the Japanese agreed to an armistice, on condition that Shanhaikwan, Taku and Tientsin were surrendered to them, together with the railway connecting the three. As this would place Peking at the mercy of the Japanese forces, it was at once rejected. Count Ito then declared that, in that case, hostilities would be pushed

[65] Tel. Peking, Feb. 15th, 18th, in *North-China Herald*, Feb. 22nd, 1895.

[66] *Ibid.*, March 8th, 1895.

[67] "Our sailing day has been changed from the 15th to the 13th, as the astrologers tell the viceroy the 13th is a more auspicious day. So it has been determined to try to hoodwink the gods by making a pretence of beginning the journey on the 13th, though we shall probably not cross the bar till the 15th or 16th.—Foster, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 127.

[68] Cf. chap. i, § 16.

and an armistice would not again be taken into consideration. The Chinese envoy then asked for an adjournment for three days to allow him to receive instructions from Peking. The third conference was held on March 24th. The Chinese envoy, under instructions, abandoned his proposal for an armistice and asked for a statement of the conditions of peace; these were promised for the next day. Count Ito incidentally mentioned that a Japanese expedition was then on its way to attack Formosa.[69]

§ 23. On the return of the Chinese ambassador from this conference he was fired on by a Japanese patriotic enthusiast, the bullet entering the cheek an inch below the left eye and remaining there inaccessible. Li himself was unmoved and walked quietly from his chair to his room; but he was filled with rage and disposed to charge the Japanese government with responsibility for the act; the staff of the mission was in great apprehension of further attacks; and the Chinese people, with their memories of the *Kowshing* and the Port Arthur massacre, were worked into fury. Western nations joined in reprobating the crime, which "barely escaped being an international catastrophe." [70] Japan was dismayed. [71] The war party in Japan was strong, [72] reluctant to make peace except with important cessions; now, as the Minister of War declared, "the scoundrel has undone the great achievements of the nation." [73] The Japanese emperor sent an imperial rescript expressing his most profound grief and regret [74]; the empress showered attentions on the ambassador; and expressions of sympathy came from all classes of Japanese society. In fact this dastardly attempt benefited China more than a victory in the field.

§ 24. The ambassador continued to conduct the negotiations from his sick-room, to which he was confined for seventeen days, Li Ching-fang being now included in the

[69] Foster, op. cit., ii, p. 129.

[70] Ibid., p. 131.

[71] "Cet attentat était un événement extrêmement funeste. Les regrets les plus sympathiques que la nation entière . . . témoignèrent en cette occasion, furent une manifestation toute spontanée des sentimens innés des Japonais."—Nagao, op. cit., p. 247.

[72] Tel. from Yokohama to London, from London March 22nd, North-China Herald, March 29th, 1895.

[73] Foster, op. cit., ii, p. 135.

[74] Ibid., loc. cit.; Nagao, op. cit., p. 248.

commission. The first result of the assault was the voluntary offer by Japan of an unconditional armistice for Manchuria, Chihli and Shantung for twenty-one days; a convention to this effect was signed on March 30th, and a renewal for twenty-one days on April 17th.[75] A second result was a considerable mitigation in the severity of the conditions imposed; the area of the cession of territory in Manchuria was reduced, the indemnity was diminished by a third, claims for exceptional privileges in the interior of China were abandoned, and the Japanese waived their demand to occupy Mukden, the home of the dynasty, as a material guarantee.[76] After three weeks of negotiation by notes, the treaty of Shimonoseki [77] was signed, on April 17th, in Japanese, Chinese and English, embodying terms which, after all the mitigations, were sufficiently severe even for the helpless condition to which China was reduced.[78]

§ 25. By the treaty China was required to "recognise definitely the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea" [79]; and to "cede to Japan in perpetuity and full sovereignty," (a) that part of Manchuria lying east of the river Liao (Liaotung) and south of a line from the junction of the rivers Anping and Yalu, by Fenghwang-heng and Haicheng, to Yingkow, (b) Formosa, and (c) the Pescadores group.[80] In addition China was to pay an indemnity of 200,000,000 taels [81]; and the Japanese occupation of Weihaiwei was to continue until the indemnity was paid, and until a treaty of commerce was signed and ratified.[82] A satisfactory treaty of commerce was to be negotiated forthwith, and meantime four cities were to be added to the list of treaty ports—Shasi and Chungking on the Yangtze, and Soochow and Hangchow on the Grand Canal—and the direct waterways leading to them were to be open to traffic.[83] The subsidiary treaty of commerce [84] was signed at Peking on July 21st, 1896; it

[75] *Treaties*, ii, pp. 1327, 1330.

[76] *Foster*, op. cit., ii, p. 138.

[77] *Treaties*, ii, p. 1318.

[78] *Foster*, op. cit., ii, pp. 129 seq.; *North-China Herald*, May 31st, June 14th, 21st, 28th, July 5th, 12th, 1895.

[79] Art. i.

[80] Art. ii.

[82] Art. viii.

[84] *Treaties*, ii, p. 1332.

[81] Art. iv.

[83] Art. vi.



embodied all that had been granted to any of the Western powers, including extraterritorial jurisdiction over Japanese subjects in China and the most-favoured nation clause. On one point it was in advance of other treaties, in conceding [85] specifically the right "to carry on trade, industries and manufactures" at any of the treaty ports, a right previously rejected by the Chinese.[86] This treaty also was signed in Chinese, Japanese and English; and it was provided [87] that, "in case of any divergence in the interpretation between the Chinese and Japanese text of the treaty, the difference shall be settled by reference to the English text." [88]

§ 26. In point of time the first provision of the treaty of Shimonoseki to be carried out was the recognition of the independence of Korea. The American representative at Seoul, in his correspondence with the Japanese authorities, "refused to recognise that Korean independence dated from June 6th, 1895." His attitude was approved—"The position assumed by this government toward Korea since contracting a treaty with it in 1882 has in no wise been affected by recent events; Korea's treaty independence since then has been for us an established and accepted fact." [89] This philosophical attitude was corrected by a later decision, more in accord with stern fact. In October a revolt upset the government of Korea, with the usual accompaniment of many murders, including that of the queen, and the murderers assumed the administration, with Japanese approval and support; and the British, Russian, French, German and American representatives took steps to intervene.[90] The American government promptly informed its representative that "intervention in political concerns of Korea is not among your functions,"

[85] Art. iv.

[86] Cf. "Submission," chap. xv, § 9.

[87] Art. xxviii.

[88] Col. J. W. Foster remained with the Chinese until after the formal transfer of Formosa under the treaty. He was offered great inducements to remain at Peking as official adviser to the government, but declined them; and left Shanghai finally on June 8th to return to America.—Foster, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 155 seq.

[89] Mr. Sill to Mr. Olney, June 7th; Mr. Adee to Mr. Sill, July 9th, 1895; U.S. For. Rel., 1895, ii, p. 971. Cf. *antea*, chap. i, §§ 12, 23.

[90] North-China Herald, Oct.-Dec., 1895, *passim*; telegrams, Séoul legation to State dept., Oct. and Nov., U.S. For. Rel., 1895, ii, p. 972:

and he received a severe rebuke for having "completely ignored the Japanese minister." [91]

§ 27. The treaty gave Liaotung to Japan; but as early as April 10th Russia and France had begun to concert measures; and, before the ratifications were exchanged (at Chefoo, on May 8th), the Japanese government received from Russia, France and Germany a joint note, "recommending" that the territory be restored to China. Mr. Foster declares that he first heard of the demand during his stay in Peking, April 24th to May 2nd, and that "Li Hung-chang waited anxiously for some indication from Russia, but none was received by him till we reached Tientsin on our return." [92] This disposes of the possibility of any direct assurance having been given; but, none the less, the viceroy must have had a reasonable expectation that the action would be taken. It was thought worthy of record that, before leaving Peking, Li Hung-chang had made a special visit to the Russian and French legations [93]; the Russian Mediterranean squadron was ordered to the Pacific in March [94]; in the conferences at Shimonoseki the Chinese ambassador argued against the cession of Formosa, but did not consider it urgent that he should refer to Liaotung [95]; on the exchange of ratifications at Chefoo on May 8th, there were present ships-of-war of many nations, including a Russian fleet of seventeen war-ships and several torpedo-boats. [96] The demand for retrocession was no surprise to the Japanese. Annexation at that time of Chinese territory on the mainland was contrary to the better judgment of both Count Ito and Count Mutsu, but they were forced to demand it by the attitude of the military. [97] It was impossible to resist the recommendation of the three powers and Japan yielded, signing an agreement at Peking on November 8th by which she received in exchange an increase in the indemnity to 230,000,000 taels. [98]

[91] Mr. Olney to Mr. Sill, Nov. 11th, 20th, 21st, 1895, Jan. 10th, 1896, *ibid.*, p. 973.

[92] J. W. Foster, "Diplomatic Memoirs," ii, pp. 150, 153.

[93] *North-China Herald*, March 22nd, 1895.

[94] *Tel. London*, March 19th, *ibid.*

[95] Foster, *op. cit.*, ii, pp. 130, 141.

[96] *Ibid.*, p. 151.

[97] *Ibid.*, p. 153.

[98] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc., 1894-1904," p. 26.

§ 28. For Formosa the treaty was the beginning of events, and not the end. The expedition, of which Count Ito informed Li Hung-chang, arrived off the Pescadores on March 20th; on the 23rd the fleet silenced the principal forts; and within the next three days the troops overcame such opposition as was offered, and obtained entire possession of the islands and of the port of Makung, constituting the keys of Formosa. In Formosa there was much alarm, intensified by the news that southern waters were not included in the armistice of March 30th; and the alarm was increased when, on April 20th, it became known that the cession of Formosa was one of the conditions of peace. On April 22nd the excitement culminated in an attack on the governor, Tang Ching-sung, in his own yamen at Taipeifu. The disorder continued and anarchy was imminent, and, to protect foreign lives and interests, guards were sent to Twatutia [99]—twenty-five German sailors and thirty British marines—and a British and a German gunboat at Tamsui, and a British gunboat at Takow in south Formosa. Covered by this small force, confidence was temporarily restored and trade was carried on in such security that, up to June 8th, from Tamsui the shipments of tea amounted to 51,800 piculs, and of camphor to 10,000 piculs, while from south Formosa 630,000 piculs of sugar were exported, with commotion and disturbance seething all around at both ends of the island.[100]

§ 29. As soon as the terms of the treaty were known, the governor and a "deputation of the gentry of Formosa" offered, on April 20th, a protectorate of the island to England, the basis of the offer being that China should retain the sovereignty and the land-tax, while England should have sole control over the administration, the cost of which should be borne by dues and duties.[101] This having been rejected, the same offer was, on May 20th, made to France, and rejected by her.[102] During this time the dissatisfaction in Formosa continued; and,

[99] Cf. "Submission," chap. xi, § 14.

[100] The statements regarding what went on in Formosa are based on the author's own recollection, as he was in close touch with the governor; but supported in all cases by reference to J. W. Davidson, "The Island of Formosa"; H. B. Morse, "Report on the Trade of Tamsui, 1895"; W. F. Spinney, "Report on the Trade of Tainan, 1895."

[101] H. B. Morse to Sir R. Hart, Tamsui, April 23rd, 1895.

[102] Same to same, May 10th, 24th, 1895.

under the direct inspiration of the war party in China, on May 24th the independence of the republic of Formosa was declared.[103] The Chinese functionaries of the official hierarchy at once left, being replaced by others, more devoted patriots—all except the governor, Tang Ching-sung, who was informed that neither he, nor any munitions of war, nor any treasure, would be allowed to leave; and “so pressing were the solicitations of the people,” as he declared, that he accepted the office of president of the new republic. At the same time a parliament was summoned, the members having been already elected by the gentry, and receiving an honorarium of 50 cents (one shilling) a day.

§ 30. The inspiration leading to this step was not in the island itself. The people disliked their cession to Japan and resented their abandonment by China; but their discontent, while it might easily be manifested by riots, would never take the form of organised rebellion. Of troops garrisoning Formosa there were at least 50,000, and the number was put by some as high as 80,000. Of these about three-fifths were in north-Formosa under the direct command of the governor, and two-fifths in south-Formosa under the “Black Flag” leader, Liu Yung-fu,[104] who had brought his division to the island early in the war. These troops were all of the coolie-army type, good material, as had been shown by Ward and Gordon; but they were untrained and undisciplined, they had no officers capable of leadership, and they were armed with a miscellaneous lot of second-hand Mausers, Winchesters and Lee-Metford rifles, .450's firing black powder, while the Japanese had their improved Murata .315 rifle with smokeless powder. The Chinese troops were not conscious of their own deficiencies, but the heart of the movement was not in them either.[105] The new departure was engineered from

[103] The author has in his possession the only surviving authentic flag of the republic—azure, a tiger or regardant, waving a long and very aggressive tail. This flag, of blue silk, about eight by ten feet, was sent by the president with instructions that it was to be raised over the custom house at Tamsui. The Chinese flag continued, however, to be flown there until it was displaced by the Japanese on June 9th.

[104] Cf. “Submission,” chap. xvii, § 10.

[105] In several units infantrymen and artillerymen declared in much the same terms to the author:—“We don't want to fight for this blessed republic; it's these civilian fellows (che-ko lao po-hsing).”

China, and was the last despairing effort of the war party to defeat the steps taken to secure peace. This was the course which had been regularly adopted at the end of every unsuccessful war [106]; and for a month, from April 20th to May 24th, the wires burned with telegrams on the subject exchanged between Formosa and the mainland; among the senders being such prominent leaders of the Chinese state as Chang Chih-tung [107] and others of his party. [108]

§ 31. Li Hung-chang was held responsible for the

[106] Cf. "Conflict," chap. x, §§ 13, 19, 21; chap. xii, § 14; chap. xvi, § 24; chap. xxv, § 12; chap. xxvi, § 14.

"In fact yesterday was just as serious as serious could be: for I had had a Yamen sitting over Japan's offer of peace—a long one—the night before and I was waiting for my cart to take me back to another equally dismal festival while I wrote. The armistice—good for the north but not for the south—will expire this day fortnight and if we have not swallowed the Japanese bolus by that time military operations will re-begin the next day and that will mean the Japanese here and the Emperor—and perhaps dynasty—God knows where by the end of May. Meantime I expect this week will find Mörse and Spinney *in extremis*, for the Japs took the Pescadores a fortnight ago, and ought now to have their preparations matured and be ready for an advance. China's collapse has been terrible, and the comical and tragical have dovetailed all along the frontier of incident in the most heartbreaking, side-bursting fashion. Even to-day those who can, try to make their own game out of any sycee issued for expenditure and the heart of the country knows nothing of the war, and will not make allowances for defeat: thus the government will have its own difficulties in getting the people at large to believe in sacrifices made for peace, and internal trouble may appear just as the external war ends. But in fact, although it is only at a minute spot along the fringe of this big empire that the Chinese have received thrashing after thrashing, it is the shell of the egg that is cracked, and—it seems to me a bad case of Humpty Dumpty. The conditions were terrible, and those wily Japanese have played their cards—even in framing conditions—with such a mixture of civilized grace and Asiatic slyness that all the world will be on their side and applaud, and all China will wince from north to south and for a whole cycle! I am trying to get rid of an innocent impossibility which might any day become a breach of treaty and a new *casus belli*, and also of a pound of flesh plus blood stipulation which would be hard to stagger under, as well as to round off a few corners to a shape that will be easier: but I find the other party is too clever and knows both what it wants, and how to get it, too well, to allow me to hope for success. Japan wants to lead the East in war, in commerce, and in manufactures, and next century will be a hard one for the West! Everything that China should have yielded gracefully to others when asked for will now have to be yielded to Japan's hectoring: Japan will then pose and say to all creation—'That's the way to do it, you see, and it's I that did it!'"—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, April 7th, 1895.

[107] Cf. "Submission," chap. xviii, § 8.

[108] During the period spent in China by the author, 1874–1907, government offices, and especially telegraph offices, were notoriously leaky. Without taking any special steps it was easy to be kept informed of what was going on.

disastrous war; he was directly responsible for the formation of China's only "trained" force, the army of the Peiyang, and his supporters filled the posts of command in that army and in the supply departments. When other diplomatic measures failed, he was the ambassador who signed the distasteful treaty, accepting the terms imposed by the victors; and to him it fell [109] to bring the court and administration to consent to ratification, which was opposed by the Chinese war party and by the envoys of Russia, France and Germany.[110] The war party now scored a point in securing the appointment of the viceroy's son and associate in the embassy, Li Ching-fang, as commissioner to carry out the cession of Formosa. All attempts by both to evade the dangerous honour were unavailing [111]; and the commissioner proceeded to Formosa, accompanied by Mr. Foster. Outside the port of Tamsui his steamer was boarded by a messenger,[112] who explained the situation in the island, and, on behalf of the "president," gave warning that Formosa held the two Lis primarily responsible for the cession. The commissioner then proceeded to Kelung, and there, on June 2nd, on board the Japanese flagship, formally transferred the island to the Japanese authorities.

§ 32. The republic was proclaimed on May 24th, but within the week its death knell was struck. On May 29th a Japanese force was landed twenty miles south-east of Kelung; for a few days their progress was resisted, but on June 3rd they took possession of Kelung and its forts, which they found quite uninjured and abandoned without a shot by the garrison holding them under the Tiger flag. The Chinese troops in north Formosa ceased from that time to be an organised force; deserted by their officers, they spread over the country plundering for their subsistence; and in a few days many thousands of them followed the common practice of abandoning arms and

[109] J. W. Foster, "Diplomatic Memoirs," ii, p. 149.

[110] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[111] "I asked . . . if there was no way for a public official to decline an unwelcome appointment. . . Yes, there are three ways; the first is to allege illness, but that is so common it is usually ineffective; the second is to flee the country, but the delinquent can never return; the third is suicide, which is not an unusual result."—*Ibid.*, p. 155.

[112] The author, then commissioner of customs at Tamsui. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 159.

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uniforms, and posing as inoffensive peasantry, being then plundered in their turn by the people of the country-side. The fabric of government dissolved, and, by noon of June 4th, not one of the new functionaries of the new republic was to be found at his post; and anarchy reigned supreme. The capital, Taipehfu, was given up to arson and plunder, and the arsenal and all government establishments were thoroughly looted; and this safety-valve did much to save Twatutia, which, with its score of foreign merchants and its thirty thousand Chinese inhabitants, was moreover protected by the half-hundred British and German marines landed for that purpose. The port of Tamsui was meantime protected by one British and one German gunboat; around it for two or three days swarmed ten thousand or more disorganised soldiery, constantly firing promiscuous rifle shots, but animated by no special evil intent, and only bent on getting away.

§ 33. The Japanese forces entered Taipeh on June 7th, welcomed by the people as deliverers; and they took possession of Tamsui and its forts on June 9th. Within the next three weeks the fragments of the Chinese army of north Formosa were either rounded up and contemptuously shipped off to the mainland, or were herded towards mid Formosa, to be dealt with at leisure. South Formosa was still held by Liu Yung-fu and the troops under his command. The heavy surf raised there by the prevailing south-west monsoon delayed operations; but on October 12th the Japanese fleet appeared off Anping. After some attempted negotiations Liu Yung-fu abandoned his troops and fled; neither before nor after his flight was there any resistance, and Tainanfu was occupied by the Japanese forces on October 21st. During this discreditable attempt to upset the treaty of Shimonoseki the Chinese losses are unknown; the Japanese lost 164 killed and 515 wounded in battle, and 4642 died and 26,994 incapacitated from disease, chiefly malarial fever [113]; but Japan was satisfied, having now possession of Formosa.

§ 34. In June 1895 all national foreign loans contracted previously to the outbreak of the war had been paid off, except a small remnant of about £300,000; and for the purposes of this war, China had borrowed £6,750,000

[113] Davidson, "The Island of Formosa," p. 364.

through foreign banks [114]; the sole restraint on the borrowing power of the empire was therefore an indebtedness of £7,000,000 secured on the customs, with an interest charge of £420,000 a year. The customs revenue for 1894 was Tls. 22,523,605, equivalent at the average exchange for that year to £3,601,431. When it became necessary to provide for the indemnity payable to Japan, about £40,000,000, the Chinese administration turned by a natural instinct to their trusted adviser, Sir R. Hart. [115] But the other Western powers feared that borrowing in the open money market would result in England's "getting a dangerous hold on China's finances" [116]; and, of the intervening powers, the two which had taken the initiative, Russia and France, saw no reason why they should lose any part of the diplomatic influence which that intervention had given them. [117] It was at first proposed that Russia should lend to China one hundred million taels (£16,500,000) at 5 per cent., to be followed by a similar loan a year later. [118] The financial magnates in Paris objected to a loan made solely by Russia, which would provoke the opposition of other financial centres [119]; and, after negotiations through the Chinese legation at Paris, an agreement was signed on June 24th (July 6th, N.S.) between the Russian Ministry of Finances and a group of six French and four Russian banks, by which a thirty-six year loan of 400,000,000 francs (£15,820,000) at 4 per cent. should be made to China, under the guarantee of the Russian government. [120]

§ 35. The British envoy at Peking protested angrily against this loan. [121] Germany, thrown over by her colleagues in the intervention, was driven to join hands with England; and later loans to provide for the indemnity

[114] Cf. Appendix A.

[115] Tel. Peking, May 7th, North-China Herald, May 10th; editorial, *ibid.*, May 17th, 1895.

[116] *Ibid.*, May 31st, 1895.

[117] Cordier, "Relations," iii, p. 305.

[118] North-China Herald, June 7th, 1895.

[119] Cordier, *loc. cit.*

[120] *Ibid.* The loan was issued to the public at 98'80 to 99'20 per cent.; China received 94'125 per cent. Application was made by the public for 5,968 million francs, nearly fifteen times the amount of the loan.

[121] *Ibid.*, p. 309. China demanded the recall of Sir N. R. O'Connor, and in October, 1895, he was appointed ambassador at St. Petersburg.



ties and to repair the waste of war were made jointly by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank. The first in 1896 was a thirty-six-year loan of £16,000,000 at 5 per cent., the second in 1898 a forty-five year loan of £16,000,000 at 4½ per cent., and neither was guaranteed by the governments of the Western countries concerned. All three loans were secured by the customs revenue, the annual charge for interest and amortisation being £2,626,195; and, to provide sufficient cover for the third loan, China was obliged to pledge revenues from salt and likin in six collectorates in the Yangtze basin. These collectorates were to provide a sum of Tls. 5,000,000 (£833,333) annually, and were placed under the supervision of the Inspectorate of customs; in case of default the Inspectorate was to undertake their administration.

§ 36. The Chinese are bad losers; and, being unable to make headway against the Japanese, they hit hard at the missionary. In every month of 1895 the American legation at Peking had occasion to report on the dangerous position in which American missionaries were placed [122]; but it was more especially the exasperation experienced after the conclusion of peace that made itself felt, continuing even in 1896. The worst riots were one at Chengtu in Szechwan in May, 1895, and one at Kucheng (locally Kutien) in Fukien on August 1st; the former was directed against French, English and American, the latter against English and American missionaries. Official laxity, if not connivance, was charged against the Szechwan officials; while the Fukien officials were charged not only with connivance, but also with attempting to burke the subsequent inquiry.[123] This attitude was quite in accord with the feelings of the people. In Hunan one of the gentry Chow Han, to whom had been attributed violent anti-missionary placards issued in 1869 and 1870,[124] again emerged into prominence with a series of diatribes against foreigners in general and missionaries in particular.[125] The Peking government tried hard to shield the provincial authorities,

[122] U.S. For. Rel., 1895, i, pp. 87-198.

[123] Ibid., passim; North-China-Herald, July-Nov., 1895, passim.

[124] Cf. "Submission," chap. xi, § 19 and n. 57.

[125] North-China Herald, Oct. 11th, Nov. 8th, Dec. 6th, 1895.

but the three governments concerned were firm; for the Chengtu riot the Szechwan viceroy was degraded,[126] some other officials were cashiered, six rioters were beheaded and seventeen otherwise punished [127]; for the Kucheng massacre twenty-six rioters were beheaded,[128] but no official was punished.[129] The latter settlement was based on a note "requesting the issuance of peremptory instructions for the summary punishment of all persons implicated in the Kucheng massacre whose guilt is proven, and stating that executions will not be taken as conclusive and final satisfaction" [130]; and at the trial "the participants in the massacre were tried, convicted and sentenced in accordance with the criminal code of China." [131] The American government informed China that it was "seriously considering the question of devising means for the further and more perfect prevention of these lamentable outrages." [132] No further action was, however, taken, and it is difficult to see what preventive measures could have been adopted.

§ 37. In 1842 China was defeated and compelled to sign a treaty, moderate in its terms, but imposed by the victors; but she was not humiliated. In 1858 and in 1860 she again suffered defeat, and again she had to submit to terms imposed by the victors; but her ministers might console themselves with the reflection that her situation was due to the Taiping ulcer eating at her bowels, and not to the external wound inflicted by foreign arms. In 1885 she brought a year of hostilities to a stalemate. But now, in 1895, she was not merely defeated; she had been humbled. Her armies had never once scored a victory, but had fled from every field of battle, and had surrendered one strong position after another; her fleet, on which many hopes were based, was driven ignominiously

[126] Imp'l decree in Mr. Denby to Mr. Olney, Oct. 7th, 1895, U.S. For. Rel., 1895, i, p. 157.

[127] Imp'l decree in same to same. Oct. 16th, 1895, *ibid.*, p. 162.

[128] Same to same, Dec. 8th, 1895, *ibid.*, p. 173.

[129] *Ibid.*, Nov. 30th, 1896, U.S. For. Rel., 1896, p. 68.

[130] Mr. Olney to Mr. Denby, Nov. 12th, 1895, U.S. For. Rel., 1895, i, p. 171.

[131] Report by Commander J. S. Newell, member of committee of investigation on the part of the United States, *ibid.*, p. 174.

[132] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Denby, July 28th, 1896, U.S. For. Rel., 1896, p. 57.

to the shelter of fortified ports ; her commanders showed themselves all incompetent, and many cowards ; her administration was as inefficient and as corrupt [133] in the hour of the nation's peril as it notoriously was in time of peace ; and her people, while they had acquired some sense of nationality, were still an inchoate mass, in which self-interest was the only motive power and blind fury replaced patriotic endeavour. The empire now lost Formosa, and Liaotung had been saved only by the interested intervention of the three Western powers ; a war indemnity had imposed on it a national debt, from which it had hitherto been free ; except for Mongolia and Tibet it had lost the last of its buffer guards ; and these results had been accomplished by a despised Asiatic power, which had now demonstrated its superiority over China and its equality with the privileged Western powers. The conclusion of peace was followed by a general discrediting of her ministers, including her one statesman, Li Hung-chang, who, for a time, was relegated to a position of obscurity [134] ; and China's humiliation was complete.

[133] " Even those to-day who can, try to make their own game out of any sycee [money] issued or expenditure."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, April 7th, 1895.

" Poor China has been knocked into a cocked hat ; the outlook is threatening ; their officials will not reform. . . . The situation is heart-breaking, and has caused me immense worry, sorrow, and anxiety."—Same to C. Hannen, Jan. 6th, 1897.

[134] " Li [Hung-chang] is only a member of the [Tsungli] Yamen, but while the empress dowager lives Li may still get into power again—he's nobody now. At the Yamen, and in presence of his colleagues, he has to ' play to the gallery ' and is very obstinate—an attitude which astonishes the legations after the way all Europe treated the old traveller."—Ibid.

## CHAPTER III

### POSTAL DEVELOPMENT

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§ 1. THE war with Japan and its disastrous ending left China in a state of utter helplessness. During the war her most energetic efforts were directed, not to defeating the enemy, but to invoking the intervention of foreign powers, which, her rulers hoped, might save her from the results of her own weakness, without the necessity of making any serious effort to remedy the causes of that weakness. It was the duty of foreign powers, and not any part of the duty of China, to save China from aggression and dismemberment; and to all experienced observers, experienced in the ways of the West but not in those of the East, it was obvious that dismemberment

was impending and was inevitable.[1] But, before considering the effect of the war on the politics and administration of the empire and on the question of its partition, certain minor matters must be dealt with, notably the development of the postal service and the introduction of railways.

§ 2. The Ichan,[2] or government service of couriers, was mentioned in the records of the Chow dynasty, the beginnings of which date back 3,000 years; and during the succeeding centuries this channel for maintaining communication between the emperor and his government at the capital, and his governors and garrisons in the provinces, has always been kept in working order. In 1902 the cost of its maintenance was declared by Chinese officials to be Tls. 3,000,000 a year. The service was under the direct control of the ministry of War at Peking; at each provincial capital an army officer acted as director of Posts, under the provincial Judge; and the actual transmission was effected by each district magistrate (Hien) from border to border of his district, the cost being a charge on his budget. The work of the Ichan was handed over to the Post-office in July 1912.

§ 3. The Wenpao Chü, or Despatch Office, was an offshoot of the Ichan. It was instituted in 1876 to provide for the transmission, as far as Shanghai, of despatches,

[1] "China must be divided. If she cannot govern herself, why, there are those who can, and who will." But the article, written by one who knew China (Mr. Robert W. Little), goes on to point out that "such a partition of the Chinese empire would introduce into the eastern end of the Asiatic continent the same elements of discord, suspicion and armed preparation which now crush the life out of Europe."—*North-China Herald*, Sept. 13th, 1895.

"The Manchus cannot keep the Chinese in order; the Japanese are not allowed to do so; who will take the job?"—*New York exchanges cited in ibid.*, Sept. 27th, 1895.

"The situation is heart-breaking, and has caused me immense worry, sorrow, and anxiety. . . . This place is [illegible] as Constantinople—the vultures are in the air, and the man in possession is known to be very sick."—R. Hart to C. Hannen, Jan. 6th, 1897.

This was the period in which were issued such books as George Curzon [Lord Curzon of Kedleston], "Problems of the Far East"; Lord Charles Beresford, "The Break-up of China"; Alexis Krausse, "China in Decay"; Archibald R. Colquhoun, "China in Transformation."

[2] The early history of the Chinese Post is summarised from the author's "Trade and Administration of China," chap. xiii, "The Post-office"; and this, in turn, was mainly summarised from Mr. T. Piry's admirable "Report on the Working of the Post-office, 1904."

to the Chinese envoys sent to foreign countries, and the transmission from Shanghai of despatches from them; Shanghai being the terminus of the foreign mail-steamer lines. In recent years the sole function of the office has been to affix postage stamps to official covers for the legations abroad, and to deposit the covers in the post-office.

§ 4. A government post-office open to the public was established in Formosa in 1885 by the first governor [3] of the new province, Liu Ming-chüan, who as Imperial High Commissioner had defended the island through the war with France. He adopted adhesive prepayment stamps for the service, which was purely local; and he obtained from England finely engraved stamps in two denominations, for shorter and longer distances—red 3 cent and green 5 cent. The simplicity of an almost uniform system worked against its adoption, and the stamps had a history unique in philately; duly swayed to that effect, they were used for railway tickets on the Formosa line. By the system ultimately adopted the rate charged was 20-cash (2 cents) for each stage, about twenty-five miles, of the distance covered by the couriers. This service came to an end in 1895.

§ 5. The people of China are essentially a literary and commercial people, and are therefore a letter-writing people; and for centuries past they have provided for the transmission of their business and family correspondence with no more support or interference from the government than is given to any other commercial undertaking. This they did by "Letter Hongs," [4] usually established by a remittance bank or a merchant's firm having its own business connexions with certain other places, and having its own correspondence to forward; these undertook for a consideration to forward the letters of other people, and gradually extended their postal operations to other places in the same direction to which their ordinary business did not reach. Under this system very strong letter hongs were developed, utilising every means of

[3] Actually governor of Fukien and Taiwan (Formosa), directly administering the affairs of Formosa; Fukien affairs were in the hands of the viceroy at Foochow.

[4] Hong indicates a business firm of any kind; "corporation" is too large a term, "shop" too small, to render it.

conveyance, and meeting in every way the convenience of the public: maintaining fast special services where they were wanted, and content with slow conveyances where economy was the first object; keeping open until after midnight wherever it was demanded by business interests; and, most attractive in China, making the addressee pay a portion of the postage, usually half. The rates were moderate, ranging from 20-cash to 200-cash (2 to 20 cents), according to the distance, but the offices were not particular to an ounce or two in the weight; and commutation for an annual payment was common. The system served the people admirably; but, from the national point of view, it had the fatal defect that it developed the profitable routes only, and neglected those which could not give a margin over expenses.

§. 6. The foreign communities were served by foreign post-offices, the opening of which was necessitated by the need for transmitting the mails between China and the countries of the West. The first so opened was the British [5] in 1834; and the Hongkong Post-office subsequently opened branches at the principal ports, such as Canton, Foochow, Shanghai, Hankow and Tientsin, rendering to the foreign residents a service which they had no other means of obtaining. As other nations in turn instituted mail-steamer communication with China, they too opened post-offices at Shanghai—American, French, Japanese, German; and a Russian office was opened in connexion with mails via Kiakhta. After 1900 these offices, too, generally opened branches in Chinese cities; and, in 1906, the following alien post-offices were working on Chinese soil, not including Manchuria—British, ten, French, thirteen; German, fourteen; Japanese, sixteen; Russian, five; American, one (at Shanghai).[6] Distribution along the coast was granted free of cost by the steamers, and senders of letters, literally, “dumped” them on board each departing boat; on arrival those who expected letters sent for them to the steamer agencies. At Shanghai a local post-office was opened; it enjoyed, with the community in general, free transport for its mails; but it performed a useful service

[5] Cf. “Conflict,” chap. xiii, § 3; xxiii, § 4.

[6] Report on Post-office, 1906.

in collecting and distributing in Shanghai itself. In later years other ports followed this example, but their principal function was to tax non-resident philatelists for the maintenance of local roads. The Shanghai local Post was absorbed by the Chinese Imperial Post in 1898; those at the other ports fell on the institution of a national service.

§ 7. Any proposal for the creation of a national post had, thus, three elements in opposition to it. Officialdom would oppose the suppression of the Ichang, and the transfer from Chinese to foreign hands of the political and financial patronage connected with an annual budget of three million taels. The strong commercial interest vested in the letter hongs would resist the compulsory closing of the postal agencies, which operated on the routes which were immediately profitable, but neglected those which could not show a profit on their own working. The foreign post-offices had a legitimate interest in providing for the ocean transport of over-seas mails, for which they paid the cost; they demanded ample guarantees for the security of the local distribution before they would hand over their mail-matter to a Chinese, and, *prima facie*, untrustworthy administration; and in later years, after 1900, the foreign nations concerned declined to surrender their political interest in their alien and extraterritorialised post-offices. To meet the objections of the first two elements it was imperative that a postal administration should be developed on Chinese lines, and should work by Chinese methods; to conciliate the foreign objection it was needful to introduce an "element of probity and vigilance" [7]; and this double obligation forced the Chinese government to adopt for the postal service a system analogous to that adopted for the customs.

§ 8. To the British envoy, and therefore, by "most-favoured nation" clauses, to the envoys of all other powers, was secured [8] "full liberty to send and receive his correspondence to and from any point on the sea-coast that he may select . . . he may employ for their transmission special couriers who shall meet with the same protection and facilities for travelling as the persons

[7] Cf. "Submission," i, § 22.

[8] Br. tr. Tientsin, 1858, art. iv.



employed in carrying despatches for the imperial government." During nine months of the year the carriage of the legation mails involved the use of couriers only between Tientsin and Peking; but from early in December to the end of February Tientsin is closed by ice, a situation aggravated in the early years by the absence of telegraphic facilities. During the winter then the Peking mails must go from Chinkiang, a mounted-courier distance of twelve days (625 miles) through a country infested in the early sixties by the Taiping forces, and afterwards by the Nienfei banditti. To meet its responsibility for protection the Tsungli Yamen undertook to convey the mails; and, when the Inspector General of customs established his office at Peking, transferred the task of collecting and distributing, and ultimately of conveyance, to his broad shoulders.

§ 9. To provide for this work postal departments were opened at the customs offices at Peking, Chinkiang, and Shanghai, and in course of time at the ice-bound ports, Newchwang, Tientsin and Chefoo; and, arising from this work, the Inspector General conceived the idea of a Chinese Imperial Post. In 1876 he was authorised by the Tsungli Yamen to inform the British envoy that it was ready to take up the task of establishing a national postal service, if it could be included in the Chefoo convention; but Sir T. Wade was obsessed by other questions, and the subject was not referred to. However, Mr. G. Detring took the matter up at Tientsin and, with the support of the viceroy, Li Hung-chang, and authorised by Sir R. Hart, he supervised the institution in 1878 of a restricted service for the northern ports, extended in December, 1879, to the Yangtze ports, and in 1882 to all ports north of Fukien. Alongside this "postal department" service for foreign correspondence, was established the skeleton of a "Shu-hsin Kwan," or "Letter Office" for Chinese correspondence.

§ 10. The first postage stamps were issued in 1878, of three denominations, 1, 3 and 5 candarins (Tls. 0·01, Tls. 0·03 and Tls. 0·05); of these 1,004,864 were issued. The second issue, of the same denominations, appeared in 1885; of these 1,707,539 were issued. The third issue, in commemoration of the empress dowager's sixtieth

birthday.[9] appeared in 1894; it was in nine denominations, from 1 to 24 candarins, and of it 624,857 stamps were issued. The fourth issue, surcharged in dollar notation on stamps of the third issue and on a 3-cent revenue stamp, appeared in 1897; it was in ten denominations ( $\frac{1}{2}$ , 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 and 30 cents, 1 and 5 dollars) and of it there was a net issue of 2,229,966 stamps. The fifth issue appeared in 1898; it was in twelve denominations ( $\frac{1}{2}$ , 1, 2, 4, 5, 10, 20, 30 and 50 cents, 1, 2 and 5 dollars) and the issues were 4,562,130. The sixth issue was in 1899, three denominations (3, 7 and 16 cents) being subsequently added. The seventh issue was made by the republic, surcharged on the stamps of the sixth; and the eighth was a new issue by the republic.

§ 11. In 1876 China had been turned from her half-formulated intention of organising a national service; but in 1878 she was formally invited to join the International Postal Union. In the same year Sir R. Hart, while in Paris, was approached by the French minister of Foreign Affairs with a proposal for closing the French post-office, then only at Shanghai, and the assumption of its work by China; then, and from time to time in later years, the Hongkong Postmaster-general expressed his entire readiness to close the British post-offices in Chinese ports as soon as China would undertake the work; and at intervals arrangements were discussed for taking over the work of the Shanghai municipal post-office. But the Inspector General would not consent to undertake these tasks until he was provided with the machinery and the authority of a properly organised national Post. Hampered as he was by the existence of the Ichan and the letter hongs, and under the necessity of grafting Western methods on a Chinese organisation, his maxim was to assure his ground before he stepped, and then to move slowly.[10]

[9] "The fates are not precisely smiling on the empress dowager's birthday preparations, and if Japan attempts a march on Peking I doubt if there will be any celebration. . . . Thus one does not approach the idea of a jubilee stamp with much enthusiasm. Further, Japan is now out of the question for engraving, and Shanghai will have to do the work—can it?"—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Aug. 17th, 1894.

[10] A good illustration of his procedure in this time of preparation is given by a letter written to the Postal Secretary towards the end of the first year of the national Post. Though written *currente calamo* and in prose form, it has rhyme and rhythm, and has good sense and caution too.

§ 12. The Shu-hsin Kwan, always supported by Li Hung-chang, worked on under the control of Sir R. Hart, but with its development directly in the hands of Mr. Detring; but, except for the winter mails, its expansion was not noteworthy. The conception of a national service was, however, not lost sight of, and it was constantly pressed on the attention of the authorities, by Mr. Detring on that of the viceroy, and by Sir R. Hart on that of the

The Postal Secretary to whom it was written was also Statistical Secretary, with his office at Shanghai; his successors as Postal Secretary had their office at Peking.

"I fear, the more you hurry, the more will be our worry, and I think the postal business ought not to go too fast: what now concerns us most is just the Chinese coast—what's foreign will come easier, taken last. First get rid of all disorder inside our proper border, and then push on to tackle something more: while there's danger on the deep, had we not better keep in port in quiet water near the shore? There's lots of time before us—why let clamour bore us? It is not waste of time to do things well! But, if our men get fed up, the business will be muddled, and what further trouble that will be, I'd rather not foretell! I think if we keep steady, and only move when ready, we're bound to win without the least disaster; but, if we quit the track, I fear that getting back will make bad time instead of going faster. The steam negotiation has caused some indignation—Legations think that they have been insulted!—but if we had shown our hand, we'd have lost what's ours—command, and that's the reason they were not consulted. For, had we not succeeded in getting what we needed, what a fix we'd have been in to send the mails! But now the road is clear, and cost is only dear when money's paid for any scheme that fails. Are those postage plates appearing? I often can't help fearing they won't arrive before our work's begun; thin paper, too, is wanted—though the requisition's granted, when will the London Office have all done? The Hongkong proposition to you when on that mission, if giv'n effect to would be quite the thing; but I fail to understand the telegrams to hand, and wait to read the news your letters bring. The Notice you propose—that offices will close—seems also something more than we require: will they *themselves* desist? Is it *we* that must insist? I wish you'd wire more clearly when you wire! Our couriers travel slow in Shantung where the snow fell heavy and lies deep along the route; we have had no mails for days, and, instead of winning praise, our system's losing some of its repute. I see no way to mend it, so one simply must defend it, and hope the men now missing will get through; but I fear Legation mails, that crawl along like snails, won't like to pay a Coast rate—what say you? It's little use complaining; experience we'll be gaining that ought to come in usefully all round; and, thus, next winter season, I hope, will give less reason, for saying our procedure is unsound. What faults did you detect when you ran round to inspect? Were our people well advanced in preparation? Do you think all will go well, and did your visit tell, and are there grounds for self-congratulation? 'Tis not my wish to bully, but you really must write fully, and tell me all your doings and your news; the situation's such that we two must keep touch—local action must accord with Peking views! I write this letter laughing, but do not think I'm chaffing: my every word, I trust, has proper meaning; so carefully digest it, and, when you come to test it, you'll find ideas in it well worth gleaming."—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Jan. 25th, 1897.

Tsungli Yamen. In 1893 the matter was under serious consideration,[11] but the war stopped progress. After the war the project was again taken up,[12] but it still hung fire.[13] Finally, after many years of consideration,[14] an imperial decree of March 20th, 1896, ordered the creation of a national Post, under the direction of Sir R. Hart, who then became Inspector-General of Customs and Posts. Under him to this end Mr. G. Detring had worked for twenty years, with great energy and efficiency. After this the successive Postal Secretaries were Mr. H. Kopsch in 1896, Mr. J. A. van Aalst from 1897, and Mr. Théophile Piry since 1901; to the last named the present organisation of the Post-office is due; but it was always Sir R. Hart who set the pace.[15]

[11] "Post-office is still simmering and I believe the Yamen is taking the opinion of various provincial personages, before making the final plunge."—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Feb. 12th, 1894. Cf. also Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, July 1st, 1893, U.S. For. Rel., 1893, p. 237.

[12] "I had a long talk with the new Ministers last Friday—Weng Tung-ho and Li Hung-tsao, and they gave me quite a lecture on the unsuitability of proposals that are not feasible. 'Anybody can—everybody does—make proposals,' they say, 'but we have to work them: *their* part is easy: . . . quite another thing!' If Chang takes up the Postal . . . he will be able to put it through: I brought it again to the notice of the Yamen a fortnight ago, asking them will they go on with it or drop it, and as yet have got no reply. It would be best if the Yamen, i.e. if Central government and not a Provincial official, took it on itself to engineer reform: plan, continuity and success would be the result."—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Aug. 29th, 1895.

Chang was either Chang Chih-tung, then viceroy at Nanking, or Chang Yin-hwan (cf. chap. ii, § 18), then a minister of the Tsungli Yamen; probably the viceroy (see n. 13).

[13] "I hope you enjoyed your trip to Nanking. Chang is full of plans, but hitherto he has been exploited by his surroundings and little good has been got for much expenditure. If you get hold of him, perhaps you'll 'engineer' him to more advantage as far as China is concerned. I put Postal—and many other matters—before the Prince and Ministers six weeks ago, but just now everything hangs fire waiting for the replies of the provinces and also perhaps owing to uncertainty about Liao-tung."—Same to same, Sept. 9th, 1895.

[14] "Yamen tells me an edict will be out to-morrow (20th) establishing Post-office on the quiet lines I recommended for a beginning. . . . It is exasperating to think how long the Chinese officials take to say Go! Both these things (Post and Silver) have been in the hands of the Yamen several years!"—Same to same, March 19th, 1896.

[15] "I am quite sure my plan is the safe one, and my pace not only prudent, but the only pace that will win through, and in the interest of all it is the tortoise and not the hare way."—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Aug. 12th, 1896.

"It is my intention to place *details* in the hands of a Postal Secretary as

§ 13. Sir R. Hart's task was difficult. The authority and monopoly accorded to the postal authorities in Western countries were not, and could not be, granted to him. The Ichān continued to carry the government despatches, and its abolition could not then even be suggested. The letter hongs could not be forcibly closed; facilities had even to be given to their "clubbed mails" at favorable rates; and it was only by offering to the public a better, cheaper and quicker service that competition with them was possible. The foreign post-offices were at the outset willing enough to hand over the work of collecting and distributing in China; but they retained a jealous hold on their subsidised mail-steamer lines, and in time questions of political interest made them less inclined to close their doors. No powers of compulsion existed by which steamers under foreign flags, plying along the coast or on the rivers, could be forced to receive the mails of the Chinese Post or to refuse to receive those of other offices, Chinese or foreign. The International Postal Union constantly invited the adhesion of China; but as constantly full adhesion was rejected so long as China was not full master of her own postal affairs. All these complications might well make Sir R. Hart declare—"The slower we go, the better; the faster we go, the surer we are to lose our footing and flounder into sand or quicksand." [16]

§ 14. Caution was therefore the order of the day. The customs office was made the basis of the Post, and each customs district became at first the unit of area for postal working. The commissioner of customs became the postmaster-general for the district; his customs staff did all the secretarial, accountant and recording work; and a

much as possible, but he must follow my general plan and take his time from me."—Same to same, Aug. 14th, 1896.

"In future please keep me informed of *everything* you do, for there are rocks ahead and difficulties all round, and when anything goes wrong it's myself that gets the whipping!"—Same to same, Nov. 6th, 1896.

"Do not begin any negotiations till you and I have decided what they are to be. Above all, keep me well informed in letters and despatches, and when you wire, wire intelligibly. We are bound to win, but we must go slowly; and you must submit, as the Lieutenant, to take your 'time' from headquarters—Peking."—Same to same, Feb. 26th, 1897. See also n. 10.

[16] R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Feb. 26th, 1897.

separate postal staff was created only for the work directly connected with the handling of letters. The service could not, under the conditions of its existence, be self-supporting; and yet it worked for seven years, until 1904, without a subvention, and in that year was granted Tls. 720,000 a year, of which perhaps a half was actually issued; and for fifteen years, until 1911, large deficits had annually to be met from funds provided for the maintenance of the customs.[17] For it was customs funds which provided men who did much important work for the postal service—Inspector General, Deputy Postal Secretary, District Postmasters, District Accountants and Secretaries, and many subordinate employees; the mass of printed forms required was supplied by the customs; office accommodation was provided on customs premises at many of the smaller ports; steamer mail subsidies were paid from customs funds; and much minor expenditure formed no charge on the postal budget.

§ 15. Under this system the life blood of customs energy was drained away, but without this aid a Chinese service could not have been instituted; without it an exotic organisation would have been formed, having its roots in Western practice, but not satisfying the needs of China; with it has grown up a service which has grafted Western methods on Chinese requirements.[18] That organisation has been done by men trained in the Chinese customs service and without postal experience, and it speaks volumes for the spirit animating that service that this unaccustomed work was cheerfully undertaken and carried through. The organisation was effected by the

[17] The tide turned in 1915, when a small surplus was shown; and in 1916 the receipts of the postal service exceeded its expenditure by 625,485 silver dollars.—Annual Report for 1916 of Mr. H. Picard-Destelan, Co-Director General of Chinese Posts.

[18] "Circumstances here are *not* the same as elsewhere, and the Postal Union connexion is far too elaborate a system for us to start on—of course we'll work up to it. As to an 'expert'—I arranged with B. to lend me a couple of good men, one for Shanghai and one for Peking, but the time for them has not yet come: after we have hewn the block into something that suggests *form* we shall get them out to chip it into shape and do the polishing: they would be disgusted *now* and would go right home again! After all, the *responsibility* is on my shoulders, and we can only go safely by following my lines—and that is what I want all to do, but of course men at ports have free hands, not to alter general principles, but to suit practice to port requirements and to follow local peculiarities in planning local procedure."—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, March 21st, 1897.

foreign staff of the customs; but the postal work was done with a minimum of foreign help. In 1910 the customs included in all grades 1369 foreigners and 5816 Chinese; but in that same year the post-office staff included 95 foreigners of the customs staff doing post-office work, 99 foreigners transferred definitely from the customs, and 11,885 Chinese of all grades.

§ 16. In April, 1896, China addressed the Swiss Federal Council, notifying it of the creation of the imperial Post, and of her intention to join the Postal Union as soon as her postal organisation was sufficiently perfected; at the same time she declared that her post-offices would observe Union practice and rules. But, while observing the rules, she still refrained from giving her full adhesion; as Sir R. Hart phrased it—"Demand for full adhesion to the Union and for haste generally—for running before we can crawl—make me feel like a man who is shut in a coach with a driver on the box who wants to start his untrained team down a declivity to the left instead of toiling up the hill that is in front." [19] At first, then, the interior working of the offices was taken in hand, and towns having commercial relations with the treaty ports were given postal facilities. The public had first to be accustomed to the idea of a national Post. Senders were encouraged to hand their letters for foreign countries to the Chinese offices franked with Chinese stamps at Union rates; the Chinese service then affixed foreign stamps at the same rates and handed the letters to the foreign offices; in this way the Chinese offices, though they received no part of the postage, still introduced the principle that they were to handle the mail matter; and they further accepted incoming foreign mail matter and gave it free distribution.

§ 17. One of the principal reasons for this caution was the necessity for buying the co-operation of the foreign steamers plying in Chinese waters [20]; and this was done at the expense of the customs. Early in the history of the customs the rule had been established that the

[19] R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Aug. 12th, 1896.

[20] Tonnage of shipping under foreign flags entered and cleared at Chinese ports in 1896: foreign trade, 9,059,365 tons; coasting trade, 17,175,200 tons.

loading and discharge of cargo could be carried on only between the hours of 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. and on week days [21]; to provide for exceptional cases special permits were issued, for which a fee was charged—Tls. 10 for a half-night, Tls. 20 for a whole night, Tls. 20 for a holiday, double fees for holiday night work; and in time, with the increase in the use of steamers, this extra work became the regular practice, while the payment of the fees was felt by the steamer companies to be a grievance. The fees did not, however, form the perquisite of the officers who did the extra work, but were drawn on to increase the staff available for the duty. Sir R. Hart now made an ingenious proposal, offering to refund half the special permit fees paid by those steamer companies which would agree to carry the mails of the Chinese Post and to refuse all others. Even in putting forward the proposal he was cautious—"Take care how you handle this, for, if the [steamer] companies get to thinking we are in their clutches, they may prove hard to deal with, and either squeeze us for their consent or refuse consent—in which latter case we would be in a very bad fix indeed! You will see now why I am going so slowly and cautiously, and why I hold back from full adhesion to the Postal Union till we have everything in working order." [22] The steamer companies assented to the proposal and agreed to accept this refund as payment for carriage of the mails coastwise; a good bargain for them then, but within ten years the advantage of the bargain was to the Post.

§ 18. Adhesion to the Postal Union was still withheld, but China conformed in every way to its rules and practice; and the principle adonted was succinctly expressed thus—"The native postal establishments must be kept up, the foreign post-offices must be humoured, and the Postal Union can do nothing for us; I have therefore been working here for launching our system in such a way as to not merely meet these conditions but also, on one side, secure recognition and support for principle, and, on the other, avoid responsibilities we are not prepared for." [23] With all this caution the progress was slow,

[21] Cf. "Submission," chap. vii, § 7.

[22] R. Hart to H. Kopsch, Nov. 8th, 1896.

[23] Same to same, Feb. 26th, 1897.



but ultimately, in February, 1900, a convention was signed with France, followed by others, in 1903 with Japan, in 1904 with India and Hongkong. The Transiberian route not being opened, these postal administrations controlled the routes for China's foreign mails; and with them it was agreed that each side should receive, transport and distribute mail matter franked at Union rates with postage stamps of the other, and this reciprocity of service was paid for, as is done between any two Union countries, on the basis of yearly statistics. These conventions have placed China in the same relations with all Postal Union countries as if she had joined the Union; but complete and formal adhesion to the Union was accepted by China only in time for her to be represented at the World's Postal Congress which was to be—but was not—held at Madrid in September, 1914.

§ 19. Nothing was done that could in any way antagonise the Ichan, with the official interest behind it; the letter hong, however, must be fought. Behind them was a strong commercial interest, and this could always command the support of the gentry, and from the gentry were mainly drawn the officials. They had, therefore, to be at the same time fought and cajoled. They were first summoned to register; and, though at the outset they generally refused, they were ultimately driven to it by the monopoly of steam transport acquired by the Post in the agreement with the steamer companies. Then they were required to send their mail matter in "clubbed mails" through the Post; this requirement they resisted whenever they could. From treaty port to treaty port the clubbed mails were carried, at first free of charge; while half the tariff rates of postage were charged on these mails on other steam routes, and full rates on courier lines. In 1906 the hong, worked up an agitation in the cities along the Yangtze and demanded free transport for clubbed mails, irrespective of destination or mode of transport. The strike failed, and the imperial government enacted that the letter hong must pay on the gross weight of their clubbed mails, half the tariff rates on routes served by steamer or railway, and full rates on courier lines. The hong still maintained the contest, readily abandoning unprofitable lines, but fighting stoutly for those which gave

them a profit; but it was a losing fight. The number of letters in clubbed mails was as follows:

|      |   |   |   |   |           |
|------|---|---|---|---|-----------|
| 1904 | . | . | . | . | 8,304,125 |
| 1907 | . | . | . | . | 6,389,374 |
| 1910 | . | . | . | . | 7,409,600 |
| 1913 | . | . | . | . | 4,796,100 |

§ 20. The Chinese Post was severed from the customs on May 28th, 1911, and placed under the ministry of Posts and Communications; at its head Li Ching-fang was placed as Director-General, with Mr. Théophile Piry as Postmaster-General. The development during ten years may be read in the following figures:

| —                          |           | 1904.      | 1908.       | 1913.       |
|----------------------------|-----------|------------|-------------|-------------|
| Districts                  | No. . .   | 40         | 44          | 45          |
| Post-offices               | „ . .     | 392        | 592         | 1,276       |
| Postal Agencies            | „ . .     | 927        | 2,901       | 6,487       |
| Mail matter. Articles [24] | . . .     | 66,000,000 | 252,000,000 | 629,447,000 |
| Parcels. No. . .           | . . .     | 772,000    | 2,455,000   | 6,177,091   |
| Clubbed mails. Letters     | . . .     | 8,300,000  | 8,042,000   | 4,796,100   |
| Money orders issued. \$    | . . .     | 752,500    | 3,867,000   | 10,161,000  |
| Mail routes:               |           |            |             |             |
| Railway:                   | miles . . | 2,780      | 4,000       | 6,300       |
| Steamer:                   | „ . .     | 8,000      | 8,000       | 9,700       |
| Native boat:               | „ . .     | 5,000      | 6,800       | 9,700       |
| Courier:                   | „ . .     | 33,000     | 68,300      | 127,300     |

[24] This line gives the number of pieces of mail matter handled in all offices. The true statistical category is "articles posted," of which there were 197,484,136 in the year 1913, and 250,432,273 in the year 1916. Parcels are similarly exaggerated (1,380,912 in 1913); but the other items need no correction.

Army.”[4] In this frame of mind he returned the answer that “railways would only be beneficial to China when undertaken by the Chinese themselves and conducted under their own management; that serious objections existed to the employment of numerous foreigners in the interior; and that the people would evince great opposition to being deprived of their land for that purpose.” The petition was thus rejected.[5]

§ 3. In that same year an English engineer, Sir Macdonald Stephenson, paid an unsolicited visit to China, with the avowed purpose of saving China from the evils of haphazard development, such as had occurred in England. From the incomplete information then available he laid down certain trunk systems: from Hankow westward through Szechwan and Yunnan to Burma; from Hankow eastward to Shanghai; from Hankow southward to Canton; from Chinkiang northward to Tientsin and Peking; from Shanghai to Ningpo; and from Foochow into the interior. It did not require a great engineer to make these proposals, and, such as they were, they were rejected.[6] They served, however, as the text from which one friendly adviser after another exhorted the rulers of China to advance the interests of their country by building railways. This frightened them; and while the advisers were inspired more and more by roseate visions of railway possibilities in China, the rulers were filled with greater dismay at the possible injection of still another foreign interest to be covered by extraterritorial privilege. This foreign aim was declared in 1868 through the mouth of Mr. Burlingame, who asserted that China was then ready

[4] Cf. “Submission,” chap. iv, §§ 18, 19; chap. v, §§ 5, 8.

[5] Sir H. Parkes to Sir M. Stephenson, March 8th, 1864, cited in Kent, “Railway Enterprise in China,” p. 2; Laboulaye, “Chemins de Fer de Chine,” p. 11. These two works give excellent and trustworthy accounts of the progress of railway construction in China. They need to be corrected only for their want of intimate knowledge of Chinese domestic conditions. Mr. Kent, for example, (p. 5) ascribes Sir M. Stephenson’s failure in 1864 to the fact that he found support only among Chinese merchants, while “this class occupied the lowest grade in the Chinese polity, and at that time enjoyed but little refinement.” This was true of Japan, but not of China. Chinese gilds have always exerted much power, and in China the gentry and merchants are closely allied, individuals passing readily from one class to the other, and often standing astride the two.

[6] Kent, *op. cit.*, p. 3.

to engage Western engineers to open mines and build railways; but the attitude of the imperial ministers was expressed by Wensiang—"The only instruction we gave our envoy was to keep the West from forcing us to build railways and telegraphs, which we want only so far as they are due to our own initiative." [7]

§ 4. The Shanghai merchants in 1865 formed a company to make a railway from Shanghai to Wusung, a length of ten miles. This would have presented no difficulty two years earlier, when the country to be traversed was in the occupation of the English and French allied forces holding the thirty-mile radius; but in 1865 the territory had reverted to the control of the Chinese civil authorities, and only the warmest support from those authorities could have overcome the difficulties in the way of expropriating the land in a territory so covered with graves and cemeteries, objects of the highest reverence to all Chinese. The promoters then resorted to a subterfuge. They obtained permission to re-construct the military carriage road from Shanghai to Wusung, and to acquire by private negotiation the land necessary to widen and straighten it. In this way they unostentatiously bought the land and made the embankments and culverts needed for a raised road over a level country, intersected by creeks and liable to floods. In 1872 there was another project for making a tramway (at that time involving horse traction) within the settlement limits from the extreme end of Hongkew, along Broadway and the Bund, to the East Gate of the city. [8] Soon after the promoters of the Wusung line announced that they proposed to lay rails for a "tramway" along their new road [9]; and for this at least they received authority from the British envoy, who founded his action on the words of art. iv of the treaty of 1858—"Treaty ports or other places"—thus supporting the extreme pretensions of the foreign merchants. [10] The rails for the "tramway" were landed at Shanghai in December, 1875, and work was at once begun on the permanent way of a line of 30-inches gauge; but the Chinese soon learned

[7] Cf. "Submission," chap. ix, §§ 6, 9.

[8] "News-letter," cited in *North-China Herald*, March 21st, 1872.

[9] In translating both "road" and "tramway" it would have been quite impossible to avoid using the word "horse" as a prefix.

[10] Cf. "Submission," chap. x, §§ 7, 8.

that the tramway was to be actually a railway,[11] and, on February 23rd, 1876, the Taotai enjoined the promoters to stop the construction until he could refer to Peking. The British envoy had meantime been reminded that his government had never supported the contention that foreign activities might be extended to "other places"; and when, after waiting a month in vain for the official permit, the promoters decided to go on with the work, it was without the authorisation of their own legation.

§ 5. The line was completed to Kiangwan, five miles, by June 30th, and from that day six trains a day each way were run for passengers only. These trains were crowded and the railway seemed very popular with the people; but on August 3rd a man walking on the line was killed under circumstances which suggested, either extremely dense stupidity, or a malicious intention to commit suicide and thereby create a prejudice against railways. If it was the latter, the intention succeeded, and the attitude of the people became threatening. Sir T. Wade was then in Shanghai, on the point of leaving for Chefoo where he was to negotiate the Chefoo convention [12]; and, by his instructions, the running of the trains was suspended. On October 24th the Nanking viceroy signed an agreement by which China bought the railway—land and plant—for Tls. 285,000, its actual cost. Traffic was then resumed by the promoters as security for the purchase money; but, the money having been paid on October 21st, 1877, the line was handed over to the Chinese authorities, who at once tore it up and shipped off rails and rolling stock to Formosa, where it was left rusting on the beach.[13] And so ended in failure an attempt, based on subterfuge, to impose on China a railway which she did not yet want.

§ 6. The next attempt was also based on a subterfuge, but one carried through by Chinese for China, and avoiding the foreign element which had been fatal to the previous ventures. Tong King-sing, the head of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, had in 1878 opened the Kaiping coal mine to obtain a direct supply of native

[11] "Tramway," horse-carriage iron-road; "railway," fire-carriage iron-road.

[12] Cf. "Submission," chap. xiv, § 18.

[13] Kent, pp. 9 seq.; Laboulaye, pp. 227 seq.

coal for his steamers.[14] The main shaft at Tongshan was twenty-nine miles from the nearest shipping port, Pehtang, and seven miles from Hsükochwang, the nearest point to which a canal could be made. Mr. R. R. Burnett, the chief engineer, proposed a railway from the mine to Pehtang; this was approved by Tong King-sing and obtained the imperial assent, and Mr. C. W. Kinder was placed in charge of the construction. In a short time the imperial assent was withdrawn and the work stopped. Mr. Kinder then obtained Tong King-sing's consent to connect Tongshan with Hsükochwang by a tramway, the track to be standard railway gauge, 4 ft. 8½ in., and the cars to be drawn by mules; and this line was begun in 1880 and completed in 1881. Meanwhile he had built a locomotive, of which the boiler had originally belonged to a portable winding engine, the wheels had been bought as scrap iron, and the frame was made of old channel iron; its total cost was \$520 (£95). Orders came to stop its construction, but the viceroy Li Hung-chang was interested and gave his approval; and finally, on June 9th, 1881, the hundredth anniversary of George Stephenson's birth, it was christened the "Rocket of China." Its success was soon demonstrated and, in 1882, two tank engines were bought to work the seven-mile length of railway to the canal, which had meanwhile been dug to Lutai on the Pehtang river.[15]

§ 7. The next venture was made in Formosa. Liu Ming-chüan had as imperial High Commissioner successfully defended the island against the French in 1884-85, but the war showed clearly the necessity for making Formosa a province of the empire, and of this province its defender became the first governor. The war showed also the importance of Kelung and its vulnerability—important because it was the only sheltered harbour in the island and had near it the coal mines opened in 1875; and vulnerable because it was closely encircled on the landward side by a range of rugged hills which were within easy cannon-shot of the open sea. Having transferred the capital from Tainanfu to Taipehfu, plans were considered for connecting the latter by a carriage road with Kelung, distant eighteen miles; but Liu Ming-chüan, an energetic

[14] Cf. "Submission," chap. xv, § 8.

[15] Kent, pp. 22 seq.; Laboulaye, p. 12.

army commander, was easily persuaded.[16] to substitute a railway for the road. It took some time to obtain the imperial assent, even for an experimental province like Taiwan (Formosa), but it came at the end of 1886; and, in March, 1887, the governor himself, with the aid of the English engineer, and accompanied by his whole retinue, traced the line for the first four miles. This line was to be built by Chinese for the Chinese, and there was no obstruction; but the work was done by soldiers, and the labour conditions were so unsatisfactory that, in the first two years, five engineers-in-chief resigned in succession. The work was ultimately carried through under the supervision of Mr. Henry C. Matheson.[17] The line to Kelung was completed in 1891, and that towards southern Formosa reached Teckcham (Sinchu), thirty miles from Taipeifu, in 1898. The line was throughout the victim of Chinese official management; it was starved in its construction, its equipment, and its working; the Peking authorities refused to sanction any steps for the development of Kelung, which might then become an appetising bait for a hostile force; and the Japanese in 1895 took over little except fifty miles of badly laid track.[18]

§ 8. One result of the war with France was to inaugurate the period of syndicates, which at first, however, were adopted only by France. In order to utilise whatever advantage there might be in the treaty provision that, if China should decide to build railways, the French government would give her "every facility to procure in France the personnel she might need,"[19] French industry combined and established at Tientsin a central office prepared to undertake the construction of China's railways. It

[16] The author believes that he was probably the first to suggest the substitution in a visit he paid to the High Commissioner in the course of an official mission in July, 1885.

[17] Mr. Matheson in the spring of 1900 made, with Mr. John Birch and Lieut. Watts-Grant, one of a party of three engaged in prospecting in Hunan, and, on the outbreak of the Boxer uprising, they were on their way from Hankow to Tientsin. While they were rafting across the Yellow River Mr. Birch was drowned; later on Lieut. Watts-Grant was murdered in Mongolia; and Mr. Matheson, after serving in the Tientsin volunteers, was lost in the wreck of the *City of Rio de Janeiro* outside San Francisco in April, 1901.

[18] J. W. Davidson, "The Island of Formosa," pp. 247 seq.; H. B. Morse, Report on Tamsui, "Decennial Reports, 1882-91," p. 449.

[19] Cf. "Submission," chap. xvii, § 29.

obtained a contract to build docks and fortifications, estimated to cost Tls. 2,500,000, at Port Arthur, the principal Chinese naval station; but the Chinese still preferred to build their own railways. In 1886 the Kaiping steam tramway was extended to Lutai, the cost for twenty miles being only \$135,000 (£25,000). The viceroy's interest was excited; but, though he saw clearly the commercial advantage, he based his interest on strategic grounds, and on those grounds obtained the support of Ihwan, Prince Chun, father of the emperor and president of the newly-established Admiralty. On March 15th, 1887, the prince memorialised the throne urging that the railway be extended eastward to Shanhaikwan, and westward to Tientsin and thence to Peking, "in order to facilitate the movement of troops and the transport of war material"; and a rescript at once granted the memorialist's prayer.[20] The China Railway Company was then formed, with Wu Ting-fang as director and in charge of the finances, and Mr. Kinder as engineer in charge of the construction. Subscriptions were invited to the capital of Tls. 1,000,000, which was obtained after much delay and with great difficulty; and tenders called for to supply 2,000 tons of rails were numerous, quickly sent in, and for attractive prices. The work was completed by April, 1888, to Tangku, opposite Taku, at the mouth of the Peiho, and by August to Tientsin, the total cost of construction being about \$19,000 (£3,000) a mile.

§ 9. A third of the proposed line had now been built, eighty miles; the western section, Tientsin to Peking (Lukowchiao), was also to be eighty miles; and the eastern section, Tongshan to Shanhaikwan, also eighty miles. It was now proposed to construct the western section before the eastern; but the forces of reaction, and of opposition to Li Hung-chang and all his works, became active, and the Grand Council withheld its assent and called for the opinions of the viceroys and governors.[21] Of the replies

[20] Text of Memorial in Mr. Denby to Mr. Bayard, April 5th, 1887, U.S. For. Rel., 1887, p. 208.

[21] This opposition to Li Hung-chang's projects had already been directed against the construction of the line between Tangku and Tientsin. Mr. Denby to Mr. Bayard, Jan. 12th, Feb. 25th, 1887, U.S. For. Rel., 1887, pp. 182, 191. This opposition was crushed by the rescript to the memorial of March 15th; same to same, April 5th, 1887, *ubi sup.*



received, that from Liu Ming-chüan, governor of Formosa and a partisan of Li Hung-chang, was most pronounced in support of the extension; he disposed of the argument that a railway would expose Peking to attack, by pointing out that Tangku was the real door of Peking, and that the door could best be maintained by providing means of reinforcing its garrison. Chang Chih-tung, viceroy at Canton and leader of the party of reaction, opposed the extension on strategic grounds; and he advocated instead the construction of great trunk lines through the interior of the country, safely remote from the sea, beginning with one from Peking to Hankow. Chang Chih-tung was a master of style, and his memorial carried conviction to the minds of the imperial advisers; and he was transferred to Wuchang with orders to undertake his projected trunk line, building it of Chinese material and under Chinese direction, as he had proposed. He found himself unable to carry out his intentions, but, to provide for the future, he established the Hanyang steel works.

§ 10. The extension to Peking was thus shelved; and, because of the requirement to use only Chinese capital and Chinese material, the trunk lines were also shelved for an indefinite time. Li Hung-chang was not one to sulk in his tents, and he decided to carry out the plan embodied in Prince Chun's memorial which had received the imperial assent, and to proceed with the extension eastward to Shanhaikwan. Work was begun in 1891 without any specific new authority, and completed in 1894. He did it as a government undertaking, paid for by bank overdrafts secured on his revenues as viceroy, and for it he set up a government bureau, with the title of "The Imperial Railways of North China," which, in 1894, absorbed the line and plant of the China Railway Company; to it he transferred Mr. Kinder as engineer-in-chief and Mr. A. G. Cox as constructing engineer. At the same time, in order to provide Manchuria with some defence against attack, he proposed to push his railways east of Shanhaikwan, into Kwanwai, the territory outside the Portal (of the Great Wall); and, by his orders, Mr. Kinder began surveying in that direction in 1890. The attention of Russia was drawn to this attempt to forestall a development of the Russian railways in such a way as would

enable her to dominate Manchuria, and active opposition to the proposed extension by China was encouraged at Peking. In 1893, however, Li Hung-chang obtained the permission he sought,[22] and, when the war with Japan broke out, the line had been constructed as far as Chung-howso, forty miles east of Shanhaikwan.

§ 11. Thus far had railways progressed up to the Japanese war. The result of that war demonstrated the strategic value of railways, and the absurdity of building only those which were "safely remote from the sea"; in the autumn of 1895 the rejected extension to Peking was taken in hand, and a year later it was completed to Fengtai, and subsequently to Machiapu, a short distance outside the walls of Peking. The extensions were paid for by bank overdrafts, covered in 1898 by the issue of bonds for a capital sum of £2,300,000; and the management, purely Chinese, of this railway has been so competent that, from its surplus profits, it has paid for several branch lines: one of four miles to Chinwangtao, an ice-free port midway between the ice-bound ports of Tientsin and Newchwang; one from Peking twelve miles to Tungchow; one from Peking through the Nankow pass of the Great Wall to Süanhwafu and Kalgan, a length of 125 miles. In 1906 the length operated, excluding sidings, from Peking to Sinminfu outside the Portal was 588 miles, which had cost to build and equip \$47,970,000, or per mile of line \$81,582 (£12,482 at exchange of 1898, and £8723 at exchange of 1906); and the revenue account stood as follows [23]:

|                                      |             |              |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|--------------|
| Receipts, lines inside the Wall      | \$7,016,334 |              |
| " " outside the Wall                 | 4,857,526   |              |
| " miscellaneous                      | 317,329     |              |
|                                      |             | \$12,191,189 |
| Operating expenses                   | \$3,429,943 |              |
| Net revenue                          |             | \$8,761,246  |
| Interest on £2,300,000 Bonds         | \$1,748,008 |              |
| " on debt to Chinese government [24] | 1,068,500   |              |
| Surplus revenue                      |             | \$5,944,738  |

[22] Mr. Denby to Mr. Gresham, June 21st, 1893, U.S. For. Rel., 1893, p. 236.

[23] Kent, "Railway Enterprise," p. 71.

[24] At the end of 1906 the debt to the Chinese government amounted to \$21,370,000, and, beginning from 1905, was being paid off at the rate of \$690,000 a year.

§ 12. Until the Japanese war Li Hung-chang had been fearful of Russian designs on Korea ; and, if Korea should be absorbed by Russia, he saw that Manchuria would be so completely enveloped by Russian territory that China could not hope to maintain her commercial freedom there. His tendency therefore, in so far as he did not lean on himself alone, was to lean on the commercial nations, England and America, and to develop Manchuria commercially. At the end of the war it came to him as an awakening that it was the military nations, led by Russia, which stepped in and required Japan to let go her grip on Liaotung,[25] and that the commercial nations took no step in aid of the empire ; and there is ample evidence that from that time he depended more and more on Russia. His motives were impugned ; even the sums of money paid to him were freely mentioned at the clubs ; but it may fairly be said that it was the act of a patriotic statesman to "cut a loss," and to save some vestiges of sovereignty over the endangered provinces by compounding with the enemy most to be feared. The railway already begun from Shanhaikwan was retained, and, on the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war in 1904, it had been completed, under Chinese auspices, as far as Sinminfu on the way to Mukden, with a branch from Kaopangtze to Yingkow, the port of Newchwang ; but the rest of Manchuria was surrendered to development by Russia.

§ 13. Negotiations to this effect were begun immediately after the retrocession of Liaotung, or, more probably, concurrently with the discussions on the retrocession ; and at the end of November, 1895, though the fact was not published, it became known that the Russian Transiberian railway, instead of taking the long northward curve of the Amur and then proceeding south up the Ussuri, was to strike across Manchuria "in a straight line from Nerchinsk to Vladivostock" [26] ; this was within a month after the signature, on November 8th, of the convention retroceding Liaotung, and concurrently with

[25] Cf. chap. ii, § 27.

"He [Li] was also in an important sense under the protection of Russia, that power having undertaken to hold him harmless from the consequences of his surrender to the Japanese [in 1895]."—Michie, "The Englishman in China," ii, p. 387.

[26] North-China Herald, Dec. 6th, 1895. Cf. chap. v, §§ 1, 4.

the exchange of the ratifications on November 29th.[27] In March, 1896, Li Hung-chang was appointed ambassador extraordinary to represent China at the coronation of the Tsar. Before leaving Peking he negotiated with the Russian envoy, Count Cassini, but did not sign, a secret convention on Manchuria [28]; while in Moscow he negotiated with Prince Lobanow, and did sign, a similar convention [29]; Count Cassini, having declared that he would not leave Peking until his convention was signed, did leave on September 30th,[30] the signatures having been affixed on the 29th. These provided that Russia might build her own (Transiberian) railway across Manchuria to Vladivostock, and a line from Vladivostock to Hunchun and Kirin; and that China should have recourse only to Russian banks to finance her railways from Shan-haikwan to Mukden, and from [Harbin] to Port Arthur and Talienwan; the latter was to conform to the Russian gauge.[31] The authenticity of these conventions has never been admitted, but it is significant that their clauses, thus made public in 1896, were all put into effect during the next few years.

§ 14. To carry out the railway clauses of their agreement Russia in 1895 chartered the Russo-Chinese Bank, the object of which was to carry out the policy of what came to be called "conquest by railways," which was afterwards, in 1909, merged in the policy which was termed "dollar diplomacy." The bank was nominally a Russian corporation; but among its founders were four of the principal banks of Paris and many of the leaders of the French financial world; its capital was 11,250,000 gold roubles, in addition to 5,000,000 taels advanced on permanent deposit by the Chinese government. To this bank the Chinese government granted a concession for railways in Manchuria; and to build them the bank organised, under Russian laws, the Chinese Eastern Railway Company with a capital of 5,000,000 roubles. From

[27] Convention in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc., 1894-1904," p. 26.

[28] Summary in North-China Herald, March 6th, 1896.

[29] English translation of French text in Daily Telegraph (London) cited in *ibid.*, March 11th, 1910.

[30] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9th, 1896. Summary of convention signed on Sept. 29th, in *ibid.*, Oct. 30th, 1896.

[31] Conv. of Sept. 29th, 1896, arts. i. to iv.

this exiguous sum, and from the much larger proceeds of bonds taken directly or indirectly by the Russian Treasury,[32] the Russian railways in Manchuria were built, viz. : West to east, Manchuli-Harbin-Suifenhö, 950 miles ; north to south, Harbin-Talienwan-Port Arthur, 646 miles ; making a total, up to 1904, of 1596 miles. By the agreement China might redeem the lines in thirty-six years, and at the end of eighty years they were to revert to her without payment.[33]

§ 15. Of the railways in Manchuria, those built by the Imperial Railways of North China from Shanhaikwan to Sinminfu and Yingkow (Newchwang), both before and after 1895, were kept from Russian control. To provide for their construction there had been advanced by foreign banks up to the end of 1897 a total of Tls. 2,440,000 [34] :

|                                   | Tls.      |
|-----------------------------------|-----------|
| By the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank | 1,240,000 |
| „ Russo-Chinese Bank . . .        | 500,000   |
| „ Deutsch-Asiatische Bank . .     | 700,000   |

The first step in the attempt to extend Russian control over these lines was a demand for the dismissal of Mr. Kinder—as Mr. Pavloff, the Russian envoy, stated, “not because he was an Englishman, but because he was not a Russian; for . . . the Russian government intended that the provinces of China bordering on the Russian frontier must not come under the influence of any nation except Russia.”[35] The British envoy protested and the demand was withdrawn. On June 7th, 1898, an agreement was signed between Hu Yen-mei, Director-General of the Imperial Railways, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank, acting for the British and Chinese Corporation, for “a sterling loan for the equivalent of about sixteen million taels” at  $5\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., to pay off the bank debts and provide for extensions; the security was to be “the per-

[32] So demonstrated by Senator Albert J. Beveridge, “The Russian Advance,” p. 103.

[33] *Documents for Backhill*, “Treaties, etc.”: Charter of Russo-Chinese . . . : . . . concession to bank, p. 212; Statutes of Chinese Eastern . . . : . . . p. 215.

[34] Laboulaye, “Chemins de Fer,” p. 95.

[35] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 19th, 1897, Corr. resp. China, No. 1, 1898, p. 5.

manent way, rolling stock and entire property, together with the freight and earnings of the existing lines . . . and also of the proposed new lines.”[36] The Russian envoy protested, chiefly on the ground that, in the event of default, a British corporation would obtain possession of railways in Manchuria, in which the sole right to build railways had been conceded to the Russo-Chinese bank. A diplomatic battle ensued; on September 7th Li Hung-chang was dismissed from office [37]; and on October 10th a new agreement was signed for a loan of £2,300,000 at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent., at the issue price of 90. The security was nominally the same, but it was agreed that, in case of default, any deficiency should be made good by the government of China.[38]

§ 16. China had made some attempts to consolidate her control over railway construction. In June, 1895, Chang Chih-tung summoned from America Yung Wing, the former head of the Chinese educational mission in the United States, to come to Hankow to advise him, and through him the government, on railway matters.[39] In January, 1896, Hu Yü-fen, ex-Judge of Kwangsi, then commissary-general to the armies of the Peiyang, was appointed director-general of the Tientsin-Peking line.[40] In May, 1896, Sheng Hsüan-hwai, then Customs taotai at Tientsin, chief director of the China Merchants Steam Navigation Co., and director of the imperial Telegraphs, was appointed director-in-chief of all railway construction [41]; and in October by imperial decree he was specifically charged with the projected Peking-Hankow line,[42] which had already been put by Chang Chih-tung under his control.[43] In April, 1898, as part of the reform movement of that year, an imperial decree established a Bureau of Control for Railways and Mines, and

[36] Text of agreement in Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

[37] “Li Hung-chang was one of Mr. Pavloff’s principal pieces on the chessboard; few foreigners in China do not believe he is the purchased tool of Russia, and many Chinese are of the same opinion.”—Editorial, *North-China Herald*, Sept. 12th, 1898. There were however other causes bringing about his downfall. Cf. chap. vi, § 15.

[38] Text of agreement in Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, p. 89.

[39] *North-China Herald*, Jan. 10th, 1896.

[40] *Ibid.*, Jan. 17th, 1896.

[41] *Ibid.*, May 22nd, 1896.

[42] Imp. decree of Oct. 20th, 1896, in Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, p. 108.

[43] *North-China Herald*, April 9th, 1897.

placed at its head two ministers of the Tsungli Yamen, Wang Wen-shao and Chang Yin-hwan.[44] This bureau seriously curtailed the emoluments of many highly placed officials, and its chiefs were severely dealt with in the reaction from reform.[45] The Bureau of Control was in 1903 placed under the newly constituted ministry of Commerce, and subsequently under the ministry of Posts and Communications.

§ 17. The Peking-Hankow railway was to have been built with Chinese capital and of Chinese material. The latter requirement was met by Chang Chih-tung by establishing the Hanyang Iron-works, and by opening a coal mine at Pingshan and an iron mine at Tayeh, seventy miles down the Yangtze from Hankow, where "stands a mountain of iron ore giving 65 per cent. of pure metal, three miles long and 400 feet high, sufficient to turn out 700 tons of iron a day for a thousand years." [46] The provision of capital was found more difficult, and, in October, 1896, permission was given to obtain a foreign loan.[47] Negotiations were opened with the American-China Development Company, at the head of which was ex-senator W. D. Washburn, and it undertook a rough survey of the route; meantime a Belgian syndicate made counter offers which were more attractive; and the American syndicate, cold-shouldered by the Department of State at Washington,[48] missed the prize which it counted its own. But the way of the Belgians was not smooth. Behind Belgium interested eyes, foreign and Chinese, discerned France and Russia; other powers might or might not support the American pretensions,[49] but they were all united in opposing the Belgian claims. The Belgian negotiations were then dropped, but they were renewed in July, 1897,

[44] Imp. decree of April 2nd, 1898, in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 249.

[45] Cf. chap. vi, § 22.

[46] Ronaldshay, "Wandering Student in the Far East," i, p. 54.

[47] Imp. decree of Oct. 20th, 1896, *ubi sup.*

[48] Mr. John Sherman to Mr. Denby, March 8th, 1897; U.S. For. Rel., 1897, p. 59.

[49] In an editorial it was stated that there were "other reasons why the Chinese would prefer to put the contract in the hands of an American syndicate. Each European power has exercised its influence for itself first, and the United States second; and the United States with its own vote for first, and an unanimous vote for second, has carried the contest."—North-China Herald, Oct. 23rd, 1896.

on the expressed condition that "the money is all to come from Belgium, none from France or Russia will be accepted." [50]

§ 18. In September, 1897, Mr. G. Detring took the unprecedented step of addressing in his own name a memorial to the Tsungli Yamen. In it he advised the creation of an imperial Bureau of Railways and Mines, such as was actually formed in the following April, to be constituted on the model of the foreign customs. In railway matters he warned the Yamen especially against Belgium; in financing railway construction France would be the master hand, with Russia aiding; their object being to reach the heart of the empire (Hankow), France from the south, Russia from the north. He gave a final warning against Sheng Hsüan-hwai—"employing him is like riding the tiger, dangerous to ride, more dangerous to dismount"; he controlled everything—railways, mines, cotton factories, telegraphs, steamships. [51] It cannot be assumed that Mr. Detring addressed this memorial to the Tsungli Yamen without the previous knowledge and probable support of his patron [52] Li Hung-chang, who was then a minister of the Yamen; and two months later it was reported that the negotiations between Sheng Hsüan-hwai and the Belgian syndicate had "entirely collapsed." [53]

§ 19. In April, 1898, simultaneously with the creation of the Bureau of Control for Railways and Mines, negotiations with the Belgians were resumed, [54] and, on June 26th, 1898, a final contract [55] was signed for a loan and for working the line. The loan was for 112,500,000 francs at 5 per cent. issued at 90, and was to be paid off by twenty annual drawings beginning in 1909; the syndicate was further to operate the line for thirty years from the date of the contract, and was to receive therefor 20 per cent. of the net profits, after deducting operating expenses and interest and amortisation of the loan. The line was com-

[50] North-China Herald, July 30th, 1897.

[51] Ibid., Sept. 10th, 1897.

[52] Cf. "Submission," chap. xiv, § 19; chap. xvii, § 15.

[53] North-China Herald, Nov. 5th, 1897.

[54] Ibid., April 4th, 1898.

[55] Text in Laboulaye, "Chemins de Fer," p. 107; Rockhill, "Treaties," etc., p. 232.



pleted in 1905, with a total length of 812 miles, including branch lines of 58 miles. The rails and iron fittings were bought from the Hanyang iron works; but *per contra* the Chinese government supplied, free of cost to the syndicate, work valued at Tls. 5,800,000.[56] It was provided that China should have the right to pay off the loan at any time after September 1st, 1907; and this right was exercised in October, 1908, by means of a thirty-year loan, issued through the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Banque de l'Indo-Chine, for £5,000,000 at 5 per cent. for fifteen years and  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. for the second fifteen years, issued at 94; and £450,000 at 7 per cent. and par repayable before 1920.

§ 20. Shantung was claimed by Germany as her sphere of development. By a convention signed March 6th, 1898, the enclave of Kiacchow was "ceded to Germany on lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years"[57]; and in this China "sanctioned the construction by Germany of two lines of railway in Shantung." Under this an imperial German charter was granted, on June 1st, 1899, to the Schantung-Eisenbahn-Gesellschaft, with a capital of 54,000,000 marks, for a railway from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu; the shareholders were to be German or Chinese; the material used was to be German as far as possible; and the German treasury of Kiaochow was to share in the profits after 5 per cent. had been paid to the shareholders. The company was also, on its application, to have the right to build lines from Tsingtau to Ichowfu and from Tsinanfu to Ichowfu.[58] This was supplemented by an agreement with China, signed March 21st, 1900, for acquiring the land and for protection of the line.[59] Under this charter the line from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu, 245 miles, with a branch to the Poshan coal fields, thirty-six miles, or 281 miles in all, was completed in 1904 at a cost of 52,900,000 marks of German capital. The success of the line is seen in the transfer of the trade of Shantung from Chefoo to Tsingtau, as shown by the following values of the total net import and export trade:

[56] Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

[57] Cf. chap. v, § 9.

[58] Text (translation) in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 363.

[59] Text (translation) in Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, p. 174.

|              | 1903.<br>Tls.             | 1913.<br>Tls.             |
|--------------|---------------------------|---------------------------|
| Chefoo . . . | 38,183,912 (72 per cent.) | 31,641,224 (35 per cent.) |
| Tsingtau . . | 14,598,411 (28 per cent.) | 59,168,880 (65 per cent.) |

§ 21. At the end of 1897, an imperial decree was issued authorising Yung Wing to construct a railway Tientsin-Tsinanfu-Chinkiang, with liberty to call on foreign capital. This was at once opposed by the German envoy, who declared that, under the Kiaochow convention, negotiations for which were then proceeding, Germany alone should have the right to build railways in Shantung.[60] None the less, in August, 1898, Yung Wing contracted with the American syndicate for a loan of £5,500,000 for this purpose [61]; though signed, the contract was not carried out, since Germany protested on the ground that her rights in Shantung blocked the way. Before this a German syndicate had proposed to lend £4,500,000 for a railway to connect Tientsin and the Yangtze, but the offer had been rejected; and the British syndicate was reluctant to undertake the line, though it led into the Yangtze basin.[62] In the end the British and German interests were both recognised, and in May, 1899, an agreement, ratified by imperial decree May 24th, was signed between the Chinese Railway Bureau on the one part, and the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank (acting for the British and Chinese Corporation) and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank on the other, for a loan of £7,400,000 at 5 per cent. to be issued at 90.[63] The Germans had at first proposed that the northern section should be built by the German syndicate for China, the central section, from border to border of Shantung, by a German company as in the case of the Tsingtau-Tsinanfu line, and the southern section by the British corporation for China; but this agreement provided (art. xviii) that the northern part [from Tientsin to the southern border of Shantung] should be "constructed, equipped and worked" by the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, and the southern part by the British and Chinese Corporation, both for China.

[60] North-China Herald, Feb. 28th, 1898.

[61] Corr. resp. China, No. 1, 1898, p. 168.

[62] Kent, op. cit., p. 150; Laboulaye, op. cit., p. 180.

[63] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 355; also in Kent, p. 260; Laboulaye, p. 187.

§ 22. This contract was not carried out owing to the Boxer troubles of 1900; and, when negotiations were reopened in 1906, the Chinese government had adopted the policy of constructing and working all new lines through Chinese directors, while still inviting loans of foreign capital. After long discussions a new contract was made on January 13th, 1908, with the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, representing German interests, and the Chinese Central Railway Company, representing an alliance of British and French interests.[64] By this agreement a joint loan was made for £5,000,000 at 5 per cent., issued at 93, and, by a subsequent contract, a further sum of £3,000,000 was loaned in 1910 at 5 per cent. issued at 94·5; the southern terminus was changed to Pukow, on the north bank of the Yangtze opposite to Nanking, to which the length of line is 674 miles. The loan was secured (art. ix) not on the railway receipts, but on certain specified provincial revenues; and it was provided (art. xvii) that "the construction and control of the railway will be entirely vested in the imperial Chinese government" . . . and "after completion of construction the imperial Chinese government will administer both sections as one undivided government railway." The policy thus indicated became known as "Pukow terms."

§ 23. France claimed the three provinces bordering on Tongking as her sphere of development, and extended her claim also to cover Szechwan. In June, 1895, it was agreed that "the railways, existing or projected, in Annam may be extended into Chinese territory." [65] Under this convention a contract was signed June 5th, 1896, authorising the construction of a line from the frontier to Lungchow in Kwangsi, with the right, subsequently granted in 1897, to extend it to Nanning and Poseh. Surveys demonstrated the rugged nature of the country, and investigation showed the smallness of the trade, and it became evident that this was not the true French line of penetration; so, in 1900, the project was abandoned. In June, 1898, France obtained the right to build a line from Pakhoi to the West River, and in December, 1899, the right to

[64] Text in Laboulaye, *op. cit.*, p. 195.

[65] Convention signed at Peking, June 20th, 1895, art. v, *Treaties*, i, p. 725.

build one from Kwangchowwan to the West River in Kwangsi; neither of these lines was taken in hand. In June, 1897, an agreement was made, confirmed in April, 1898, sanctioning the construction by France of a line from the frontier to Yunnanfu, in continuation of a line to be constructed in Tongking from Hanoi up the Red River to Laokay. A long study of the route was required, the Boxer troubles intervened, the deadly Namti valley killed the workmen by thousands; and the line was not opened until 1910. The line has a length of 289 miles and cost 165,000,000 francs; of this sum 76,000,000 francs were provided by a loan guaranteed by the government of France, 63,580,000 francs by a subsidy from the government of Tongking, and 25,420,000 francs by the French company which undertook the construction and working. The effect on the trade of Mengtze is shown by the following figures:

|                   | 1910.     | 1913.      |
|-------------------|-----------|------------|
|                   | Tls.      | Tls.       |
| Imports . . . . . | 5,077,320 | 8,612,646  |
| Exports . . . . . | 6,387,609 | 11,066,270 |

That the effect was not greater must be attributed to the protectionist policy adopted by France in Tongking.

§ 24. The American syndicate of Senator Washburn had failed [66]; but, in view of the territorial aspirations of at least four of the European powers which were manifested in the spring of 1898, there were strong reasons for seeking the support of capitalists in the United States, which had given no evidence of such aspirations. In December, 1897, Sheng Hsüan-hwai memorialised the throne, asking for sanction to a line from Hankow to Canton, and proposing that, as there were "serious objections to allowing England, France or Germany to undertake the work," the contract should be placed in America. An agreement was signed on April 14th, 1898, between Wu Ting-fang, Chinese envoy at Washington, and the American China Development Company, at the head of which was Senator Calvin Brice.[67] The loan was to be for £4,000,000 at 5 per cent., issued to the company at 90; construction was to be done by the company for a

[66] Cf. *antea*, §§ 17, 21.

[67] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 252.

commission of 5 per cent. on all outgoings except for land and earthwork ; and the line was to be worked by the company in consideration of receiving debentures equal to one-fifth the cost of the line, to secure the payment to it of 20 per cent. of the net profits. It was at the same time agreed that, if the Belgian syndicate should fail to complete the Peking-Hankow line, it should be transferred to the American company.[68] In April, 1898, war broke out between Spain and the United States ; and when the survey party, with Mr. Barclay Parsons as engineer-in-chief, arrived on the field, the *coup d'état* against the reformers had begun, and a general feeling of hostility against foreign exploitation had sprung up.[69] This feeling was strongest in Hunan, through which province the line was to run, and the surveys were delayed [70] ; but they were carried out in the winter 1899-1900. They gave a route 740 miles long, with branches of 100 miles (Pingsiang, 66 ; Yochow, 25 ; Siangtan, 9), making a total of 840 miles. The engineering difficulties were found to be so considerable that the estimates had to be revised ; and, on July 13th, 1900, a supplemental agreement [71] was signed increasing the amount of the loan to \$40,000,000 U.S. gold, and (art. iii) it was " declared that this supplemental agreement is to be taken as a mortgage, as is customary in America," the railway itself being " given as a first mortgage security " for the bonds. Subject to the mortgage, the line was to be Chinese property ; and it was provided (art. xvii) that the benefits of the agreement were " transmittable by the American company to their successors or assigns, but the Americans cannot transfer the rights to other nations or the people of other nationality."

§ 25. If the Chinese were anxious that the whole of the great medial line Peking-Hankow-Canton should not pass under Belgian control, the Belgians, with the other

[68] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 257.

[69] Cf. chap. v, § 29 ; chap. vii, § 15.

[70] The author was engaged through 1899, in connexion with the opening of Yochow, in preparing Hunan for the inevitable development of their province, and in convincing the Hunanese of the advantage to themselves. In that year the Chinese government abandoned its anti-foreign hostility. Cf. "Yochow," Shanghai, Stat. Dept. of the I.G. of Customs, 1900 ; postea, chap. vii, §§ 2, 3.

[71] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 259.

interests in the background, were no less anxious to obtain that control. In 1899 diplomacy became active, and the Chinese became timid and gave small support to the contract; but ultimately the Americans carried the day and the supplemental agreement was signed. Then further difficulties arose. China was thrown into confusion by the Boxer troubles; the English money market was closed through the South African war; and the death of Mr. Calvin Brice made American capitalists reluctant to venture in an undertaking which was now deprived of his support. This was the Belgians' opportunity, and, with no flourish of trumpets, they acquired a majority of the shares in the American China Development Company; and, at the end of 1903, they elected their nominee, General Whittier, as its president. China protested, basing her protest on art. xvii of the supplemental agreement, which expressly forbade such a transfer of control; but the American government stood on the legal aspects of the question and held that the company was still "in good faith an American company." [72] China, indignant at this breach of the agreement and her back stiffened by the successive defeats of Russia, the strongest supporter of the Belgian claims, then formally notified that she cancelled the contract. [73] The Secretary of State protested; and in a few days was able to announce that "the American proprietors . . . have regained control of the complete ownership of a clear *bona-fide* majority of the entire stock . . . the control of which, as a matter of fact, had never entirely passed out of their hands." [74] This did not settle matters, chiefly "because of the strong opposition of the gentry of Kwangtung, Hunan and Hupeh" [75]; and the difficulty of financing the undertaking continued. It was then agreed "to sell the concession and the railroad to the Chinese government for \$6,750,000 [U.S. gold]" [76]; this was accepted by both govern-

[72] Mr. John Hay to Liang Cheng, May 11th, 1904, in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 278.

[73] Liang Cheng to Mr. John Hay, Dec. 22nd, 1904, U.S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 124.

[74] Mr. Hay to Liang Cheng, Jan. 6th, 1905, *ibid.*, p. 128.

[75] Mr. Coolidge, chargé d'affaires, to Mr. Hay, Jan. 25th, 1905, *ibid.*, p. 129.

[76] Mr. Loomis, acting Sec. State, to Mr. Rockhill, envoy at Peking, June 8th, 1905, *ibid.*, p. 132.

ments,[77] and, in part provision of the sum, the Chinese borrowed £1,100,000 at  $4\frac{1}{2}$  per cent. from the Hongkong colonial government. The southern section, within the province of Kwangtung, has since then been "in course of construction" by the Chinese of Canton; and the northern section was in 1911 entrusted to the Four-power Group.

§ 26. Of the military nations Russia had successfully asserted her sole right of railway development in Manchuria, Germany in Shantung, and France in the three southern provinces, and the right in each case to exclude other nations had been maintained; and Japan had put forward a similar claim for Fukien. Of the commercial nations America had obtained one contract which she had been unable to carry out, and English capital was to obtain other concession; but both America and England made it their principal task to maintain the "open door," with the difference that America asserted that it applied to the whole empire, while England admitted other prior rights in Manchuria and in the Chinese provinces of Shantung, Fukien, Kwangtung (as to its western part), Kwangsi and Yunnan. The series of declarations of non-alienation is referred to elsewhere.[78] The struggle over the railway eastward from Shanhaikwan [79] had shown the necessity of coming to some agreement between England and Russia, and, in April, 1899, it was arranged that England would not seek railway concessions north of the Great Wall of China, nor obstruct Russian claims there, and that Russia would not seek railway concessions in the basin of the Yangtze, nor obstruct British claims there; it was further agreed that the Shanhaikwan railway with its direct extensions was a Chinese line and could not be mortgaged or alienated to a non-Chinese company.[80] This was a case of "give and take." A year earlier, when in the seizure of naval stations Weihaiwei was taken by England, the British government spontaneously made the declaration that "England formally declares to Germany that, in establishing herself at Weihaiwei, she has no

[ 7 ] Liang Cheng to Mr. Loomis, Aug. 21st; Mr. Loomis to Liang Cheng, Aug. 29th, 1905; *ibid.*, p. 134.

[78] Cf. chap. v, § 24.

[79] Cf. *antea*, § 15.

[80] Notes exchanged, April 28th, 1899, between Sir C. Scott and Count Mouravieff, in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 183.

intention of injuring or contesting the rights and interests of Germany in the province of Shantung. . . . It is specially understood that England will not construct any railroad communication from Weihaiwei . . . into the interior of the province of Shantung.”[81] Before this again, while the negotiations for the Kiaochow convention were going on, Lord Salisbury had declared that “the British government demands equality of treatment for British engineers in Shantung”; and that “any concession to Germany of exclusive privilege will meet with opposition on our part.”[82]

§ 27. Free-trade England was thus led by one graceful concession after another to admit the utmost pretensions of other powers which asserted protectionist principles in their respective spheres of development, and was left with the privilege of competing, on free-trade lines, with all except Russia in railway development in the Yangtze basin. There the first British contract was obtained by the British and Chinese Corporation for a railway from Shanghai by Soochow and Chinkiang to Nanking. The preliminary agreement was signed May 13th, 1898, but its execution was delayed, first by the South African war, and then by the Boxer revolt; after the restoration of quiet the final agreement was signed July 9th, 1903.[83] By this a fifty-year loan was authorised for £3,250,000 at 5 per cent., to be issued to the corporation at 90, but the second issue of £650,000 was actually at 95½.[84] The construction and operation were to be in the hands of a board of five commissioners—two Chinese, two English, and the (English) Engineer-in-chief. The line and its plant were to be security for the loan; and the corporation was to pay Tls. 1,000,000 (£125,000) for the line Shanghai-Wusung, which had been built by the Chinese. The line, 210 miles in length, was completed in 1908, and since that time the control has been vested in the president of the commission, a Chinese.[85] In August, 1898, as

[81] *Reichs-Anzeiger*. Berlin, April 22nd, 1898, in *ibid.*, p. 180; China, No. 1, 1889, p. 27.

[82] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Dec. 8th, 15th, 1897, China, No. 1, 1898, pp. 3, 7.

[83] Texts in Rookhill, “Treaties, etc.,” pp. 281 seq.

[84] Kent, “Railway Enterprise,” p. 136.

[85] Laboulaye, “Chemins de Fer,” p. 234.



compensation for "what was regarded as the Chinese government's breach of faith in the Peking-Hankow affair," the same corporation obtained concessions for a railway Soochow-Hangchow-Ningpo, and for one Pukow-Sinyangchow (this point tapping the Peking-Hankow line). Owing to provincial opposition the execution of these works was not entrusted to the corporation, but, in 1908, it undertook a loan of £1,500,000 at 5 per cent. for the former; the latter has been shelved.

§ 28. The province of Shansi is one of the richest coal fields in the world, and it has besides large deposits of iron ore. In 1896 Commendatore Angelo Luzatti made a study of this field, and in 1897 he promoted the formation of a syndicate to work it, called the Peking Syndicate, Anglo-Italian in its composition, but English in its capital. On May 21st, 1898, an agreement was made with the Shansi Bureau of Trade,[86] giving the syndicate the "sole right to open and work coal and iron mines and petroleum wells in the districts of Yühien and Pingtingchow, and the prefectures of Luanfu, Tsechowfu and Pingwangfu" for sixty years; the royalty was to be 5 per cent. of gross receipts, then 6 per cent. was to be paid on capital, then 10 per cent. of net profits to sinking fund, and from the remaining net profit 25 per cent. was to be paid to the Chinese government and 75 per cent. to the syndicate. It was further agreed (art. xvii) that the syndicate, "using its own capital," might "make roads, build bridges, open or deepen rivers or canals, or construct branch railways to connect with main lines or with water navigation," to carry its coal and iron. On June 21st, 1898, a similar agreement was made with a concessionnaire of the governor of Honan according the same mining and railway rights in "Hwaikingfu and in all the hill country in Honan province north of the Yellow River." [87] These agreements were covered by the sanction of an imperial decree of May 17th, 1898 [88]; and each allowed the use of foreign capital to the extent of Tls. 10,000,000. The syndicate, with a subscribed capital of £1,520,000, then proceeded to develop mines and

[86] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 305.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 320.

[88] Cited in art. i of Taokow-Tsinghwa railway loan agreement, *infra*.

to construct to them a railway starting from Taokow, at the head of barge navigation on the Wei River. The Boxer revolt delayed the work, but it was resumed in 1902, and in 1905 the railway was completed to (Pashan) Tsinghwa, a length of ninety miles. The Chinese then decided to buy out the rights of the syndicate in the railway, and signed two agreements on July 3rd, 1905. By them the syndicate made a thirty-year loan for £700,000 at 5 per cent. issued at 90, and sold the railway for £614,600 cash; the line itself was the security, and it was to be worked by the syndicate during the currency of the loan.[89] It is the intention of the government to extend the line thirty-five miles further, to Tsechow in Shansi.

§ 29. Other lines were also taken in hand, of which it need only be said that each represented some diplomatic pressure on the Chinese government.

(a) The Chengtingfu-Taiyuenfu Railway, connecting the capital of Shansi with a station on the Peking-Hankow line. For this an agreement was made with the Russo-Chinese Bank in 1898, supplemented by a definite contract in 1902,[90] for a thirty-year loan for 40,000,000 francs at 5 per cent., issued at 90, guaranteed by the imperial government and secured by the traffic receipts. The contract was later transferred to a French syndicate. The line, of one metre gauge, is 151 miles long and was completed in 1907.

(b) The Kaifengfu-Honanfu-Sianfu Railway, parallel to the Yellow River. In 1899 an agreement was signed with a Franco-Belgian syndicate, La Compagnie Générale des Chemins de Fer et Tramways en Chine, followed by a final contract in 1903, for the section Kaifengfu-Honanfu, 115 miles.[91] The contract of 1903 provided for a loan of 25,000,000 francs, to which a later agreement of 1907 added 16,000,000 francs, at 5 per cent., issued at 90. This section was completed in 1909.

(c) Railway communication between Hongkong and Canton is solely a British interest, and that portion of the line, twenty-eight miles, which is within the limits of the colonial territory is, for financing and construction, a

[89] Texts in Kent, "Railway Enterprise," pp. 235 seq.

[90] Texts in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," pp. 309 seq.; Laboulaye, "Chemins de Fer," p. 124.

[91] Texts in Rockhill, p. 389; Laboulaye, p. 154.

British affair. The line from the frontier to Canton, eighty-five miles in length, was taken in hand by the Chinese of Canton. On March 7th, 1907, a contract [92] was made with the British and Chinese Corporation for a thirty-year loan for £1,500,000 at 5 per cent., issued at 94, secured on the railway and guaranteed by the Chinese government. The working was to be under a board consisting of "a Chinese managing director, with whom will be associated a British engineer-in-chief and a British chief accountant."

Other smaller lines have been taken in hand by the Chinese themselves, and in general without foreign financial aid or government guarantee; but their length is not considerable.

§ 30. The Russo-Japanese war resulted in the transfer to Japan of a great part of the Russian interest in Manchurian railways. Russia retained the whole of the main Transiberian line from Manchuli to Suifenhö, 950 miles; of the north and south line from Harbin to Talienwan (Dalny, Dairen) she kept the northern section to Kwan-chengtze, 132 miles, but the lines south of that point, 514 miles, went to Japan. In addition it was agreed with China in 1905 that Japan, providing the funds herself, might build a line from Mukden to Antung on the Korean frontier, a length of 189 miles; also one from Sinminfu to Mukden, forty-eight miles, and one from Kwanchengtze to Kirin, seventy-five miles; for the two latter half the cost was to be provided by China, and half lent by Japan. [93] Japan has lent to China at 5 per cent. £33,300 for the Sin-min-tung-Mukden line, and £225,000 for the Kwanchengtze-Kirin line; for her other lines in Manchuria she organised in 1906 the South Manchuria Railway Company with capital of 200,000,000 yen (£20,000,000), [94] of which half was provided by the Japanese government, and £4,000,000 by a 5 per cent. thirty-five-year loan issued in London in 1906.

§ 31. Szechwan was a subject of rivalry between England and France; the latter hoped to tap its trade from Tongking, the former from Burma, by railways through Yunnan; and England would benefit by a continuance

[92] Text in Kent, p. 287; Laboulaye, p. 288.

[93] Summary of protocol, Dec. 22nd, 1905; agreement, April 15th, 1907; in Laboulaye, pp. 69, 73.

[94] Articles of Incorporation in Laboulaye, p. 52.

of traffic along the course of the Yangtze. In 1905 an Anglo-French syndicate, the Chinese Central Railways Company,[95] was formed to undertake railways in the Yangtze basin; and the American financial interests were invited to co-operate, but were not then inclined to accede. In 1909 the German syndicate obtained a strong position by diplomatic influence at Peking, and it was admitted to form a tripartite group; and in the same year an American group demanded to be allowed to share. In May, 1910, an agreement was made in conference at Paris for dividing the Hukwang railways, including the Hankow-Szechwan line and the northern portion of the Hankow-Canton line, equally between the members of the "Four-power Group," viz.: for England, the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank; for Germany, the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank; for France, the Banque de l'Indo-Chine; and The American Group (composed of Messrs. J. P. Morgan & Co., Messrs. Kuhn, Loeb & Co., the First National Bank, and the National City Bank, all of New York). It may here be said that the Four-power Group asserted, in the interest of China, its sole right to provide all loans for the purposes of the government of China, and that, for this function, it became the Six-power Group by the adhesion, on their demand, of Russia and Japan; and that, in March, 1913, on the inauguration of President Wilson, it became the Five-power Group by the withdrawal of official support from the "dollar diplomacy" of the American group.

§ 32. On May 20th, 1911, the Four-power Group signed with the imperial minister of Posts and Communications, Sheng Hsüan-hwai, a contract for the Hukwang railways.[96] It provided for a present loan of £6,000,000 at 5 per cent., and (art. xv) a later loan of £4,000,000, repayable in forty years, secured on the traffic receipts and (art. ix) on certain salt and likin taxes of the Hukwang provinces (Hupeh and Hunan), and (art. iv) guaranteed by the Chinese government. The present issue was designed to provide capital:

1°. For the redemption of \$2,222,000 U.S. gold of bonds issued by the American China Development Company on behalf of the Chinese government.

[95] Cf. *antea*, § 22.

[96] Text in Laboulaye, p. 210.

2°. For the construction of the Hupeh-Hunan section of the Hankow-Canton railway, an estimated length of 900 kilometres (559 miles).

3°. For the construction of a line Kwangshui-Shanyangfu Kingmenchow-Ichang, an estimated distance of 373 miles, and of a line Ichang-Kweichowfu, an estimated distance of 300 kilometres (186 miles).

The "construction and control" of the lines were (art. xvii) to be "entirely and exclusively vested in the Chinese government"; for the construction the Chinese were to appoint an English engineer for the section Hankow-Ichanghien on the southern border of Hunan, a German engineer for that Kwangshui-Ichang, and an American engineer for that Ichang-Kweichowfu; and, as far as possible, Chinese material was to be used. The four banks were (art. xxii) to "take the loan in equal shares and without responsibility for each other." An additional section of railway, Hankow-Kingmenchow, did not come under this contract, but was entrusted to a Chinese company employing Chinese capital. Extension into Szechwan was left to be the subject of further agreement. A table of the railways on Chinese territory is given in Appendix B.

## CHAPTER V

### THE IMPENDING BREAK-UP OF CHINA

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**§ 1. THE war with Japan left China beaten to her knees at every point—"the Chinese bubble had burst" [1]—**

[1] Editorial, North-China Herald, Jan. 3rd, 1896.

while Japan had asserted her right to a place with the great European powers. And yet the Chinese rulers had learned no lesson from the defeat, and their subsequent action indicated only two lines of policy: first, that they must provide a large sum to pay the indemnity imposed on the empire; second, that they must reconsider their diplomatic relations with Western nations, and must lean more on the intervening powers—Russia, France and Germany. There was no plan for re-organisation, none for developing the internal resources of the country, none to enable the empire to stand on its own feet; but it was still held to be the duty of the Western powers to save China from the consequences of her own weakness, and, the commercial nations having failed her, that duty must now devolve on the military powers.

§ 2. For the ceremonial coronation of Nicholas II at Moscow on June 2nd (N.S.), 1896, China was requested to send a prince of the imperial blood to represent her, but, instead, Li Hung-chang was commissioned as special envoy and ambassador extraordinary to the Tsar. The nomination of China's leading statesman and strongest administrator was readily accepted by Russia, and he left Peking on March 8th, accompanied by Li Ching-fang, Lo Feng-loh, Ma Kien-chung, and a numerous suite. He was also to visit other capitals, and certain commissioners of customs, appointed councillors of embassy *ad hoc*, were to act as his advisers—Mr. Victor von Grot in Russia, Mr. G. Detring in Germany, Mr. A. M. de Bernières in France, Mr. James H. Hart in England, and Mr. E. B. Drew in the United States. The ambassador, leaving Shanghai on a French steamer of the Messageries Maritimes, did not land at Hongkong, alleging as his reason his age and infirmities, his wish to avoid festivities and the, otherwise numerous, visits of the Kwangtung officials, and his anxiety to escape quarantine at Singapore, Hongkong being infected with bubonic plague.[2] At Saigon he landed and was given a "brilliant reception" [3] by the French authorities; and he was suitably received at Singapore. A Russian Volunteer cruiser carried him from Port Said to Odessa, where he

[2] Hongkong tel. in *ibid.*, April 2nd, 1896.

[3] The quoted epithets are those given in Reuter's telegrams reproduced in the North-China Herald.

arrived on April 27th and was given an "imposing reception." He remained in Russia until after the coronation on June 2nd. Thence he proceeded to Berlin (June 14th), where he had an "imposing reception"; The Hague (July 5th); Paris (July 13th), where he had an "enthusiastic welcome"; London (August 3rd), where he had a "simple reception." Thence he went to Washington, arriving at New York August 28th, his relations with the American people being characterised by impertinent curiosity on the part of the ambassador, and a mixture of respectful interest and jocose badinage from the newspaper reporters and prominent people whom he met. He returned to China from Vancouver across the Pacific.

§ 3. One supposed object of this mission was indicated by the press reports from one capital after another that "officials and manufacturers felt great disappointment that his Excellency placed no orders, either for armaments or for railways." Its avowed purpose was expressed in the ambassador's instructions:

"1°. To represent the Chinese emperor at the coronation of the Tsar.

"2°. To return official thanks to Russia, Germany and France for their intervention leading to the retrocession of Liaotung.

"3°. To deliver complimentary letters to Queen Victoria and the President of the United States.

"4°. To sound the Western powers on a revision of the customs tariff." [4]

Of these the only important object was the last. China had no power to modify her tariff without the assent of every one, even the smallest, of the treaty powers. It had been settled in 1858 with specific duties fixed on the basis of a 5 per cent. levy on the values of that period, in the interval the scale of values had changed, and, through the operation of the fall in the value of silver, [5] the treasury, instead of five, was now receiving on many important commodities no more than 2 or 3 per cent. China proposed, as a *modus vivendi*, to collect at the rates of 1858, but in gold instead of silver. [6] Russia assented; Germany was

[4] Communication in London Daily News, Aug. 24th, 1896, generally believed to have emanated from Mr. Detring.

[5] Cf. "Submission," chap. xix, §§ 18, 19.

[6] "The silver *vs.* sterling confidential memorandum now sent must be printed with all possible expedition to go with Li."—R. Hart to H. Kopsch, March 19th, 1896.



not unwilling, but would wait on England's decision; France left the decision to her envoy at Peking [7]; England was sympathetic, and "will only ask what is beneficial to China herself." [8] The American government accepted in principle the proposals for improving the Chinese revenue. Notwithstanding this general assent, absolute or qualified, no action followed and the customs tariff remained unchanged.

§ 4. The real purpose of the mission was not avowed at the time, nor has it ever been acknowledged. Russian influence was paramount at Peking, [9] and, in recognising this, China instructed her ambassador to make the best terms he could. The terms imposed were sufficiently hard; they were first published in the spring of 1896, [10] and again six months later [11]; their authenticity was disputed, but two years later, when most of the published articles had been carried into effect, the newspaper which published them felt justified in reminding its readers that, in effect, "we told you so." [12] The agreements then made in Peking and in Moscow, besides the railway clauses, [13] provided that Russians and Chinese should have equal rights in mining in Manchuria; that Russian officers should organise and drill the Chinese army; and then followed:

"9°. In order to give Russia an ice-free port, China leased Kiaochow to Russia for fifteen years, but occupation was to be deferred for the present.

"10°. China was to provide Lüshunkow [Port Arthur] and Talienwan with adequate fortifications, and Russia was to assist and would guarantee their retention.

"11°. China was to retain control of these two ports until a war emergency required otherwise.

"12°. Articles 9°. to 11°. were to be kept secret."

§ 5. While Russia was thus consolidating her predominant influence in China, and more especially in Man-

[7] This meant, *inter alia*, that the export duty on raw silk must not be increased.

[8] Mr. Detring's communication, *ubi sup.*

[9] Peking tel. in North-China Herald, March 13th, 1896.

[10] *Ibid.*, March 6th, 1896.

[11] *Ibid.*, Oct. 30th, 1896.

[12] *Ibid.*, March 28th, 1898.

[13] Cf. chap. iv, §§ 12-15.

churia, she was at the same time reaching out to establish her hold on Korea [14]; and during the next two years, during 1896 and 1897, by a mixture of diplomacy and the overshadowing threat of force, she acquired a position of paramount influence in the kingdom, the independence of which had so recently been declared. Mr. John McLeavy Brown, of the Chinese customs service, had retained his post, as financial adviser to the king of Korea and head of the Korean customs, through the war and after independence; but, at the end of 1897, he was summarily dismissed and was replaced in both capacities by a Russian, Mr. Alexeieff.[15] This was symptomatic of numerous far-reaching changes in all branches of the administration—"We see an Englishman ejected from the Finance Department to make room for a Russian, the Korean army officered by Russians, the arsenal in charge of a Russian officer, Russians made commissioners of customs and acting at the same time as Russian vice-consuls, and a pro-Russian Korean as Foreign Minister." [16] Russia had attained her aim and had apparently ousted Japan from the control of Korean affairs; but she had shot her bolt too late. England was too much interested in the questions of Kiaochow and Port Arthur to intervene, and, beyond a formal protest by the British envoy to the courts of Peking and Seoul, she took no direct action; America had no interest in the matter; and France and Germany were Russia's good friends. But by this time Russia was more concerned to maintain her position in China, and, to avoid a dispersion of her efforts, she withdrew from the position she had assumed in Korea and recalled all her officers.[17] Mr. McLeavy Brown then reassumed his former functions. On April 25th, 1898, an agreement was signed at Tokyo by which Russia explicitly recognised Japan's commercial interest in Korea.[18]

§ 6. Compensation for the retrocession of Liaotung was obviously due by China to all the three intervening

[14] Cf. *North-China Herald*, April 2nd, 1896.

[15] *Ibid.*, Jan. 7th, 1898.

[16] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7th, 1898.

[17] Korean Minister of Foreign Affairs to Mr. Speyer (Russian envoy), March 7th; Mr. Speyer to Korean Minister, March 17th; in *Seoul Independent*, March 19th, cited in *North-China Herald*, April 11th, 1898.

[18] Text in Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 433.

powers; the first of them to obtain this compensation was Germany. That country had, in the spring of 1897, informed Russia, Austria and Italy of her intention to acquire a naval station in China [19]; and during the following summer and autumn her ships of war were constantly reported to be surveying along the coasts of Fukien, Chekiang and Shantung.[20] At length the desired "opportunity and pretext" [21] was found. On November 1st, 1897, two German missionaries of a Roman Catholic mission, Franz Nies and Richard Heule, were murdered at the village of Kiachwang, Küyeh-hien, Tsaochow-fu, in the south-western corner of Shantung. The murder had been committed by robbers, who plundered the whole village; the Chinese authorities acted promptly, and the provincial Judge hastened to the scene of the crime to execute justice.[22] The previous year, 1896, had been characterised by many outrages and murders committed on foreign missionaries.[23] In June, 1897, there had been much apprehension of disturbances at Tientsin and a revival of the kidnapping rumours of 1870; the occasion was the approaching dedication, on June 21st, of the new French cathedral replacing that destroyed on June 21st, 1870, the reconstruction having been pushed by the French envoy, M. Gerard, because of his "desire to reassert French prestige." [24] The foreign missionaries sorely needed protection, and even the American government had informed China in 1896 that it was "seriously considering the question of devising means for the further and more perfect prevention of these lamentable outrages against missionaries." [25]

§ 7. Under these circumstances we may credit Germany with the intention of demonstrating to China and to other Western powers the manner in which a strong military power intervenes to protect its subjects engaged in a lawful calling in foreign parts; but the measures adopted went far beyond this intention. Germany was prepared for action,

[19] Berlin correspondent, *London Standard*, Nov. 24th, 1897.

[20] China newspapers, *passim*.

[21] Cf. "Submission," chap. xvii, §§ 3, 5.

[22] Tel. Tsinanfu, Nov. 10th, in *North-China Herald*, Nov. 19th, 1897.

[23] Cf. chap. ii, § 36.

[24] Tientsin correspondent in *North-China Herald*, June 25th, 1897.

[25] Cf. chap. ii, § 36.

and she acted promptly. On November 14th, thirteen days after the murder, four days after it became known, a small German force expelled the Chinese garrison at Tsingtau, the port at the mouth of Kiaochow Bay, seized the forts and occupied the port. The humiliation of China was complete,[26] and her helplessness was no less manifest; and Germany grasped her opportunity. For a long time Germany had been soliciting from China the grant of a naval station, and at once an inspired agitation began in the German press, urging on the government the permanent occupation of Kiaochow Bay.[27] The government showed no reluctance, and on November 22nd presented its demands as follows [28]:

"1°. An imperial tablet to be erected to the memory of the murdered German priests.

"2°. An indemnity to be paid to their families (ultimately fixed at Tls. 3000 for each missionary and Tls. 66,000 for each of three chapels to be rebuilt).

"3°. Li Ping-heng (retiring governor of Shantung, viceroy-designate of Szechwan) to be cashiered and dismissed from the public service.

"4°. Repayment of the expenses incurred in the occupation of Tsingtau.

"5°. Germans to have sole right to construct railways and open coal mines in Shantung.

"6°. Germany to be granted a naval station at Kiaochow."

§ 8. The Chinese ministers were "much perturbed" [29] by the seizure of the Tsingtau forts, but they presented a bold diplomatic front. Demands 1° and 2° were accepted; they demurred at 3°, but an imperial decree forbade Li Ping-heng to leave his post in Shantung until the case of the murdered missionaries was settled; 4°, 5° and 6° were rejected. The German government stood firm. In opening the Reichstag on December 1st the German emperor

[26] "Humiliating to China as was her easy conquest by the previously despised Japanese, her present situation is infinitely more humiliating. A foreign power with three ships and 600 men finds no difficulty in effecting a descent on a country of three hundred millions . . . and establishes herself without opposition within 350 miles of the capital."—Edit. North-China Herald, Dec. 3rd, 1897.

[27] Tel. London, Nov. 17th, in *ibid.*, Nov. 19th, 1897.

[28] Tel. Peking, Nov. 29th, in *ibid.*, Dec. 3rd, 1897; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Nov. 22nd, 1897, China, No. 1, 1898, p. 2.

[29] Tel. Peking, Nov. 20th, in *ibid.*, Nov. 26th, 1897.

declared that the German navy was inadequate; that Germany had no desire to compete with other powers, but her fleet must be such as would maintain the prestige of the empire abroad; and a navy bill was introduced on December 5th. At once reinforcements of ships, men and field guns were sent out under the command of the emperor's brother, Admiral Prince Heinrich of Prussia. The keynote of the German spirit was given on December 18th at a banquet at Hamburg in honour of the admiral on his departure. In his speech the emperor said:

"I am conscious that it is my duty to extend and enlarge what my predecessors have bequeathed to me. . . . May every one in those distant regions be aware that the German Michael has firmly planted his shield with the device of the German eagle upon the soil of China, in order once for all to give his protection to all who ask for it. . . . Should any one essay to detract from our just rights or to injure us, then up and at him with your mailed fist."

The admiral in his reply maintained the same tone:

"Most august emperor, most mighty king and lord, illustrious brother . . . of one thing I may assure your Majesty, neither fame nor laurels have charms for me. One thing is the aim that draws me on, it is to declare in foreign lands the gospel of your Majesty's hallowed person, to preach it to every one who will hear it, and also to those who will not hear it. . . . Let the cry resound far over the world, most august, most mighty, beloved emperor, king and lord, for ever and ever." [30]

§ 9. China had learned to count on the jealousies of the Western powers to enable her to extricate herself from unwelcome demands by one of them. During this crisis Russia, though she had claims on Kiaochow, had other objects in view; France had her Dreyfus case, and (in the following September) was to have her Fashoda affair, and was besides committed to support of the German demand; England was beginning to hear the first mutterings of the storm in South Africa; America was already concerned over Cuba; and China, which, in the two years given her, had done nothing to reform her administration or to reorganise her forces, was left to meet the threatened onslaught alone. Confronted by German firmness she yielded early in January one point after another, and the

[30] Text from London Spectator, Dec. 26th, 1897.

final act was on March 6th, 1898, when a convention was signed at Peking,[31] by which China granted the last of the German demands. By this China ceded to Germany, "by way of lease, provisionally for ninety-nine years" (*pachtweise, vorläufig* [32] *auf 99 Jahre*), the land on both sides of the entrance to Kiaochow Bay, including Tsingtau and all the islands, together with the water area of the bay; within a line drawn at a distance of fifty kilometres from the shores of the bay the territory, while the sovereignty was reserved to China, was to be open to the free passage of German troops, and its government was to be subject to the approval of the German authorities; the working of the Chinese customs in the fifty-kilometre zone was to be safeguarded; and "should Germany at some future time express the wish to return Kiaochow Bay to China before the expiration of the lease, China engages to refund to Germany the expenditure she has incurred at Kiaochow and to cede to Germany a more suitable place; Germany binds herself never to sublet to another power the territory leased from China." Railway and mining concessions in Shantung were granted to Germany [33]; and "the Chinese government binds itself, in all cases where foreign assistance, in persons, capital or material, may be needed for any purpose whatever within the province of Shantung, to offer the work and supply of materials in question in the first instance to German manufacturers and merchants engaged in similar undertakings."

§ 10. In one respect the German authorities showed their wisdom. In order to conciliate Western opinion they declared their intention of making Tsingtau a free depot (*Freihafen*), though this was qualified by the statement of the Chancellor in the Reichstag on February 8th that, "while the creation of a free depot at Kiaochow [Tsingtau] [34] will best serve Germany's interests, yet I should not bind myself beforehand, especially not with

[31] *Treaties*, ii, p. 944; Rockhill, "*Treaties, etc.*," p. 45.

[32] The Chinese text has a character meaning "in the first instance."

[33] Cf. chap. iv, §§ 20-22.

[34] The Chinese city of Kiaochow, situated inland from the head of the bay, within the fifty-kilometre neutral zone, remained under Chinese jurisdiction; the German port and administrative centre were at Tsingtau at the mouth of the bay.

regard to foreign countries." Ultimately, by two agreements, signed by Sir Robert Hart and the German envoy on April 17th, 1899, and December 1st, 1905, the Chinese customs administration, instead of being pushed outside into Chinese territory, was invited inside the Schutzgebiet and established at Tsingtau. Under these agreements the port, docks and manufacturing district were made a bonded area; all goods entered this area freely; the Chinese customs tariff duty was levied on imported products leaving the area for Chinese territory, and on Shantung produce shipped from the area for export; in return for this Tsingtau was given the privileges of a Chinese treaty port, and one-fifth of the net revenue from imports by sea was paid to the German administration.[35] The free depot, aided by the railway, prospered,[36] but it was a prosperity based on an English free-trade policy, and not on the policy adopted elsewhere in German territory.

§ 11. China was already committed to give Germany compensation for her share in the Liaotung intervention, and it was common knowledge that this compensation might take the form of the grant of a naval station. This might have been obtained by the ordinary diplomatic pressure at Peking, which the Chinese could not have resisted; but Germany deliberately elected to make her demand in a spectacular way, by measures which affronted and humiliated both the rulers and the people of China. A moderate appreciation declared—"we do not intend to enter on a futile discussion of international morality, but it seems to us that the proceedings of Germany have deviated from international usage." [37] Li Hung-chang, who was soon to sign the convention ceding the territory, declared that "the occupation of Kiaochow by Germany constitutes a flagrant violation of the treaties and the law of nations." [38] On May 18th, after the restoration of friendly relations, Prince Heinrich was received by the emperor at the Summer Palace with imperial honours; the Chinese comment on this act, friendly in form on both sides, was—"He came uninvited and he left un-

[35] Texts in Treaties, ii, pp. 951, 957.

[36] Statistics in chap. iv, § 20.

[37] The Far East, Dec. 1897, cited in North-China Herald, Jan. 7th, 1898.

[38] Cordier, "Rélations de la Chine," iii, p. 353.

mourned.”[39] One historian declares that “we must find in the manner in which the Kiaochow affair was conducted, not the sole cause, but the principal cause of the Boxer movement and the support given to it by the empress dowager.”[40] The spirit of the Hamburg speeches was carried into action in China and produced there the worst effect on the people and rulers of the empire; and, before any of Germany’s demands had been acceded to, it was “the general opinion in Japanese official circles that the proceedings had been unnecessarily hasty, and that a prolonged or possibly permanent occupation of such an important strategical point by a Western power would imperil the peace of the Far East.”[41]

§ 12. Russia had earmarked Kiaochow for her own, and for the present was to “enjoy the hospitalities of the port” at Port Arthur.[42] She could obtain land access to Kiaochow only through Mongolia and Chihli, and she was pledged to support the demands made by her associate in the act of intervention; and she readily turned her attention to Port Arthur, which was an ice-free port on the coast of her own recognised sphere of influence. Within a week after the German dash on Tsingtau, Russian ships of war arrived at Port Arthur, having under the pre-existing convention [43] been granted permission by the Chinese government to winter there. Russia was ready to swallow the port, and China could offer no resistance [44]; and its fate was decided by two conventions,[45] signed,

[39] North-China Herald, June 6th, 1898.

[40] Cordier, *op. cit.*, iii, p. 356.

[41] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, Tokyo, Dec. 1st, 1897, China, No. 1, 1898, p. 12.

China was never in a position to be able to regain her lost possession; but, after the outbreak of the European war, the Japanese forces, supported by a British contingent, invested Tsingtau and, on Nov. 7th, 1914, obtained possession of the place, with its forts, ships and garrison. Japan announced her intention of restoring the place to China after the war, on conditions to be settled between Japan and China.

[42] Cf. *antea*, § 4.

[43] North-China Herald, Dec. 24th, 1897, Feb. 7th, 1898.

[44] “It is reported from Peking that the Grand Council has informed the viceroys and governors, in answer to many protests, that China cannot resist the rumoured intention of Russia to seize Port Arthur.”—*Ibid.*, Jan. 14th, 1898.

[45] Texts: Chinese, *Treaties*, i, pp. 94, 98; Russian, *ibid.*, pp. cxxvi, cxxx; English trans., Rockhill, “*Treaties, etc.*,” pp. 50, 53; French trans., Cordier, “*Rélations*,” iii, pp. 362, 365.



the first at Peking March 27th, the second at St. Petersburg May 7th, 1898. These ceded to Russia on lease the ports of Lüshunkow [Port Arthur] and Talienwan, with the adjacent waters and islands, and the peninsula as far north as Pitzewo on the east and Polanpu on the west, but the cession was "without prejudice to China's sovereign rights"; the lease was for twenty-five years, and "on expiration an extension of the term may be arranged between the two countries"; a neutral zone, under Chinese jurisdiction but closed to Chinese troops, was demarked with its boundary, about sixty miles north of the ceded territory, running from the mouth of the Kinchow River on the west, thence east to the Tayang River, thence south to Takushan at its mouth; Port Arthur was to be a naval port, closed to all but Russian and Chinese ships, but Talienwan [thenceforward renamed Dalny] was to be a trading port, open to the merchant vessels of all countries; Russia might connect the two ports by a railway with [Harbin], but recognised China's right to make railways eastward from Shanhaikwan; and mining and other concessions in the neutral zone could be granted to none but Russians. Under these conventions the two ports were evacuated by the Chinese garrisons on March 27th, and occupied by the Russian forces the following day.

§ 13. France watched these movements with close attention. M. Hanotaux, then Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in February that France had "not the slightest intention of imitating Germany in seizing a naval base in China" [46]; but, on April 11th, the French envoy at Peking informed him that China had consented to lease to France for ninety-nine years as a naval station the Bay of Kwangchow [Kwangchow-wan] with its dependencies. The French flag was raised there on April 22nd; a convention [47] for the lease was submitted to the Tsungli Yamen on May 27th, 1898, but was not ratified by China until January 5th, 1900, the Chinese ministers being then brought to a decision by the murder, near Kwangchow-wan, of two French naval officers on November 12th, 1899. It

[46] Tel. London, Feb. 28th, in North-China Herald, March 7th, 1898.

[47] Text, Cordier, "Relations," iii, p. 370; Eng. trans., Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 55. It was omitted from the treaties supplied for the Chinese collection of treaties. (Cf. "Submission," chap. viii, § 19, n. 112.)

ceded to France the bay, with its inner and outer islands and territory on the mainland around the bay from lat.  $20^{\circ} 50' N.$  to lat.  $21^{\circ} 25' N.$ ; within these limits the territory was to be governed and administered by France alone; the ships of all nations were to be treated "in the same manner as in the opened ports of China"; and a railway concession was granted. The close proximity of Haiphong deprived Kwangchow-wan of its utility otherwise than as a port of shelter, and the chief use of the cession was to advance the French flag a stage further towards the heart of China.

§ 14. England had no desire to see the "break-up" of China, of which these successive cessions seemed to be the beginning; and, acting on her unvarying policy in China, her one wish was to maintain the equality of opportunity which had existed up to that time. When the German demands were formulated, the British envoy had knowledge only of the first five [48]; the sixth took the verbal form of a demand for a material guarantee for China's future good behaviour in protecting the persons of German subjects, and either was not known to Sir C. MacDonald, or was considered to be a soothing phrase adapted for popular consumption. The envoy was instructed to advise the Chinese ministers to accept promptly demands 1° to 4°, but to inform them that the British government "will feel themselves compelled, if the fifth point is conceded, to demand equality of treatment for British subjects under the most-favoured-nation clause of the treaties, and compensation will be demanded on points in respect to which the rights secured by treaty have been disregarded." [49] He was later instructed to say that "objections were raised by the British government, in the case of the French convention of 1895, to the grant of exclusive privileges to other nations, and any concession to Germany of this nature will also meet with opposition on [our] part." [50] It was at this stage that the British envoy was told by the Chinese ministers that the "absence of any assurance that Kiaochow would be evacuated if the demands were conceded was delaying the negotiations,

[48] Cf. *antea*, § 7.

[49] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Nov. 3rd, Dec. 8th, 1897, China, No. 1, 1898, pp. 3, 7.

[50] Same to same, Dec. 15th, 1897, *ibid.*, p. 8.

and that Germany had asked for a coaling station," [51]; but it was only when the demands were "all practically agreed to" that he learned that the cession of territory on Kiaochow Bay was to be the "guarantee for future good behaviour." [52]

§ 15. On the commercial question Lord Salisbury had, for the space of a whole week, made a strong protest—to China, not to Germany; but when the question of territorial cessions was raised, the affair had gone beyond protest unless he was prepared to resort to force. There were three questions raised: cession of territory, exploitation by railways and mines, and trading. There is no record of any protest against the cession; no further protest was made against exclusive exploitation; and on the question of trading facilities the declaration of the German government that Tsingtau would be open to the trade of all nations was accepted without demur. The German Chancellor gave the British Secretary the flattering assurance that he could find no better model to copy than the British crown colonies (such as Hongkong and Singapore) which had been so prosperous under the open-port policy adopted; but he condescended to give no further assurances, either to England or to other powers—"The German government had shown in the whole proceeding so much loyalty, love of peace, and moderation, that special declarations, either before or after sending out the squadron to Kiaochow, were not necessary." [53]

§ 16. In the middle of December Russia was negotiating with the Chinese ministers on a proposal to lend China £16,000,000 at 4 per cent. and issue price of 93, this being the third loan of a like amount to make up the indemnity payable to Japan. The first had been a Franco-Russian loan with the guarantee of the Russian government, and the second had been made jointly by English and German banks without government guarantee; Sir C. MacDonald now proposed that the third loan should be made directly and officially by the British government. [54] On

[51] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Dec. 14th, 1897, *ibid.*, p. 8.

[52] Same to same, Jan. 3rd, 5th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 14.

[53] Reichskanzler von Bülow before Budget committee of Reichstag, *Kölnischer Zeitung*, Jan. 25th, cited in Sir F. Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, Berlin, Jan. 25th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 31.

[54] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Dec. 22nd, 1897, *ibid.*, p. 9.

January 8th he was authorised to propose such a loan for £12,000,000, the amount required to complete the Japanese indemnity, at 4 per cent. and par, the security being the foreign and native customs, the salt gabelle, and the likin; certain conditions were imposed :

- " 1°. Control of the pledged revenues.
- " 2°. A railway from Burma to the Yangtze valley.
- " 3°. A guarantee against the cession of territory in the Yangtze basin to any other foreign power.
- " 4°. Talienwan to be a treaty port, also Nanning in Kwangsi and Siangtan in Hunan.
- " 5°. The likin-free area at treaty ports to be defined." [55]

§ 17. The French government declared at Paris its "objection" to an official loan with the sole guarantee of England, [56] and at Peking protested against the opening of Nanning as a treaty port, and the concession of a railway from Burma. [57] The Russian envoy at Peking, under instructions from his government, protested in the strongest manner against the opening as a treaty port of Talienwan, which was within the Russian sphere of influence, and warned the Chinese ministers that by such an act they would bring on China the hostility of Russia [58]; both protest and warning were repeated by Count Muravieff at St. Petersburg and by the Russian ambassador at London [59]; and, as a hint, the campaign against Mr. Kinder and the British connexion with Manchuria, begun in October, [60] was now revived. Lord Salisbury gave way and, after the protest at Peking, but before those at St. Petersburg and London, withdrew Talienwan from his demands. [61]

§ 18. Russia now attacked on another line. She had, on December 22nd, obtained permission for her fleet to

[55] Same to same, Dec. 30th, 1897; Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Jan. 8th, 1898; *ibid.*, pp. 11, 16.

[56] Sir E. Monson to Lord Salisbury, Paris, Jan. 12th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 17.

[57] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 25th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 24.

[58] Same to same, Jan. 16th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 21.

[59] Sir N. O'Connor to Lord Salisbury, Lord Salisbury to Sir N. O'Connor, Jan. 19th, 1898, *ibid.*, pp. 23, 24.

[60] Cf. chap. iv, § 15.

[61] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Jan. 17th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1898, p. 21.

winter in Port Arthur, and the Japanese government was officially informed that the permission would be used only temporarily.[62] The British fleet at once proceeded north; on the 29th seven ships were at Chemulpo, a most unusual winter station, and two at Port Arthur.[63] The presence of British ships at Port Arthur was complained of as being "so unfriendly as to set afloat in St. Petersburg rumours of war with England"[64]; and Lord Salisbury was informed that "Russia is anxious to maintain friendly relations, but hopes that England will endeavor to avoid friction in the Russian sphere of influence." He replied that only one ship, the *Iphigenia*, was at Port Arthur, having been sent there by the admiral acting within his discretion, and would in ordinary course be leaving in a few days; and he asserted the "perfect right of British ships to visit Port Arthur and other Chinese ports." [65] The *Iphigenia* left in ordinary course, and the Chinese were promptly inspired with the belief that she had left under Russian threats; and this was also implied in the official announcement made at St. Petersburg.[66] Lord Salisbury informed the Chinese ministers that "the statement that the admiral had been directed by the government to withdraw the ship from Port Arthur was a pure invention"[67]; but none the less British prestige in China received a severe shock.

§ 19. China agreed to the terms of the British government loan on January 18th [68]; on the 21st her ministers were emboldened to ask for £16,000,000 instead of the bare sum required for the indemnity [69]; this was refused [70]; on the 25th the Russian envoy "protested against the loan in the strongest manner as disturbing the balance of influence in China," and the French envoy protested against certain of the conditions [71]; and on

[62] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, Dec. 23rd, 1897, *ibid.*, p. 10.

[63] Brit. admiral to Admiralty, Chemulpo, Dec. 29th, 1897, *ibid.*, p. 11.

[64] Sir N. O'Connor to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 19th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 23.

[65] Lord Salisbury to Sir N. O'Connor, Jan. 23rd, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 24.

[66] Tel. London, Jan. 24th, in *North-China Herald*, Jan. 28th, 1898.

[67] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Jan. 27th, 1898, *China*, No. 1, 1898, p. 25.

[68] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 18th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 22.

[69] Same to same, Jan. 21st, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 23.

[70] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Jan. 24th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 24.

[71] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 25th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 24.

February 3rd Prince Kung informed Sir C. MacDonald that Russia had used such strong threats that China had decided to borrow from neither.[72] The proposal was perforce abandoned, and a preliminary agreement was signed, on February 19th, with the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank and the Deutsch-Asiatische Bank, acting together, for a loan of £16,000,000.

§ 20. Driven from one position after another, Lord Salisbury next gave his attention to the task of securing commercial facilities in what was now obviously about to become a Russian port. He informed the Russian government that he had no objection to the cession of a commercial port, but that a military port was another matter—to that there were grave objections.[73] To this Count Muravieff replied that Port Arthur was a vital necessity to Russia, that Russia could not be denied what had been granted to Japan and Germany; and he added, as if in pained surprise, that the only government to raise any objection was the British.[74] This was the crux of the situation in which Lord Salisbury found himself: Germany and France were Russia's accomplices; Japan had not yet recovered from the exhaustion of war; America had no aggressive policy and, besides, was otherwise engaged [75]; and intervention by England to resist or to retard the cutting of the melon [76] could have had the support of no other power. Lord Salisbury realised this; it was also realised by Count Muravieff, and the convention for the cession of the Liaotung peninsula was signed on March 27th.

§ 21. In February Sir C. MacDonald had reported that a Chinese minister occupying an influential position had hinted that the Chinese government would offer a lease of Weihaiwei to England, if it thought that the offer would meet with a favorable response.[77] Lord Salisbury at once replied [78] that the policy of the British govern-

[72] Same to same, Feb. 3rd, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 32.

[73] Lord Salisbury to Sir N. O'Connor, March 22nd, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 52.

[74] Sir N. O'Connor to Lord Salisbury, March 23rd, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 53.

[75] The *Maine* was blown up in Havana harbour on Feb. 15th.

[76] The expression used by the Chinese to describe the situation in China during the spring of 1898.

[77] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Feb. 25th, 1898, *China*, No. 1, 1898, p. 41.

[78] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, same date, *ibid.*

ment was to discourage the alienation of Chinese territory, and that the proposal to lease Weihaiwei was premature. In no long time he reconsidered his position, since "the influence of Russia over the government at Peking will be so much increased to the detriment of British interests, if Russia is to have a lease of Port Arthur and Talienwan" [79]; and on March 25th he instructed his envoy at Peking that "as the balance of power in the Gulf of Pechihli is materially altered by the cession of Port Arthur to Russia, it is therefore necessary to obtain a lease of Weihaiwei, on the departure of the Japanese, on terms similar to those for Port Arthur." [80] The Japanese government expressed its "concurrence in the contemplated lease of the port to England" [81]; the Chinese ministers promptly agreed, [82] probably with a sigh of relief; and a convention [83] was signed on July 1st leasing, "for so long a period as Port Arthur shall remain in the occupation of Russia," the bay of Weihaiwei together with the island of Liukungtao and a belt of land ten miles wide around the bay; but the Chinese officials were to continue to exercise civil jurisdiction within the town of Weihaiwei. The last instalment of the indemnity having been paid on May 9th, the Japanese troops evacuated the place, and the British flag was raised on May 24th.

§ 22. England stood alone, and, having accepted the cession of Kiaochow to Germany, Lord Salisbury was anxious to give no cause for suspicion to that power. Before he took any steps in the matter of the lease of Weihaiwei, he announced to the German government his intention of "occupying territory forming part of Shantung," and assured it that Weihaiwei was not and could not be made a commercial port having access to all parts of the province; that England did not wish to interfere with the interests of Germany in that region; and that it was regrettable that the action of Russia compelled her to take the course she proposed. [84] After some negotia-

[79] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, March 7th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 42.

[80] Same to same, March 25th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 54.

[81] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, April 2nd, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 61.

[82] Sir C. MacDonald to same, April 3rd, 1898, *ibid.*

[83] *Treaties*, i, p. 349.

[84] Lord Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, March 14th, 1898, *China*, No. 1, 1898, p. 54.

tion the assurance, the publication of which in the *Reichs-Anzeiger* was authorised, took the following form :

"The British government, in view of the approaching occupation of Weihaiwei, has spontaneously informed the German government that it has no intention of injuring or calling in question German rights or interests in the province of Shantung, or of creating any difficulties for the German government in that province; and that in particular it has no intention of laying down railway communications with the interior of the province from Weihaiwei or from the territory which appertains to that port." [85]

This self-denying declaration was a frank admission that British enterprise had no rights in Shantung which Germany was bound to recognise, notwithstanding Lord Salisbury's previous assertion of those rights [86]; and it limited the purpose in obtaining the lease of Weihaiwei to "serving as a base from which to resist the placing of inconvenient pressure on Peking," and to "keeping the Gulf of Pechihli free from foreign domination." [87] The British government did not fortify Weihaiwei, and it served only as a British port to which a British fleet might at any time be sent without question.

§ 23. The military position at Hongkong had long been a subject of much concern to the British authorities. The harbour was bordered on much of its northern side by Chinese territory, [88] and it was desired to secure such an extension of the colonial limits as would free the town and harbour from any danger of hostile attack. As direct compensation for the cession of Kwangchow-wan to France the previous tentative negotiations for the extension were now pushed; and China, in her helpless search for support from one Western power or another, was ready to accede to the demand. A convention [89] was accordingly signed at Peking on June 9th, 1898, by which England obtained on lease for ninety-nine years the whole of the Kowloon peninsula from Deep Bay to Mirs Bay, together with the waters of the two bays, and all the waters and

[85] Same to same, April 19th, Sir F. Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, April 22nd, 1898, *China*, No. 1, 1899, pp. 27, 30; *London Times*, April 22nd, 1898; Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 180.

[86] Cf. *antea*, § 14.

[87] *London Spectator*, April 9th, 1898.

[88] Cf. "Submission," chap. xviii, § 15.

[89] *Treaties*, i, p. 347.



islands north of  $22^{\circ} 9' N.$  lat., and between  $113^{\circ} 52'$  and  $114^{\circ} 30' E.$  long.; civil jurisdiction over the city of Kowloon was reserved to the Chinese officials, and a future railway to Canton was provided for. To the previous area of twenty-nine square miles was thus added 376—286 on the mainland and ninety on the islands—making a total of 405 square miles. It was planned that the British flag should be raised over the new territory on April 17th, 1899; on the 15th its turbulent inhabitants rose in mass to resist the cession of their homes, but the rising was quelled by the British police and military, with some loss of life, in encounters during the next three days; and on May 16th, as punishment for the resistance, Chinese jurisdiction was expelled from the city of Kowloon [Kaulung] [90]. The inclusion of the waters of Deep Bay and Mirs Bay in the cession was a serious impediment to the work of Chinese customs cruisers, to which they were closed.

§ 24. The cession of territory was not the end of the demands on China. The first "declaration of non-alienation" was made on March 15th, 1897, to France; she had asked China to declare that she would not "alienate or cede the island of Hainan to any other foreign power, either as final or temporary cession, or as a naval station or coaling depot"; to this the Tsungli Yamen replied disclaiming any intention of ceding Hainan to any power.[91] When Germany had definitely obtained the cession of Kiaochow Bay, and the Russian claim on Liaotung was obviously coming to a head, the British envoy asked for "a definite assurance that China will never alienate any territory in the provinces adjoining the Yangtze to any other power, whether under lease, mortgage, or any other designation"; and, on February 11th, 1898, the Tsungli Yamen gave the assurance in the words quoted.[92] In April, 1898, France asked for "an assurance that China will not cede to any other power all or a part of the provinces bordering on Tongking, either definitely or temporarily, or on lease, or by any title whatsoever"; on

[90] North-China Herald, April 24th, May 22nd, 1899.

[91] Rockhill, "Treaties, etc.," p. 173; Cordier, "Relations," iii, p. 333.

[92] Rockhill, p. 174; Cordier, p. 368.

April 10th the assurance was given in the terms quoted.[93] Japan then asked for a similar assurance for the province of Fukien; and, on April 26th, an assurance was given that China would not alienate any part of Fukien to any power whatsoever.[94]

§ 25. The provinces bordering on Tongking are Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung; but the assurance given as to Kwangtung must be considered as being limited to the western part, since China was called upon to cede Kwangchow-wan to France herself, and consequent upon that cession, the extension of the territory of Hongkong was agreed to in June, without any protest being made by France. The Yangtze declaration was an assertion of the open door, and not a claim to share in the break-up of China; indeed the British policy was to avert or to retard that break-up. Lord Salisbury put forward a claim that, "other things being equal, railways in the Yangtze region should be conceded to English companies, and in the province of Shantung should be conceded to German companies" [95]; but he had already been informed that Germany claimed that there was a distinction between the German position in Shantung and the British position in the Yangtze basin—[the German ambassador] "maintained that Germany, by her occupation of Kiaochow, and her agreement with China respecting Shantung, has acquired a special position in that province, which consequently is not unreservedly open to British enterprise, whereas Great Britain, not having acquired any place in the Yangtze region, that region is still unreservedly open to German enterprise" [96]; and it was the German contention which ultimately prevailed. With Russia, however, a bargain was struck in April, 1899; Russia agreed not to interfere in the Yangtze basin, and England not to interfere outside the Great Wall.[97]

§ 26. There remained the two great services of which Sir R. Hart was the head, with the title of Inspector General of Customs and Posts, and for these assurances

[93] Rockhill, p. 178; Cordier, p. 368.

[94] Rockhill, p. 181; Cordier, p. 369.

[95] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, June 8th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 117.

[96] Same to Sir F. Lascelles, May 13th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 82.

[97] Cf. chap. iv, § 26; Rockhill, p. 183.

were now demanded. Consequent on the failure of the proposed loan to China,[98] the British envoy, "in view of the immense preponderance of British trade with China over that of other countries," asked for an assurance that "the Inspector General of Maritime Customs should in the future, as in the past, be of British nationality"; and on February 13th, 1898, China gave the required assurance—"but if at some future time the trade of some other country should become greater than that of Great Britain, China will then of course not be bound to necessarily employ an Englishman as Inspector General." [99] France asked for a similar assurance that China would place a Frenchman at the head of the postal service [100]; but the Tsungli Yamen, while pointing out that the postal was under the same direction as the customs service, contented itself with promising that, "if a separate postal department were at some future time established with a European director at its head, France equally with other powers should have the right to recommend a candidate for the post." [101]

§ 27. Advantage was also taken of China's condition of abasement to establish new foreign "concessions" at several of the treaty ports, at which, up to that time, there had been British concessions, nominally exclusive, but actually open to all on equal terms. At Newchwang Russia obtained such a concession, Germany at Tientsin, and Japan demanded concessions at Amoy and Foochow. At Hankow, obviously destined to be a great railway centre, all joined in the scramble; France revived her claim to an abandoned concession; and Russia, Germany, Japan and Belgium staked out new claims. At Shanghai the former English and American settlements have been merged in one general international and self-governing settlement; but the French settlement had been kept under separate French jurisdiction.[102] For nearly twenty years there had been an agitation to extend the boundary of the international settlements, the prosperous

[98] Cf. *antea*, §§ 16, 17, 19.

[99] Rockhill, p. 176.

[100] Cordier, p. 369.

[101] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, April 15th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 102. Cf. chap. iii, §§ 12, 20.

[102] Cf. "Submission," chap. vi, §§ 8 seq.

merchants of which felt cramped in their narrow limits ; but now, in July 1898, France demanded a large increase in the area of her settlement, in which the chief commercial interest was the river-side wharfrage, and that was not French. There were immediate protests from British and American owners of land within the proposed extension, who objected to being deprived of the jurisdiction of their own courts ; but this was met by a declaration that the French courts would not claim jurisdiction.[103] Upon this the claim for the extension of the international settlement was again pressed, and against this extension the French envoy protested.[104] The Chinese were opposed to both extensions and welcomed both protests. The French envoy having withdrawn his protest, the international extension from about 1500 acres to 5584 acres was agreed to in May, 1899 [105] ; the French claim was then reduced so as not to include British or American owned land, and, the British and American protests being then withdrawn, that extension to 358 acres was, in January, 1900, also agreed to.[106]

§ 28. England, standing without other support, had been unable to resist the German demand for a naval station at Kiaochow and a predominant position in Shantung ; she had also been driven to withdraw her active opposition to the Russian demand for the cession of Port Arthur and Talienwan, and for a predominant position in Manchuria ; these were both foreign bases for an offensive penetration of China. France then obtained the defensive base of Kwangchow-wan, with other advantages already enumerated ; and England occupied the defensive base of Weihaiwei. This has seemed to most English writers a

[103] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 16th, Dec. 5th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, pp. 275, 312 ; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 5th, 1899, U.S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 143.

[104] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, March 24th, 1899, U.S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 145.

[105] Same to same, July 5th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 148 ; Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, May 15th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 156 ; Shanghai Taotai's proclamation, May 8th, in *North China Herald*, May 29th, 1899.

[106] Mr. Adee to Mr. Conger, Aug. 26th, 1899, U.S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 149 ; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Dec. 27th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 409. Taotai's proclamation, Jan. 27th, in *Echo de Chine*, Shanghai, Feb. 12th, 1900. The opportunity was also taken to settle, in favour of the French claims, the question of the Ningpo gild house. Cf. "Submission," chap. xiii, § 15.

humiliating position for a power which, in the first stage of China's international relations, 1834-56, had single-handedly opened the trade of the empire to the nations of the west; which, in the second period, 1856-94, had occupied a leading position in the councils of the Western powers; but which now, in the third period, appeared to have lost all control over the direction of affairs. And yet from the swelter she succeeded in picking up some trifling advantages. In addition to Weihaiwei and the Hongkong extension, she had obtained the declaration for the non-alienation of the Yangtze basin, and for the Inspectorship of the customs, though the practical value of either might be small. These were demanded as compensation for the rejection of the accepted offer of a guaranteed loan, and, as further compensation for the same offence,[107] Sir C. MacDonald obtained the opening of the "inland waters" [108] of China to steam navigation, and the opening of Nanning in Kwangsi, and Siangtan (subsequently changed to Yochow) in Hunan, as treaty ports. In exploitation also some successes had been scored; in addition to the mining rights conceded to the Peking Syndicate (British), Sir C. MacDonald asserted that, to the end of November, 1898, the railway concessions granted were as follows: [109]

|                   |            |                    |           |
|-------------------|------------|--------------------|-----------|
| British . . . . . | 2800 miles | Belgian . . . . .  | 650 miles |
| Russian . . . . . | 1530 „     | French . . . . .   | 420 „     |
| German . . . . .  | 720 „      | American . . . . . | 300 „     |

These figures would have been more comforting had they not turned out somewhat illusory.[110]

§ 29. Of the six powers which had shown an active interest in Chinese affairs, five had obtained a slice of the melon, America alone having abstained. The world was now to be surprised by the advent of Italy on the scene. In February, 1899, it was announced that Italy intended

[107] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Feb. 20th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 14.

[108] It was provided by the Chefoo convention, 1876 (Sec. III, art. iv) that the term "inland" should "apply as much to places on the sea coasts and river shores, as to places in the interior not open to foreign trade."

[109] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord C. Beresford, Nov. 23rd, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 344.

[110] Cf. Appendix B.

to despatch a squadron to Chinese waters and to increase the numbers of her consuls in China [111]; and a week later she demanded the cession of a naval station on Sanmen Bay, a deep inlet on the east coast of the province of Chekiang.[112] The demand was approved by England, Germany and France; the attitude of Russia was doubtful; and in Japan it was held that Italy had demanded the cession of a "district lying within the territory which by arrangement between Japan and China must not be alienated to any other power." [113] Such approval as was given was purely platonic, limited only to diplomatic support, and it was conditioned by an assurance given by Italy to the other powers that she would avoid the use of force; and, at the very outset, the Italian envoy at Peking, commendatore R. Martino, was disavowed and recalled because he had presented an ultimatum on the subject to the Chinese ministers.[114] Against a demand so supported, it is not surprising that the Chinese ministers should have stiffened their backs; and the Grand Council instructed the governor of Chekiang to resist any act of aggression and to call upon the viceroys at Foochow and Nanking for such additional troops and supplies as he might require.[115] There was a bustle of activity throughout the empire,[116] and it was generally felt by high and low that the Italian demand must be resisted and a stop put to the unending nibbling at Chinese territory by foreign powers. In face of this resistance Italy abandoned her claim, declaring at the end of May that she had "no intention to pursue a policy of occupation in China, but only a policy of commercial expansion" [117]; and a feeling of elation filled the hearts of patriotic Chinese.

§ 30. America had stood apart. She was busily engaged in 1898 with the Spanish war, and in 1899 with the insurrection in the Philippines; but, apart from this, foreign aggression and demands for cession of foreign non-

[111] Tel. London, Feb. 24th, North-China Herald, Feb. 27th, 1899.

[112] Ibid., March 2nd, *ibid.*, March 6th, 1899.

[113] Kobe Chronicle, Feb. 28th, cited in *ibid.*, March 13th, 1899.

[114] Tel. London, March 14th, 16th, *ibid.*, March 20th, 1899.

[115] Tel. Peking, March 15th, *ibid.*

[116] The author was at the time in close touch with Chang Chih-tung, viceroy at Wuchang, and was aware of great military preparations in his jurisdiction. Cf. chap. vii, § 15.

[117] Tel. London, June 2nd, North-China Herald, June 5th, 1899.

contiguous territory were contrary to her uniform policy. The administration of President McKinley had, however, looked with some dismay on the creation of spheres of influence, in which exclusive privileges were claimed for, and conceded to, the subjects of other powers, while Americans were rigorously excluded from the development of railways and mines in them; but the task which could not be taken up by England, always devoted, and never more so than at this time, to the policy of the "open door," it was obviously beyond the power of America to undertake. The supply of financial means, of engineering and industrial ability, and of railway and mining material, was now subject to the veto of interested powers in some of the provinces of the empire, and was possible in the remaining provinces chiefly through the action of the British government; but the door had not yet been anywhere closed to the unrestricted exchange of commodities, other than railway and mining plant, and the American administration now undertook to keep this door open.

§ 31. On September 6th, 1899, Mr. John Hay addressed a note to the American ambassadors to England, France, Germany and Russia, and on November 13th and 17th to those to Japan and Italy, instructing them to obtain from the governments to which they were accredited a "formal assurance that each, within its respective sphere of whatever influence,

"1°. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or any vested interest within any so-called sphere of interest or leased territory it may have in China.

"2°. That only the Chinese government should collect duty and according to the Chinese treaty tariff.

"3°. That no preferential harbour dues or railway charges should benefit its own subjects." [118]

All the powers gave the desired assurance. Russia made the reservation that "the settlement of the question of customs duties belongs to China herself," but disclaimed any "intention of claiming any privileges for its own subjects to the exclusion of other foreigners." [119] Germany declared that she had, "from the beginning, not only

[118] Correspondence in U.S. For. Rel., 1899, pp. 128 seq.

[119] Count Muravieff to Mr. Tower, Dec. 18th, 30th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 141.

asserted, but also practically carried out to the fullest extent, in her Chinese possessions, absolute equality of treatment of all nations with regard to trade, navigation and commerce" [120]; and further that "the policy of Germany in the extreme Orient is *de facto* the policy of the open door." [121] France declared that she "desires throughout the whole of China equal treatment to the citizens and subjects of all nations, especially in the matter of customs duties and navigation dues, as well as transportation tariffs on railways." [122] None of the three manifested any intention of waiving any of the exclusive privileges in exploitation and development asserted for their subjects in their spheres of interest. The other powers assented without reservation.

§ 32. In the world's history no country, with so vast an extent of territory and so large a population, under one government, as China—no country with a tithe of its area or population—had ever been subjected to such a series of humiliations, or to so many proofs of the low esteem in which it was held, as China had been subjected to in the six months from November, 1897, to May, 1898; and, it may be added, no country had so thoroughly deserved its fate; no country had ever shown itself so incapable of correcting admitted abuses in its administration, or of organising the resources of an exceedingly rich territory, inhabited by a sturdy race with many good qualities. This was felt by some patriotic Chinese; but, though many realised the facts of the situation, they were few who saw a way out; and those few could exercise no influence on the nation until it had been subjected to yet deeper humiliation. Foreign powers were now contemplating with complacency the impending break-up of China; she was yet to reach a stage of abasement so deep that the foreign powers would fear her break-up and provide against it.

[120] Count von Bülow to Mr. White, Feb. 10th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 131.

[121] Mr. Jackson to Mr. Hay, Berlin, Dec. 4th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 130.

[122] M. Delcassé to Mr. Porter, Dec. 16th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 128.



## CHAPTER VI

### THE HUNDRED DAYS OF REFORM

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§ 1. THE abasement of China, which was the result of the war with Japan, was perhaps scarcely felt by the toiling millions, whose outlook was limited to their own village, or, at the widest, to their own province ; but it produced a profound effect on the educated classes. Those whose education enabled them to discern what had been accom-

plished, in the administration of national affairs and for the well-being of the people, by Western countries and by Japan, were already anxious to see their own country brought to the same level of progress; but they were a few thousands at most, and, at that stage, could produce but small effect on public opinion. But the disasters of the empire brought enlightenment to those others also, many myriads in number, who could judge of Chinese affairs only by their knowledge of Chinese conditions; and among those of that class who urged reform were to be found even some of the official hierarchy, a class of men whose interests must be most adversely affected by any project for changes in the administration.

§ 2. The earliest public declarations were in 1894 and 1895. The first, just before the Japanese war, was a Cantonese memorial to the throne, drawn up by Sun Yat-sen and signed by many of the gentry of Kwangtung.[1] The second, just at the end of that war, was also a memorial to the throne, drawn up by the "modern sage of China," Kang Yü-wei, signed by over a thousand küjen [2] drawn from many provinces, containing proposals for reforms, and presented as a protest against the ratification of the treaty of Shimonoseki.[3] Neither produced any effect. Societies for a reform propaganda were formed everywhere. Of one of these, the "Reform Association of China" at Nanking, the presidency was assumed by the viceroy, Chang Chih-tung,[4] who preferred to ride the flood rather than be submerged by it; it attracted the attention of the higher authorities, and was suppressed by an imperial decree [5]; and from that time it became, under another president, one of the secret societies with which China has always been permeated. The "Hanlin Reform Club" of Peking, with members drawn from the élite of the empire, was suppressed at the same time [6]; but it was revived

[1] Cantlie, "Sun Yat-sen and the Awakening of China," p. 57.

[2] The second, and higher provincial, literary degree. The four degrees may be represented as bachelor (Hsiutsai), master (Küjen), doctor (Chinshih) and academician (Hanlin).

[3] North-China Herald, Dec. 6th, 1895. The ratifications of the treaty were exchanged on May 8th, 1895; the memorial was therefore presented before that date.

[4] Chang Chih-tung was in Jan., 1896, transferred back to Wuchang, and Liu Kun-yi appointed to Nanking; they will be found there in 1900.

[5] North-China Herald, Jan. 31st, 1896.

[6] Ibid., Feb. 12th, 1896.

on the strength of assurances by leading ministers that it would do no harm [7]; and two years later, at the opening of the "hundred days" it was reported to be "flourishing." [8] In general any official inclination to reform remained a matter of pious opinion, leading to no result.

§ 3. The seeds of reform had been planted, however, and the necessity for a change—some change, any change—was felt in all parts. The feeling was stronger along the coast and the course of the Yangtze than it was in inland provinces. In the interior some effect was created by the ferment introduced by the missionaries, scattered over the empire; but, in the cities on the trade routes, a stronger impression was produced by the influence radiating from foreign schools in Peking, Shanghai and Hongkong, and from the vernacular newspapers published in the last two centres. No province threw itself so wholly and so heartily into the cause as Kwangtung; its sons felt the direct influence of English administration at Hongkong, they alone supplied the emigrants to California and to Australia, and they supplied much, and the most intellectual part, of the emigration to Singapore and other places in the Southern Isles; and from those seats of democratic thought they brought back democratic ideas, and those ideas, in the chilling air of the rusty old Chinese empire, inevitably became revolutionary. From Kwangtung, which gave the Taiping rebellion its leader, came the two champions of present-day reform, Sun Yat-sen, the chief of the revolutionary party, and Kang Yu-wei, chief of the party of constitutional reform.

§ 4. Sun Yat-sen [9] was born in 1867, of a father who had been converted to Christianity. His education was obtained under missionary auspices, chiefly English; and in 1887 he went to Hongkong to study at the newly

[7] North-China Herald, Feb. 28th, 1896.

[8] Ibid., April 18th, 1898.

[9] His official, or "baptismal," name was Sun Wen; Yat-sen (a Cantonese form) was the to-name assumed by himself, as is customary in China, on reaching adolescence, the name by which he is known to all his friends. There was a time when the British soldier would more readily recognise "Bobs" than "Lieutenant-General Sir Frederick Roberts," or even "Field-Marshal Viscount Roberts of Kandahar." So too in 1864 the American soldier never called General William Tecumseh Sherman anything but "Billy."

opened College of Medicine. He was qualified in 1892, the first graduate of the college, and started practice in Macao, and it was there that he came into close touch with the Kwangtung revolutionists. From this time he was actively engaged in revolutionary attempts. In 1894 he established a branch of the Kolaohwei at Canton, and narrowly escaped arrest as member of a deputation to the Kwangchow Fu. In October, 1895, he organised an armed raid from Hongkong on Canton, in co-operation with a revolutionary movement from Swatow, but the authorities were on the alert and it failed. Denied a refuge in Macao and then in Hongkong, he went by Honolulu to America, organising, wherever he went, a revolt by the people of China against the corrupt Manchus; and thence he proceeded to England. In London in October, 1896, he was kidnapped and kept a prisoner for ten days in the Chinese legation, from which he was released by the personal intervention of Lord Salisbury, moved thereto by Sun Yat-sen's former medical instructor, Dr. James Cantlie. In the following years "emissaries of the Chinese government haunted Sun's footsteps in Japan, in China, in Annam, and wherever he went, an enormous price being set upon his capture or his death." [10] For seventeen years, from 1895 to 1912, death by violence constantly threatened him. [11] The verdict of his friends has not been disputed—"The transparent honesty of the man, his manifest patriotism, the simplicity of his character, the readiness to endure all for his country's sake; even torture and death." [12] With opinions moulded by his missionary education and the democratic ideas he had absorbed, he was convinced that, if the Manchus were to be expelled, their place must be taken by a republic [13]; but, in 1898, the way was not prepared for the acceptance of his views.

§ 5. Kang Yu-wei was the Erasmus of the reform movement. He too was a Cantonese, born in 1858; and, though educated only in the Chinese curriculum, he yet was able to contrast the success of the measures adopted in Japan with the fatal lethargy which had fallen on all Chinese statesmen, and he was filled with bitterness at the helpless position of the empire. But he had no thought

[10] Cantlie, "Sun Yat-sen," p. 63,

[11] Ibid., p. 66,

[12] Ibid., p. 34.

[13] Ibid., p. 143.

of overturning the dynasty or of ejecting the mandarin; his aim was to bring the throne to the support of reform and to demonstrate to the mandarins the wisdom, and the necessity, of a thorough reorganisation of the machinery of government. By his writings, the most noteworthy being three books, "The Book of Great Similitudes," "The Reform of Japan," and "The Reform of Russia," he had already attracted attention and had gained the title throughout the empire of "the modern sage" [14]; and, holding no office, his name was on the tongue of all those educated Chinese who, while abhorring revolutionary methods, were anxious that reforms should be adopted to save China from what appeared to be her inevitable fate. His ideal was "to make China a republic with a nominal hereditary ruler," in other words, a constitutional monarchy; and he declared that "China could not be a republic," and that "the political evolution of the Chinese state led naturally to a monarchy." [15]

§ 6. These movements had made some progress while the empire was suffering only from the degradation of the war with Japan. The campaign of foreign aggression, which began with the buccaneering raid on Tsingtau in November, 1897, and ended in the forcible seizure of four new foreign enclaves and the extension of a fifth, and the domineering attitude of some of the foreign powers, [16] greatly intensified the feeling of humiliation and brought the intelligenzia of the empire to a fuller realisation of the imperative necessity of reform. It may fairly be said that, in the spring of 1898, all the younger members of the mandarin and the gentry were reformers—some of them, perhaps, with a confused idea of what reform meant, but all ready to support moderate reform, and some resolved on radical measures. Even the younger members of the Manchu nobility were infected—it may have been a passing fashion, but their support was none the less valuable. Their feelings of indignation at the cessions of

[14] He was referred to under this appellation in North-China Herald, Dec. 6th, 1895; it was another way of calling him "a second Confucius."

[15] Mang Hyi-zung, paper on "Kang Yu-wei," St. John's Echo, Shanghai, April, 1915.

[16] "The Chinese complain that Mr. Pavloff [Russian envoy] treats China as if it were a subject province."—Tel. Peking, July 29th, in North-China Herald, Aug. 1st, 1898.

Kiaochow and Liaotung were manifested in April by a memorial signed by 1200 of the younger metropolitan officials and recent chinshih graduates, including some Manchus, urging the emperor not to trust "the mercenary, selfish and timid advice" of his ministers, but "to use his own judgment and summon his courage in dealing with the crisis"; this memorial was presented by a prince of the blood.[17] At the same time a formidable palace conspiracy was discovered, directed against the existing court régime, and promoted by "progressive young Chinese and Manchus who are in a state of fiery indignation at the virtual sale of their country." [18]

§ 7. Reform, then, was in the air, and even at Peking there was a reform party; its organ, "Chinese Progress," a very outspoken weekly with a circulation of 10,000, was now turned into a daily.[19] The two parties were formed on lines of double cleavage—the young and enthusiastic against the old and experienced, and the South against the North. The leaders of the North, the party of the Manchus, were Hsu Tung, a Chinese Bannerman, formerly Grand Tutor to the Emperor Tungchih, and Li Hung-tsao, a Grand Councillor and native of Chihli; the leaders of the South were Weng Tung-ho and Pan Tsu-yin, both natives of Kiangsu, both accomplished scholars, and Weng Tung-ho the imperial Grand Tutor and in that capacity having always the entrée to the emperor's presence; all four "bore good reputations for integrity." [20] Between these two pairs there had been rivalry for many years; the northern party, strong in the support of the empress dowager and the Manchu nobles and clansmen, had always held its own; but the more intellectual southern party, supported by most of the Chinese ministers, could never be wholly suppressed. Other prominent actors on the scene were Junghu, Kangyi, both being partisans of the empress dowager and bitter opponents of the emperor, and Li Hung-chang, now in the cold shade of failure. The empress dowager, Tzchi, had retired from the regency in

[17] North-China Herald, April 18th, 1898.

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

[20] Bland and Backhouse, "China under the Empress Dowager," p. 180.

February, 1889, but, though abdicating her power, she did not cease to intervene in the affairs of state whenever she judged it to be necessary. A moderating influence might have been found in two imperial princes, sons of Tao-kwang; but Prince Chun, father of the emperor, had died in January, 1891; and Prince Kung, chief counsellor of the state during the greater part of forty years, had been ill since January, and died on May 29th, 1898. It is generally admitted that a continuation of the life of Prince Kung might have saved the state many ills.[21]

§ 8. Weng Tung-ho was no reformer—his interests were bound up with those of the mandarinatè—but he was the leader of the party in whose ranks the reformers were to be found; and, early in June, 1898,[22] he brought Kang Yu-wei to the personal notice of the emperor, and strongly recommended him. The emperor, immured though he was in the seclusion of his palace, was already eager to learn what other countries had done. In 1894 his attention was attracted by the gift of a richly bound copy of the New Testament, presented by 10,900 Christian Chinese women to the empress dowager on her sixtieth birthday; and from that time he was sedulous in getting all the light he could on Western religion and customs.[23] His mind was immature, though he was now approaching his thirtieth year, and his ideas were crude; but in the spring of 1898 he had reached the point of feeling the necessity for a change—some change, any change—if the state was to be saved. To him the constitutional reformer came as a messenger of light, and his first act was to read, and to be greatly impressed by, Kang Yu-wei's books on the reform of Russia by Peter the Great, and the reform of Japan in recent years, which were now sent to him by the author. The effect was instantaneous. A decree of June 13th appointed Kang Yu-wei to the sub-

[21] "Prince Kung's death was a serious matter. . . . It is probable that, had he survived, there would have been no Boxer rising."—*Ibid.*, p. 184.

"It is certain that [Prince Kung's] influence was great, and that at his death in the spring of 1898 an important balance-wheel in the intricate governmental machine was lost."—Smith, "China in Convulsion," i, p. 128.

[22] "Shortly after the Prince's [Kung's] death."—Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 184.

[23] Smith, *op. cit.*, i, p. 128.

ordinate post of a third-class secretary in the Ministry of Works, and ordered him to the distinguished honour of a personal audience on the 14th.

§ 9. On June 11th the emperor had issued his first reform decree, a state document declaring in general terms that reform was necessary and foreshadowing the creation of the Peking University [24]; and a second decree of June 12th urged princes of the blood and imperial clansmen to travel abroad and study foreign institutions. These decrees alarmed the Manchus, but they had been submitted to Tzchi for her approval,[25] and protest was useless. The keen flair of the great empress scented danger, however, and she took prompt steps which, a hundred days later, were to bring the reform movement to an end. On June 18th several decrees appeared, all bearing signs of having been issued under coercion of the empress dowager; one deprived the Grand Secretary and Grand Councillor, Weng Tung-ho, Grand Tutor of the emperor, of all his offices and dignities, and ordered him to "return to his native place"; one ordered that all the higher officials, civil and military, should return thanks for receiving any appointment in a personal audience of both the emperor and the empress dowager; one appointed Junglu to be viceroy of Chihli, Wang Wen-shao being brought from that post to take Weng Tung-ho's place on the Grand Council. By the first Tzchi showed that she could strike hard at her enemies; by the second, without yet resuming the regency, she put her finger on the pulse of the administration; by the third she placed her personal friend and loyal supporter in command of China's only organised army.[26]

§ 10. All this, however, lurked in the background, and reform became the fashion. Among others Junglu was affected; before leaving for Tientsin he recommended for employment a young reformer who was afterwards executed.[27] Even the empress dowager, who had

[24] Translation in Bland and Backhouse, op. cit., p. 186.

[25] Ibid., p. 185.

[26] Junglu was appointed in 1894 captain-general of the Peking gendarmerie, lieutenant-general of the White Banner, and minister of the Tsungli Yamen; in 1895 president of the ministry of War; in 1896 assistant Grand Secretary; in 1898 Grand Secretary and comptroller of the ministry of Finances; and now, June 12th, viceroy of Chihli and Peiyang Tachen.—Cordier, *Rélations*, iii, p. 402.

[27] Bland and Backhouse, op. cit., p. 186.



sanctioned the first of the decrees, may be assumed to have looked with a kindly eye on the emperor's reaching after reform, so long as the changes would serve to strengthen the state, would not impair the prestige of the Manchu dynasty, and would not undermine the privileges of the Manchu nobles and the imperial officials. But the strongest adherent of the movement was a viceroy who was afterwards to become the leader of the moderate conservatives, Chang Chih-tung, then viceroy of Wuchang. At this juncture he wrote a book, under the title "Learn,"[28] of which a million copies were bought and read throughout the width of the empire.[29] Clothed in a faultless classical style, it appealed to the intellect of all who read it, and produced a deep effect on the minds of all, from the emperor [30] down.

§ 11. In the introduction to "Learn" the author enumerated five objects of learning: learn the shame of not being like Japan, etc.; learn the fear that we may become as India, Annam, Burma, Korea, Egypt and Poland; learn that, if we do not change our customs, we cannot reform our methods; learn what is important, especially the methods of foreign governments; learn what is radical, and let not much learning make you forget the holy sages; and all this learning will accord well with the Doctrine of the Mean. He inculcated the maintenance of religion and the Confucian precepts; and declared that no dynasty since the Han and Tang [31] had shown a better spirit than "this our Holy Tsing," to which all must be loyal. He has ascertained that Western nations generally observe the three moral obligations—"the sovereign is head of his subjects, the father of his sons, the husband of his wife,"—and that they recognise class distinctions; therefore their institutions may profitably be studied. The value of all literature must be tested by Confucian standards. China was not fitted to be a republic—with

[28] An excellent summary of "Learn," by Mr. S. I. Woodbridge, is disguised under the title "China's Only Hope."

[29] "China's Only Hope," p. 6.

[30] An imperial decree of July 25th declared that "Learn" would be of great benefit and instruction to the scholars of the empire, and ordered its general distribution.—Smith, op. cit., i, p. 140.

[31] Han, 206 B.C. to A.D. 25, Tang, A.D. 618 to 907, the two most glorious epochs in Chinese history. The Chinese generally style themselves "Sons of Han," but the Cantonese "Sons of Tang."

unrestrained liberty, "the scholar would always sit at meat, the farmer would pay no taxes, the merchant would garner unbounded wealth, the workman would strike for higher wages, the proletariat would plunder and rob, the son would disobey the father, the student would not follow the teacher, the wife would not obey the husband, the low would not defer to the high, the strong would oppress the weak, and mankind would soon be annihilated"; therefore a strong centralised government is necessary. Again he enjoins on the people to retain the Confucian classics, but to include also the study of other subjects; and, Japan being nearer, students should go to that country to study. Schools should be established everywhere, and to supply the necessary funds, the money now spent on benevolent institutions, idol processions, theatrical exhibitions, and clan ancestral halls, should be diverted; if these were not enough, "then convert the temples and monasteries of the Buddhists and Taoists into schools, together with the temple lands and their incomes." Books were to be translated and more newspapers established; methods were to be reformed, railways constructed, the army reorganised and kept up to its strength, and all religions must be tolerated. He declared further that "the fate of China depends upon the literati alone"; and that the opponents of reform were of three classes—the conservatives, who are stuck in the mud of antiquity; the slow bellies of Chinese officialdom, who, if reform came, must bestir themselves; and the hypercritical, who would criticise anything.

§ 12. The reform movement was now fairly launched, and decrees were issued with bewildering rapidity by the emperor, who was completely under Kang Yu-wei's influence. The following is a list of those introducing the more far-reaching reforms:

- June 20th.—Tsunqli Yamen ordered to report on steps to be taken to encourage art, science and agriculture.
- June 20th.—Urging haste in building the Peking Hankow railway.
- June 23rd.—Abolishing the Wenchang essay as a prominent feature in the examinations, this being universally admitted to cripple Chinese thought.
- June 27th.—Ministers and princes to report on the adoption of Western arms and drill for the Manchu Banners.
- July 4th.—Agricultural schools to be established in each province.

- July 4th.—Indicating an intention to appoint Sun Chia-nai, a progressive, to be president of the new university of Peking.
- July 5th.—Patent and copyright laws to be introduced.
- July 6th.—Ministries ordered to report on the substitution of mental tests, in the military examinations, for the existing tests of archery, riding and sword-brandishing.
- July 7th.—Offering rewards to inventors and authors.
- July 10th.—Establishing colleges and schools in all district cities, and ordering that all memorial and unofficial temples should be used for the purpose.
- July 14th.—Officials ordered to do all in their power to encourage trade and assist merchants.
- July 29th.—School boards to be established in every city in the empire.
- July 29th.—Forecasting reform of the courts of law.
- Aug. 9th.—Journalists encouraged to write on political subjects for the enlightenment of officials.
- Aug. 9th.—Peking University established; Sun Chia-nai appointed president; Dr. W. A. P. Martin appointed head of the faculty and granted second civil rank (red button).
- Aug. 10th.—Bureau of Control for Mines and Railways to be established under the presidency of two Imperial High Commissioners, Wang Wen-shao and Chang Yin-hwan.
- Aug. 10th.—Junglu and Liu Kun-yi [32] ordered to consult and report on the establishment of a naval academy and training ships.
- Aug. 10th. } Ministers at Peking and officials in the provinces urged  
Aug. 26th. } to assist the emperor in his work of reform.
- Aug. 16th.—Government Bureau of Translation established.
- Aug. 19th.—Reform of method of appointing to Hanlin.
- Aug. 21st.—Establishing Ministry of Agriculture, Arts and Commerce.
- Aug. 21st.—Schools to be established abroad, under the auspices of the legations, for the sons of Chinese abroad.
- Aug. 24th.—Emperor and empress dowager intend to go by rail to Tientsin on Oct. 29th to review the troops.
- Aug. 28th.—Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung ordered to establish at Shanghai and Hankow Bureaux of Commerce for the encouragement of trade.
- Aug. 30th.—Abolishing six minor and sinecurist Boards at Peking; duplicate governorships, those in provinces having also a viceroy—Hupeh, Kwangtung, Yunnan, but not Kiangsu, the governor of which is at Soochow;

[32] The viceroys at Tientsin and Nanking were ex officio Imperial High Commissioners for matters connected with international trade in, respectively, the northern and southern provinces—Peiyang and Nanyang Tachen; they acted in this capacity as viceroy-general over the northern and southern provinces respectively.

- the Director General of the Yellow River ; salt and grain commissioners in those provinces in which no salt is produced or grain sent for tribute ; and many minor sinecurist posts.
- Sept. 5th.—On the recommendation of Chang Yin-hwan, a beginning to be made in organising with Western drill a national army based on conscription, involving the abolition of the Green Banner, the "regular" Chinese army.
- Sept. 8th.—Decrees on labour relief, the encouragement of machinery, and a medical school.
- Sept. 9th.—An appeal not to inundate the emperor with memorials.
- Sept. 10th.—Abolishing more sinecure and redundant posts.
- Sept. 11th.—Establishing schools for instruction in production of tea and silk.
- Sept. 12th.—Tsungli Yamen and Ministry of War to report on transfer of work of Ichang [33] to Imperial Posts.
- Sept. 12th.—The examinations for military degrees to be remodelled.
- Sept. 13th.—General right granted to all subjects to memorialise the throne in closed memorials.
- Sept. 14th.—Granting to Manchus who have no taste or capacity for civil or military office, permission to take up a profession or trade.
- Sept. 14th.—Uncultivated lands of military garrisons to be thrown open to the people.
- Sept. 16th.—Sanctioning a system of annual published budgets of receipts and expenditure.
- Sept. 16th.—Yuen Shih-kai promoted brevet vice-president of a ministry and appointed Inspector General of army organisation in the Peiyang.

§ 13. Provided that reform was to begin at the top and not at the foundation, no fault can be found with this list of reforms. Every one was sound, every one struck at a manifest evil, and every one was capable of being carried into effect ; but the whole structure of reform by decree was a pyramid standing on its apex. It was the work of the emperor, physically weak and mentally anæmic, and of his adviser, Kang Yu-wei, a single-minded enthusiast, with no experience in administration and unskilled in swaying men, whose head had been turned by his sudden elevation to a position of power ; he had taken no high office for himself, contenting himself with his influence over the mind of the emperor, but his government of that mind was a philosopher's government and not a statesman's. Beyond these two, the reform movement was

[33] Cf. chap. iii, §§ 2, 19.

actively supported by the young students who had acquired a Western education, and by the Cantonese officials and gentry; the rest of the southern party was lukewarm or apprehensive of the consequences; and the northern party was united in sullen resistance, though, during the hundred days, its members dared not show any open opposition. The masses in the nation generally were as yet apathetic.

§ 14. The decrees of the first months, until the end of August, chiefly laying broad foundations, were generally approved, and were not opposed by any party; but, emboldened by success, the two reformers then issued a series of decrees which struck at the roots of existing evils and excited the active hostility of many whose interests were touched, directly or indirectly. The decree of August 30th not only hit the sinecurists who were deprived of their posts, but it affected also those who, for a consideration, had put them there, and those others who hoped for such a post, and those others who counted on obtaining one for a nephew or a devoted follower. The decree of September 5th worked for the ill-educated military wing of the gentry the harm which that of August 30th had worked for the scholarly civilians. That of September 12th was designed to transfer to a regulated service the patronage connected with an annual postal expenditure of three million taels. Those of June 27th and September 14th relating to the Manchus struck at the privileges of the Manchu commonalty, and brought within sight a possibility of being compelled to work. The general right to memorialise struck at the privileges of the higher officials who had had a monopoly of the right; and the introduction of published budgets threatened the very foundations of the system from which the officials of the empire obtained the emoluments proportioned to the dignity of their office. The purists were further scandalised by a decision, taken at the end of August and approved by the empress dowager, that she and the emperor should travel by fire-carriage on the iron-road to Tientsin on October 29th, and there review the troops.

§ 15. During this time the former incumbents were generally left undisturbed in their posts, though newly created posts, created to further reform, were of course

given to adherents of reform; but some exceptions were made. On September 7th Li Hung-chang was dismissed from his post as minister of the Tsungli Yamen, together with the Manchu minister Kingsin; Li had little of his old actual power left, but he was still China's most capable statesman, and a firm supporter of the empress dowager, convinced that the ship of state was safe only with her hand on the helm; his downfall was directly attributed to his support of Russian designs in Manchuria and his opposition to England,[34] but his unfriendliness to reform was doubtless an element in the emperor's decision. On September 4th, for the offence of suppressing a memorial sent in conformity to the decree granting the right generally, many officials of the ministry of Rites were summarily dismissed and their places filled by reformers; among the cashiered officials were the two presidents, the Manchu Hwaitapu, a kinsman of the empress dowager, and the Chinese Hsü Ying-kwei, and the two Manchu and two Chinese vice-presidents. The conservatives were alarmed for their privileges and the reformers were equally alarmed at possible action by their opponents, and both sides saw that the time had come to strike. Both struck, the emperor hard and blindly, the empress dowager hard and effectively.

§ 16. Each needed the support of the army, as had been the case in 1875.[35] This was now under the command of Junglu, the empress dowager's man; but, under him, was Yuen Shih-kai, who, on the termination of his functions as resident at Seoul, had, in 1895, been appointed civil commandant of the Tingwu division of 5,000 foreign-drilled troops of the Peiyang army,[36] and subsequently, in addition, provincial Judge of Chihli. The empress dowager wished to wait, before striking, until the proposed trip to Tientsin, when she could consult Junglu in person, on the best way to counter the hostility of the southern provinces [37]; but the emperor, warned by Kang Yu-wei

[34] Cf. chap. iv, § 12.

"Li Hung-chang has recently shown himself markedly antagonistic to our interests."—Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 8th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 240.

[35] Cf. "Submission," chap. xiii, § 18.

[36] North-China Herald, Jan. 3rd, 1896.

[37] Bland and Backhouse, op. cit., p. 201.

that Tzchi, supported by Li Hung-chang and malcontent imperial clansmen, was on the point of taking steps to restrict his personal freedom, resolved to anticipate her by shutting her up and clipping her wings; it was a time to do or die, and as a first step he sent for Yuen Shih-kai. Yuen came promptly and, at his first audience, convinced the emperor of his zeal for reform; a decree was then issued giving him the brevet rank of vice-president of a ministry, and charging him with the special task of organising the army; he would then be in effective command of the Peiyang forces, while the control of the viceroy Junglu, shut up in his yamen, would become nominal. He was also summoned to audience with the empress dowager, and, on the morning of September 20th, to a final audience with the emperor. He was then given a decree appointing him viceroy *ad interim* of Chihli and Peiyang Tachen, and received his final instructions [38]—to execute Junglu immediately by decapitation in his own yamen, seize the government, and bring the Peiyang army to Peking without delay. It was then the emperor's intention to seize the person of the empress dowager and to arrest the leaders of the conservative party, especially Kangyi, Yülu, Hwaitapu and Hsü-Ying-kwei.[39]

§ 17. There are two circumstantial accounts of the course taken at this juncture by Yuen Shih-kai. One follows the foregoing narrative of events at Peking, according to which the initiative in giving him his orders came directly from the emperor; it then shows that, leaving by train on the morning of September 20th, he reached Tientsin before noon and, going at once to Junglu, asked if he regarded him as a faithful blood brother, the two having taken the oath of brotherhood several years before. The viceroy answered in the affirmative, whereupon Yuen said—"You well may, for the emperor has sent me to kill you, and, instead, I now betray his scheme, because of my loyalty to the empress dowager and of my affection for you"; and he laid before his superior the instructions he had received.[40] This account was accepted at the

[38] Cf. *postea*, § 18.

[39] Bland and Backhouse, pp. 201 seq.; North-China Herald, Oct. 10th, 1898.

[40] Bland and Backhouse, p. 206; North-China Herald, Oct. 10th, 1898.

time by the reformers, whose plans were thus brought to naught, and generally by foreign historians [41]; it was believed in 1900 by the leaders of the Boxer movement, who hoped for his support, and by the foreigners in Tientsin, who were apprehensive of the action he might take in the post he then occupied of governor of Shantung; it was acted on by the reforming conservatives in 1909 when, on the removal by death of his protectress, the empress dowager, he was driven from office; and, in 1912, it made his acceptance by the republicans as president of the republic a matter of some difficulty.

§ 18. The other account was given by Yuen Shih-kai himself to the Times' correspondent at Peking in November, 1911, when he was recalled to office in the vain hope of saving the dynasty. Thirteen years after the occurrence he said that, on the night of September 18th, he was visited by Tan Tze-tung, an adherent of Kang Yu-wei, secretary of the Grand Council, who explained to him the plan which had been decided on, which, he declared, had the emperor's consent and approval; and he produced an imperial decree, written in black ink, giving general instructions on the subject. Yuen objected that the decree was not one from the vermilion pencil, and that it did not specifically refer to the seizure of the empress dowager nor to the execution of Junglu, but only to a "sound plan of action"; and he declared that he could take no such action without specific orders under the vermilion pencil. At his farewell audience at daybreak on the 20th, the emperor made no reference to the "sound plan of action," and gave him no specific orders except to support reform. On his seeing Junglu at Tientsin, it was the viceroy who broached the subject—"You have come for my head; you had better confess, as a man has told me everything." Yuen then explained—"What you have heard is but the plot of a few political schemers; the emperor said nothing to me of such a plan, and he is innocent of such a measure." [42] This is not inconsistent with the opinions commonly attributed to Yuen Shih-kai, even by those who

[41] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 206; Cordier, "Relations," iii, p. 408; Kent, "The Passing of the Manchus," p. 18; Sergeant, "The Great Empress Dowager of China," p. 184; Smith, "China in Convulsion," i, p. 148; Dingle, "China's Revolution," p. 225.

[42] McCormick, "The Flowery Republic," p. 352.



condemned his course [43]; but it is the uncorroborated and *ex parte* statement of the survivor of the two most concerned, and it can only be accepted with some reserve. At the same time it must be remembered that, as was said by his great leader thirty-five years before,[44] "this is China, not Europe"; and an official occupying a subordinate though responsible position may well have thought less of his loyalty to his sovereign, when that sovereign was an inexperienced and reckless puppet in the leading strings of a visionary enthusiast, than of his duty to his immediate superior the viceroy and to China's real ruler the empress dowager. The latter was the upholder of official privilege as well as Manchu rights, and had acquired experience and certainty of touch by forty years of power; and a conscientious official may well have decided to support her party rather than the emperor's. It is by such methods as were now to be adopted that general elections are held in Asiatic countries.

§ 19. On receiving warning of the reformers' plot, Junglu lost no time and reached the presence of the empress dowager, in the Iho palace at Yuenmingyuen, at 5 p.m. of the same day, September 20th. A council of the most prominent of Tzchi's supporters was called, including the members of the Grand Council and many heads of ministries, many Manchu princes and nobles, and the two cashiered ministers, Hsü Ying-kwei and Hwaitapu; and at this council a counter-revolution was decided on, supported by troops to be sent up by Junglu; he returned to Tientsin that night. On the morning of September 22nd the emperor was to give audience to the Japanese statesman, marquis Ito Hirobumi; before the hour appointed he was

[43] "His [Yuen's] predilections were for reform, but, like most Chinese, he was a constitutional trimmer, and at the critical juncture he failed the emperor and betrayed his plans to Junglu."—Smith, "China in Convulsion," i, p. 148.

"In 'My Reminiscences, by Sun Yat-sen' it is mentioned that Yuen Shih-kai sent a messenger to Sun to convey Yuen's appreciation of what he was doing, and offering to help him in his campaign. My wife and myself knew of this from Dr. Sun personally. . . . Yuen had at least a leaning towards reform."—Cantlie, "Sun Yat-sen," p. 149.

"Yuen Shih-kai comes in for a good deal of censure, and it is safe to predict that, if ever a progressive government is established, he will do well to make an early escape from China."—North-China Herald, Dec. 5th, 1898.

[44] Cf. "Submission," chap. v, § 14.

summoned to the presence of the empress dowager, whose person he had intended to seize, and was not again seen in full liberty. For many days it was suspected that he had been put to death, and rumours of his illness, the common forerunners of a convenient death, were in constant circulation. The foreign envoys gave the Chinese ministers to understand that they considered themselves accredited to the emperor alone, and that any accident to his person would give rise to grave suspicions; they made frequent pointed inquiries as to the state of his health, and were ultimately reassured only by an examination made, on the suggestion of Sir C. MacDonald to the Chinese ministers, by Dr. Dethève, the physician of the French legation; and the opinion was expressed that "there is some anxiety on the part of the empress dowager and her party to appease the opinion of other nations, which is adverse to them." [45] It is certain that the emperor's life was only saved by the fear of foreign adverse opinion and by the difficulty of immediately finding a successor.

§ 20. Meantime Kang Yu-wci, the protagonist of this reform movement, had escaped. After Yuen Shih-kai's first audience the empress dowager informed the emperor that Kang had spoken disrespectfully of her private life and morals, and that he must be arrested. [46] On September 17th the emperor sent him a private note warning him of his danger and urging him to leave Peking, and a decree asking why he had not obeyed a previous order to go to Shanghai and there establish the Official Gazette, and adding, "You must proceed at once outside [? abroad, or only away from Peking] and devise means to save me without delay." He spent the next two days in hiding, consulting with his adherents, who told him that "the situation was getting more serious"; and he asked a friendly adviser, Rev. Timothy Richard, to obtain the support of the British and American envoys. [47] He left Peking before daybreak on September 20th, and travelled

[45] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 18th, 29th, 1898, *China*, No. 1, 1899, pp. 270, 278; *North-China Herald*, Oct. 17th, 1898.

[46] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 203.

[47] Sir C. MacDonald, Mr. Conger, Baron von Heyking, and Sir R. Hart, who might have given wise counsel, were all absent from Peking during the crisis. Mr. T. Richard was later informed by Sir C. MacDonald that he would do well not to interfere in affairs of state.

to Tientsin on the same train with Yuen Shih-kai. At Tientsin he had a narrow escape, but got away on a British steamer; at Shanghai all incoming steamers were searched for him, but outside Wusung he was transferred direct to the P. & O. steamer *Ballaarat* leaving for Hongkong; and at Hongkong he accepted shelter in the police barracks. Thence he went to Saigon and Singapore, and thence he took refuge in the outer world. Whenever he was under the British flag the British authorities gave him special protection, in order to avoid the diplomatic complications which would have arisen from the assassination or kidnapping of a political refugee who had not been proved to have committed any criminal offence. The Chinese government offered 100,000 taels for his person, dead or alive, ordered the destruction of all books and essays written by him, destroyed the graves of his ancestors, and did its best to arrest and execute every one of his kinsmen who could be got hold of [48]; but the Cantonese gild at Shanghai sent to the press a resolution in which its members expressed their gratitude to the British for having saved his life. [49]

§ 21. On September 22nd the emperor, a prisoner in a pavilion of his palace, presented a humble memorial to the empress dowager, praying her to reassume the government, and asking that he might be allowed to pay his obeisance to her the next day; and a decree from Tzchi graciously accepted the rule of the state. The next day the emperor, at the head of the body of princes, nobles and high ministers, duly made with them his "congratulatory obeisances." [50] Tzchi's hold on the government was also strengthened. Avowed reformers were dismissed from the positions to which they had been appointed, and

[48] Kang Yu-wei's own statement in *China Mail*, Hongkong, Oct. 7th, 1898; Governor, Hongkong, to Colonial Office, Oct. 8th, adm. Sir E. Seymour to Admiralty, Oct. 2nd, Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 13th, 1898, *China*, No. 1, 1899; pp. 280, 300, 306.

The decree of Sept. 17th, as published in the *Peking Gazette*, ended with the words—"We command him to start with all speed for Shanghai; he is forbidden to linger here any longer." It contained no reference to his getting help for the emperor.

On Sept. 23rd the village of Fangchun, south of the river opposite to Canton, was raided by yamen runners searching for all members of the Kang family; those living there had been warned and had escaped a few hours before. *North China Herald*, Oct. 7th, 1898.

[49] *Ibid.*, Oct. 3rd, 1898.

[50] *Ibid.*, Sept. 25th, 1898.

their places were filled by others whose loyalty—to the empress dowager—was beyond question. The most important step was the appointment of Yülu, an imperial clansman, as viceroy of Chihli, and the transfer of Junglu to Peking; Yülu was thus *ex officio* Peiyang Tachen, but the command of the Peiyang forces was left in Junglu's hands, and a new viceregal seal was sent down omitting this function. Junglu, the nephew of Tzehi's sister, the friend—the world said, more than friend [51]—of Tzehi's youth, her firm supporter through all her career and always her most trusted adviser, was now appointed to a number of posts which gave him a position of power unprecedented in the history of the dynasty. Already commander of one of the Eight Banners and retaining command of the New Model army of the Peiyang, he was brought into the Grand Council, made junior Grand Secretary (the senior being Li Hung-chang), and appointed Comptroller General of the ministry of War.[52] Other kinsmen of Tzehi were given important commands in the Eight Banners and offices in the provinces—her grand-nephews Tsengho governor of Hupeh, and Yüchang provincial treasurer at Nanking; her kinsmen Sungshow governor of Kiangsi, and Teshow governor of Kiangsu—and other Manchus to other posts.[53] The old statesmen of Chinese race fell into line with no delay. Chang Chih-tung, viceroy at Wuchang, hastened to swallow his words of encouragement to reform, and telegraphed to Tzehi urging her to take strong measures against the reformers; but another Chinese statesman, Liu Kun-yi, viceroy at Nanking, “was found brave and disinterested enough to speak on behalf of the emperor,”[54] and his advocacy must be considered one of the factors in saving the emperor's life.

§ 22. At the reformers the empress dowager struck hard, and she especially singled out the province of Kwangtung for retribution. On September 23rd a decree was issued depriving Kang Yu-wei of his rank and ordering his arrest and immediate decapitation; and another ordering the arrest of Chang Yin-hwan and the confiscation of his

[51] Cf. “Submission,” chap. iii, §§ 7, 10.

[52] North-China Herald, Oct. 3rd, 10th, 1898.

[53] Ibid., Nov. 14th, 1898. Tsengho was cashiered two months later. Ibid., Jan. 23rd, 1899.

[54] Bland and Backhouse, *op. cit.*, p. 220

estates. The former had escaped, but the latter was arrested, and only the strongest representations by the foreign envoys on behalf of one who had been Chinese envoy abroad saved his life for the time [55]; he was banished to the frontier in Turkestan, and only those who know Chinese procedure can appreciate the horrors of such a sentence on one whose estate had been confiscated, whose friends would not venture to come to his aid, but who was compelled to meet incessant and extortionate demands for payment for even the necessities of life. On the 24th the censor Sung Peh-lu (a Cantonese especially detested by Tzchi) was cashiered for having recommended a traitor [sc., a reformer] Liang Ki-chao, the editor of "Chinese Progress"; a second decree cashiered three taotais—Hsü Kien-ying, Wu Mao-ting [better known as Woo Jim-pah] and Twanfang—who, having been appointed directors of the bureaux of Commerce, Agriculture, and Mechanical Science, respectively, had audaciously styled themselves High Commissioners; a third ordered the arrest of sixteen reformers, all Cantonese. Of these last some escaped, some were cashiered, but six were brought to trial, summarily sentenced, and decapitated on the 28th; these were Kang Kwang-jen [56] (a younger brother of Kang Yu-wei), Yang Shen-siu (a censor), Tan Tze-tung (son of the governor of Hupeh), and three Hanlins, Lin Hsio, Yang Jui and Liu Kwang-ti.[57] The two men most active in stamping out reform and searching for reformers were Kangyi, ex-governor of Kwangtung, now president of the ministry of War, and Chungli, president of the ministry of Punishments and commandant of the Peking Gendarmerie.[58]

§ 23. The counter-reform was taken in hand without delay. An omnibus decree of September 26th made a clean sweep of many reforms: the various yamens at Peking which had been abolished as sinecures were restored

[55] Cf. chap. x, § 2.

[56] No one was bold enough to claim Kang Kwang-jen's body, and on Sept. 29th it was dragged away by the executioners and cast unburied in the paupers' burying ground, considered in China the greatest dishonour and misfortune.—Nor. China Herald, Oct. 10th, 1898.

[57] "The blood of the martyrs will be the seed of the new China. These men were not mere unattached scholars, but, except Kang, were men of high official rank in responsible positions."—Ibid., Nov. 14th, 1898.

[58] Ibid., Oct. 24th, 1898.

to their original state and their officials to their original duties and emoluments; but the restoration of abolished posts in the provinces was left for further consideration; the magazine "Chinese Progress" was suppressed; the general right given to all persons to memorialise the throne was withdrawn, and the privilege was in the future, as in the past, limited to censors and high officials; the Peking university and the secondary schools in the provincial capitals were to stand, but the fu and hien cities were to exercise their own volition about establishing elementary schools; the Buddhist, Taoist and unofficial memorial temples which had been ordered to be turned into schools, were to revert to their former use; the proposals for encouraging trade, agriculture, science and military reform were in general to be retained, but not such of them as conflicted with the interests of the government or were contrary to established custom.[59] On November 1st a decree restored the posts of governor of Kwangtung, Hupeh and Yunnan, and Director General of the Yellow River; and a second restored, for the military examinations, the old tests in horse and foot archery, brandishing swords, and throwing weights.[60] The last decree conciliated the rank and file of the Manchus in and around Peking; but those in the provinces were infected by the spirit of reform and had hoped for better things; and it was reported of the Manchu garrisons in Hangechow and Chapu, 6,000 in all, that they had laid aside their bows and matchlocks and were armed with Mauser rifles,[61] and had energetically begun drilling with Western tactics.[62]

§ 24. The Manchus and their adherents were in the ascendant, but before them loomed two causes of fear which imposed on them some restraint. Within their body were many divergent interests, and the empress dowager was not yet able to compose their jealousies. On October 23rd, while the ultimate fate of the emperor was still in the balance, a palace conspiracy broke out, presumably with the connivance of Tzehi, to place on

[59] North-China Herald, Oct. 3rd, 1898.

[60] Ibid., Nov. 7th, 1898.

[61] Rifles of 450 calibre, mark 1880, at a time when the armies of other nations had adopted rifles of about 300 calibre.

[62] North-China Herald, Nov. 14th, 1898.

the throne the fourteen-year-old son of Yikwang, Prince Ching,[63] then president of the Tsungli Yamen; the project was opposed by two imperial clansmen (of whom one was probably Junglu) who were ministers of the Tsungli Yamen, and before their superior knowledge of foreign affairs Tzchi had to give way; but the crisis led to the empress dowager bestowing Shāngfang swords on Tsaichi (Prince Twan) and Tsailien, two sons of Prince Tun, such swords giving the right to behead any one, regardless of rank or dignity, without previous reference to the throne.[64] On September 22nd the empress dowager was eager to recall to office her loyal adherent and most able statesman, Li Hung-chang, who had been driven from office two weeks before, but Junglu urged that this would certainly antagonise England [65]; a decree of November 13th ultimately brought him back to official life by appointing him to the revived post of director general of the Yellow River.[66] The administration was anxious to avoid having an international difficulty injected into China's domestic squabbles. The foreign legations had already become intrusive—they appeared to have laid aside for a time their own jealousies—and were constant in their inquiries for the emperor's health and well-being, and in delicately suggesting that the foreign envoys were accredited to him and not to any usurping successor. Junglu, from the wider outlook which he had gained at Tientsin, was deeply impressed by the steady movement of foreign navies in the direction of the northern seas, coupled with the firm tone of the legations; and when this loyal and trusted adviser of the empress dowager counselled prudence, she must perforce listen to his advice. But, while yielding, all precautions were taken, and troops were called in from the marches of the empire and concentrated on Peking, Tientsin and Shanhaikwan.

§ 25. There was much unrest, and the precautions of the foreign powers were directed as much to the dangers from this cause as to the political situation in Peking.

[63] Grandson of the seventeenth son of Kienlung (1736-96), Kiaking being the fifteenth son. For Kiaking's descendants, see genealogical table at end of "Submission," chap. xiii.

[64] North-China Herald, Oct. 31st, 1898.

[65] Ibid., Oct. 10th, 1898.

[66] Ibid., Nov. 21st, 1898.

During the spring and summer of 1898 there had been anti-foreign outbreaks in the island of Hainan,[67] at Shasi,[68] at Sungpu,[69] and at Yangchow[70]; and the "notorious Chow Han" again appeared in Hupeh, inciting the people to the wholesale slaughter of native converts.[71] In Kwangsi a French missionary, Père Bertollet, was murdered in the spring,[72] and in the summer a rebellion broke out,[73] which it took five years' campaigning to suppress. After the *coup d'état* there was an anti-foreign riot at Canton on October 25th [74]; an English missionary named Fleming was murdered in Kweichow in November [75]; and in Kùchowien, Ichowfu, Shantung, there were repeated and serious anti-foreign risings—in one on November 5th a German missionary was attacked, and in a second on November 13th three American missionaries, but in both cases effective protection to the persons of the foreigners was given by the officials [76]; in a third, in December, "two Roman Catholic missionaries were murdered and a great deal of mission property destroyed." [77]

§ 26. At Peking much apprehension was felt from the disturbed political state, but the actual danger came from the turbulent soldiery brought to the capital to guard against the fear of foreign aggression, and of these the most turbulent were the Kansu troops of Tung Fu-siang, stationed in the southern Hunting Park. Men of this force attacked, on September 30th, a party consisting of members of the British and American legations, and the next day the foreign representatives decided to send for a guard of marines from each of their fleets. The viceroy at Tientsin refused to allow them to pass, but, as the envoys

[67] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, April 15th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 102.

[68] Ibid., May 11th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 78.

[69] Ibid., May 15th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 85.

[70] Ibid., July 7th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 140.

[71] Ibid., April 25th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 119.

[72] Ibid., May 3rd, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 71.

[73] Ibid., July 11th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 163.

[74] North-China Herald, Oct. 31st, 1898.

[75] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Nov. 20th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 306.

[76] North-China Herald, Dec. 5th, 1898.

[77] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Dec. 26th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, p. 336.



persisted, the Tsungli Yamen gave orders that their passage was to be permitted; the Chinese legation in London also protested against the step, and, after the guards had arrived, requested that they be withdrawn before the close of navigation, but the request was not complied with.[78] On October 23rd another attack was made by Tung Fu-siang's men at the railway station on a party of engineers and members of the British legation. As the general commanding was slow to punish the offenders, Junglu took the matter in hand and obtained a special commission from the empress dowager for Hu Yü-fen, governor of Peking, to investigate the matter; but even then the superior officers of the force assumed an attitude of bold and determined resistance to any inquiry.[79] The troops around Peking, largely increased as they had been, were filled with a feeling of hostility to the visible enemy—the few foreigners in Peking—and in this feeling they were supported by the rowdy element of the people who were thought to be waiting expectantly for the signal for a general rising [80]; the danger to the personnel of the legations was apparent, and the foreign envoys jointly demanded the removal of Tung Fu-siang's Kansu troops from the vicinity of Peking. The Chinese ministers were between Scylla and Charybdis. They were convinced of the wisdom of the policy of conciliating the foreign powers in the actual situation, but, with the means at their disposal, they were unable to coerce the disorderly troops; these had it in their power to throw Peking into disorder, and, given good leadership and a better discipline, to overthrow the fabric of Manchu ascendancy, in so far as that was based on the paper organisation of the Manchu Banners. The imperial ministers set to work, however, and, probably by means which greatly increased the banking account of Tung Fu-siang and his generals, succeeded in procuring the removal of the Kansu troops to Kichowpei, eighty

[78] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 1st, 5th, Dec. 2nd, Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Oct. 5th; 12th, 15th; Nov. 28th; Dec. 2nd, 1898, *ibid.*, pp. 258, 264, 266, 310, 311.

Though the passage had been permitted by order of the Tsungli Yamen, Kangyi made the act a ground of impeachment of Hu Yü-fen, governor of Peking and chief director of the Imperial Police of China.—*North-China Herald*, Oct. 31st, 1898.

[79] *Ibid.*, Oct. 31st, Nov. 7th, 1898.

[80] *Tel. Peking*, Nov. 30th, *ibid.*, Dec. 5th, 1898.

miles east of Peking, though still 150 miles west of Shan-haikwan, to which the envoys had desired that they should be sent; but the result was accepted as a satisfactory solution.[81]

§ 27. Except for the question of regulating the succession to the throne, which was not taken in hand until over a year later,[82] the counter-reform movement was now completed. The empress dowager had seated herself on the safety-valve; the leaders in reform had been executed, banished to the frontier, exiled, cashiered, or driven to recant; the Cantonese wing had been crushed to earth. never, it was decided, to rise again; and this promising attempt at reform of the empire within the empire, correcting manifest abuses and anachronisms while maintaining the dynasty, was brought to failure. The reasons for the failure are obvious. The movement was the creation of two men, Kang Yu-wei and the emperor, a visionary enthusiast and an inexperienced weakling; and they were actively supported only by the Cantonese, at Peking and in their own province, and the support of this revolutionary party threw suspicion on the movement in all the other provinces. Among statesmen of position they secured the active support only of Chang Yin-hwan, a Cantonese; Chang Chih-tung gave it a Platonic approval; and Liu Kun-yi maintained an attitude of cold neutrality. As said before, the pyramid of reform stood on its apex. Against the movement were arrayed, actively or passively, all the forces of the empire. The peasantry would have welcomed a reduction of taxes or freedom from extortion, but otherwise asked only to be left alone; the traders were probably enlightened enough to welcome the reform of abuses, but dreaded a state of disorder; the gentry, from whose ranks the officials were drawn, resented the modification of established customs; gentry and officials alike regarded with dismay the curtailment of official privileges and emoluments; such statesmen as Li Hung-chang saw in the established régime the only possible system for the empire; that portion of the

[81] Tel. Peking, Oct. 31st, Nov. 7th, Dec. 5th, 1898; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 29th, Nov. 20th, 26th, 1898, China, No. 1, 1899, pp. 278, 300, 322, 351.

[82] Cf. chap. vii, §§ 27-30.

army which was represented by the Green Banner refused to accept annihilation; the Manchu rank and file were threatened with being compelled to go to work; the Manchu gentry and nobility saw that Manchu ascendancy was threatened; the imperial clansmen and princes of blood saw the foundations of the Manchu throne endangered; and the empress dowager saw her own life in peril, and the reversal of all that had been gained in her forty years of rule, which, bloodstained though it might be, corrupt though it was, was yet based on sound and statesmanlike principles. With such support and such opposition any reform movement must have come to naught, however well intentioned, and however noble its principles.

§ 28. Foreign opinion, so far as expressed, has generally approved the projects of Kang Yu-wei, but condemned his precipitancy. The French historian says—"The great fault of the reformers was to seek to transform China in too short a period, to take in hand at the same time all the machinery of government, to strike at one time in all abuses. . . . In Japan there was a feudal system to crush, but not the traditions of centuries to overturn." [83] An American writer laments that "there was so little appreciation on the part of foreign powers of the nature of the crisis"; he deplored the fact that help from the British or American envoy was not available—"and a golden, a priceless, opportunity was thrown away; it became the fashion to speak of this great crisis as a 'Manchu family quarrel,' with which foreigners had no concern." [84] But another American writer sums up the situation thus—"The young emperor showed himself an apt pupil, issuing a series of reformatory edicts, which alarmed the conservatives and provoked a reaction." [85] The empress dowager's biographers give her view in these words:

"Kwanghsü's reign was over; there remained to him only the imperial title. He had had his chance; in the enthusiasm of youth and new ideas he had played a desperate game against the powers of darkness in high places, and he had lost. . . . Tzehi had given her nephew a free hand, she had retired from the field, leaving him to steer the ship of State; if he had now steered it into troublous and

[83] Cordier, "Rélations," iii, p. 413.

[84] Smith, "China in Convulsion," i, p. 150.

[85] Martin, "The Awakening of China," p. 172.

dangerous seas, if, by common consent, she were again called to take the helm, this was the doing of Heaven and no fault of hers.”[86]

The foreign press in China sympathised with the reformers—“The reformers’ plan was too precipitate and dangerous, needing at every step the courage of a strong man . . . the hesitation of Yuen Shih-kai overwhelmed them in defeat and death. . . . Reform in China is not dead. A huge family quarrel has overshadowed it, but it is yet very much alive.”[87] And again—“The blood of the martyrs will be the seed of the new China.”[88] Finally, the firm and constant friend of China during half a century of administration, expressed his opinion, in a letter not intended for the public eye, thus—“The emperor’s head was set in the right direction, but his advisers, Kang Yu-wei and others, had had no experience of work, and they simply killed Progress with kindness—they stuffed it, against its powers of assimilating and digesting, with food enough in three months for three times as many years; so it is killed for the present, but it will have its proper representatives to the front again later on.”[89]

[86] Bland and Backhouse, “China under the Empress Dowager,” p. 211.

[87] North-China Herald, Oct. 10th, 1898.

[88] Ibid., Nov. 14th, 1898.

[89] R. Hart to H. B. Morse, Oct. 24th, 1898.

## CHAPTER VII

### THE GENESIS OF THE BOXER MOVEMENT

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§ 1. THE year 1898 ended with affairs in a "ticklish" state [1]; but some progress was made in the commercial concessions which had been obtained by the British envoy, not especially for British interests, but for the general good.[2] Regulations for the control of steam navigation in inland waters were issued promptly,[3] and under those rules steamers began a traffic which developed to large proportions; these were generally steam launches, sometimes laden with cargo, sometimes towing native cargo-boats; but steamers of considerable size, plying to non-treaty ports, came under the rules. On the whole there was little friction, but occasionally disturbances were created, sometimes fomented by likin officials whose profits were interfered with, sometimes created by junk men who resented being hustled into new and more speedy habits. Of the latter kind, though possibly intensified by the famine then prevailing in northern Kiangsu, were disturbances in March, 1899, at Chinkiang, where incendiarism was alarmingly frequent,[4] and at Yangchow, where anti-foreign placards appeared and crowds assembled to search for a lost child, declared to have been kidnapped.[5] China had conceded the opening of Nanning and Siangtan (for which Yochow was substituted); the opening of Talienswan had been demanded, but Russia had intervened; and Tsingtau (the port of Kiaochow) had been appropriated by Germany. Warned by these events, China now hastened to place other ports under the protection of a quasi-international guarantee by giving them the status of treaty port: Chinwangtao, an ice-free port midway between the ice-bound ports of Tientsin and Newchwang; Santuao, of no commercial value, but offering a tempting naval station to any acquisitive power; and Nanking, the former capital of the empire, the opening of which was stipulated in the French treaty of 1858.[6]

§ 2. The province of Hunan, in which Yochow is situated,

[1] "The times are too ticklish to go in for adventures even on our own ground, and caution and discretion are everywhere necessary."—R. Hart to H. B. Morse, Oct. 24th, 1898.

[2] Cf. chap. v, § 28.

[3] I.G. circ., April 29th, 1898.

[4] North-China Herald, March 13th, 1899.

[5] Ibid., March 20th, 1899. Cf. "Submission," chap. xi, §§ 9, 10.

[6] Cf. "Conflict," chap. xxiv, § 7.

had for forty years dominated the empire. Its men had saved the dynasty from being overwhelmed by the Taiping rebellion, and had not allowed the court or the imperial ministers to forget their obligations [7]; and for three-fourths of the period its soldiers had furnished the fighting point to China's military spear. After the province was over-run by the rebels and while the imperial authority was in abeyance, the government was administered and the taxes collected by local committees of the gentry; and, with the restoration of imperial authority, the system was continued and gave to every magistrate and every tax collector, aliens all, a local consulting committee, whose advice they could not refuse to accept. Even the central provincial administration, alien to the province, dared not oppose the considered opinion of the gentry, strengthened by the support of the Hunanese officials holding office in Peking and in every province, and of the retired officials who had returned with their large fortunes to their Hunan homes. As a result the administration was more efficient and less corrupt than in any other province in China; the likin collection was more simplified and less burdensome; and the difference between what the people paid and the treasury received did not reach such large dimensions.[8] With, and largely because of, this excellence of administration, the province had retained all of the old hostility to foreigners. No missionary had been permitted to dwell within its borders; none had "itinerated" there without great risk of being hustled and maltreated; and as late as April, 1899, one was stoned while on his return to his boat from an official visit to the Fu of Yochow.

§ 3. There has commonly been in the legations a disposition to recognise the genuine difficulties of the Chinese administration, and the exceptional difficulties in the way of forcing an entrance into Hunan were obvious.[9]

[7] Hunan provided a succession of three administrators, held in high esteem by the Chinese: Tseng Kwo-fan, Tso Tsung-tang and Liu Kun-yi.

[8] Report by H. B. Morse to Sir R. Hart, Nov. 25th, 1899, printed in "Yochow," Shanghai, Stat. Dept. of I.G. of Customs, 1900.

[9] "If you keep your family out with you, I can give you Tientsin; if you send them home, and remain out alone, ten to one you will be selected to open Yochow and nurse it through its initial stages. The Hukwang authorities are very anxious to have an experienced, reasonable, and common-sense man for the post of commissioner there—a post which will have its difficulties and discomforts, and too important, seeing that

As a preliminary step Yochow was substituted for Siangtan as the point of entry, in order to conciliate Hunan opinion. Yochow was the threshold of the province, a place of small commercial importance, but past its portals flowed nine-tenths of the stream of Hunan traffic, while Siangtan, a large trading mart in the heart of the province, was inaccessible in the winter to boats drawing more than three feet. The compromise contented both sides, while it satisfied neither; it was accepted on the one side because it gave an entering wedge, and on the other because for a time it held the intrusive foreigner at arm's length. The delegate sent to arrange the opening was specially guarded against the happening of untoward accidents, and had behind him the active support of the Peking administration and of the viceroy at Wuchang, Chang Chih-tung; but the chief part of his mission was to convince the officials and people of Hunan that the proposed opening would not be an injury, and to meet their objections and fears in so far as it would not defeat the intention of the government. During six months he held many conferences with the governor and his representatives, with officials who came to him from various places, with delegations of the gentry from many parts of the province, and with such merchants as he could meet; and, after the opening of the port on November 18th, 1899, he felt justified in writing:

"For a third of a century Hunan had steadily resisted the entering of the wedge which should open up her resources and her commerce to foreign enterprise; the wedge has now been admitted, and, while the cry is still, 'Hunan for the Hunanese,' there are distinct evidences that the concession has been granted in no grudging spirit. This, too, is not solely a change of attitude on the part of the officials. For years past the people would have no intercourse with foreigners; and now, during the current year the testimony of foreign officials, missionaries, and merchants alike shows the friendly attitude of the people of Yochow; while one [Rev. Griffith John] who has made Hunan his study for a quarter of a century has publicly recorded his conviction that a distinct change has come over the spirit of the Hunanese in general, but he adds his belief that they must be treated as men." [10]

there is the Hunan feeling to be kept in mind, for any youngster, or faddish person, to be sent to."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Feb. 8th, 1899.

Mr. Drew was in the end appointed to Tientsin, and the author, while titular commissioner of customs at Hankow, was delegated to make the arrangements for opening Hunan to foreign trade.

[10] H. B. Morse, report on Yochow, Customs Annual Reports, 1899. As late as May 23rd, 1900, the Rev. Griffith John reported that the complete



§ 4. The antagonism manifested everywhere against missionaries and their work [11] attracted the attention of the administration. In 1871, after the Tientsin massacre, China had made proposals tending to place the missionaries under more perfect control, and they had been approved in principle, but were severely criticised in detail.[12] In 1886 an attempt had been made to take the Roman Catholic missions out of politics, by asking the Pope to send a legate to act as his representative and their head; but France interposed her veto and demanded a continuation of her old-time right of protection.[13] On March 15th, 1899, an imperial decree was issued giving official status to missionaries. Bishops were assimilated to viceroys and governors, and were entitled to visit and correspond with them on equal terms; archdeacons and deans to the *sze-tai* (*fantai*, *niehtai*, *taotai*); and ordinary missionaries to *fu* and *hien*; the bishops were to send to the officials lists of those under them, and missionaries were not to intervene in cases before the courts.[14] The last clause presented China's claim to redress a real grievance. On the official status it may be noted that consuls in China are not merely commercial agents, but represent their government and exercise executive and judicial functions; they are in civil and criminal matters the official superiors of all missionaries; but, while by later practice they correspond on terms of equality with viceroys, their official status is declared by the treaties of 1858 to be equal to that of *taotai*. The British government at once directed its envoy to inform the Chinese ministers that, "where bishops and priests of British nationality are concerned, H.M. government cannot allow their affairs to be subject to the intervention of the officials of any government other than the British government" [15]; and Germany had in 1897 taken the same attitude. The decree dealt in words

transformation of the Hunanese into friendliness still continued.—North-China Herald, June 6th, 1900.

[11] Cf. chap. ii, § 36; chap. vi, § 25.

[12] Cf. "Submission," chap. xii, § 22.

[13] North-China Herald, Oct. 27th, 1886; Michie, "The Englishman in China," ii, p. 344.

[14] Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, April 27th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 141; North-China Herald, May 22nd, 1899.

[15] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Bax-Ironside, June 20th; Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 16th, 1899; China, No. 1, 1900, pp. 149, 323.

only with the Roman Catholic missions, but other missions were of course entitled to equal privileges ; these privileges were promptly claimed by the former, and unanimously rejected by the Protestant missions.

§ 5. During the year 1899 in Hunan alone there were no disturbances, but elsewhere throughout the empire there was distress and commotion. In some districts risings were anti-dynastic, in others anti-foreign, in others especially directed against the missionaries ; in some they arose from a rebellious spirit, in others from hostility to foreigners, and in others the exciting cause was scarcity of food. In 1898 there had been floods from the Yellow River, and in consequence Li Hung-chang had been appointed to the revived post of Director General of the Yellow River ; he went to the scene and reported that a complete scheme of conservancy would cost Tls. 40,000,000, while a palliative scheme could be carried out for half that amount ; the magnitude of the sum required killed all such plans. The resulting distress was great, and, as usual, the foreign residents in China contributed generously ; the relief fund at Shanghai amounted at one stage to \$24,219,[16] and that at Chinkiang to \$3898.[17] These sums were a mere drop in the bucket ; in March in northern Kiangsu "the people were pallid ghosts," and children, especially female children, were sold to rescue them from starvation at prices ranging from 50 to 1000 cash (1 to 20 pence) each [18] ; and there was the usual cry of "kidnappers." [19] In some other districts there was also distress, but more commonly risings were due to the feelings of the people.

§ 6. In Chekiang it was reported from Wenchow in March that anti-foreign rumours were circulating and that Chinese converts to Christianity were being persecuted.[20] In Shaohingfu and Ningpofu there had been rice riots in 1898, occasioned by bad harvests, and these were renewed in October, 1899.[21] At Taipingchien in Taichowfu there

[16] North-China Herald, March 27th, 1899.

[17] Ibid., June 26th, 1899.

[18] Ibid., March 20th, 1899.

[19] Cf. *antea*, n. 5.

[20] Corresp. Wenchow, March 24th, North-China Herald, April 3rd, 1899.

[21] Ibid., Oct. 23rd, 1899.

was serious rioting in June. This was a manifestation of a state of feud between Roman Catholic and Protestant converts, and the heavy artillery of the heads of the respective missions was brought into action with charge and countercharge; but it soon assumed a more serious aspect in getting mixed up with two other factors. In May the threatening attitude of Italy in demanding a naval station on the coast of Chekiang led to the issue of an imperial decree ordering the authorities of the five provinces of the Liangkiang and Minche viceroalties to put their forces on a war footing and to take such steps as might be necessary to defend Sanmen Bay from aggression [22]; and this stimulated the patriotic feelings of the people at large. Moreover a general state of disorder naturally attracted all the disorderly elements, and the whole prefecture was soon in a state of rebellion which lasted into the next year. In July the rioters successfully resisted the troops, and in August a mob overawed the troops so that they were afraid to advance.[23]

§ 7. In Fukien it was reported from Hinghwa in March that the situation was becoming more critical every day; that secret associations under the titles of "The Gun Society" and "The Sword Society" had been formed; that there were daily highway robberies, which the officials were powerless to check; that the majority of the population were organised for rebellion against the existing government, and made no secret of their intentions; but that so far the movement was not anti-foreign.[24] A year later the same centre reported that, owing to scarcity of food, there were many robberies and much disorder.[25] At Kienning in June, 1899, in a serious riot, mission premises were plundered and burned, seven converts were killed, and three English missionaries; at first reported killed, barely escaped with their lives; it was stated that the anti-foreign feeling was general in the district, and that "native Christians were to be hunted down like wild beasts" [26]; it was further reported that

[22] Imp. dec. May 26th, *ibid.*, May 29th, 1899.

[23] *Ibid.*, June 12th, 1899 and later dates. Cf. "The Trade and Administration of China," 2nd ed., Appendix D.

[24] North-China Herald, April 10th, 1899.

[25] *Ibid.*, Jan. 24th, 1900.

[26] *Ibid.*, June 19th, 26th, July 10th, 1899

"vagabonds in Foochow were spreading rumours of foreign missionaries kidnapping children and extracting their brains, eyes, etc." [27] The British authorities exercised diplomatic pressure and "the Kienning notables signed a bond undertaking responsibility for the safety of the missionaries." [28] At Amoy in August there was a riot directed against the Japanese. [29]

§ 8. The Canton provinces (Liangkwang) had been hard hit by the wave of reaction against reform, and the resentment of the people was correspondingly great. Their feeling was fairly expressed in an article in a Canton vernacular paper, [30] in which it was stated—

"that foreign nations were all greedy and were preparing to cut up the Chinese empire: Russia had taken Port Arthur and Talienwan, and had 25,000 troops stationed in Manchuria; England had practical possession of the Yangtze basin, comprising seven provinces; Germany had taken Kiaochow and claimed all Shantung as her sphere of influence, while she was reaching out towards Hainan; France had occupied Kwangchow-wan, but her hidden and fixed purpose was to get full possession of Kwangtung, Kwangsi, Yunnan and Kweichow; Japan had Formosa and was now reaching out for Fukien; and China must be on the alert and reform herself and must guard herself against aggression."

During the Italian scare a British man-of-war was fired on by the Bogue forts in mistake for an Italian [31]; but in general the animus of the Cantonese was against the Manchu administration and not against foreigners, though in November French officers were killed by a mob in the vicinity of Kwangchow-wan. In Kwangsi the rebellion started in 1898 continued to over-run the province. In Kwangtung a serious rebellion broke out in the summer at Saikiu, so considerable that the veteran Liu Yung-fu was sent against it with a force of 3500 men and 8 guns [32]; it was finally suppressed, on cheap terms, by taking the leader into the imperial service and giving him command of a company of 100 men. [33] Generally in Kwangtung a state of disorder leads to wide-spread water-way robbery, commonly characterised as piracy. In February this

[27] Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, July 10th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 257.

[28] Same to same, Oct. 20th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 384.

[29] North-China Herald, Sept. 4th, 1899.

[30] Trans. in *ibid.*, Dec. 4th, 1899.

[31] *Ibid.*, July 10th, 1899.

[32] *Ibid.*, Aug. 28th, 1899.

[33] *Ibid.*, Dec. 11th, 1899.

piracy was so prevalent as to call for a "forcible representation and vigorous protest" from the governor of Hongkong [34]; it continued unbroken, and ultimately the British naval forces co-operated with the Cantonese in patrolling the inland waters of the Canton delta, so as to free the trade of Hongkong from this incubus.[35]

§ 9. In Yunnan the intentions of the French created a sense of unrest and disquiet, and this developed into hostile acts. Early in the year it was reported from Chaotungfu, in the north-eastern corner, that "the ferment, so general now, is spreading to this province." [36] Elsewhere in the province the hostility was directed especially against the French. At Mengtze on June 22nd the French consulate was burned and plundered by a band from the country-side, its occupants barely escaping for shelter to the walled city [37]; the premises of the customs and their occupants shared the same fortune, but the leader of the band sent in a message of regret, explaining that his followers had mistaken the buildings for those of the consulate.[38] At Yunnanfu in August there was an anti-French riot, and placards were posted calling upon the patriotic to rise against the foreigners; French railway engineers, occupying lodgings in a temple, were driven out.[39] In Kweichow in October there was an armed rising in Jenhwaihen, in which the district magistrate was murdered. Apart from this, the chief interest attaches to the proceedings in the case of the murder of Mr. Fleming, an English missionary. The murder occurred in November, 1898, and evidence was obtained indicating that high officials of the province had been guilty of connivance, or at least of negligence. A British consul was sent to Kweiyang, the provincial capital, and after three months of investigation and negotiation, it was reported that the actual murderers had, after conviction, been punished according

[34] Sir H. A. Blake to Mr. Chamberlain, March 2nd, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 68.

[35] Admiralty to Foreign Office, Aug. 22nd; Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 25th; same to same, Sept. 8th; Foreign Office to Colonial Office, Nov. 25th, 1899; *ibid.*, pp. 265, 339, 349, 380.

[36] North-China Herald, March 6th, 1899.

[37] *Ibid.*, July 3rd, 1899.

[38] Personal statement to author by the commissioner of customs, Mr. W. F. Spinney.

[39] North-China Herald, Oct. 23rd, 1899.

to law, six officials had been dismissed, three of the gentry had been deprived of their honours and degrees; and an indemnity of Tls. 22,000 was to be paid; but the headman of the village of Chungan, in which the murder had been committed, had escaped arrest. The British policy was to fasten responsibility on local authorities, and the arrest and punishment of the headman was held to be most important. Proof was obtained that the governor of the province had connived at his escape and continued freedom from arrest, and in June a demand was made for the governor's degradation. Repeated demands to this effect were refused by the Chinese ministers, but finally, in October, it was reported that the headman had been arrested, and the case was closed.[40]

§ 10. In Szechwan a serious rebellion occurred in 1898, under the leadership of Yü Man-tze, a rebellion which was widely extended and caused much destruction. It had assumed large proportions in June, 1898, when the Roman Catholic mission at Yungchang in Chungkingfu was destroyed, and Père Fleury taken prisoner and held as hostage. The seizure of the priest "paralysed the action of the provincial government," as the French government held it responsible for his safety. By September Yü Man-tze's power was greatly extended, and his emissaries were organising secret societies in districts not actually held by him; and in that month an imperial force was defeated. By the end of October there was an "alarming extension of the rebellion," the imperial troops being hampered by the necessity of providing for Père Fleury's safety; but at the end of December the troops were let slip from their leash, one victory over the rebels was gained, the priest was released on January 20th, and Yü Man-tze surrendered. The minor leaders of the insurrection were executed, but "Yü Man-tze was . . . pardoned, and was merely kept under surveillance." [41]

[40] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Dec. 9th, 1898, Jan. 28th, March 15th, 1899; Mr. Bax-Ironside to same, May 4th, June 9th, Oct. 6th; Lord Salisbury to Mr. Bax-Ironside, Sept. 15th, 1899; China, No. 1, 1900, pp. 4, 45, 96, 108, 208, 294, 373.

[41] Summary on Yü Man-tze outbreak, Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, May 13th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 151; North-China Herald, Jan. 9th, 23rd, 30th, 1899.

In January the Telegraph administration notified that telegrams

The transaction suggests the inference that silver bullets played as great a part in the suppression as lead. In May Yü Man-tze again raised the standard of rebellion and gathered the malcontents around him.[42] Again he was "suppressed"; and again, in July, there was another rising at Tachu, in which many converts were killed.[43] Yü Man-tze had again been put under surveillance, but in August he was arrested; and, as a protest, his fellow townsmen rose in rebellion.[44] There was at the same time another rising in Chüentung, in eastern Szechwan, the rebels plundering at will [45]; and another in Shunkingfu, in which the mission was destroyed, but the missionaries escaped, being given shelter by the Fu.[46] In October disquieting rumours circulated in the tea-shops of Weihien that the foreigners were poisoning the wells [47]; and the same rumours were prevalent in Shihnanfu in Hupeh.[48] Towards the end of the year the Kolaohwei was reported to be occupying by force four districts in eastern Szechwan, bordering on Hupeh.[49]

§ 11. In March it was reported that a Mohammedan rebellion had broken out in **Kansu**, and that there was much unrest in Sinkiang; a jehad was proclaimed, and the rebels raised the war-cry of "death to Buddhists." [50] The unrest in Sinkiang (Chinese Turkestan) developed into a rebellion in the following month.[51] From Shensi it was reported at the end of 1898 that in Sanyuen there was a "great conspiracy to exterminate foreigners" [52]; and, in October, 1899, that "the departure of the governor had given the secret societies another opportunity to proclaim their intention to rebel and to attack mission premises." [53]

from Chungking were "delayed for destroying the poles by mobs in the section of Luchow station."—*Ibid.*, Jan. 9th, 1899.

[42] North-China Herald, May 13th, 1899.

[43] *Ibid.*, July 17th, 1899.

[44] *Ibid.*, Aug. 28th, 1899.

[45] *Ibid.*

[46] *Ibid.*, Sept. 4th, 1899.

[47] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9th, 1899.

[48] *Ibid.*, Oct. 23rd, 1899.

[49] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4th, 1899.

[50] *Ibid.*, March 27th, 1899.

[51] *Ibid.*, April 24th, 1899.

[52] Corresp. Sanyuen, Dec. 28th, North-China Herald, Feb. 6th, 1899.

[53] Same, Oct. 25th, *ibid.*, Dec. 4th, 1899.

§ 12. Hupeh was infected by adjoining Szechwan, and a rebellion was reported there at the end of 1898.[54] Its suppression was taken in hand, and in February four men were executed at Ichang for offences committed at Changyang, south of Ichang; the country was reported to be quieter, but rumours were prevalent.[55] In March there were more executions for rebellion at Changlo, further south, still more for rebellion to the west, and at the end of the month still more.[56] In April trouble broke out in Shihnanfu,[57] in June at Anlufu, in central Hupeh [58]; and in July there was another rebellious outbreak at Changyang, especially directed against missions.[59] In September at Hingkwowchow, south-east from Wuchang, a spirit of hostility against foreigners was manifested, and the people cried "kill the foreign devils." [60] At the end of September it was reported that the rebellion in south-western Hupeh, suppressed in the spring, was, it was planned, to break out again in the spring of 1900 with renewed vigour; no mercy was to be shown to foreigners or those connected with them; and Nanking was to be made the capital of the empire [61]; and, in fact, the year 1900 opened in Hupeh with "the Kolaohwei very active." [62] In the adjoining province of Kiangsi there was reference in February to "the prevailing unrest" at Wusüeh on the Yangtze.[63] In June at the capital, Nanchang, there was an anti-missionary riot on the 21st, and the 26th was announced as the date on which all foreigners were to be expelled from the city.[64] In October there was a riot at Hokow, in Kwangsinfu, in which the China Inland mission premises were destroyed [65]; and in Jaochowfu there was a general rising against the Roman Catholics, their mission being destroyed and the priests being compelled to flee.[66] In December there

[54] Imp. decree addressed to Liu Kun-yi, *ibid.*, Jan. 30th, 1899.

[55] *Ibid.*, March 13th, 1899.

[56] *Ibid.*, March 27th, April 3rd, 10th, 1899.

[57] *Ibid.*, May 1st, 1899.

[58] *Ibid.*, July 17th, 1899.

[59] *Ibid.*, Aug. 7th, 1899.

[60] *Ibid.*, Sept. 11th, 1899.

[61] Corresp. Ichang, Sept. 29th, *ibid.*, Oct. 9th, 1899.

[62] Same, Jan. 15th, *ibid.*, Jan. 30th, 1900.

[63] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20th, 1899.

[64] *Ibid.*, July 3rd, 10th, 1899.

[65] *Ibid.*, Oct. 9th, 1899.

[66] *Ibid.*, Oct. 16th, 1899.



was a "formidable rebellion" in Pingsiang, extending across the border into Hunan, to suppress which required the despatch of a force of 6000 troops.[67]

§ 13. In Anhwei and northern Kiangsu there was widespread rebellion, occasioned to some extent by the distress following the inundations of the Yellow River.[68] In January reference was made to "the rebels of Hsüchowfu [Kiangsu] and Huyang [Anhwei], one a hundred miles from the other." [69] In February the rebels of Anhwei were "working towards the north," [70] that is into Honan; and the rebellion in northern Kiangsu was "only partially checked." [71] In March there was general panic in northern Anhwei, caused by fear of the rebels [72]; and at Yangchow in Kiangsu there were fears of riots, and the Kolaohwei and Tataohwei were holding secret meetings to organise rebellion. [73] In April the Anhwei rebellion was said to have been quieted [74]; but in the following January, encouraged by the success of the Tataohwei ("Great Swords") in Shantung, a society called the Siaotaohwei ("Small Swords") was formed in Anhwei, with the avowed object of "plundering converts and men of wealth," and several raids were made by them. [75]

§ 14. In Manchuria there was one disturbance occasioned directly by the action of the Russian authorities at Port Arthur. They had assumed the right of levying the land tax, inherent in Chinese sovereignty, in the neutral territory which had been reserved to Chinese jurisdiction; and a body of peasants, inhabitants of the territory, who had assembled unarmed to present a humble petition of protest, had been met by Cossacks and shot down; the Russians suffered of course no loss, and of the Chinese peasants there were reported 94 killed and 123 wounded, among them many women and children. [76] Russia ultimately agreed to pay Tls. 700 compensation for each

[67] Corresp. Ichang, Dec. 18th, 1899.

[68] Imp. decree addressed to Liu Kun-yi, in *ibid.*, Jan. 30th, 1899.

[69] *Ibid.*, Jan. 23rd, 1899.

[70] *Ibid.*, Feb. 9th, 1899.

[71] *Ibid.*, Feb. 20th, 1899.

[72] *Ibid.*, March 12th, 1899.

[73] *Ibid.*, March 20th, 1899.

[74] Corresp. Kuyang, April 15th, *ibid.*, May 15th, 1899.

[75] *Ibid.*, Jan. 24th, 1900.

[76] *Ibid.*, March 13th, 1899.

of those killed, and proportionate sums for the wounded.[77] No further action followed on either side, but Chinese love of the foreigner was not increased; and China was called upon at this time to "deny the right of England and Russia to enter upon an agreement delimiting their spheres of influence, on the ground that China is an independent empire." [78] Elsewhere throughout Manchuria lawlessness was rife, and the country was over-run by troops of mounted bandits, [79] known in later years as Hunghutze or Chunchutze. [80] Just across the border in Chihli, Nanpiao was described as a "brigand stronghold," one-sixth of the population being active members of the brigand fraternity, most of the others being aiders and abettors; and from this centre an area of 2000 square miles was terrorised. [81] The numerous and continuous disturbances in Southern Chihli were directly connected with the state of Shantung, which will be considered later.

§ 15. In every province in the empire there had been unrest, riots, or rebellion, through the whole of 1899, and continuing into 1900; mission stations had been attacked in every province, and railway engineers in Yunnan and Shantung, the only classes of foreigners who were not ordinarily in the shelter of the treaty ports; and in many provinces the discontent had taken the form of rebellion against the existing government. Through all this state of uneasiness ran two threads of fear, dread of the doings of the Germans in Shantung, and dread of the aims of Italy along the coast of mid-China, both inspiring deep distrust of all foreigners. In March the Italian fleet in Chinese waters consisted of four cruisers of 14,351 tons, carrying 110 guns, and two more cruisers were on the way, [82] to support her claims. [83] Italy had never in China been considered to be one of the great powers, and it seemed to the Chinese, ministers and people alike, that "the Italians were utterly unreasonable in their action—

[77] *Corresp. Kuyang*, June 12th, 1899.

[78] *Ibid.*; cf. chap. iv, § 26, chap. v, § 25.

[79] *North-China Herald*, June 5th, Dec. 4th, 1899.

[80] "Red-beards." Chunchutze [Khunkhutze] is the Russian transliteration, like Kharbin for Harbin.

[81] Mr. Sidney Barton, "Report on the brigandage on the south-western frontier of Manchuria, 1899," *China*, No. 1, 1900, p. 374.

[82] *North-China Herald*, March 13th, 1899.

[83] Cf. chap. v, § 29.

they did not even wait for a missionary to be killed before demanding a naval station.”[84] Resistance was decided on. In May the viceroys and governors of the five provinces in the Liangkiang and Minche viceroyalties were “ordered to put their forces on a war footing owing to the menacing attitude of Italy and Germany,” and the Chekiang authorities were ordered to take active steps to protect Sanmen Bay [85]; and in June a further decree ordered Liu Kun-yi, as Nanyang Tachen, to resist by force any landing of armed troops of European powers in his jurisdiction, and he was given “full powers” for the purpose.[86] Preparations for resistance continued through the year [87]; and the country, already aflame with rebellion and anti-foreign riots, was fanned into a blaze of hostility to foreign aggression. The administration was also stirred to a feeling of elation; in the spring it was reported to be “confident of its ability to meet force with force” [88]; and at the end of November orders were sent to all viceroys and governors, granting them “full power and liberty to resist by force of arms all aggression upon your several jurisdictions, proclaiming a state of war, if necessary, without first asking for instructions from Peking”; and they were to be “held responsible for any repetition of indecision or too great trustfulness in the assurances of an encroaching enemy, such as had happened in 1897 at Kiaochow.”[89]

§ 16. During this agitated period, the empire was stirred against the dynasty by steps taken to fill the exhausted treasury. In May Kangyi, assistant Grand Secretary and president of the ministry of War, was appointed High Commissioner and deputed to hold an investigation generally into the conduct of all officials in Kiangsu, and more especially into that of the viceroy Liu Kun-yi.[90] Kangyi was a Manchu of the Manchus,

[84] Corresp. Peking, March 20th, North-China Herald, April 3rd, 1899.

[85] Imp. decree May 26th, *ibid.*, May 29th, 1899.

[86] Imp. decree June 5th, *ibid.*, June 12th, 1899.

[87] *Ibid.*, Nov. 13th, Dec. 4th, 1899.

[88] *Ibid.*, May 1st, 1899.

[89] Secret edict of empress dowager, circular despatch of Tsungli Yamen, Nov. 21st, 1899, in Mr. Conger to Mr. John Hay, Jan. 2nd, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 84.

[90] Imp. decree May 21st, North-China Herald, May 29th, 1899; Mr. Bax-Ironside to Lord Salisbury, July 10th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 256.

had taken a prominent part in the anti-reform reaction of the previous year, and was intensely anti-foreign and against all change.[91] His mission was threefold: its ostensible purpose was that of investigation; then, to meet the deficit in the imperial exchequer, estimated at twenty million taels, he was to find means to increase the provincial assessments from their present amount of eighty million to at least a hundred million; and, most important of all, the empress dowager needed money, much money, to strengthen her position against the reform party, and Kangyi was sent to get it.[92] The "Lord High Extortioner," as the foreign press termed him, found the money. Liu Kun-yi was sagacious enough to go straight to the fountain head and arrange matters directly with the empress dowager, and Kangyi received but a cool reception from him; but from the other officials in Kiangsu alone he obtained increased annual contributions amounting to two million taels, which was "just upon 50 per cent. more than has hitherto been remitted." [93] His commission was extended and he visited in turn Kiangsi, Anhwei, Chekiang and Kwangtung; in the five provinces "the work that Kangyi has done in stopping extortions and turning to the imperial exchequer funds which would otherwise have gone to fill the pockets of provincial officials," was declared by the empress dowager to have been "indeed commendable and practical." [94] From these five provinces he must have obtained an increase of at least five million taels annually in the provincial contributions to the treasury. Moreover, being armed with the fullest powers,[95] he cannot have failed to take back to the empress dowager many millions of taels as a special mark of loyalty and affection from the donors; and so worthy an exponent of the traditions of Manchu

[91] "Kangyi's rabid hatred of foreigners is likely to land the empire before long in some disastrous predicament."—Corresp. Peking, North-China Herald, Jan. 16th, 1899.

"Kangyi is an utterly ignorant old Bourbon; after many years in office he has learned nothing."—Ibid., Aug. 21st, 1899.

[92] Ibid., Aug. 14th, 1899.

[93] Mr. S. F. Mayers, "Report on the Mission of Kangyi to Kiangnan," Aug. 29th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 350.

[94] Imp. decree, Aug. 13th, North-China Herald, Aug. 21st, 1899.

[95] A second imp. decree of Aug. 13th gives honours and promotion to several officials recommended by Kangyi, and cashiers several others denounced by him.—Ibid., Aug. 21st, 1899.

and Chinese mandarindom may be trusted to have rewarded himself adequately for his exertions. In Manchuria, Li Ping-heng, who had been cashiered in January, 1898, on the demand of Germany, was appointed High Commissioner for the same purpose, and Chihli was also taken in hand; at Tientsin the directors of the Kaiping Mines were required to pay Tls. 100,000, and the customs taotai was assessed at Tls. 100,000; this official was in a cleft stick—he had exhausted his resources by paying a total of Tls. 450,000 for his post only three months before, and now offered Tls. 70,000 as a compromise; but in the end he had to pay the amount demanded.[96] When Chinese officials are thus mulcted by their superiors, they do not tamely accept the loss as irretrievable, but pass on the assessment to their contributories, and, at bottom, it is the people who pay; and the people of China, already sufficiently excited, were still further inflamed by increased levies on them made by the tax collectors.[97]

§ 17. The question of the succession to the throne [98] was still unsettled and produced its effect on the country; and party politics in Peking were embittered. The reform party was of course in a state of suspended animation, but in the party which had checked reform and recalled the empress dowager to the regency there were two wings. The moderates, the more generally supported by the Chinese at Peking and in the provinces, were led by Junglu, who was in command of all the trained Chinese troops of the Peiyang; and the ultra-conservatives, composed of the majority of the Manchus, were led by Prince Ching, who was in supreme command of the Manchu Banners. Had it come to an armed conflict, the undisciplined Manchus must have gone under; but the battle was fought by palace intrigue. In April, when Italy had first presented her demands and the Germans were adopting strong measures in Shantung, moderate counsels were disregarded, and it was observed that “the ultra-conservatives in Peking are now confident of their ability to meet force

[96] Corresp. Tientsin, *ibid.*, Aug. 7th, 1899.

[97] “To add to the troubles of this unhappy empire Kangyi has been sent down to squeeze Canton province for funds and troops; and it almost looks as if the empress dowager were anxious to fan the fire of rebellion, which is always smouldering there, into flame.”—*Ibid.*, Sept. 11th, 1899.

[98] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 19, 24; postea, §§ 27–30.

with force.”[99] This feeling of confidence gave them the upper hand, and by August the antagonism between the two leaders was bitter.[100] The empress dowager was not yet prepared, however, to throw her weight on one side: it was at this time proposed to transfer Yülu from Tientsin to Nanking, in succession to Liu Kun-yi who had asked leave to resign, and to re-appoint Li Hung-chang to Tientsin [101]; but the proposed changes were not made as they were opposed by Junglu, ostensibly on the ground that Li Hung-chang’s re-entry into public life would alienate England, but actually because he wished to retain his adherent Yülu near Peking. Nevertheless this split in the camp made the empress dowager realise the insecurity of her position and decide to postpone once again the deposition of the emperor.[102] The rivalry continued to increase in bitterness.[103] Kangyi, on his return from Canton, was under orders to extend his mission to Szechwan; but, on November 12th, he hastily left Shanghai to return to Peking, there to use his influence against Junglu, to whom he was bitterly opposed.[104] Owing to the difficulties at Kwangchow-wan, Li Hung-chang was appointed acting viceroy at Canton in December.[105]

§ 18. Shantung shared the emotions of the empire, and its state during the year was typical of the general feeling. In 1898 there had been serious riots against the missions in Ichowfu; protecting imperial decrees and soothing proclamations were issued, but the kernel of the matter was that the Chentai had declared that he could not send troops to protect the missions, without a direct order from the governor at Tsinanfu, 200 miles away.[106]

[99] North-China Herald, May 1st, 1899.

[100] Tel. Peking, Aug. 23rd, *ibid.*, Aug. 28th, 1899.

[101] *Ibid.*, Aug. 25th, *ibid.*

[102] *Ibid.*, Sept. 4th, 1899.

[103] *Ibid.*, Nov. 6th, 1899.

[104] *Ibid.*, Nov. 20th, 1899.

[105] Imp. decree, Dec. 19th, *ibid.*, Dec. 27th, 1899. Cf. *postea*, § 28.

[106] Mr. W. P. Chalfant and others to Consul Fowler, Ichowfu, Nov. 29th; Mr. Conger to Tsungli Yamen, Dec. 20th; Tsungli Yamen to Mr. Conger, Dec. 20th, 1898; U.S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 154.

During this period the North-China Herald was ably served by its correspondents in Shantung, notably at Pangchowang in the north-west, by Rev. A. H. Smith, author of several noteworthy books on China, and at Ichowfu in southern Shantung, by Rev. W. P. Chalfant, who was afterwards president, first of the Chinese college at Weihien, and later of the American Mission Theological Seminary at Tsingchowfu.

The state of affairs grew steadily worse, and, "though it had not yet assumed the proportions of an organised rebellion, it was rapidly drifting in that direction"; and a warning was given that the "prospective buying of land by German syndicates in the spring is almost sure to give rise to local disturbances" [107]; a further warning was given that Jihchao was "on the verge of anti-foreign rebellion, the gentry leading." [108] There was now a lull in the anti-foreign riots, "the reason being that all who can be suspected of connexion with foreigners have been stripped of everything worth taking" [109]; but at the end of February there was a renewal of "placards and riots against missions." [110] While this mass of combustibles was being set alight, a party of three Germans prospecting on the way inland from Jihchao was, on March 22nd, attacked by a mob of a hundred villagers, who were beaten off with great difficulty.

§ 19. The German authorities took prompt action to check the "anti-foreign feeling pervading the whole of southern Shantung" [111]; they regarded seriously the "continuous and growing disturbances causing grave dangers to missionaries as well as to engineers" [112]; and even before this assault they had despatched an armed force to patrol in the direction of Jihchao, and this force was enabled to carry retribution for two acts of violence against Germans. For the offence against the three engineers a party of 125 soldiers burned to the ground two villages from which the mob had come. Another body of 125 soldiers marched to Jihchao, fifteen miles inland, to exact punishment for the arrest there and maltreatment of a German missionary, and seized the town and held it. [113] This produced no effect, and, after holding the town for six weeks, the captain in command invited the officials and gentry to a conference, at which he informed them that he intended to take five of the gentry to Tsingtau

[107] Mr. Chalfant *et al.* to Consul Fowler, Dec. 26th, 1898, *ibid.*, p. 159.

[108] Same to same, Jan. 9th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 161.

[109] Corresp. Ichowfu, Jan. 31st, North-China Herald, Feb. 20th, 1899.

[110] Same, Feb. 25th, *ibid.*, March 20th, 1899.

[111] Ostasiatische Lloyd, Shanghai, April 5th, 1899.

[112] Baron Heyking to Mr. Conger, March 21st, 1899, U.S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 166.

[113] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, April 17th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 168.

as hostages to secure a settlement of the case; there was great consternation and he was charged with breach of faith, but the captain acted on his announced intention and carried off the hostages.[114] The German claims were then settled; reparation was made for other Roman Catholic losses; but the Protestant mission claims were not settled until the following August.[115]

§ 20. The Chinese government, late in the day, was in a bustle of preparation for resistance against aggression. In the first week of May Yuen Shih-kai with 5500 men, Nieh Titai with 7500, and Tung Fu-siang with 9000 of his Kansu troops, were ordered to Shantung for manoeuvres; but the German military instructors attached to Yuen Shih-kai's division were given three weeks' furlough from May 1st, and it may be assumed that the march south was not solely for purposes of instruction.[116] This force of 22,000 men marched up the hill and then marched down again, returning to Chih within a month [117]; but in the interval appeared the bellicose decree of May 26th,[118] issued on account of "the menacing attitude of Italy and Germany." From this time the feeling of hostility to foreigners, shown so strongly in all the provinces, was manifested with even greater intensity in Shantung. Foreign garrisons could protect themselves; foreign merchants were secure in the shelter of the treaty ports; foreign missionaries in the interior had an anxious time and some of their missions were destroyed, but, for the present, none were murdered; but the native converts were held to be tainted with the taint of foreign ideas, and on them fell the full fury of a hostility which could find no other vent. The enmity to everything foreign continued to grow, and, in September, it was noted that "a sect has arisen whose only reason for existence is their hatred for foreigners and the foreign religion. For some occult reason they have taken the

[114] *Ostasiatische Lloyd*, May 27th, 1899.

[115] Mr. W. P. Chalfant *et al.* to Consul Fowler, Aug. 14th, 1899, U.S. For. Rel., 1899, p. 177.

[116] *Ostasiat. Lloyd*, May 27th, 1899.

"There are disturbing rumours afloat re return of Tung Fu-siang's men to this neighbourhood, and appearance of considerable body of Chinese troops in Shantung. If these are all facts, I fear our summer will not be without its agitations!" —R. Hart to E. B. Drew, May 14th, 1899.

[117] *North-China Herald*, June 12th, 1899.

[118] Cf. *antea*, § 15.



name of 'BOXERS,' and last spring they tried to drive out the missionaries at Siao-chang." They had recently made the same attempt at Pangchwang. For some months past they had had a free hand, the magistrates knowing of their existence, but making no attempt to suppress them. Now to fanaticism brigandage had been added, bullies and robbers joining the bands, which had grown bolder, the magistrates trying only to reason with them. Every night some Christian village was raided; the converts were in a panic—some recanting, some paying blackmail, some holding firm for their faith. Villages were beginning to combine for resistance. And then the hopeful statement was made that, "like other uprisings in China, this promises to die out." [119]

§ 21. This was the first reference in print to the Boxers. A year earlier the Tataohwei, or Great Sword Society had been active in promoting rebellion in northern Kiangsu and north-western Shantung; but, after destroying some missions and causing much distress in the country-side, the rising had been suppressed. In May, 1899, a similar rising in southern Chihli had been similarly suppressed. During all this period western Shantung had been the scene of continued disorders, and early in September it became known that these were under the control of the Ihochüan; this name was capable of a double signification: its written form, as seen in different official documents, indicated either "Association for Justice and Harmony," or "Fist of Patriotic Union"; the latter was the recognised form, and in fact the society was a Turnverein, making boxing and gymnastics its ostensible purpose. Hence the popular name "Boxers." It adopted as the blazon or its flags a motto in four characters—"Cherish the Dynasty, exterminate the Foreigners" (hing-chao mieh-yang); and its members passed through various stages of secret initiation and mystic rites; the highest class of initiates were rendered invulnerable, by sword, spear, or bullet, through the protection accorded by the spirits of the dead hovering over them. They showed great activity in their raids. The 15th day of the moon (September 19th) was designated as the date for a raid on mission premises

[119] Corresp. Pangchwang, Sept. 21st, North-China Herald, Oct. 9th, 1899.

at Enhien in north-western Shantung; but stringent orders were sent from Peking and Tientsin to the governor to give effective protection, and the Boxers were diverted to raiding villages of Chinese converts.[120]

§ 22. The officials in all the disturbed region seemed sympathetic to the Boxers, or culpably negligent, or at the best helpless, and the raiding went on day after day, the raiders being systematically shielded by the gentry.[121] The native Christians were forced to burn incense and prostrate themselves before the altars in the temples; but, whether they submitted or not, they were relieved of everything portable, even to the grain destined for their support in the winter, and this at a time when, owing to poor crops, the distress was universal from the Great Wall to far beyond the Yellow River.[122] But little check was imposed on the operations of the raiders: indeed, early in October, the Chentai of Tsaochow, in south-western Shantung, had been assassinated, together with six of his body-guard, because of his activity in arresting members of the Tataohwei.[123] Troops had, however, been sent out to repress the general disorder, and, a force coming into collision with a band of Boxers, the latter were dispersed, 100 being killed and several made prisoners. This gave a promise of a restoration of order; but the governor of the province degraded the Fu of the prefecture and the Hien of the district, recalled the troops, and ordered the head constable, who had made some arrests, to be sent to Tsinanfu in chains. The Boxers had it thus made plain to them that the governor was not unfriendly to their society, but was actively hostile to those who might attack them; and they were encouraged in their course. The troops, wherever stationed, had orders not to fire, except under explicit instructions from the governor, and these orders effectively neutralised the instructions sent to all magistrates that they were to protect foreigners and maintain order—and “nothing now seems more certain than that the Chinese authorities either cannot or will not govern Shantung.”[124]

[120] Corresp. “North-western Shantung,” *ibid.*, Dec. 4th, 1899.

[121] Corresp. Ichowfu, Oct. 4th, *ibid.*, Oct. 23rd, 1899.

[122] Corresp. Tientsin, Oct. 11th, *ibid.*

[123] *Ibid.*, Oct. 16th, 1899.

[124] Corresp. “North-western Shantung,” *ibid.*, Dec. 4th, 1899.

§ 23. The Boxers continued their raids. These were regularly organised, one summons reading—"The Imperial Association of Justice and Harmony: you are summoned to meet on the 7th day of the 9th moon. Cherish the dynasty, exterminate the foreigners. Whoever declines to obey this summons is in danger of his head." [125] The German legation reported to Berlin in November that "the followers of the sects of 'Red Fists' [Boxers] and 'Great Knife' are in a state of revolt against the administration and the people of Shantung, and are engaged in rapine and plunder in many places." [126] Once, in northern Shantung on October 18th, they were dispersed by troops sent from Chihli, under the command of Yuen Shih-tun, brother of Yuen Shih-kai, sixty being killed and 100 wounded, including several of the "invulnerables." [127] But still their activity continued to the end of the year, always essentially anti-Christian, and always under the banner inscribed "exterminate the foreigner"; there were constant battles between Boxers and converts, while the troops looked on inactive; the cruelties committed on the native Christians were "most atrocious," men tortured, houses plundered, converts driven to recant; and the movement had spread far into Chihli. [128]

§ 24. On December 31st, as the Rev. S. M. Brooks, a missionary of the Church of England, was returning from Taian to his station at Pingyin, he was murdered by a party of marauders at Maokiapu, fifty miles south-west from Tsinanfu. The leaders of the mob were proved to be members of the Tataohwei, and for five days had been engaged in working up an anti-foreign commotion; on the sixth day they saw Mr. Brooks coming on his way, and, hastily putting on red head-cloths, [129] they rushed out and attacked him; in the attack he was wounded. They then stripped him to his underclothing and left him tied

[125] Corresp. Tientsin, Oct. 29th, *ibid.*, Nov. 13th, 1899.

[126] Nord-Deutscher Zeitung, cited in Lord Gough to Lord Salisbury, Berlin, Nov. 15th, 1899, China, No. 1, 1900, p. 368.

[127] North-China Herald, Nov. 13th, 1899.

[128] Corresp. Tsinanfu, Dec. 4th, Lintsingchow, Dec. 1st, Pangchwang Dec. 11th, Western Shantung, Dec. 4th, Tientsin, Dec. 11th; in *ibid.*, Dec. 27th, 1899. Corresp. Pangchwang, Dec. 18th, Jan. 1st, *ibid.*, Jan. 10th, 17th, 1900.

[129] Red girdles were the distinguishing badge of the Boxers.

up outside in the bitter cold. At night they took him to Maokiapu, which he reached much exhausted from exposure and his wounds. Here he broke away, but was soon overtaken, and his head was cut off.[130] The outrage was only a culmination of the war waged for over a year on the Christians in the province, but it excited universal condemnation by those in authority. The imperial government, by the pen of the empress dowager, declared that it was "most deeply grieved"; it pointed to repeated declarations that "all nations may propagate their religions in China," and to its "repeated orders and injunctions" to that effect; and it commanded that "the murderers should be caught and brought to justice." [131] This was done; and, in the presence of Mr. C. W. Campbell, of the British consular service, seven men arrested were tried by the provincial Judge at Tsinanfu on February 28th. Of the prisoners two were sentenced to death, and three to imprisonment for life, ten years, and two years, respectively; one, the innkeeper, was discharged because he had charitably given Mr. Brooks food and water and had relaxed the tightness of his bonds; and the village constable was also discharged because it was held that he was overawed by the Tataohwei, not by the half-dozen members present, but by the hundreds unseen in the background. An indemnity of Tls. 9500 was to be paid to provide memorials, but no indemnity was demanded as blood-money. The district magistrate was denounced to the throne.[132]

§ 25. "Yühsien is the principal culprit, and we cannot well insist on the punishment of minor officials, who practically acted under his orders, unless this man is first punished," was the comment of the British envoy.[133] An imperial clansman, a special protégé of the empress dowager, an adherent of the party of reaction among the Manchus and therefore intensely anti-foreign and opposed

[130] Report of trial at Tsinanfu on Feb. 28th, written by Mr. S. Couling, who was present officially.—North-China Herald, March 21st, 1900.

[131] Imp. decree, Jan. 5th, Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 5th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 3; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 6th, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 86.

[132] Mr. Couling's report, *ubi sup.*; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, March 29th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 12.

[133] *Ibid.*

to all reform, Yühsien had been appointed governor of Shantung in March, 1899.[134] The imperial decrees of May 26th, June 5th, and November 21st, ordering all officials to resist foreign aggression and directed as much against German aggression in Shantung as against the Italian claims, threw a special burden on his shoulders to keep the Germans in Shantung within proper bounds. He was a Manchu, with less than the ordinary Chinese official's conception of statecraft, and from the outset he accepted the idea, which was also that of Tung Fu-siang and of many more highly placed, that the best way to curb the foreigner was to make his position uncomfortable. Continuously through the summer and autumn the correspondents of the Shanghai newspapers, American missionaries generally, pointed out that it was Yühsien the governor, and he alone, who made it impossible to restore order; he it was who supported the gentry in their attitude of hostility to foreigners, who checked the zeal of local officials desirous of giving protection to those in peril, who restrained the troops from activity, who released Boxer chiefs on some technicality. Chinese opinion also supported this belief. A letter from a Chinese at Tsinanfu to his brother, an official at Shanghai, declared categorically that Yühsien abetted the Boxers; he practically said to the Ihotwan and the Tataohwei—"go forth and slay, pillage and exterminate all foreigners and Chinese converts, and I will forgive your sin in having formed associations which are prohibited by imperial decree." After giving many instances of Boxer outrages, he writes that Yühsien has said to the officials—"consider all petitions and appeals from missionaries and their converts as so much waste paper"; and he adds—"if he wanted to attack foreigners, why not send the Boxers against the Germans at Kiaochow?"[135]

§ 26. The foreigners directly affected were American, English and Italian missionaries, and German missionaries and engineers; and the brunt of the attacks fell on the Americans. The American legation was impressed by the danger, and repeatedly drew the attention of the Tsungli Yamen to the urgent necessity of dealing vigorously with

[134] North-China Herald, March 20th, April 17th, 1899.

[135] Trans. in *ibid.*, Jan. 10th, 1900.

the growing disorder in Shantung, and sending "peremptory and unmistakable orders" to that effect to the governor [136]; and finally the envoy demanded the recall of Yühsien—"if this governor will not or can not control the rioters and protect these people, he should be removed at once and some one put in his place who can and will." [137] The government acted on this, and, on December 6th, an imperial decree called Yühsien to Peking and appointed Yuen Shih-kai acting governor in his place. [138] The Boxer movement continued to spread, but the narrative must be interrupted to deal with the emperor's fate.

§ 27. In the reaction against reform the emperor's life was in actual peril, and, even if life were granted, his imminent deposition seemed to have been averted only by the fear of foreign intervention, and the existence of a party among the conservatives favorable to him. [139] On December 13th, 1898, the empress dowager showed a desire to conciliate foreign opinion by receiving in audience, for the first time, the ladies representing the American, British, French, German, Russian, Austrian, Dutch and Japanese legations, the emperor receiving with her; valuable presents were given to each of the ladies, and a favorable impression was produced. [140] The question of deposition was, however, not dropped. At the beginning of September—a time when the Lord High Extortioner Kangyi was nearing the end of his round, when the Boxer rising in Shantung was becoming a real danger, and when the rivalry between Junglu and Prince Ching was pronounced, and censors on both sides were bombarding the throne with memorials denouncing one or the other—in such a crisis the deposition was definitely decided on, the proposed successor to Kwanghsü being Putsüan, the nine year old son of Duke Tsailan, a friend and supporter of Prince Ching; the preliminary step had been a decree of September 4th in the sole name of the emperor, in which he pleaded his bad state of health, and begged leave from

[136] Am. legation to Tsungli Yamen, Nov. 11th, 16th, 23th, 26th, 27th, Dec. 2nd, 3rd, 5th, 1899, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 78 seq.

[137] Mr. Conger to Tsungli Yamen, Dec. 5th, 1899, *ubi sup.*

[138] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Dec. 7th, 1899, *ibid.*, p. 77.

[139] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 19, 21, 24.

[140] North-China Herald, Dec. 31st, 1898.

\* the empress dowager to abdicate.[141] It is the custom in China for an official who wishes to retire to plead bad health in three successive memorials, to be refused twice, and have his final answer on the third application, and this prayer from the emperor was accorded a first refusal; but it was ominous that Russia was reported to be preparing to send a large body of troops from Manchuria.[142] Many memorials were presented by Chinese officials protesting against any attempt at deposition, and the influence of Junglu was sufficient to postpone a decision.[143]

§ 28. The Manchu princes, nobles and bannermen were now ranged solidly on the side of Prince Ching, and Junglu stood practically alone; and from this time his influence in the council of the empress dowager waned rapidly.[144] He still, however, maintained his fight against Prince Ching's supremacy [145]; but the latter now found an ally in Tsaiyi, Prince Twan, grandson of the third, and adopted grandson of the fourth son of Kiaking.[146] He was a strong adherent of Tzehi and a rising man at court; originally Beileh (prince of the 3rd rank), he had been promoted in 1894 to Künwang (prince of the 2nd rank).[147] In November a renewal of the proposal to depose the emperor was supported by most of the Manchus, but was strongly opposed by some among them and by many influential Chinese, including Li Hung-chang, Liu Kun-yi, and Chang Chih-tung.[148] Li Hung-chang's opposition was possibly a factor in his appointment, while still Grand Secretary, and after having been Peiyang Tachen, to the distant and minor post of acting viceroy at Canton.[149] On January 1st the emperor issued a significant decree—"As our health is still weak, we hereby command that the ceremony of the emperor ascending the throne to receive the congratulations of the court on New Year's day be

[141] Tel. Peking, Sept. 7th, *ibid.*, Sept. 11th, 1899.

[142] *Ibid.*

[143] Tel. Peking, Sept. 17th, *ibid.*, Sept. 18th, 1899.

[144] *Ibid.*, Oct. 2nd, 1899, Jan. 30th, 1900.

[145] *Ibid.*, Nov. 6th, 1899.

[146] Cf. table at end of "Submission," chap. xiii.

[147] Corresp. Peking, Nov. 2nd, North-China Herald, Nov. 13th, 1899.

[148] *Ibid.*, Dec. 4th, 1899.

[149] Cf. *antea*, § 17.

omitted, as well as the court banquets usually held during the New Year.”[150]

§ 29. The Kengtze year of the Chinese sixty-year cycle, the twenty-sixth year of Kwanghsü, 1900 by the Western calendar, was a fateful year for the Great Tsing dynasty of the Manchus. Its intercalary month [151] was the eighth, and a year indicated by the character Keng and containing the eighth intercalary month had always been regarded as fraught with disaster to the dynasty. The omen was the more impressive from the fact that, though a “Keng” year recurred every ten years, no such year had contained the month of ill omen from 1680 until 1900. Moreover the Chinese year of the Hundred Days of Reform, 1898, had opened on January 22nd with an eclipse of the sun, of which the central line passed from Lhasa over Inner Mongolia, while at Peking five-sixths of the sun was eclipsed—foreboding disaster to the people. These omens following so closely on each other, the one affecting the people, the other the emperor, produced a profound effect on the people; but the empress dowager was not to be turned aside by any omens, and, on January 24th, a decree was issued in the sole name of the emperor, in which he recited the known fact that he had been selected as emperor by adoption as son of Hienfeng, and that his son was to be adopted as heir to Tungchih [152]; that for a year past [since September, 1898] he had been an invalid; “but ever keeping in our mind that we do not belong to the direct line of succession, and that for the safety of the empire of our ancestors a legal heir to the throne should be selected, we again begged the empress dowager to choose carefully amongst the imperial clan such

[150] North-China Herald, Jan. 3rd, 1900.

[151]. The year of twelve lunar months contains 354 or 355 days, and the discrepancy from the solar year is rectified by inserting an intercalary month in seven of every nineteen years. Several methods have been adopted in Chinese history. The system now in force is based on two principles: first, the winter solstice must fall within the 11th moon, the summer solstice within the 5th, the spring equinox within the 2nd, the autumn equinox within the 8th; second, that lunar month is intercalary, within which the sun does not transit from one sign of the zodiac to another. In Chinese astronomy the zodiac is divided into twenty-four stations, corresponding to the days on which the sun enters the 1st step (the chief station) and the 15th step (the jointed station) of each zodiacal sign; the intercalary month contains therefore a jointed station, but never a chief station. Cf. P. Hoang, “*De Calendario Sinico*.”

[152] Cf. “*Submission*,” chap. xiii, § 18.



an heir, and she has selected Puchün, son of Tsaiyi, Prince 'Twan." A second decree commanded that Puchün be made heir to "the late emperor Tungchih." A third decree appointed Chungyi (father-in-law of Tungchih) to be Grand Tutor, and Hsü Tung (Chinese Bannerman and bigoted in his anti-foreign views) to be Tutor in personal attendance on the Ta-ah-ko, or Heir Apparent, who was then fourteen years of age.[153] A further decree of the empress dowager "commands that the emperor [alone] shall at the New Year pay his obeisances to me in the Ningshow palace, after which I will proceed to the Hwang-chihtien [Throne-hall of Imperial Supremacy] where the Heir Apparent and all the princes, dukes and nobles of the imperial House shall pay me their obeisances." [154]

§ 30. The emperor had not been deposed; but he had been made to admit his technical illegitimacy as successor to his predecessor on the throne, an illegitimacy which had been asserted in 1875 by many Manchus and Chinese as "a violation of all ancestral custom and the time-honoured laws of succession." [155] The defect had been ignored when it had suited the plans of Tzehi to ignore it, but now that her plans had changed it was revived. But Kwanghsü had since his accession qualified for his position. He had attained a rightful position as son of Tungchih by his observance of the required term of three years of mourning, and he had been on the throne for twenty-five years; and these facts appealed to the empire at large, mingled with a deep distrust of Tzehi, who, it was felt, had in her later years made a tyrannical use of the power she had usurped. Kwangtung was in sullen opposition, but, to dominate it, measures were taken to have Kang Yu-wei captured or assassinated [156]: the reformers in the provinces were, to a man, loyal to the person of the emperor; so were the greater number of the Chinese among the officials.[157] Liu Kun-yi was ordered to Peking to answer charges

[153] Imp. decrees, Jan. 24th, North-China Herald, Jan. 30th, 1900; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 29th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 91.

[154] Imp. decree, Jan. 26th, North-China Herald, Jan. 30th, 1900.

[155] Cf. "Submission," chap. xiii, § 19.

[156] Tel. Peking, Jan. 24th, North-China Herald, Jan. 30th, 1900.

Imp. decree, Feb. 14th, offering a reward of Tls. 100,000 for the person of Kang Yü-wei or Liang Ki-chao, alive or dead, in *ibid.*, Feb. 21st, 1900.

[157] One memorial in protest was signed by the governor, judge and fifty-two officials holding office in Hupeh. It was taken to the viceroy,

brought against him, but postponed his departure until the spring [158]; and it was suggested to Chang Chih-tung that he should ask leave to go to Peking, but he declined,[159] and was snubbed in consequence.[160] Memorials poured in; one, telegraphed from Shanghai on January 26th, signed by Kin Lien-shan and 1230 others, was addressed to the emperor, assured him of the senders' loyalty and begged him not to abdicate.[161] These collective memorials, forty-six of which were received,[162] produced their effect, and caused Tze-hi to hesitate and to adopt a middle course. On January 29th four decrees regulated the procedure for the emperor's thirtieth birthday on August 6th next: the first forbade any special ceremonies in connexion with it; the second forbade the high officials to ask leave to come to Peking to offer their congratulations; but the third ordered that the customary Grace examinations should be held; and the fourth that full court robes should be worn for seven days, i.e. three days before and three days after the birthday.[163]

§ 31. The decree of January 4th, on the murder of Mr. Brooks, had been of a soothing tone; but, on the 11th it was followed by another on which the American envoy declared—"I myself have some anxiety as to the effect of its strange wording" [164]; the French representative characterised its terms as "vague and elastic," and conveying "a double meaning" [165]; while the British

Chang Chih-tung, and there was an angry outburst when he refused to add his name.—Tel. Wuchang, Jan. 27th, *ibid.*, Jan. 30th, 1900.

[158] *Ibid.* Cf. *postea*, § 35.

[159] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7th, 1900.

[160] Imp. decree, Jan. 31st, *ibid.*

[161] *Ibid.* Kin Lien-shan, whose name was the first appended to this telegram, was subsequently arrested at Macao. Tel. Hongkong, Feb. 26th, *ibid.*, Feb. 28th, 1900. The Portuguese authorities held him prisoner and took his case under advisement, until the outbreak of the Boxer rising, when he was released.—*Ibid.*, March 21st.

[162] A eunuch in attendance at court declared that he was present when the emperor was compelled, by the use of physical force, to sign his decree of abdication on Jan. 24th; the act was followed by his collapse, caused by the bursting of a lesser blood vessel. The empress dowager was furious at the receipt of Kin Lien-shan's memorial; but forty-six similar collective protests were received, and this made her pause and defer for a time, but not abandon, the deposition.—*Ibid.*, March 14th, 1900.

[163] *Ibid.*, Feb. 7th, 1900.

[164] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 15th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 88.

[165] M. d'Anthouard to M. Delcassé, March 13th, 1900, Documents Diplomatiques, 1900, p. 7.

envoy contented himself with noting that "it is regarded in some quarters with misgiving." [166] Premising that "recently the practice of robbery and pillage has increased very much in all the provinces," and that this was due to "leagues or societies of bad characters and rebels," the decree ordered that "a discrimination should be made in the nature and objects of these societies." Unlawful associations for plunder and rioting could not be tolerated, but "if law-abiding and loyal people combine to drill for their own protection, or villages join for mutual defence, this is only to fulfil the subject's duty of keeping watch and ward." Officials who did not thus discriminate would fail in their duty; missionaries and converts were to be dealt with justly and given full protection; but it was "the duty of the people to protect and guard their hearths and homes . . . thus quiet and peace will prevail . . . such is our earnest desire."

§ 32. Further reports from Shantung and southern Chihli "confirmed the general opinion that the decree . . . was considered by the Boxers and Big Sword societies as in their favour and did give them much encouragement . . . and their numbers are daily increasing and more serious trouble is threatened." [167] It was further believed that the empress dowager had decided that "Tung Fu-siang should carry out his plan of driving all foreigners into the sea," and that she regarded the Boxers as serviceable allies to that end. [168] These beliefs were strengthened, in the minds of foreigners and Boxers alike, by the reception given to Yühsien in Peking. The court circular in the Peking Gazette of January 16th recorded that "Yühsien arrives in Peking, is received in audience, and is presented by the empress [dowager] with [a tablet bearing] the character fu [happiness]." [169] The Tsungli Yamen explained that this was only a customary acknowledgment of service [170]; but the American envoy at

[166] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Jan. 17th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 8.

[167] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 29th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 93. Cf. also corresp. Tientsin, Jan. 11th, Ichowfu, Jan. 10th, Lintsingchow, Jan. 6th, N.W. Shantung, Jan. 16th, Feb. 6th, in North-China Herald, Jan. 24th, 30th, Feb. 14th, 28th, 1900.

[168] North-China Herald, Feb. 14th, 1900.

[169] Ibid.

[170] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 29th, 1900, ubi sup.

once protested against the laxity shown in dealing with the disorder in Shantung, declaring that "certainly the imperial commendation of governor Yühsien furnishes grounds for such opinions." [171]

§ 33. The légations directly concerned, the American, British, French, German and Italian, becoming more alarmed, addressed an identic note to the Tsungli Yamen on January 27th, drawing attention to the ambiguous wording of the decree, and asking that another be issued, "ordering by name the complete suppression of the Ihochüan and Tataohwei societies," and that it might be "distinctly stated in the decree that to belong to either of these societies, or to harbour any of its members, is a criminal offence against the laws of China." [172] The question appeared to the légations to be urgent, but not so to the Chinese administration, which was engaged in the more important business of settling the succession to the throne and of celebrating the new year season; but a month later, on February 25th, the légations were informed that a decree had ordered the viceroy of Chihli and the governor of Shantung to suppress the societies; and, on March 1st, that the viceroy of Chihli had issued a proclamation in conformity with his orders. On March 2nd the légations, at a conference with the Tsungli Yamen, presented another note asking that the decree be given general publicity by being published in the Peking Gazette; but, on March 7th, this was refused as being contrary to precedent. The légations repeated their demand with more insistence in a note of March 9th. The American envoy expressed his opinion that "the Chinese government have, either purposely or through fear of a general uprising, flagrantly trifled with this matter from the beginning and have grossly violated their treaty obligations"; and all five envoys were agreed in advising their respective governments that a naval demonstration be made in the gulf of Pechihli. [173]

[171] Same to Tsungli Yamen, Jan. 18th, 1900, in *ibid.*

[172] China, No. 3, 1900, p. 13; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 96.

[173] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, March 16th, 23rd, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 11, 24; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, March 10th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 102; M. d'Anthouard to M. Delcassé, March 11th, 13th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 6, 7.

The French chargé d'affaires considered the naval demonstration as

§ 34. Opinions on the conduct of Yuen Shih-kai varied. Much was expected from his vigour, his wide knowledge of foreign affairs, and his long training under Li Hung-chang; and the American administration was led to express its belief that "the appointment of Yuen Shih-kai as governor of Shantung may inaugurate a new era in that province" [174]; but in those on the spot the feeling was one of "almost unmixed disappointment." [175] As time went on, those same "men on the spot" began to see that he seemed to be trying to do what he could, but that his hands were tied through restraining orders from Peking and silent obstruction or lukewarm support from the officials under his command [176]; and ever, in imperial China, the apparently autocratic ruler of a province was strangely under the influence of any show of cold disapproval from above or latent hostility from below. That he did not go outside his orders from Peking is shown by his promotion, on March 14th, from acting to titular governor of Shantung. The animus of the administration was manifested in the favour shown to Yühsien; he had been, apparently, removed from the governorship on the representation of the American envoy, that envoy had protested against the favour shown to him by the empress dowager, and now he was appointed governor of Shansi; the British and German envoys protested; the American envoy regarded the act as "unfriendly" and warned the Chinese ministers that "trouble would come of his appointment," and this warning was approved by the Secretary of State. [177]

§ 35. This time was selected for a renewal of the crusade against the reformers. On February 22nd, the

"pour le moment prématurée": but the Minister of Foreign Affairs agreed to co-operate in the movement, did not improve. M. Delcassé to Fr. ambassadors, March 13th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 10. The British government thought the movement inopportune, but agreed to send ships to cruise, M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, Peking, March 15th; M. Cambon to same, April 4th, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 12, 14.

[174] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Feb. 1st, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 96.

[175] Corresp. N.W. Shantung, Jan. 16th, North-China Herald, Feb. 14th, 1900.

[176] Same, Feb. 6th, March 13th, 20th, April 24th; Tientsin, March 29th; in *ibid.*, Feb. 28th, March 28th, April 4th, May 9th, 1900.

[177] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, March 16th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 24; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, March 23rd, Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, May 15th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 112, 126.

empress dowager gave orders that twenty members of the reform party living in the provinces be arrested; Weng Tung-ho, Grand Tutor to Kwanghsü, then in enforced seclusion in his home in Changshu, Kiangsu,[178] was among them, but his arrest was postponed owing to his illness. It was reported that other lists were expected to follow, to include altogether upwards of 400 names; that this was the work of Kangyi and other reactionaries, but was repugnant to Junglu; and that it was hoped the persecution would cease as soon as Liu Kun-yi could make his influence felt.[179] On March 9th five members of the Hanlin, known as advocates of reform, were sentenced to severe penalties for incompetence, speculation, "loss of right feeling," "an unfathomable heart," etc.; this was accepted as "tangible evidence of the very strong anti-foreign sentiments of the empress dowager and her closest advisers." [180] On March 12th an imperial decree gave a long list of honours conferred for the emperor's thirtieth birthday; among them Li Hung-chang was permitted to quarter the imperial arms,[181] Hsü Tung received the three-eyed peacock's feather (usually reserved for princes and dukes), Wang Wen-shao and Liu Kun-yi were appointed Junior Guardians to the Heir Apparent.[182] Liu Kun-yi went to Peking close on the heels of his honour and was received in audience on April 5th, and again on the 7th. He had a cordial reception from the empress dowager and the princes present; he was urged to take steps to "wipe out" the reform party, but replied that it was an "almost impossible task"; but it was obvious that he was the only man capable of maintaining order in the Liangkiang and other provinces under his jurisdiction, and, notwithstanding his numerous requests to retire from

[178] Cf. chap. vi, § 9.

[179] Tel. Peking, March 1st; Chinese corresp. Peking, Feb. 22nd, March 1st; North-China Herald, March 7th, 14th, 1900.

[180] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, March 13th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 109.

[181] This is the European equivalent of the honour bestowed on him. As a civil official of the first class he wore on breast and back of his official robes a square plaque with a white crane embroidered on it; he was now honoured by being permitted to embroider the imperial dragon on the square plaques. The emperor wore the dragon embroidered within a circle or on a round plaque.

[182] North-China Herald, March 14th, 1900.

office, he was ordered back to his post at Nanking.[183] He resumed office there on May 9th.[184] The persecution of the reformers had been stopped, the edict against the Ihochüan and Tataohwei was published in the Peking Gazette on April 15th, and the foreign ships of war "returned to their ordinary duty." [185]

§ 36. A spirit of unrest prevailed everywhere. In February news was received that two members of the British Burma boundary commission, Mr. Kiddle and Mr. Sutherland, had been killed, and Mr. Litton, of the consular service, had been wounded, by native tribes at Mengka, 200 miles from Tengyueh [186]; but on this occasion no such political importance was attached to the murders as had been the case in 1875. In Honan in February there was a "general state of disorder," directed more especially against the administration and the well-to-do.[187] In Hunan a general rising was threatened if the deposition of the emperor were proceeded with, but meantime the province was kept quiet by the influence of Liu Kun-yi, who was still at Nanking.[188] In Hupeh there was general talk among the people that a rebellion would break out during the year.[189] In Yunnan the word was passed around to "sharpen your weapons and prepare for the coming struggle," with an especial animus against French railway projects.[190] In Kwangtung the officials were visibly making active preparations against a "great rebellion during the summer." [191] In Chekiang the old feud between converts broke out again in Taichowfu, and a Roman Catholic missionary was severely wounded.[192] In Chihli "the Boxer movement was spreading quietly over the northern part of the province," and it was reported that 8000 of Prince Twan's troops had "joined the

[183] North-China Herald, April 11th, 1900.

[184] Ibid., May 16th, 1900.

[185] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, April 16th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 23; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, April 16th, May 3rd, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 117, 119.

[186] Tel. Peking, Feb. 16th, North-China Herald, Feb. 21st, 1900

[187] Corresp. North Honan, Feb. 23rd, *ibid.*, Feb. 28th, 1900.

[188] Tel. Peking, March 5th, *ibid.*, March 7th, 1900.

[189] Corresp. Anluifu, March 27th, Ichang. April 18th, *ibid.*, April 11th, 25th, 1900.

[190] Corresp. Chaotungfu, March 5th, *ibid.*, April 11th, 1900.

[191] Corresp. Canton, May 2nd, *ibid.*, May 9th, 1900.

[192] M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, May 14th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 20.

Boxers" [193]; early in May armed Boxers raided villages of Roman Catholic converts near Paotingfu, eighty miles from Peking, killing and burning alive some seventy of them [194]; and two days later they attacked in the same way villages of Protestant converts in Laishuihien, only forty miles from Peking.[195] In Shantung, in addition to all the Boxer attacks on missions and converts, there were attacks also on German railway works. The most formidable was on February 2nd, when five railway engineers were driven from their work by an armed band coming from Kaomi; three days before, the correspondent had been warned by the Chinese magistrate not to go near Kaomi.[196]

§ 37. While the Boxers were raiding the converts of all denominations, and attacking the German engineers, in Shantung; while the court was covertly encouraging the Boxers; while the emperor was threatened with deposition; while the reformers were again being sought out for persecution—at such a time the German organ at Shanghai protested against the attitude of the English newspapers of Shanghai in “circulating the most incredible rumours about events in China of a nature to make people in Europe believe that China is either on the threshold of a revolution or of a general collapse of her system of government.” It ridiculed the alarmist reports, which it characterised as “wild tales,” and which it declared were telegraphed abroad for the sake of influencing the stock markets; and it deprecated such an attempt to “shake confidence in the stability of the present state of China.”[197]

§ 38. A truer note was struck in a communication from Peking early in May warning the public that there was a great secret scheme to crush all foreigners in China and to wrest back the cessions made to foreign powers; that the principal leaders in the project were the empress dowager, Prince Ching, Prince Twan, Kangyi, Chao

[193] North-China Herald, April 11th, 18th, 1900.

[194] M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, May 14th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 20.

[195] Same to same, May 16th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 20; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 21st, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 127.

[196] Corresp. Weihien, Jan. 30th, Feb. 2nd, North-China Herald, Feb., 14th, 21st, 1900.

[197] Ostasiatische Lloyd reproduced in Berlin Post, March 20th, cited in Sir F. Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, March 22nd, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 12.



Shu-kiao, and Li Ping-heng; that the armed force behind the movement was entirely Manchu—Prince Ching's force, 50,000, Prince Twan's force, 10,000, and the Imperial Guard under Kangyi, 12,000—while the Boxers were counted on as auxiliaries; and that the carrying the project into effect was imminent. All the Chinese of the upper classes knew of this, and had warned their friends among foreigners, but had been laughed at. The foreign legations had demanded the suppression of the Boxers and had had dust thrown in their eyes; and Junglu had now decided to stand by the emperor.[198]

[198] Corresp. Peking, May 8th, North-China Herald, May 16th, 1900.

This correspondent was a Chinese holding an official position in Peking, a member of the family which had been viceroy of the great viceroy, Tseng Kwo-fan, and the able *chong*, *Chong* *Chong*; he was killed in June or July, somewhere between Peking and the Yangtze.

# PLAN OF PEKING


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8. Pingtze Gate.
9. Sichih Gate.
10. Sipien Gate.
11. Tungpien Gate.
12. Shakwo Gate.
13. Kiangtze Gate.
14. Yungting Gate.
15. Nansi Gate.
16. Kiangyü Gate.
17. Water Gate.
18. Hanlin Library.
19. Imperial Carriage Park.
20. Mongol Market.
21. Tsungli Yamen.
22. Observatory.
23. Temple of Heaven.
24. Temple of Agriculture.
25. Suwang Fu.
26. British Legation.
27. Russian Legation.
28. American Legation.
29. Netherlands Legation.
30. Spanish Legation.
31. Japanese Legation.
32. French Legation.
33. German Legation.
34. Italian Legation.
35. Austro-Hungarian Legation.
36. Belgian Legation.
37. Customs Inspectorate.
38. Customs Students.
39. Post-Office.
40. American Methodist Mission.
41. Old Pehatang.
42. New Pehatang (besieged).
43. Nantang.
44. Tungtang.
45. American Presbyterian Mission.
46. American Board Mission.
47. London Mission.
48. Church of England Mission.

Gates of  
Tartar City.

Gates of  
Chinese City.

(Roman  
Catholic  
Churches and  
Missions.



Scale of English Miles



## CHAPTER VIII

### THE BREAKING OF THE STORM

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§ 1. "PEKING, Tientsin and Paotingfu are encircled by bands of maddened and fanatical people, whose numbers

are swollen by an excited crowd of vagabonds, and who, being maintained by leaders in high position, rob, pillage, burn and kill as they pass. For the moment their activity is directed against Chinese converts, Catholic and Protestant. . . . They do not conceal their object to get rid of all foreigners . . . by means of destruction of religious missions and a general insurrection against European and American residents . . . and on their flags they now assert that they act by imperial command.”[1] Thus, on May 20th, the French envoy, driven to action by a warning letter from Mgr. Favier, Roman Catholic Bishop of Peking, the culmination of many such letters from this prelate, who “wrote in a state of extreme alarm, demanding detachments of marine guards and declaring that the greatest evils are imminent.”[2] Warnings there had been in great abundance, so many that people had become accustomed to them and had ceased to regard them; while others, who took them seriously, thought that the outbreak would be deferred until the eighth moon (September), immediately preceding the fatal intercalary eighth.[3] The warnings had been emphasised by two among the English newspapers in China—the North-China Herald of Shanghai, and the Peking and Tientsin Times of Tientsin, both then under editors of exceptional ability; and the former in an editorial ten days before this date stated that “Chinese in Peking write that they are more and more convinced that the Manchus in power are preparing for a bold attempt to expel the foreigner altogether from North China”; and it pointed out, adducing many precedents, that May and

[1] M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, May 20th, 1900, Documents Diplomatiques, France, 1900, p. 21.

[2] Ibid. Bishop's letter in China. No. 3, 1900, p. 107; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 130.

[3] “We cannot say we had no warning. . . . In fact, if there was one cry to which our ears had grown so accustomed as to mind it less than our own heart beats, it was this Chinese cry of ‘Wolf.’ . . . Some of us regarded the movement as very significant, but we did not expect it to become a danger before autumn: its earlier development was a genuine surprise.”—R. Hart, “These from the Land of Sinim,” p. 1.

“Throughout a large part of China there was a general expectation that by the eighth moon there would be serious disturbances. Many who had been anticipating such an event at that time, were taken by surprise because the catastrophe occurred so many months earlier.”—A. H. Smith, “China in Convulsion,” i, p. 219.

“There are predictions of a general uprising in the eighth moon.”—Corresp. Ichang, April 18th, North-China Herald, April 25th, 1900.

June were the favorite months for launching rebellions in China.[4]

§ 2. The French envoy was "profoundly impressed by the apprehensions of Mgr. Favier,"[5] and called a meeting of his colleagues to consider the situation. It was unanimously agreed that a joint note should be sent,[6] making explicit demands for the suppression of the Boxers, by arrests, by punishment, and by the issue of imperial decrees. The question of summoning legation guards was considered, but a decision was deferred, several of the foreign envoys being reluctant to advise the step at this stage, as they feared to consolidate the anti-foreign element and drive the administration into the arms of the Boxers.[7] The German envoy considered that, if the Chinese government failed to suppress the Boxers, pressure should be brought to bear on it by a concentration of ships of war near Shanhaikwan; and it was decided to recommend this step to the various governments as a contingent measure.[8] The British and American envoys had both had interviews with the Tsungli Yamen on May 18th, and were both hopeful of the outcome. The former reported—"I confess that little has come to my own knowledge to confirm the gloomy anticipations of the French Fathers. . . . My judgment as to the probability of continued security must be suspended until the Chinese government shows, by its action within the next few days, whether or not it has the will and the power to do its duty."[9] The American envoy reported—"I believe that the government is aroused, itself alarmed at the situation, and will take more energetic action; but no one can be certain of this until it is done."[10]

[4] Ibid., May 9th, 1900. Mr. Robert W. Little was editor of the North-China Herald, and Mr. Alexander Michie of the Peking and Tientsin Times.

[5] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, May 21st, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 103.

[6] Text in *ibid.*, p. 109; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 129; Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 24.

[7] "Even now there were many in the various legations who were opposed to bringing up a large force."—Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 210.

"We did not consider that the circumstances . . . were such as to justify the bringing up of legation guards."—Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, *ubi sup.*

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid.

[10] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 21st, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 127.

§ 3. Of energetic action there was no evidence; but the wing of the Chinese administration which may be variously described as cautious, or fearful of the consequences, or regardful of its international responsibilities, or friendly to foreign powers, was allowed to soothe the legations by the issue of imperial decrees of a most correct tone. One, purporting to have been issued secretly on May 17th, but brought to the notice of the legations only on May 21st, ordered the Peking police to consult and report on the best way to check Boxer activities. Then followed three others, issued on May 24th, 29th and 30th, which left nothing to be desired in the stringency of the orders given to "act immediately and vigorously arrest the leaders and chiefs, and disperse the followers of the Boxers," and to protect mission chapels.[11] Again the legations were reassured. The hopeful spirit of the British and American envoys has been referred to; and now the Russian envoy made such a report that, in the opinion of the Russian Foreign Minister, "the danger is now less acute" [12]; and similarly, on the French envoy's reports, M. Delcassé continued as late as June 5th to consider that "for the moment all imminent danger was over." [13] But meantime events were outpacing reassuring decrees. On May 25th the Boxers attacked and destroyed the houses of converts of an American mission at Pachow, sixty miles south of Peking, and "murdered nine Christian women and children." On the 28th "word came that the railway was attacked, two bridges and two stations burned on the Paotingfu line; and that Fengtai, on the Tientsin line, only ten miles from Peking, was being burned with all the machine shops, and that no trains were running between Peking and Tientsin." [14] Each legation, independently, had already requisitioned for marines to be sent to Tientsin, and, at a meeting of the envoys held May 28th, it was decided to order up the legation

[11] Trans. of decrees in same to same, June 2nd (received in Washington, Oct. 24th), 1900, *ibid.*, p. 132.

[12] Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, St. Petersburg, May 31st, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 31.

[13] Sir E. Monson to same, Paris, May 31st, June 4th, 5th, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 32, 34, 35.

[14] Sir C. MacDonald to same, May 29th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 30; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 2nd, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 132.

guards [15]; the French envoy had, in fact, sent for his before the meeting assembled.[16]

§ 4. When the legations were established at Peking under the conventions of Peking, 1860, each of the three then opened [17] was provided with a guard for its security in a capital in which they were not welcome; but in course of time they were reduced to a number sufficient only for ceremonial escort duty. Later on, in times of crisis, detachments of marines were sent up from the several fleets for special duty to guard the legations during the winter, when Peking was cut off from the outer world by the closing by ice of the port of Tientsin; this was done at the end of 1894 and 1898, the guards being on each occasion withdrawn in March. The guards were sent up by concerted action of the great powers, acting on a joint representation of their envoys in Peking; but the American government in February, 1895, while agreeing to joint action, noted its dissent from the principle, and declared that the proper course to pursue was for the legation to demand an escort to "a place of safety where you would be under the immediate and legitimate protection of your own flag." [18] In 1900 the State Department made no such demur, [19] but there was still some misgiving on the subject of combined action. [20] The other powers assented

[15] Same to same, May 28th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 132; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, May 29th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 30; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, May 29th, 1900, *Doc. Dip.*, 1900, p. 27.

[16] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, May 29th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 30.

[17] Mr. Burlingame, the first American envoy in residence, did not arrive in Peking until July, 1862.

[18] "The President sees no reason why the legation should court danger by remaining at Peking in the face of imminent or threatening peril; and you would have the right to an adequate escort to assist you in avoiding it by removal to a place of safety where you would be under the immediate and legitimate protection of your own flag. Nevertheless, in view of your telegram of the 18th instant, reporting that other legations are bringing military guards to Peking with the consent of the Chinese government, I telegraphed on the 19th authorising you to bring up marines under similar conditions."—Mr. Gresham to Mr. Denby, Feb. 28th, 1895, U.S. For. Rel., 1895, p. 198.

[19] "If required for safety of legation, confer with admiral about sending guards for your protection."—Mr. Hill to Mr. Conger, tel., May 26th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 132.

[20] "Act independently in protection of American interests where practicable, and concurrently with representatives of other powers if necessity arise."—Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, tel., June 8th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 143.



without reservation. The Tsungli Yamen refused to grant permission,[21] and consequently the viceroy at Tientsin refused to sanction the necessary railway transport; but, after some further discussion, the permission was given on May 31st, provided that the number did not exceed thirty for each legation.[22] The guards were at Tientsin ready to start and they arrived at Peking at 6.45 p.m. the same day—79 British, 79 Russian, 75 French, 53 American, 39 Italian and 24 Japanese; in addition 51 German and 32 Austro-Hungarian arrived on June 3rd; to these must be added 19 officers, making a total of 451 armed men. Of these 2 officers and 41 men guarded the Pehtang cathedral, and 17 officers and 391 men the legations. The British, American, Austrian and Italian forces each had a machine-gun; the Russians brought ammunition for their gun, useless for any other, but left the gun itself behind in Tientsin. Of the British and French guards there were 100 of each ready to entrain, but, as the Russians had only 79 men, diplomatic exigencies required that the excess of each of the other two be left behind.

§ 5. The alarm which led to summoning the guards was well founded. Heretofore the animosity of the Boxers had been actively directed against the "secondary devils," the "erh-kwei-tze"—the Chinese converts tainted with the foreign poison; the primary devils had been in constant peril, but, with the exception of Mr. Brooks, no foreign life had been taken. On May 28th that foreign institution, the railway, had been interrupted from Peking both to Tientsin and to Paotingfu, and the machine shops at Fengtai had been destroyed; and the railway engineering staff at Fengtai were blocked in their houses. Word of their danger was brought to Peking on the 29th; the foreign envoys were busily engaged with their conferences, and the diplomatic body with its dozen heads took no action; but a Swiss hotel-keeper, M. Chamot, with his American wife started off with five others and, on May 30th, "they brought in the whole party, thirteen men, nine women and seven children, safely to Peking, weary, bedraggled, and

[21] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, May 30th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 30.

[22] Same to same, May 31st, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 31; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 2nd, 1900, U.S. For Rel., 1900, p. 132.

in a condition of extreme faintness of body and mind.”[23]. The line to Tientsin was temporarily restored, but that to Paotingfu remained unworkable.

§ 6. At Yungtsing, twenty miles north-east of Paotingfu, fifty miles south of Peking in the direction of Pachow, on June 1st two English missionaries met their fate. Mr. Charles Robinson and Mr. H. V. Norman, threatened by an armed mob, fled for refuge to the magistrate's yamen; when the mob demanded their surrender they were forced to leave the yamen by the back door, and were refused entrance to the Confucian temple, in which a shelter had been promised. Mr. Robinson was killed inside one of the city gates. Mr. Norman escaped from the city, but was made prisoner at once; he was kept for twenty-four hours and then killed.[24]

§ 7. At Paotingfu was a large force of railway engineers, Belgians, Italians and others, with their families. Warned of serious danger impending they hastily collected boats, and started by river for Tientsin at 5 p.m. on May 29th, a party of 41, viz. 33 men, 7 women and one child. They were provided by the officials with an escort of soldiers, but at 5 p.m. on May 30th the officers left on some trivial excuse. The next morning they were attacked by a mob armed with swords and spears, the weapons customary at this stage of the movement, but the soldiers of the escort also joined in the attack; this attack was beaten off. They then left the boats and proceeded on foot through the dust and burning sun, with scanty food; and, sometimes maintaining a running fight, sometimes creeping between villages unseen, through four days, they reached Tientsin at 4 p.m. on June 4th. Of the whole party, 9 were “missing,” 23 wounded, and 9 unhurt.[25] With such beginnings, well might the “legations consider situation serious.”[26]

§ 8. Shantung, the home of the Boxers, was kept quiet through this crisis by the exertions of the governor, Yuen Shih-kai [27]; but the whole of Chihli was now a seething

[23] Smith, “China in Convulsion,” i, p. 209.

[24] Forsyth, “The China Martyrs of 1900,” pp. 13-18; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 4th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 139.

[25] North-China Herald, June 6th, 13th, 1900.

[26] Tel. Peking, June 1st, *ibid.*, June 6th, 1900.

[27] Smith, “Convulsion,” ii, p. 604; Forsyth, “China Martyrs,” p. 12.

“By common report Yuen Shih-kai has now become a convert to

mass of Boxers, active throughout the province; only within Peking and Tientsin they had as yet committed no overt act of outrage, but even in and around those cities they were already enrolling recruits, drilling, and engaging in their mystic rites [28]; even in the imperial palace the newly selected heir to the throne "had dressed himself up as a Boxer and was going through their drill," and was reprimanded by the empress dowager.[29] The imperial Council was rent with dissension: on the side of caution were Junglu and nearly all the Chinese among the high ministers; Prince Ching was always hostile to Junglu, but in this crisis did not stand in opposition to his views [30]; in favour of the policy of using the Boxer movement as a means of driving foreigners into the sea were all the other Manchu nobles and high ministers, foremost among them Prince Twan, Duke Lan, Hsü Tung, Changyi and Kangyi, and ranged on their side was the commander of the Kansu troops, Tung Fu-siang. Junglu was in infirm health and was, from time to time, confined to his house; but his was the only voice on the side of caution which had any weight. On May 31st, after the Tsungli Yamen had given formal permission for the legation guards to come to Peking, an aggressive party headed by Kangyi wished still to oppose their entrance at the gates; but "Prince Ching implored Prince Twan not to oppose their entry," while "Junglu had already ordered their admission." [31] At a secret conclave held at the palace on June 4th it was proposed that the Boxers should not be crushed, since they

Christianity; if he too were to suppress the [Boxer] movement in Shantung, not death itself could expiate his guilt."—Diary of Chingshan, June 1st, Bland and Backhouse, "Empress Dowager," p. 260.

[28] "There is no prohibition of the Boxers drilling, which they now openly do in the public squares and in the temples."—Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 8th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 42.

"The [Princess Imperial] has over two hundred and fifty Boxers quartered at the palace outside the Howmen."—Diary, Chingshan, June 10th, p. 262.

[29] Diary Chingshan, June 1st, p. 257.

[30] "On the other side is Prince Ching, president of the Tsungli Yamen, and nearly all the ministers of the Tsungli Yamen."—Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 4th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 139.

"Prince Ching habitually ridicules the Boxers in private conversation, declaring them to be utterly useless. . . . In public, however, he is most cautious."—Diary, Chingshan, June 1st, p. 259.

[31] Ibid., June 1st, p. 256.

were loyal to the dynasty, and, if properly armed, would be useful auxiliaries. The only voices raised in opposition were those of Junglu and Prince Li (representative of one of the eight princely families); Wang Wen-shao sat silent; and "the empress dowager kept her own counsel." [32]

§ 9. The foreign envoys now saw more clearly into the situation and were much perturbed. On June 4th, on the proposition of the French envoy, the governments of the eight powers were simultaneously informed by telegram that "we may at any time be besieged here, with the railway and telegraph lines cut"; and they were asked to instruct their naval authorities to "take concerted measures for our relief"; and the question was declared to be most urgent. [33] The cutting of communications was imminent. "The last trains left Makiapu on the 9th; the last telegrams were despatched on the 10th; the special postal courier sent overland on the 15th failed to reach Tientsin; and the last letter that got up from Tientsin was dated 16th and received 18th." [34] The admirals had also been communicated with and were ready for any eventuality; but no explicit orders had been received from any of the home authorities when, on June 9th, the British admiral, Sir Edward Seymour, then with the other admirals off Taku, received a telegram sent at 8.30 p.m. by Sir C. MacDonald—"Situation extremely grave; unless arrangements are made for immediate advance to Peking it will be too late." [35] The admiral

[32] Tel. Peking, June 5th, North-China Herald, June 6th, 1900.

[33] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 4th, 5th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 34, 36; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 4th, 7th, 8th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 141, 142, 143; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, June 3rd, 8th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 30, 34.

[34] R. Hart, "These from the Land of Sinim," p. 15. The last telegrams to reach the legations were those reporting the departure of the advance party, 500 strong, of the Seymour relief force.—Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 11th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 144. There were no through trains after June 5th; cf. *postea*, § 14.

[35] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 10th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 1; E. H. Seymour, "My Naval Career," p. 343; H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 19. Instructions dated June 7th and 8th were sent by the British Admiralty giving Adm. Seymour a free hand, but were not received in time; China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 39, 43. The American envoy also telegraphed on June 9th to Admiral Kempff that "railroad communication ought to be opened and a movement in force made on Peking if possible."—Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 11th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 144.

lost no time, and left his flagship with his landing force within two hours. At Tientsin some objections were made to giving him a train, but these were over-riden, and he started at 9.30 a.m. on June 10th with a portion of a mixed naval force; the next day at Yangtsun he was joined by other detachments, bringing his total force to 2066, consisting of 915 British, 540 German, 312 Russian, 158 French, 112 American, 54 Japanese, 40 Italian and 25 Austrian.[36] Admiral Seymour was in command as the senior officer present.[37]

§ 10. The whole country around Peking "was filled with wild reports of pillage, arson and the murder of Christians" [38]; and, on June 7th, "threats of impending troubles became more ominous,"[39] and, within a day or two, "the situation here has been daily growing worse," and "is now critical." [40] On June 7th appeared an imperial decree on the Boxer troubles which "probably represented a compromise between the conflicting opinions existing at court"; the "general tone was most unsatisfactory," and "a very bad effect was produced by it." [41] The envoys now proposed to demand a personal audience with the empress dowager and the emperor in order to "put in plain terms the existence of so deplorable a state of things in North China," and to make "a strong intimation that, unless the Chinese government immediately suppressed the Boxers and re-established law and order, the foreign powers would be compelled themselves to take measures to that end." [42] They also, on June 8th, asked the Tsungli Yamen for permission to bring additional legation guards.[43] Both requests were categorically refused by the Chinese administration. The envoys were

[36] Report, Sec. of Navy, U.S., 1900, p. 4.

[37] Seymour, "My Naval Career," p. 342.

[38] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 212.

[39] Ibid., p. 213.

[40] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 11th, 1900, *ubi sup.*; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 8th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 32; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, June 8th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 34.

[41] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 7th, 8th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 39, 42.

[42] Same to same, June 8th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 43; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 8th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 143; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, June 9th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 35.

[43] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 11th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 144.

only ministers plenipotentiary, without the privileges of ambassadors, and could not insist on the audience without express instructions; these were sent, but arrived too late to be of use. The extra guards, permission for which had been refused, were sent for on June 9th.

§ 11. The empress dowager and the emperor returned from the Iho palace at Yuenmingyuen to the imperial palace in the Forbidden City in Peking on June 9th. On that day and the next the Boxers were especially active around Peking: they burned the grand stand of the race-course, three miles west of Peking, used chiefly as a centre for picnics; they assaulted a party of legation students riding in that direction; they burned the summer cottages of the British legation at the Western Hills; and at Tungchow, thirteen miles south-east of Peking, they burned the premises of the American missionaries and massacred many of their converts.[44] The situation was fairly summarised in a telegram sent on June 8th by a meeting of American citizens to President McKinley but not received by him: "Boxers destroy chapels, massacre hundreds Christians, threaten exterminate all foreigners. Tungchow abandoned; Paotingfu, Tsunhwa, extreme danger. Chinese troops useless. Attack Peking, Tientsin daily threatened. Railways destroyed, telegraphs cut. Chinese government paralysed. Imperial edicts double-faced, favour Boxers. Universal peril. Unless situation promptly relieved, thirty Americans convened regard outlook practically hopeless." [45] As a crowning threat an imperial decree of June 10th appointed the "malignantly anti-foreign" [46] Prince Twan to be president of the Tsungli Yamen conjointly with the invertebrate Prince Ching.

§ 12. It was time for outlying bodies of foreigners to get under cover. The missionaries in the interior had no place of refuge, but in and around Peking there had been much alarm, and from the end of May many of the women and children had spent the night in the British legation.[47] One June 8th a rescue party, headed by Mr. W. S. Ament,

[44] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 10th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 1.

[45] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 216.

[46] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 11th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 144.

[47] Hart, "Sinim," p. 13.

brought in from Tungchow the personnel of the American mission—six men, eleven women and seven children—besides “a considerable number of native Christians who dared remain no longer”; the journey was effected without incident, “although a few hours later it would have been impossible.”[48] On the same day it was decided that all missionaries in Peking, who had not already taken shelter in the British and American legations, should concentrate in the compound of the American Methodist mission, east of the Hatamen Street; there they formed their own volunteer guard of men and women, supported by twenty American marines. On June 9th the customs and college staffs, living a mile and a half away on the eastern side, were called in to the Inspectorate of Customs. On June 13th a rescue party brought in the priests and nuns from the Nantang, the Roman Catholic southern church; other Catholics were concentrated in the Pehtang, guarded by forty-three French and Italian marines. Around the legation quarter a cordon was drawn, guarded by the legation guards; this covered the Inspectorate of Customs and Posts, and all the legations except the Belgian

§ 13. The Boxer adherents in Peking were much in evidence from June 9th. On the 11th Mr. Sugiyama, chancellor of the Japanese legation, was killed by Tung Fu-siang's Kansu troops just outside the Yungtingmen gate. On the 12th a “full-fledged Boxer with his hair tied up in red cloth, red ribbons around his wrists and ankles, and a flaming red girdle” was seen flaunting along Legation Street, armed with a big carving knife; he was summarily attacked and chastised with a walking stick by the German envoy, Baron von Ketteler; he was kept a prisoner, but his companion escaped.[49] On June 13th great forces of Boxers,[50] girt with red sashes and armed with swords and spears, rushed into the Tartar City in a tumultuous crowd. They entered by the Hatamen gate,

[48] Smith, “Convulsion,” i, p. 214.

[49] Ibid., p. 236; Putnam Weale, “Indiscreet Letters from Peking,” p. 31.

[50] “Myriads of Boxers,” Putnam Weale, p. 35. “Several hundred Boxers.” Diary, Chingshan, June 14th, p. 262. “The noise of a crowd and a rush of people were followed by the advent of the Boxers.” Hart, “Sinim,” p. 14. “A large force of Boxers.” Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 19.

and, being deflected from the guarded legation quarter, they spread to the north, carrying fire and devastation in all directions. During the following night all foreign premises, outside the three guarded areas, were completely destroyed and plundered; the converts at the R.C. Tungtang were massacred, with their pastors [51]; the Nantang premises were entirely destroyed, but a volunteer party, headed by M. Fliche, brought in four priests, five French nuns, and twenty Chinese nuns, and later "2000 Chinese converts, mostly women and children, who were but the survivors of a massacre intended to be complete." [52] The shops of dealers in foreign goods were destroyed and plundered; so were those of dealers in valuable commodities; so too, in no long time, were the houses of well-to-do Manchus and Chinese, the plundering of which spread over several days. [53] The destruction was on an enormous scale; the Protestant missions alone, seven in number, lost thirty-four dwelling houses, eighteen chapels, twelve boys' schools, eleven girls' schools, four training schools, eleven dispensaries and eight hospitals, all within the walls of Peking. [54] The cemeteries of the foreign community were also desecrated, bodies being disinterred and tombstones broken.

§ 14. While the community at Peking was thus beleaguered, that at Tientsin was in an equally perilous situation. On June 2nd it was reported that incendiarism was common in the foreign concessions [55]; and the arrival of the refugees from Paotingfu [56] on June 4th gave assurance that the country to the west and south-west was up in arms. There was no railway communication with Peking after June 5th, [57] and the Tientsin end of the line

[51] "Our post was so close to the Tungtang that we could hear the yells and screams of the fiends that were destroying and murdering, and those of their victims too; we learned afterwards that many native Christians had fled to this their church for safety and had been slaughtered or burnt to death within its walls."—MS. notes of J. H. Macoun of the Customs, a volunteer during the siege.

[52] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, *ubi sup.*

[53] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 237; Diary, Chingshan, June 14th, 17th, p. 282; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 15th, 18th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 151, 154.

[54] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 238.

[55] Corresp. Tientsin, June 2nd, North-China Herald, June 13th, 1900.

[56] Cf. *antea*, § 7.

[57] H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 9.



to Tangku, at the mouth of the river, was torn up on the 17th.[58] The Boxer forces made their tumultuous irruption into the city of Tientsin on June 14th, a day later than at Peking, and, as at Peking, the official administration took no steps to check their excesses; in fact proof was afterwards obtained that the viceroys' yamen was the headquarters of the Boxer society, muster rolls and membership cards in great number having been found there.[59] "The Boxer typhoon centred over the native city and spread havoc in its path," as it had in Peking; its adherents brought officials and gentry alike to their knees, and "slew those who sympathised or associated with foreigners with an ardor that turned the place into a ghastly hole and the river into a veritable bier." [60] Many buildings in the city and its suburbs were burned; and, on the nights of June 14th and 15th, the armed mob destroyed all the mission chapels and the French cathedral, Notre Dame des Victoires, which had met the same fate in 1870.

§ 15. There had already been consultations between the consuls at Tientsin and the naval authorities off Taku, but no concerted action had been taken. At Tientsin there were 1700 Russian troops, who had arrived from Port Arthur just too late to join Admiral Seymour; 560 marines of different nationalities; and enough volunteers to bring the total to about 2400. On June 15th a council of the admirals [61] was held at which it was recorded that numerous movements of Chinese troops had been observed, that there had been attempts to break up the Tientsin-Tangku railway, and that mines had been laid at the mouth of the Peiho; and it was resolved that steps must be taken to preserve the railway and to protect the Tientsin community.[62] A guard of 300 Japanese was at once sent to Tangku, and another of 250 French and Russians to Chünliangcheng further up the line. Meantime the Boxers continued their devastation and slaughter, "the river being full of the bodies of Chinese sympathisers with the foreigners, who had been killed by the Boxers and

[58] Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, ii, Tientsin, p. 517.

[59] North-China Herald, Aug. 8th, 1900.

[60] Decennial Reports, ii, p. 517.

[61] Three of the powers (Japan, Italy and Austria-Hungary) were represented by senior captains.

[62] Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, p. 113.

thrown into it" [63]; on the night of June 14th three mission chapels in the city were burned, and, on the night of the 15th, the French cathedral and the remaining mission buildings were destroyed. The admirals felt that they were confronted by a condition and not by a theory, and, at a conference held on the 16th, it was decided to send an ultimatum demanding the delivery into their hands, before 2 a.m. of June 17th, of the Taku forts guarding the entrance to the Peiho. Landing parties of 935 men of six nationalities were put ashore in the afternoon, and the light-draught gunboats, nine of six nationalities, took up their position inside the forts after dark; the big ships were out of range outside the bar. The Chinese garrison opened an offensive-defensive fire at 0.45 a.m., an hour and a quarter before the ultimatum expired. The fire was returned; at dawn the storming party began their assault; and by 6.30 a.m. the last of the forts was in their possession. The loss of the allies was 64 killed and 89 wounded.[64]

§ 16. In these decisions and proceedings the American Admiral Kempff had taken no part. On June 14th he informed the British Admiral Bruce that he "was not authorised to initiate any act of war with a country with which my country was at peace." On the 15th he refused to join in the occupation of the Tangku railway station on the ground that he "could not join in taking possession of Chinese government property." Of the seizure of the Taku forts he remarks simply—"I did not join in the attack on the forts. Captain Wise of the *Monocacy* had orders to protect American interests, but in case of attack by the Chinese government force he was to consider it as a declaration of war and act accordingly." [65] The American ship *Monocacy* gave a shelter to the foreign community of Taku, and, by a curious chance, was the first ship to be hit by a Chinese shell. Admiral Kempff's abstention was approved by President McKinley on the ground that "we were not at war with China, and that a hostile demonstration might consolidate the anti-foreign

[63] H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 35.

[64] North-China Herald, June 20th, Aug. 15th, 1900; Decennial Reports, p. 515; Savage-Landor, i, pp. 112 seq.; H. C. Thomson, p. 31.

[65] Adm. Kempff's report to Sec. Navy, July 17th, 1900, cited in H. C. Thomson, op. cit., p. 25.

elements and strengthen the Boxers to oppose the relieving column." [66]

§ 17. Was the seizure of the forts both wise and timely ? The admirals were responsible for opening communications and for protecting foreign interests, in life and in property, in North China ; no troops had yet arrived, except about 2000 Russians from Port Arthur ; the small guards sent to the Peking legations were naval, Admiral Seymour's force to reinforce the legations was naval except for the Russians, and the force guarding Tientsin consisted of 1700 Russian troops and 560 naval ratings ; and further land forces were not expected for some days. Moreover the admirals were the deciding authority ; the British Admiralty instructions of June 7th and 8th, giving Admiral Seymour a free hand, had not been received by him at 11 p.m. on June 9th [67] ; the only channel of speedy communication was over Chinese telegraph lines through a country in a state of insurrection ; and telegraphic communication with the foreign envoys at Peking had been interrupted since June 10th. Some decision was necessary : to act was to decide ; to do nothing was equally a decision. On June 15th the admirals made a half decision in resolving to guard the Tangku end of their railway communication with Tientsin. On that night the native city of Tientsin was given over to Boxer excesses, and on the 16th the admirals made their decision. In his dissenting vote Admiral Kempff, in effect, avoided a decision. By the letter of his regulations he was technically correct in avoiding an act of aggression against a country with which his own country was not at war ; whether " a hostile demonstration might consolidate the anti-foreign elements " was a political question, not for his decision, but for the ultimate decision of his superiors at Washington and the American envoy at Peking, with both of whom he had lost touch ; but he neglected the first duty of a naval officer on a foreign station, that of protecting the representative of his country and, a more imperative duty, of covering his own detachments landed on shore ; and he forgot the declaration by his predecessor at Taku in 1859 that " blood

[66] Message to congress cited in *ibid.*, p. 22.

[67] "Time was not given for any reply . . . about 11 p.m. on 9th June."—E. H. Seymour, "My Naval Career," p. 343.

is thicker than water." In his further duty of protecting the lives of American citizens there was a divided interest.

§ 18. Was the decision wise? The attitude of the empress dowager was doubtful; she might "keep her own counsel,"[68] but her acts had been sufficient to show that, beyond any doubt, her sympathies were fully with the Boxers and with those Manchus who would use them as allies to expel foreigners [69]; she had, it is true, given an assurance on June 11th, by the mouth of two friendly Chinese ministers, Yuen Chang and Hsü Ching-cheng, that full protection would be given to the legations; but the reporter stated that "their manner on the present occasion struck me as that of men not speaking from their own conviction."[70] The palace officials were to a man actively anti-foreign, except only the out-spoken Junglu and the irresolute Prince Ching. In the administration nearly all the Manchus were aggressively anti-foreign; and on June 10th the most energetically hostile among them, Prince Twan, had been placed at the head of the Tsungli Yamen, which controlled all foreign affairs and was actually the cabinet of the empire. The viceroy at Tientsin, Yülu, was an adherent of Junglu and was legitimately believed to be friendly; this was afterwards found not to have been true, and the adhesion to the Boxers of this supposedly friendly official was taken as proof that he must have acted under superior orders in the first half of June. His entire province of Chihli was in a state of insurrection, which the administration had clearly shown itself unable to suppress, and which the responsible foreign authorities had declared the administration was unwilling to coerce.[71] It therefore now, as on all previous occasions during the preceding sixty years, devolved on the armed foreign force to protect the lives of foreigners within the measure of its capacity; and for this the first step was

[68] Cf. *antea*, § 8.

[69] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 10th, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, pp. 1, 19; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 11th, 15th, 18th, Aug. 17th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 144, 151, 154, 161; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, June 3rd, 6th, 9th, 11th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 30, 32, 35, 37.

[70] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 19.

[71] Cf. n. 69 *supra*,

to secure the point of entry giving access to the endangered foreigners.

§ 19. The foreign lives to be protected were in four classes. There were first the detached bodies of foreigners scattered through the interior, almost entirely missionaries, as the railway staffs had for the most part already gone to shelter; then there were the naval detachments with Admiral Seymour; then the Peking community, already concentrated; and finally the foreign residents at Tientsin, known to the admirals to be in a perilous situation. The scattered missionaries were known to be in danger; on June 6th the American government expressed its solicitude—"Friends of American missionaries at Paotingfu are solicitous on account of press reports; are they adequately protected?"[72] It was informed in reply—"Chinese government has sent troops and promises ample protection, but this does not insure permanent safety."[73] A few days before the forts were taken, a consul said at a meeting held at Tientsin—"If you take the forts, you will be signing the death warrant of every foreigner in the interior." The prediction was true; but it cannot be asserted that their safety would have been secured if the admirals had delayed action. The wholesale murders of missionaries occurred, with one exception, entirely in districts within close reach of the palace camarilla, as at Paotingfu, or in Shansi within the jurisdiction of Yühsien, known to have been actively hostile to foreigners, and soon to make himself "infamous for ever." [74] Under such protection the missionaries could not possibly have escaped, and we must be careful not to argue that a subsequent event is necessarily the consequence of an earlier act. The Seymour force had been summoned to Peking on the urgent appeal of the responsible envoys for reinforcements to their scanty legation guards; it was already blocked, on June 11th, unable to advance further, with scanty supplies of food and water; and its dangerous position was known to the admirals. A sailor's first duty, his most imperative obligation, is to save his detachments

[72] Mr. Hill to Mr. Conger, June 6th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 142.

[73] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 8th, 1900, *ibid.*

[74] Hart, "Sinim," pp. 105, 137. "The most infamous of them all."—Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 550.

from being overwhelmed if any precaution can save them ; and for this the obviously necessary step was to maintain or open up communications. On the consequences of the seizure of the forts to those in Peking it is only necessary to quote two authorities, neither of them bellicose or unfriendly to China. Sir R. Hart says—"Our alarm apart, it was fortunate for us eventually that the forts were thus taken, for, had that not been done, not only ourselves at Peking, but our sorely pressed countrymen at Tientsin, would have fared far worse." [75] Dr. A. H. Smith says—"Nevertheless, if the Taku forts had not been taken within a few hours of that time, it is a moral certainty that, not only would the legations in Peking have been even in far greater peril than they were placed by this act, but that it would have been hard to save the lives of a single man, woman or child of the large numbers who were at Tientsin, and who, as it was, were rescued from deadly peril only with the greatest difficulty." [76]

§ 20. The Chinese government took the seizure of the Taku forts as a declaration of war by the united foreign powers, and at once opened hostilities. Thereafter, for the first time, armed troops in uniform openly attacked foreigners ; but the question arises whether the act was a ground for hostilities, or an eagerly awaited pretext. The admirals had but a limited view of the political situation after the telegraph to Peking was cut on June 10th ; but certain movements were observed by them. There was some movement of General Nieh's troops eastward from Tientsin, movement of other troops was seen in proximity to and in the direction of the forts, men were seen laying mines in the river and at its mouth, and if action was to be taken a prompt decision was necessary. [77] These were specific acts visible at Taku ; but the atmosphere was charged with electricity everywhere. On June 12th Sir C. MacDonald telegraphed [78]—"Inform relief party the mutinous Kansu soldiery, who are to-day in possession

[75] Hart, "Sinim," p. 133.

[76] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 436. See also Sir R. K. Douglas, "Europe and the Far East," p. 348; Seymour "My Naval Career," p. 348.

[77] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 436, Savage Landor, "China and the Allies," i, pp. 112, 115.

[78] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, June 12th, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 52. Two or three telegrams only were allowed through after

of the Peking terminus, may offer them some resistance there. Government of China seems powerless. . . . If necessary, I hope admirals will not have the least hesitation in depleting their ships." On June 14th he was informed by "a friendly trustworthy Chinese source" that at a meeting of the Grand Council it had been decided to attack Admiral Seymour's force with the imperial troops [79]; and our Manchu authority states that, on the same day, "Kangyi believes she [the empress dowager] is about to give her consent to a general attack upon the legations" [80]; and, two days earlier, that it was rumoured that "more foreign troops are coming to Peking and that the empress dowager will not permit them to enter the city." [81] The American envoy reported that, at 2 a.m. on the morning of June 17th, "our outposts on three different streets were stealthily fired upon by Chinese soldiers; in front of the American guards a new Mauser rifle and cartridge box, together with a piece of a Chinese soldier's uniform, were picked up. . . . During yesterday [17th] a conflict occurred between a small German guard and Chinese soldiers, in which five of the latter were killed." [82] Of the Chinese intentions but little evidence could be obtained; but the indications at Taku were supported by these indications at Peking in showing that the seizure of the forts was not the *causa causans* of China's opening of hostilities, but was eagerly grasped by the anti-foreign party as a conclusive argument to silence their opponents and to push the administration into active hostilities. On the military side there is but one criticism of the admirals' decision, that it was not made earlier; the relief of Tientsin and of Peking was not made any the more necessary, but an earlier decision would have made it easier. On the political side it may perhaps be said that the seizure brought in its train the massacre of the missionaries, but that is not indisputable; and by the

June 10th, this and one of June 14th from Sir C. MacDonald, one of June 11th and one of June 12th from M. Pichon, none from Mr. Conger.

[79] Same to same, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 19. Cf. *postea*, n. 90.

[80] Chingshan, Diary, June 14th, p. 263.

[81] *Ibid.*, June 12th, p. 262.

[82] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay. June 18th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 151. Cf. also Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 19.

seizure alone was the rescue of the Seymour force and of the communities at Peking and Tientsin rendered even possible.

§ 21. Admiral Seymour left Tientsin on June 10th with 475 men, and was joined on the 11th by three train-loads, bringing his force to a strength of 2066 as already shown.[83] The bridge crossing the Peiho at Yangtsun, twenty miles from Tientsin, was still intact, and here he "found General Nieh's troops, some 4000 strong, but we exchanged friendly greetings, crossed the river, and went on till that afternoon, when we had to stop and repair the line which the Boxers had torn up." [84] From that point he had constantly to repair the line and rebuild bridges, but was able on June 12th to reach Langfang, forty miles from Tientsin and half-way between that city and Peking. There during several days he had constant brushes with the Boxers; the "invulnerables," armed with clubs, swords and spears, suffered heavy losses in killed and wounded, while the casualties of the relieving force were small. From that point "the line was too badly damaged for us to repair it," though the force worked hard at the task, amid constant attacks; and the advance was brought to a standstill. "We were now isolated, with no transport or means to advance, and cut off from our base behind." [85] Admiral Seymour himself admitted later that, in view of Sir C. MacDonald's telegram calling for speedy relief, "an immediate dash to save the legations was the only course to pursue" [86]; and this was the opinion of others better informed. The American envoy, a soldier of the American Civil War, wrote—"We cannot understand why, if they find it impossible to readily repair the railway, they do not, with the larger part of their command, march directly here." [87] Sir R. Hart said—"Had his force left the train and marched straight across the country to the capital it could have been with us on the 13th or 14th and so changed history, for opposition was not yet or-

[83] Cf. *antea*, § 9.

[84] Seymour, "My Naval Career," p. 344.

[85] *Ibid.*, p. 346.

[86] *Ibid.*, *ubi sup.*

[87] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 18th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 151. Edwin Hurd Conger attained the rank of major in the civil war.



ganised.”[88] But a sailor commanding on shore [89] could not be expected to see the situation so clearly; the opposition was not far from being organised [90]; Admiral Seymour’s position was rather one of influence, as the senior officer, than of command; he led a conglomerate body of eight nationalities; and he was not equipped for forcing his way into the city of Peking, girt with massive walls and guarded by unknown thousands of troops. The expedition was serviceable for one result, in that “it disposed once for all of the favorite proposition so often advanced that it would be possible for a small but well organised and thoroughly equipped foreign force to march through China from end to end without effective opposition.”[91]

§ 22. The expedition was absolutely blocked at Langfang, and, on June 16th, it was decided to repair the line backwards and return to Tientsin, and there, if possible, to organise an advance by river. At Yangtsun the bridge was found to have been destroyed, and some native boats were seized on the 19th, enough to provide transport for the wounded, and for provisions, field-guns and ammunition. Meantime, as the result of the seizure of the Taku forts, the rear guard at Langfang was attacked, on June 18th, by Tung Fu-siang’s Kansu troops, some 5000 strong, the first imperial troops to engage in open hostilities elsewhere than at Tientsin; and from that day until the 23rd the attacks of these and other imperial troops were constant. At 4 p.m. on June 21st two bodies, one British, one German, crossed the river and captured the arsenal at Hsiku, three miles from Tientsin, five miles from the foreign settlement, finding there abundant food, and munitions of war of the estimated value of £3,000,000 sterling. This was held against a determined attack by a large Chinese force on June 23rd; on June 25th the international force was

[88] Hart, “Sinim,” p. 11.

[89] A British admiral, Sir E. Freemantle, said to the author in 1895, referring to a detachment of his men on shore, “I don’t like it; a sailor’s place is on board ship.”

[90] On June 16th a palace council discussed the question of hostilities against foreigners, the Manchus being solidly in favour of immediate action. It was decided, as a compromise, to send Natung and Hsü Ching-chang to “persuade” Admiral Seymour to return to Tientsin.—Smith, “Convulsion,” i, p. 244.

[91] *Ibid.*, ii, p. 443.

relieved by a body of troops, chiefly Russian, from Tientsin; and on June 26th, after destroying the arsenal and its contents, all returned to Tientsin. In a force of 2066, the killed were 62 and the wounded 238. In his report Admiral Seymour made special reference to the value of the services of Captain John Jellicoe, R.N., Captain B. H. McCalla, U.S.N., Captain von Usedom of the German navy, all of whom were severely wounded; Mr. C. W. Campbell, of the British consular service, and Captain Clive Bigham, who had been useful as interpreters and intelligence officers.[92]

§ 23. At Tientsin, after the departure of Admiral Seymour, the foreign concessions were guarded by a force of about 2400 men, of whom 1700 were Russian infantry, who came up on June 14th. The first few days were days of alarm, marked by many incendiary fires, by the flight of Chinese servants, and by commotion, depredation, and murder, all around. The community took such precautions as were possible, and gathered all the women and children together in the municipal hall, known as Gordon Hall. The seizure of the Taku forts precipitated matters and, at 3 p.m. of June 17th, heavy guns in and behind the Chinese city opened fire on the foreign concessions, and imperial soldiers started sniping from across the river, causing many casualties; some desultory attacks by the troops were repulsed. On June 18th an allied force tried to advance by the railway line to the relief of Admiral Seymour, but was compelled to return. On the 19th a force drove back two guns from a threatening position across the river, but in the end was compelled to retire; shelling and sniping continued through the day. On the 20th shelling and sniping, and so on each day, causing many casualties, until the relief. Fired on from not less than sixty heavy guns, sniped at by many thousand soldiers, threatened by the lawless doings of the Boxers during several days, the foreign concessions seemed in a perilous situation. The attitude which might be assumed by Yuen Shih-kai in Shantung was not known, and on it the consuls

[92] Decennial Reports, Tientsin, ii, p. 514; Seymour, "My Naval Career," p. 345; Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 439; H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 12; Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, pp. 85-111.

could give no assurance; while the attitude which might be taken by the imperial government was only too well known. Under these conditions the military authorities then in Tientsin decided that, if a relieving force did not arrive very soon, it would be necessary to withdraw to a base at Taku. Such a withdrawal must have deprived the Peking community of their last chance of rescue, and placed Shanghai and other northern ports in danger.

§ 24. From this disaster the world was saved by the bold action of a few brave men. Communication with Taku had been difficult since June 14th, and quite cut since the 17th, and the military and naval authorities there had no information on events at Tientsin. On the night of June 18th a Taku pilot, Mr. Seeberg, accompanied by eight English sailors and one French officer, started down river in a steam launch, but the party was compelled to land at dawn; they made their way to the outpost at Chünliangcheng during the following night, and Mr. Seeberg delivered his despatches at Tangku on the 20th. On the night of June 19th a young Englishman, Mr. James Watts, escorted by three Cossacks, rode through the darkness and delivered his despatches also on the 20th.[93] A relief column of many nationalities was at once formed and fought its way up, through the heat, with scanty food, and with water from streams poisoned by floating corpses; and, after a running fight of twelve miles and overcoming serious resistance with heavy losses, it arrived within touch of Tientsin on the evening of the 22nd, and entered the foreign concessions on the morning of June 23rd. A strong column proceeded to the relief of Admiral Seymour's force and brought it in on June 26th. Tientsin was relieved, the women and children were sent away by sea, and the relieving force was in its turn besieged.[94]

§ 25. The Peking community was in a state of "semi-siege" [95] from June 8th to the 20th, concentrated in three quarters—the legation area, the Pehtang, and the

[93] "Mr. Watts' intimate knowledge of the country made the feat possible, but the bravery of his act was not diminished through its not being foolhardy."—Consul W. R. Carles to Lord Salisbury, cited in H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 37.

[94] Decennial Reports, Tientsin, ii, p. 517; Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 444; H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 34; Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, pp. 136-149.

[95] Smith, "Convulsion," chap. xiv, *passim*.

American Methodist mission. During all this time incendiaryism and plundering were rife throughout the city, especially in those districts in which portable articles having intrinsic value were to be found; the fires spread to the wooden tower over the T sienmen, the principal imperial entrance to the city, and destroyed it. The government made no effort to restrain the excesses of the Boxers, and many Manchus in high places were known to be active supporters of their cause and of the truculence of Tung Fu-siang [96]; it is worthy of note that the release of the Boxer beaten and arrested by the German envoy on June 12th was demanded by a personal visit of Chungli, governor of Peking, accompanied by two other high officials.[97] The Pehtang was put in a state of defence, guards of volunteers patrolled the Methodist mission, and barricades were erected to protect the legations. The Boxers, armed with sword and spear, roamed around the defences and assumed a threatening aspect; they made occasional dashes at apparently unprotected points, from which they were repelled with as little effusion of blood as possible. When the Boxers burst into the city on June 13th, they were turned aside from the legations by rifle fire; but that night they were allowed without interference to burn and massacre at the Nantang, the Tungtang, and elsewhere; and the next day an armed mob was dispersed by volunteers armed with riding-whips, so as to avoid drawing first blood.[98] This policy was dictated by the envoys, who never lost the hope that the Chinese government would rise to a sense of its obligations, and who held frequent conferences with some of the Chinese ministers during these anxious days.[99] The envoys were, however, much disheartened by the reports received regularly from Admiral Seymour of his inability to make progress; and they realised that "it was hardly possible that, if Chinese troops were employed against the admiral, they would not

[96] Chingshan, *Diary*, June 1st, 8th, 10th, 14th, 17th, pp. 258-264.

[97] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 236.

[98] "It was decided to attack them only with riding whips, so as to avoid drawing first blood. We could not get into their barricades, so marines and sailors were requisitioned with axes."—Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 32.

[99] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, 1900, *China*, No. 4, 1900, p. 19.

also be let loose against the legations, and the outlook was consequently very dark.”[100]

§ 26. The government performed no overt act, either in restraining the Boxer excesses or in threatening the legations. On June 16th an imperial decree referred to “the feud between the people and the converts, which had led to many cases of arson and pillage,” and ordered Junglu to post troops for the better protection of the legations.[101] A telegraphed report of the admirals’ ultimatum demanding the surrender of the Taku forts must have been received that night, and the seizure of the forts must have been known the next morning; but the day of June 17th passed quietly and no intimation was made by the Chinese. Heavy gun fire was opened on the Tientsin concessions at 3 p.m. on June 17th, and still no intimation was given. On the 18th three ministers, including Hsü Ching-cheng, called to ask that Admiral Seymour’s force be ordered to turn back, but the demand was refused; “the simplest and perhaps the most probable explanation is that the peace party in the government were permitted to amuse themselves with negotiations and discussions which their opponents had no intention of allowing to be anything but sterile and useless.”[102] That same afternoon Tung Fu-siang’s Kansu troops, only the day before at Peking,[103] were launched against the Seymour force. For seventy-two hours after the admirals’ ultimatum was delivered, for sixty hours after the seizure of the forts, with the telegraph open for Chinese despatches, the government gave to the legations no intimation of past events, and delivered no protest.

§ 27. On the morning of June 19th there was printed in the leading newspaper of Shanghai an editorial denouncing the Chinese administration in strong terms.

“China is at war with all the great powers at once, and she is at war by the choice of the empress dowager and her gang. In their colossal ignorance and conceit they have persuaded themselves that they could safely defy the foreign powers. . . . Whatever happens, this gang, if it does not go of its own accord, must be driven out of Peking. It is to be hoped that it will be possible to get out the

[100] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 19.

[101] Ibid.

[102] Ibid.

[103] Ibid.

emperor Kwanghsü and replace him on the throne. Meantime it should be made perfectly clear to the Chinese that it is the empress dowager who has undertaken the present war, and that we are not fighting China, but the usurping government at Peking.”[104]

On that day, June 19th, a meeting of the Grand Council was held at which the empress dowager announced that she would postpone until the next day a decision on the action to be taken in consequence of the seizure of the Taku forts. Then “Prince Twan, Kisiu and Natung [105] showed her a despatch from the foreign ministers couched in the most insolent language, demanding her immediate abdication, the degradation of the heir apparent, and the restoration of the emperor; they also asked that the emperor should allow 10,000 foreign troops to enter Peking to restore order. Kangyi came to tell me that never had he seen the Old Buddha [106] so angry, not even when she learned of Kang Yu-wei’s treason. ‘How dare they question my authority!’ she exclaimed. ‘If I can bear this, what must not be borne? The insults of these foreigners pass all bounds. Let us exterminate them before we eat our morning meal.’ The wrath of the Old Buddha is indeed beyond control; neither Junglu nor any other can now stop her.”[107]

§ 28. *Furens quid femina*—Hell hath no fury like a woman scorned. Though not available to the foreign envoys, the telegraph line was still open to Chinese [108]; and it seems to be a justifiable inference that a summary of the editorial was telegraphed to Peking, and was there utilised to draw up a forged despatch purporting to come from the diplomatic body. The empress dowager had long avoided committing herself to any position from which she could not withdraw, but now the statesman was lost in the woman and she gave the word which let slip the

[104] North-China Daily News, June 19th, reproduced in its weekly edition, the North-China Herald, June 20th, 1900.

[105] Among the leaders of the party of aggression.

[106] A title of respect applied to the empress dowager.

[107] Chingshan, Diary, June 20th, p. 265. Chingshan was Kangyi’s brother-in-law.

[108] The Chinese newspaper “Hupao” of Shanghai was able to issue at 3 p.m. on June 17th an extra giving an account, correct in its details, of the seizure of the Taku forts that morning.—North-China Herald, June 20th, 1900.

dogs of war. A later meeting of her full council was held, at which were present the empress dowager and the emperor; the leading members of the imperial clan; the princes Kung, Chun and Twan; the beilehs Tsailien and Tsaiying; the beitze Ying; duke Lan; Prince Ching and the five Grand Councillors; the princes Chwang, Su and Yi; the Manchu and Chinese co-presidents of the six ministries and nine courts; the lieutenants-general of the twenty-four Banner divisions; and the comptrollers of the imperial household; but Junglu was not present. It was the High Council of the Manchu Empire, composed mainly of Manchus, with a small knot of Chinese eminent in the state. The empress dowager made a long and impassioned speech, inveighing against the insolence of the foreigners, their culminating insult being the despatch which had been shown to her, and calling for revenge. The only voices against war were those of the Manchu Lishan and the Chinese Yuen Chang and Hsü Ching-cheng; a Chinese, Chao Shu-kiao, junior member of the Grand Council, demanded the extermination of every foreigner in the interior; the Manchu nobles generally called for war. The decree proclaiming a war against all foreigners was ordered to be promulgated.[109]

§ 29. This council was held on June 20th at the period 3 to 5 a.m., the usual hour for the Old Buddha's audiences. Prior to this an attempt had been made to give a diplomatic cloak to the intended opening of hostilities, and, at the same time, to make a concession in form to the appeals of Junglu, who had constantly urged the sanctity of ambassadors and the necessity of protecting the envoys from injury and insult; as early as June 17th he had urged the empress dowager to allow him to escort the envoys in safety to Tientsin.[110] On June 19th, between 4 and 5 p.m.[111] the members of the diplomatic body received identical despatches, "carefully dated

[109] Chingshan, Diary, June 20th, p. 267.

[110] Ibid., June 17th, p. 264.

An imp. decree in Gazette of June 17th orders Junglu to detail soldiers of his field force to protect the legations; "if the envoys and their families wish to go for a time to Tientsin, they must be protected on the way."—U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 168. Cf. also *postea*, n. 128. No steps were taken in this direction.

[111] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Aug. 17th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 161; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, Aug. 28th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 199.

4 o'clock,"[112] from the Tsungli Yamen giving them their first information of the ultimatum delivered by the admirals, but not stating that the forts had been seized; and requiring [113] the envoys, with their families, their staffs, the guards, and all foreigners, to leave Peking for Tientsin within twenty-four hours; troops had been told off to provide an escort on the journey.

§ 30. The envoys were dumbfounded. They had been closely beleaguered since the 16th, and knew nothing of the situation at Taku or Tientsin; they had for some days lost touch with the Seymour force; they had a small mixed force of guards, all too scanty for a defence, quite insufficient for a march; and yet they did not see what else they could do than to accede to the order to leave Peking, even with full knowledge that any Chinese troops, however well intentioned their commanders might be, were absolutely untrustworthy and undisciplined, and would create the danger they were supposed to guard against. The diplomatic body drew up a note expressing their astonishment at the sudden demand, and pointing out the necessity of a conference in order to settle the details of the march, the form of escort, and the means of transport; and asking for an interview with the Tsungli Yamen at 9 a.m. on June 20th.[114] In their official reports the envoys generally represented this note as one solely designed to gain time, in order that, by further representations, they might persuade the Chinese administration of the folly of its procedure [115]; they must have known the untrustworthiness of Chinese troops, and it is possible that the explanation given later was true at the time; but it was not then or later credited by those in Peking qualified to know. "There was a general agreement among the members of the different legations that it would be necessary to leave the capital, perhaps in great haste"; and at the meeting "Baron von Ketteler strongly dissented from the almost unanimous opinion of his colleagues that

[112] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, 1900, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 19; A. H. Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 248.

[113] "Requiring," Sir C. MacDonald, *ubi sup.* "Invite," M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, *ubi sup.* "Ordering," Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, *ubi sup.* "Must therefore request," in the diplomatic language of the despatch, trans. in China, No. 4, 1900, p. 26; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 175.

[114] Text in China, No. 4, 1900, p. 27; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 176.

[115] Sir C. MacDonald, Mr. Conger, M. Pichon, *ubi sup.*



it was necessary to leave Peking.”[116] Another writes—“At the end [of an angry discussion] a joint note was prepared. . . . That is to say, the ministers were prepared to accept—”[117] Another—“It was reported that the ministers had decided to go; great was the indignation.”[118] The clearest testimony comes from Mr. Conger, who wrote at 9 p.m. that day warning the American missionaries at the Methodist mission that they must get ready to leave—“If we had a thousand men here and any knowledge of where other troops were, we might then refuse to go, but under the circumstances there is only one thing to do. It is bound to take us some time to get ready to start, and in the meantime something may happen.”[119] The American missionaries pointed out to their envoy the “practical difficulties of leaving Peking under the condition mentioned, as well as the probable consequences to those who did so, and also the certain massacre of the Christians necessarily abandoned.”[120] There was general consternation, “but beneath that wave of consternation a fiercer note arose—the note of revolt against the decrees of eleven men”[121]; and, by the next morning, the envoys, if they had lost it, had recovered their balance.

§ 31. The next morning, June 20th, the diplomatic body met shortly after 8 a.m.[122] At 9 a.m., the hour appointed for the interview, no reply had yet been received, and the envoys decided that it would be useless to proceed to the Yamen with the probability of finding no one to receive them. This decision would have been unanimous but for the dissenting voice of Baron von Ketteler. He informed his colleagues that he had given notice of an

[116] Smith, “Convulsion,” i, p. 249, 253.

[117] Putnam Weale, “Indiscreet Letters,” p. 60.

[118] Roland Allen, “Siege of the Peking Legations,” p. 101.

[119] Mr. Conger to Mr. Gamewell, given textually in Tuttle, “Mary Porter Gamewell,” p. 208; referred to in Smith, “Convulsion,” i, p. 249.

[120] Smith, *ubi sup.*

[121] Putnam Weale, “Indiscreet Letters,” p. 60.

[122] There was perhaps a previous meeting at 7 a.m. “The diplomatic body sent at 7 a.m. a second despatch asking that they might be put in communication with their admirals.”—M. Pichon, *ubi sup.* “Next morning, the 20th, there was another meeting at 8 o’clock to decide what should be done in view of the fact that he had received no reply.”—Sir C. MacDonald, *ubi sup.* “The morning of the 20th, at 8.30, the ministers met at the French legation ready to proceed in a body to the Tsungli Yamen as soon as notified that the prince would be there.”—Mr. Conger, *ubi sup.*

individual visit, during which he intended to point out to the Chinese ministers the enormity of their offence against the law of nations, and the consequences which must result from their attack on the sanctity of ambassadors, and he announced that he now proposed to carry out his previous intention. His colleagues one and all protested, pointing out the danger to himself; but he brushed aside all arguments, and started for the Yamen, accompanied only by his interpreter, Herr Cordes, and a ceremonial escort of unarmed Chinese. A quarter of an hour later one of his mounted Chinese attendants came dashing back with the news that Baron von Ketteler had been killed; another rode on to carry the tidings to the Tsungli Yamen.

§ 32. The two sedan chairs had just passed a small police station on the main street on the way to the Yamen when Herr Cordes glanced to the left and saw a Chinese soldier in uniform, with his rifle at his shoulder, and with it following the movements of the envoy's chair and evidently aiming at his head. Herr Cordes shouted a warning, and at the same time the soldier fired, killing the envoy instantly. The chairs were dropped by the frightened bearers, and Herr Cordes started upright and was then severely wounded in the thighs, which had been brought to the level formerly occupied by his head. He ran away through side streets, followed by many shots, but not actively pursued, and escaped to the American party in the Methodist mission, where his wounds were attended to.[123] The murder was committed by Enhai, a Manchu bannerman, who reported his own act and for it claimed a special promotion; at his trial he declared—"I received orders from my sergeant to kill every foreigner that came up the street; I am a soldier and I only know it is my duty to obey orders." [124] After the siege he was arrested by the Japanese, tried by the Germans, and executed. The baron's body was carried into the Yamen and there was placed in a coffin by order of Yuen Chang, and buried hastily [125]; it was exhumed on August 16th and decently interred the next day in the German legation.

[123] Herr Cordes' own narrative, cited in all the authorities.

[124] Memorial to throne from censorate, Bland and Backhouse, "Empress Dowager," p. 305.

[125] "Duke Lan writes to tell me . . . that, by the orders of that rascally Chinese, Yuen Chang, the corpse of the foreign devil had been

§ 33. One curious, and quite unexplainable, incident was connected with the murder. On June 14th, six days before it occurred, a report was current in Tientsin, emanating from Peking, that a foreign envoy had been killed [126]; and on the 17th Sheng Hsüan-hwai, the head of the telegraph administration, received at Chefoo a telegram from London—"it is rumoured here that the German envoy has been murdered." [127] The London evening papers of June 16th contained telegrams of the Laffan news agency from Tientsin saying that the "the German minister in Peking has been murdered." When this intelligent anticipation of an absolutely incredible coming event was turned to fact, the fact was not known to the world outside Peking for twelve days, so closely drawn was the net around the legations.

§ 34. This murder came as a crushing blow to the few advocates of peace in the Chinese administration, silencing their voices and leaving them helpless to stem the tide of hostility to foreigners, and it pushed on the party of aggression to the completion of their plans. [128] It struck with horror the envoys and the foreign community in Peking, already shut in their defences, and now expectant only of the worst. There was no thought of leaving Peking under any kind of Chinese escort, every thought was turned to defence, and every man and woman was resolved to continue the defence to the end. The Americans in the Methodist mission first were brought in—20 marines, 70 American men, women and children, 126 Chinese girls from the school, some hundreds of Chinese converts, and Herr Cordes on a litter; they were given twenty minutes to pack, and took with them only what they could carry in their hands; and they filed along, slowly and without molestation, until they joined the main body of refugees in the legations. The converts in the Pehtang and their guard remained there. During the day there were no

coffined; — wanted Prince Twan to have the corpse decapitated and the head exhibited over the Tungan gate."—Chingshan, Diary, June 20th, p. 273.


[126] Tel. Tientsin, June 14th, North-China Herald, June 20th, 1900.

[127] *Tsinwen Pihao*, Shanghai, June 17th, cited in *ibid*.

[128] "Hsien says that already the Kansu braves have begun the attack upon the legations, and that Junglu's endeavours to have the foreigners escorted to a place of safety have completely failed."—Chingshan, Diary, June 20th, p. 271.

# PEKING LEGATION QUARTER.

1900



## LINES OF DEFENCE

June 8 to August 14 (held throughout)


June 8-20 (abandoned June 20)

June 21 (Beginning of Siege)

August 14 (End of Siege)

# PEKING LEGATION QUARTER.

1900





signs of hostility, but, punctually at 4 p.m., twenty-four hours after the precisely dated request to leave Peking, exactly as if the despatch were an ultimatum demanding the surrender of the legations and their occupants, the legation enceinte and the Pehtang were swept by a storm of rifle shot. From this time the foreign community of 473 civilians (245 men, 149 women and 79 children), the 451 of the foreign guards, and some thousands of Chinese converts, were subjected to constant assaults by the Boxers and by Chinese imperial troops.

## CHAPTER IX

### PEKING AND TIENTSIN

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§ 1. THE admirals at Taku had no communication from their envoys at Peking since June 10th, from the Seymour force since June 14th, and from Tientsin since June 16th [1]; and they necessarily assumed, each for himself, the responsibility for such steps as seemed proper to safeguard their national interests. This assumption of responsibility was at once regularised by direct instructions from the home governments, generally without restriction [2]; but the British government indicated some questions in which it might be inadvisable to submit to the decision of a majority, [3] and "disclaimed any responsibility for the acts of other powers." [4] On June 20th, a full week before the events occurring in Peking on that date were known in Tientsin, the admirals outside Taku issued a notification to reassure the Chinese government and people: "The admirals and senior naval officers of the allied powers in China desire to make known to all viceroys and authorities of the coasts and rivers, cities and provinces, of China that they intend to use armed force only against Boxers and people who oppose them on their march to Peking for the rescue of their fellow-countrymen." [5]

§ 2. The viceroys controlling the Yangtze basin, Liu Kun-yi at Nanking and Chang Chih-tung at Wuchang, were already disposed to accept this assurance. Early in June Liu Kun-yi issued stringent orders to arrest all members of the Tataohwei and to execute them promptly without first referring to him [6]; and on June 20th two members of that society were executed at Nanking. [7] On June 16th the two viceroys, conjointly with Yuen Shih-kai, governor of Shantung; and the governors of Anhwei and Kiangsi, memorialised the throne by telegram begging the empress dowager to take prompt steps to suppress the

[1] Adm. Bruce to Admiralty, June 21st, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 67.

[2] M. de Lanessan to Adm. Courrejolles, June 17th, 1900, Doc. Dip., France, 1900, p. 44.

[3] M. Paul Cambon to M. Delcassé, London, July 3rd, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 66.

[4] Statement to Chinese envoy, London, in Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, June 22nd, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 70.

[5] Adm. Bruce to Admiralty, Taku, June 20th/21st, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 67; tel. Chefoo, June 20th, North-China Herald, June 22nd, 1900. Signed by senior naval officers of eight nations.

[6] Corresp. Kiangyin, June 8th, North-China Herald, June 13th, 1900.

[7] Corresp. Nanking June 21st, *ibid.*, June 27th, 1900.

Ihochüan, since they were not patriots but revolutionaries; the memorialists were ready to lead their combined forces north to help the Peking government; and they recommended the same course to the viceroys at Canton and at Foochow.[8] On the issue of the admirals' declaration of June 20th the Yangtze viceroys at once stated that they, severally, would exert all their powers to maintain order in their jurisdictions, and were carefully watching every place where trouble might arise; and Chang Chih-tung issued, in concise classical form, a proclamation in four four-word metrical lines:

“Reverently obey (the) imperial decree;  
Arrest rebels; maintain (the) peace;  
Inventors (of) rumours, disturbers (of) churches,  
Shall be executed (as an) example (of) severity.”

The declaration of the viceroys was in full accord with that of the admirals, and it was communicated to the foreign powers.[9]

§ 3. Following on their concern for the safety of their envoys, the home cabinets were next concerned with their position in relation to China and to each other. Even before receiving the news of the taking of the Taku forts, the governments began to assure each other of their “intention to co-operate loyally and completely with all the powers.”[10] The American government departed from its customary policy of avoiding concerted action,[11] and readily agreed to act concurrently with the other powers to open the road to Peking and rescue the Americans and other foreigners there in peril, to protect American interests generally, to restrict the area of disorder, and to secure the future against a return of similar disasters; but it was

[8] Tel. Nanking, June 16th; tel. Wuchang, June 16th; *ibid.*, June 20th, 1900. The Manchu chronicler adds—“but [Liu Kun-yi] firmly declines to lend his forces for the purpose of massacring a few helpless foreigners,” a warning which excited the wrath of the Old Buddha.—Chingshan, Diary, June 22nd, p. 275.

[9] Corresp. Nanking, June 21st; corresp. Wuchang, June 22nd; North-China Herald, June 27th, 1900. Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, June 22nd, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 273.

[10] Japanese assurance to French envoy, June 16th, Doc. Dip., p. 45; Lord Salisbury, statement to Japanese envoy, June 11th, Russian statement to British government, June 16th, China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 60, 61.

[11] Cf. chap. viii, § 4.

resolved to obtain for China permanent peace and security, to preserve the territorial and administrative integrity of China, to protect treaty rights, and to maintain the open door.[12] The French government formulated the common aim as being—to rescue the endangered communities, to maintain the territorial *status quo*, to obtain guarantees for the future, and to take common action to these ends [13]; and, whatever their ambitions had been in the past, whatever they were to develop in the future, now, in view of the common danger, the powers one after the other gave their adhesion.[14]

§ 4. To define the situation it was necessary to determine one other question—whether a state of war with China existed or not. On this all were agreed that it did not exist, and the decision was made on a point raised by China. The seizure of the Taku forts had been asserted by the administration at Peking to constitute a declaration of war, and it was seized on as a pretext to require the foreign envoys to leave Peking, and to launch the imperial troops everywhere against the foreign forces in the province of Chihli; but the Chinese envoys at foreign courts spoke with a different voice. Li Hung-chang, viceroy at Canton, informed them on June 21st that he had been summoned to Peking for audience, and instructed them to explain that “the Taku forts had opened fire on the foreign ships of war without orders from the court; if the foreign powers did not consider that a state of war existed owing to this incident, he would go north, take steps to suppress the Boxers, and then negotiate with the powers for a settlement.”[15] The offensive-defensive act of the Chinese in being the first to open fire was not then known, in London at least, an indication that the admirals did not think seriously of it; but it was known that “the situation is getting worse; all north China under arms; no news from Seymour force;

[12] Mr. Hay, circular to envoys of powers represented in China, July 3rd, in M. Thiébaud to M. Delcassé, July 3rd, 1900, Doc. Dip., p. 64.

[13] M. Delcassé to M. de Montebello, July 5th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 71.

[14] See, more especially, Prince Ouroussoff (Russian ambassador) to M. Delcassé, June 18th; M. de Montebello to same, July 6th; *ibid.*, pp. 44, 73.

[15] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Mr. Herbert and M. Paul Cambon, June 22nd, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 70; M. Delcassé to French ambassadors, June 21st, Doc. Dip., p. 49.

Tientsin cut off, heavy fire heard there June 17th." [16] On this information the powers, with general unanimity, informed the accredited envoys of China that, if the Taku forts had opened fire without superior orders, and if the attacks on the international troops [the Seymour force] were without authority, there was no reason for considering that a state of war existed; but some of the powers for "if" substituted "as it was to be assumed" [17]; Germany refused to withdraw her forces and thought a serious warning ought to be given to China not to deceive herself on the gravity of the situation [18]; and Japan thought the Chinese government ought to be required to suppress the insurrection. [19] The Western powers generally approved of Li Hung-chang's mission, but not so the Japanese government, which considered it futile; nor did the governor of Hongkong, who thought the viceroy was needed at Canton; and he decided not to go. [20]

§ 5. The position of the Yangtze viceroys was not at any time doubtful. In 1898 Chang Chih-tung, after coquetting with reform, had rallied to the reactionary policy of the empress dowager; but Liu Kun-yi, while coldly neutral to reform, had maintained a sturdy resistance to reaction. [21]. Now the empire was rent by dissension. The Manchus, almost to a man, led by Prince Twan and Kangyi, aimed at maintaining their exceptional privileges; dethroning the emperor and substituting for him the recently selected heir apparent, Prince Twan's son Puchün; expelling the foreigner as a first step to eliminating foreign influences; and suppressing all efforts for reform. The Boxers, encouraged at first by Yühsien and

[16] Adm. Bruce to Admiralty, June 17th, Port Arthur June 17th, received London June 25th; same to same, June 18th, Chefoo June 20th, received June 20th; China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 65, 74. Adm. Courrejolles to M. de Lanessan, June 23rd, Doc. Dip., p. 53.

[17] Lord Salisbury to M. Delcassé, *ubi sup.*; Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, St. Petersburg, June 24th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 73; M. de Reverseaux to M. Delcassé, Vienna, June 22nd, M. Barrère to same, Rome, June 22nd, M. Jules Cambon to same, Washington, June 23rd, Doc. Dip., pp. 50, 52.

[18] M. de Noailles to M. Delcassé, Berlin, June 22nd, *ibid.*, p. 51. The murder of the German envoy was not then known.

[19] M. Harmand to same, Tokyo, June 24th, *ibid.*, p. 53.

[20] Consul Scott to Lord Salisbury, Canton, June 24th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 73. Consul de Szaure to M. Delcassé, Shanghai, June 24th, Doc. Dip., p. 54.

[21] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 21, 27.

finding later support in high quarters, aimed at crushing the foreign religion; this aim was in time diverted to an attack on all foreigners; and it was their creed to support the dynasty; their movement was limited to Shantung and Chihli, with one savage outburst in Shansi; but in Shantung they were now kept in check by Yuen Shih-kai. The Tataohwei and other secret societies, found in the provinces south of the Yellow River, had one aim—the subversion of the Manchu dynasty; to attain this end they were ready to resist the local administration, or to attack foreigners if thereby they might embarrass the officials. The mass of the Chinese south of the Yellow River had approved Kang Yu-wei's mission and regretted his failure; they were not ill disposed to the dynasty, but, especially in Kwangtung, they resented the burking of reform; and they had everywhere resented the attempt to depose the emperor. The officials in the provinces, four-fifths of them being Chinese, were loyal to the throne; but they had come to suspect the designs of the empress dowager and to fear their consequences; and, in this crisis, they insisted on their loyalty to the person of the emperor. The intentions of the empress dowager were obscure. On the most favorable construction it may be assumed that she saw clearly that, if she would not be submerged by the Boxer wave, she must ride it—that, if it was not to destroy the throne, it must be turned against the foreigner; but practically all the chroniclers note many indications to show that she encouraged the movement from a very early date.[22] The viceroys adopted the policy of loyalty to both emperor and empress dowager.

§ 6. In this swelter of divergent aims the position of the foreign powers was to some extent what it was in 1858, when the British navy suppressed piracy along the coast while England was still at war with China, and in 1860, when the allied English and French protected the city of Shanghai from the rebels at a time when their forces were taking the Taku forts and were marching on Peking.[23]

[22] Smith, "Convulsion," i, pp. 187, 228, 242; ii, pp. 502, 567, 596. Bland and Backhouse, "Empress Dowager," p. 257. M. J. F. McCarthy, "The Coming Power," p. 78. H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 6. Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, p. 61. Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 11. North-China Herald, June, 6th, 13th, 1900.

[23] Cf. "Conflict," chap. xv, § 5; chap. xxvi, §§ 2, 4.

In such a situation the viceroys now carried further their declaration of June 22nd, and on July 3rd they telegraphed to the Chinese envoys abroad pointing out the possibility that the agitation in the north might spread to the south, and they proposed that, "regardless of what may happen in the north, the foreign powers agree not to despatch forces to the Yangtze valley or the interior of Kiangsu and Chekiang provinces, and that the viceroys agree to guarantee protection in accordance with the treaties to the lives and property of people of all nationalities within their respective jurisdictions." [24] This proposal followed certain negotiations with the foreign consuls at Shanghai, who considered and modified some very elaborate articles of agreement, and who ultimately consented to recommend this *modus vivendi*. [25] It was satisfactory to the powers and was accepted by them; and it was at once notified to the Chinese people by proclamations issued by the two viceroys. [26] The policy was accepted in principle by Li Hung-chang at Canton, who "agreed no longer to recognise the Peking government" [27]; and in Shantung Yuen Shih-kai, in answer to a direct appeal, telegraphed—"My views are the same as those of the viceroys." [28] It was later seen that in Shensi Twanfang took his stand against the insensate folly of the Peking administration, and the Boxer outbreak found active support only in Chihli, Shansi and Manchuria. So, from a combination of motives—hostility to the plans of Prince Twan and his followers, espousal of the cause of the people against the Manchus, desire to safeguard the emperor and to save the empress dowager from the consequences of her course—all the high officials in the southern and central provinces had allied themselves with the foreign powers, on the basis of the declaration that this was an insurrection and not

[24] Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, July 3rd, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 276; Lo Feng-lu to Lord Salisbury, July 4th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 95.

[25] Yüking to M. Delcassé, June 29th, M. de Bezaure to M. Delcassé, July 5th, Doc. Dip., pp. 58, 70. Consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, June 27th, July 4th, China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 79, 97. Consul Goodnow to Mr. Hay, June 26th, 29th, July 8th, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 248, 249, 252.

[26] Text of proclamation, North-China Herald, July 11th, 1900.

[27] Consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, Shanghai, June 29th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 85.

[28] Same to same, July 1st, *ibid.*, p. 87.

a foreign war, and that the powers sought no acquisition of territory.

§ 7. This work is a history of China's international relations, and the brilliant story of the siege of the Peking legations and of beleaguered Tientsin can be given only in outline; for the full story of the peril and privation, the heroism and enduring courage, of those sieges the reader must consult other works dealing especially with the subject.[29] Fire was opened on the legations at 4 p.m. on June 20th, the rifles of Chinese troops being then for the first time [30] added to the match-locks, spears and swords of the Boxer volunteers, and from that time the foreign community was subjected to a fusillade which was generally constant and furious, but which was at times interrupted by periods of quiet and of a sort of truce; these truces were quite unexplainable to those within the enceinte, shut off as they were from all news, and can only be explained by events occurring outside Peking, known at once to all the Chinese and Manchu leaders, encouraging the one party which saw clearly the consequences of this outrageous attack, and temporarily daunting those others who had ventured all upon the cast of the die. There were three marked truces, June 25th, July 18th to 28th, and August 3rd to 4th. "We were under fire from the 20th to the 25th June, from the 28th June to the 18th July, from the 28th July to the 2nd August, and from the 4th to the 14th August." During this time,

"that somebody intervened for our semi-protection seems probable: attacks were not made by such numbers as the government had at its disposal—they were never pushed home, but always ceased just when we feared they must succeed—and, had the force round us really attacked with thoroughness and determination, we could not have held out a week, perhaps not even a day. So the explanation gained credence that there was some kind of protection—that

[29] Such as: for Peking, A. H. Smith, "China in Convulsion," B. L. Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters from Peking," Roland Allen, "The Siege of the Peking Legations," W. A. P. Martin, "The Siege in Peking," N. Oliphant, "A Diary of the Siege of the Legations," G. E. Morrison, letters in London *Times*, Oct. 13th, 15th, 16th, 1900, W. Heinze, "Die Belagerung der Pekinger Gesandtschaften," E. d'Arcy, "La Défense de la Légation de France à Pékin"; for Tientsin, G. Gipps, "The Fighting in North China," W. McLeish, "Tientsin Besieged."

[30] R. Hart, "These from the Land of Sinim," p. 32.

somebody, probably a wise man who knew what the destruction of the legations would cost empire and dynasty, intervened between the issue of the order and the execution of it." [31]

§ 8. The legations were defended by fearless men, but from the first hour international jealousy worked mischief. The citadel of refuge for all foreign civilians was the British legation, and this was guarded by the 79 British marines, besides being the headquarters of the greater part of the civilian volunteers, 75 in number (including 31 Japanese)—men who could shoot straight. Each of the other detachments guarded especially its own legation, except that, the Japanese legation being entirely covered by others, to the Japanese force was assigned the task of protecting, supported by the volunteers, the Chinese converts herded in the Suwang Fu. Each detachment was commanded by its own officers and its own envoy, and there was no unity of command except a nominal superiority accorded to the senior officer present. This was the Austrian naval captain Thomann, of a service and of a nation little experienced in Asiatic warfare on land. His first act, at the outset of the attack, was to abandon the Austrian legation in haste, an act condemned by most, declared unexplainable by others [32]; the result was to expose the flank of the French legation and to thrust the weak defences of the Suwang Fu into the front-line. Consequent on this, the British envoy, Sir C. MacDonald, an old soldier, was nominated to be commander of the defence, and he appointed as his chief of staff Mr. Herbert Squiers, secretary of the American legation, also a soldier; but the control which they were allowed to exercise was little more than nominal, [33] and to the end each legation was defended in the main by its own legation guards.

§ 9. With the instinct of self-government which characterises Americans, committees had been formed when the missionaries first took refuge on June 9th in the Methodist mission. When, on June 20th, the whole community was gathered in the British legation, these com-

[31] R. Hart, "These from the Land of Sinim," p. 39.

[32] Ibid., p. 19; Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 278, ii, p. 395; Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 71; R. Allen, "Siege of Legations," p. 112; M. Hooker, "Behind the Scenes in Peking," p. 63.

[33] Cf. inter al., M. Hooker, op. cit., p. 121.



mittees were enlarged and made to assume wider functions. A missionary, Mr. E. G. Tewksbury, was at the head of the committee of General Comfort, his work on which was specially commended by Sir C. MacDonald and by Mr. Conger.[34] Another missionary, Mr. F. D. Gamewell, was in charge of the work of fortification, for which "his services were invaluable, and it is no exaggeration to estimate them as literally indispensable to the success of the siege defence"[35]; of him it was said during the siege that he was "a representation of limited omnipresence." [36] Until he was wounded, the *Times'* correspondent, Dr. G. E. Morrison, was efficiently active in many capacities. Mr. Squiers was marked by all as the embodiment of cheeriness and ready resource. The civilian volunteers did themselves credit, and to their ranks the church militant supplied the "six fighting parsons." [37] Among the military the Japanese colonel Shiba was, by general consent, the most distinguished. On June 29th he reported that he could hold the Suwang Fu for only two or three days longer; but it was held until he was wounded, and after that to the end of the siege. He was reckless in courage, unceasing in his vigilance, and fertile in plans; and he was highly esteemed by men of Western nations, by whom, hitherto, the Asiatic had been regarded as of an inferior mould.

§ 10. When the Chinese soldiers were let slip on June 20th, they cast off all restraint. They were unceasing in their watch and their fire on the legations; but they were as active in seizing on the defenceless city and plundering it. The Boxers had burned and plundered for a week, and now the soldiers joined in the task and spread alarm in all directions. The servants, even of Manchu nobles, fled in terror [38]; the wealthy were called on to feed troops and Boxers, with "rice as dear as pearls" [39]; and plundering was so rife that those in high position were concerned for their hoarded trea-

[34] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, pp. 475, 495.

[35] Ibid., i, p. 274. For his work, *ibid.*, ii, pp. 468, 475.

[36] Hart, "Sinim," p. 41.

[37] Their photograph in Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 474.

[38] Bland and Backhouse, *Diary of Chingshan*, June 21st, 22nd, p. 273-4.

[39] Ibid., June 22nd, p. 275.

sure.[40] The Boxers were masters of the situation—their plans were now the plans of the government, their will the will of the empire, and their levies were the uninvited guests of all who had the means of supporting them. As the empress dowager crossed the road from one palace to another on June 21st she was greeted by a guard of honour of Boxers; she presented them with 2000 taels, “congratulating their commander, Prince Chwang, on their stalwart appearance.”[41] Chingshan had a hundred Boxers quartered on him [42]; on June 25th a body of sixty, led by Prince Twan and Prince Chwang, and the “beilehs” Tsailien and Tsaiying, invaded the palace itself.[43] The troops were no less exacting and insolent, and it may be asserted that those members of the administration who did not command troops, like Tung Fu-siang, or Boxers, like Prince Twan, exercised in general but little more real control over the course of events than did the Mogul king and princes at Delhi in 1857.

§ 11. The decision once taken by the Chinese administration, the orders issued were decided and ferocious. On June 20th an imperial decree directed the viceroys and governors to protect their provinces “against the aggressive designs of foreign powers,” and to send troops to Peking.”[44] The next day appeared China’s declaration of war. After reciting the many acts of aggression by foreign powers and China’s constant efforts at conciliation during the past sixty years, it declared that the seizure of the Taku forts showed that their spirit of aggression was unabated; China had never been wanting in consideration for them, “but they, while styling themselves civilised states, have acted without regard for right, relying solely on armed force.” Now “our ancestors have come to our aid, the gods have answered our call, and never has there

[40] “I find Prince Li much depressed in his mind; his treasure vaults contain vast wealth.”—*Ibid.*, June 22nd, p. 275.

[41] *Ibid.*, June 21st, p. 273. Tsaihsün, Prince Chwang, was commandant of the Peking gendarmerie, a very important post; he was own brother to the emperor Kwanghsü, the latter having been adopted into another family as son of Hienfeng.

[42] *Ibid.*, June 22nd, pp. 275, 276, 281.

[43] *Ibid.*, June 25th, p. 282. For the depredations of the soldiers, see also Smith, “Convulsion,” i, p. 270.

[44] Cited by Yühsien in despatch of July 15th, Smith, “Convulsion,” ii, p. 380.

been so universal a manifestation of loyalty and patriotism. With tears we have proclaimed the war before our ancestral shrines : " better to do and die, than to live in humiliation. A decree of June 24th completed the organisation of the Boxers, appointing Prince Chwang and the Grand Secretary Kangyi to be in general command conjointly ; another directed the issue of rice for the Boxers ; another ordered that the troops be restrained from plundering. A decree of June 25th directed the issue of Tls. 100,000 as a money reward to each of five army corps, including the Boxers as one of the corps ; and in others of the 27th further money rewards were issued to troops, including those at Tientsin. Decrees of July 1st refer to the disorganisation of the telegraph and postal service, and to " wanton murder and robbery committed by persons feigning to belong to the Boxers." On July 2nd was issued an important decree referring to " feuds between the people and the converts " ; the latter were " also the children of the state, including many good and worthy people," but they had been " led astray by false doctrines and perverted by the missionaries." The converts were to be led gently back to the path of rectitude, but, " as hostilities have now broken out between China and foreign countries, the missionaries of all nationalities must all be driven away at once to their own countries, so that they may not linger here and make trouble ; but it is important that measures be taken to give them protection on their journey." [45]

§ 12. This decree, so gentle in its tone, had been preceded a week earlier by another, giving orders of savage ferocity. No copy has been preserved, but it appears to have been issued on June 24th. [46] Though no copy is available, yet its authenticity is well established. Warning of its orders was " brought to missionaries and others by friends in the yamens, by friendly telegraph operators, and by officials—some of them of high rank—in at least three provinces and in numerous places hundreds of miles apart, almost simultaneously. Twice at least the original despatch was seen by foreigners, and its phraseology is indelibly engraved on the memories of those who were

[45] Decrees trans. from Peking Gazette, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 168 seq.

[46] " Ten days ago," Chingshan, Diary, July 4th, p. 237.

stunned by the appalling and unexampled words—*feng yang-jen pi sha, yang-jen t'ui-hwei chi sha.*"[47] An indelible impression has been made on the mind of the world by the order—"Whenever you meet a foreigner, you must slay him; if the foreigner attempts to escape [withdraw], slay him at once"[48]; but the world will also not forget that some one in Peking had the courage to alter *sha*, "slay," to *pao*, "protect." [49] The alteration was reputed to have been made by the two Chinese ministers Yuen Chang and Hsü Ching-cheng, [50] who both, in no long time, suffered decapitation in consequence of their bold act. The order for extermination therefore failed in its purpose in those parts to which it was sent by telegraph, the far-seeing officials there standing upon the imperial decree as received, and refusing to pay any heed to unsubstantiated reports of a different intention; but to the parts within the disturbed area the written text was sent by courier, and there it was obeyed ferociously and without hesitation.

§ 13. In Peking no time was lost. On June 22nd a proclamation was issued offering rewards for foreigners taken alive—50 taels for a man, 40 taels for a woman, 30 taels for a child [51]; but now, on June 24th, the slaughter began. The missionaries and other foreigners—the "primary devils"—were sheltered by the legation barricades and their guards; but the Chinese converts—the

[47] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 594.

[48] "Ten days ago she sent him [Yühsien] a secret decree saying—'Slay all foreigners wheresoever you find them; even though they be prepared to leave your province, yet must they be slain.'"  
Diary, July 4th, p. 287.

[49] "It is feared that some treacherous minister is responsible for this, but no one dares inform her Majesty."—*Ibid.*, loc. cit.

[50] "Yesterday Li Ping-heng and Kangyi discovered that the word 'slay' in her Majesty's decree ordering the extermination of all foreigners had been altered to 'protect' by Yuen Chang and Hsü Ching-cheng. I have just seen Kangyi and he says that her Majesty's face is divine in its wrath. . . . Both were executed this morning; my son Enming witnessed their death."—*Ibid.*, July 28th, p. 293.

[51] "Prince Chwang was at the head of the gendarmerie when this proclamation was issued. The proclamation was duly stamped with the official seal of the gendarmerie."—Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Sept. 4th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 193. This proclamation was dated June 28th, but—

"The Old Buddha has directed Prince Chwang, as head of the city gendarmerie, to issue a proclamation offering Tls. 50 for every head of a male barbarian brought in, Tls. 40 for that of a woman, and Tls. 30 for that of a child."—Chingshan, Diary, June 22nd, p. 276.

"secondary devils"—were no less an object of detestation, and they had to suffer. On that day "many hundreds of Chinese Christians were put to death just outside Prince Chwang's palace," after a trial by four judges, presided over by Prince Chwang; "there was no mercy shown, and a large number of innocent people perished with the guilty." [52] A week later another batch of "over nine hundred people were summarily executed by the 'Boxers,' after a trial conducted "outside the gate of Prince Chwang's palace." [53]

§ 14. The zeal of the Boxers in searching for Christians led them into temporary disfavour, and was an element in bringing about the first of the unexplainable truces. On June 25th a body of sixty Boxers, led by Prince Twan and Prince Chwang, burst into the palace precincts; clamouring noisily for the emperor, "the foreigner's friend," they were suddenly confronted by the empress dowager, who rated Prince Twan and "would have him know that she, and she alone, had power to create or depose the sovereign, and she would have him remember that the power which had made his son heir apparent could also unmake him." Her anger grew and she ordered that a stop be put to all fighting in Peking, and that Junglu might go to the legations to discuss terms of peace. [54] A white flag was sent to the bridge north of the British legation, and a notice was put up stating that "in accordance with imperial commands to protect the foreign envoys, firing must cease; a despatch will be delivered at the bridge." The bearer of a flag in return was confronted by the levelled rifles of Chinese soldiers, and he retired. No communication was received, but there was comparative quiet for a short time, and then the attack was renewed more furiously than before. [55] This abortive attempt at communication was notified to the outside world—"an imperial decree of June 25th orders that the foreign envoys in Peking be protected at all costs." [56] This explanation of the order for protection is given by the Manchu chronicler, but it is worthy of note that, in the days in which the

[52] Chingshan, Diary, June 24th, p. 282.

[53] Ibid., June 30th, p. 286.

[54] Ibid., June 25th, p. 282.

[55] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 292; Hart, "Sinim," p. 33; Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 107.

[56] North-China Herald, 4th, 1900.

order was given at Peking, the following events were occurring at Tientsin: the relieving force from Taku effected a junction with the garrison of the Tientsin settlements on June 23rd; and the Seymour force, occupying the Hsiku arsenal, repelled a determined attack by a large Chinese force on June 23rd, was relieved on the 25th, and was withdrawn to Tientsin on the 26th, after destroying the arsenal and its contents.[57] It has further been suggested that "the respite given was probably to throw us off our guard and arrange other plans for our hurt—perhaps also to put some friendliness on record." [58]

§ 15. The first place to which the orders to exterminate the foreigner could arrive was Paotingfu. From this place the railway engineers had made their escape at the end of May [59]; but there still remained a large number of missionaries, for whose safety much anxiety had been felt, but to whom the Chinese government had promised full protection.[60] A guard was in fact sent, but it was subsequently withdrawn. About June 24th some of the Chinese servants fled, but the greater number remained and shared the fate of the missionaries. On June 28th the Chinese pastor Meng was arrested, tortured and tried; on the 29th he was beheaded. On June 30th one mission was attacked by a Boxer mob aided by disorderly soldiers in uniform, and the other missions on July 1st; the missionaries with their families were either killed in the attack or burned in their houses, or, the greater number, they were beheaded—except one little girl, who was thrust through by a sword. So perished 11 Americans and 4 English—6 men, 5 women and 4 children.[61]

§ 16. The orders came next to Taiyuenfu in Shansi. On June 27th a mob attacked and destroyed a mission hospital; the occupants then escaped, except one woman (English) who, wounded, was pushed back to her death in the burning buildings. During the next few days the

[57] Cf. chap. viii, §§ 22, 24.


[58] Hart, "Sinim," p. 33. Cf. postea, § 32.

[59] Cf. chap. viii, § 7.

[60] Cf. chap. viii, § 19.

[61] Forsyth, "The China Martyrs of 1900," p. 19.

"They [those who were beheaded] fled to the imperial camp. . . . The colonel in charge plundered them, and then handed them over to the provincial judge [niehtai], who in turn delivered them to the Boxers."—*Ibid.*, p. 25.



MAP OF  
**TIENTSIN**  
1900

Scale of English Miles

REFERENCES

- 1 Cathedral, Notre Dame des Victoires
  - 2 Black Fort (heavily armed)
  - 3 Gordon Hall
  - 4 Custom House
  - 5 Viceroy's Yamen (T.P.S. Administration)
- Red lines mark Foreign Concessions as in 1902





missionaries made constant appeals to the authorities for protection, and, on July 3rd, three officials "came from the governor" and urged all, Protestant and Roman Catholic, to concentrate in a Chinese house to be assigned to them; this they did on July 6th accompanied by many of their servants. Other missionaries at Showyang, eighty miles to the east, after a fruitless attempt to escape eastwards to the coast, were brought to Taiyuenfu and lodged in prison on July 8th. On July 9th all were taken to the governor's yamen; and there, outside the principal entrance, men, women and children, they were stripped to the waist like common criminals and made to wait. Finally the governor, Yühsien, came out and inspected them, and then ordered their immediate decapitation. The order was executed on men, women and children, there and then, in the presence of the governor; first on the Protestants of Taiyuenfu, then on the Roman Catholics, then on the Protestants from Showyang. "The Roman Catholic bishop, an old man with a large white beard, asked the governor why he did this wicked deed; for answer, the governor drew his sword across the face of the bishop, causing the blood to flow down his beard, and he was then speedily massacred; the priests and nuns quickly followed him in death." So perished, under the eyes of Yühsien the governor and by his orders, 84 English and Scottish Protestants and 12 Roman Catholics—15 men, 20 women, and 11 children; in addition the heads of 6 American missionaries killed at Taikuhien were, according to his own report to the empress dowager, sent to this governor, Yühsien, now "infamous for ever." [62]

§ 17. Of the other missionaries in Shansi, those who fled to the west and crossed the border into Shensi ultimately were conducted without massacre to Hankow; they suffered many privations, from the effects of which at least seven died, and many of them were for many days in extreme peril; but once in Shensi they were under the protection of the governor Twanfang, who had received the

[62] Forsyth, "The China Martyrs of 1900," pp. 30 seq.

"Yühsien has memorialised the throne, reporting that he cunningly entrapped all the foreigners, cast them into chains, and had every one decapitated in his yamen. Only one woman had escaped, after her breasts had been cut off, and had hidden herself under the city wall; she was dead when they found her."—Chingshan, Diary, July 16th, p. 292.

order to "protect" them, and who persisted in carrying it out. His soldiers obeyed his orders grudgingly, but they obeyed, and conducted the various parties of refugees into Hupeh; there they were handed over to the soldiers of the viceroy Chang Chih-tung, whose orders were also obeyed, though grudgingly.[63] Others who were driven to flight towards the north, into Mongolia, fared otherwise and shared the fate which befell the missionaries stationed there. Others still were killed at their stations in Shansi—10 at Sopingfu, 6 at Tatungfu, 6 at Taikuhien, and many others at many other places. In all, including the victims at Taiyuenfu, 178 were known to have been killed in Shansi and over the Mongolian border, of Protestants 113 adults and 46 children, of Roman Catholics 12 men and 7 women, but the latter pair of figures is probably not complete.[64] Besides these, in Mongolia was killed with torture Captain Watts-Jones, R.E., one of a party of three engineers, who had been on a trip prospecting for railway routes. They started from Canton, went through Hunan and Kweichow to Szechwan, and were making their way thence to Tientsin; floating down the Yellow River their raft was wrecked on June 24th. Of the three Mr. John Birch was drowned then; Mr. Harry C. Matheson made his way amid many perils to Tientsin, served as a volunteer through the latter part of the siege, and was subsequently drowned, helping to save children, in the wreck of the *City of Rio de Janeiro* at the entrance to San Francisco Bay in the spring of 1901; Captain Watts-Jones reached Ning-hiafu in Kansu safely, but was later subjected to a lingering death of torture.[65]

§ 18. The orders were obeyed also in southern Manchuria. The Protestant missionaries profited by the warnings received and took refuge, those in the south at Newchwang, those in the north with Russian troops in their vicinity, their missions being destroyed on June 30th; and on July 3rd at Mukden the Roman Catholic bishop, 4 priests, 2 sisters, and elsewhere 5 priests, together with all the Chinese converts who could be got hold of, were

[63] Forsyth, "China Martyrs," passim; Smith, "Convulsion," chap. xxxiii.

[64] Smith, op. cit., ii, p. 648.

[65] North-China Herald, July 25th, 1900, and private notes.

killed.[66] On July 14th Russian steamers on the River Amur were fired upon at Aigun; and on the 15th the Russian town of Blagovestchensk on the north bank was bombarded from a Chinese battery across the river. The Russians made a terrible example, involving the slaughter of many thousand Chinese, men, women, and children, whose bodies floated down the Amur; but the act was disavowed by the supreme government as being "the unauthorised act of the military at too great a distance from the central government to be in touch with its views." [67]

§ 19. The edict of extermination seems to have reached the governor of Chekiang, probably in a written document, unaltered to the more merciful form. After some hesitation, he was induced by the provincial Judge, a Manchu, to transmit the order to the magistrates of his province; but, probably on the injunction of the Nanking viceroy, Liu Kun-yi, he soon afterwards countermanded it. The mischief was, however, done. In Chekiang there were no Boxers, but there was unrest, and there were converts' feuds [68]; and, on July 21st, at Kūchowfu, armed bands of marauders were joined by disorderly soldiers, and they together seized the Hien, who was known to wish to protect the missionaries, and took him with his family and servants before his superior, the Fu; there they were murdered, of the whole household of thirty-three persons, only the Hien's wife and his grandmother being given their lives. Then the mob turned on the missionaries; some were refused a shelter in the Taotai's yamen, some found a temporary refuge in the temple of the city god; but sooner or later, on the three days July 21st-23rd, all those resident at Kūchowfu and others who fled thither from Changshan were killed—11 in all, 2 men, 6 women, 3 children, all English.[69] Including a few other Catholic priests killed in other provinces, the total number known to have been killed between June 24th and July 24th was 231, of whom 178 were adults and 53 children.

§ 20. The force that relieved Tientsin numbered about 8000—Russians, Americans, British, Germans, and

[66] Ibid., July 11th, 1900; Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 606.

[67] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 607.

[68] Cf. chap. vii, § 6.

[69] Forsyth, op. cit., p. 90; Smith, op. cit., ii, p. 605.

Japanese; with the original guards and the remnant of the Seymour force, the garrison now numbered about 12,000. Between them and the Chinese there was from this time a constant succession of attack and counter-attack, in which the Chinese were aided by their great superiority in heavy guns; but in major operations the offensive was necessarily assumed by the allied foreign forces. The Eastern Arsenal, five miles from the foreign concessions, was the chief source of the Chinese supply of munitions in northern China; it was protected by a moat and battlemented walls, and was covered on the south by fortified camps, in which the Chinese follow the Roman practice. This arsenal was taken on June 27th by the Russians, supported by a mixed force, of 800 of the other allies. Then came days of minor attacks on both sides, the Chinese being greatly reinforced, and increasing the number of their guns of position, and the allied garrison also receiving some reinforcements of men, but being deficient in guns. On July 9th the Japanese, 1000 in number, supported by 1000 of a mixed force, cleared the country to the south and captured the Western Arsenal in the Haikwangsze, the scene of the signature of the treaties of 1858. On July 13th came the last scene; the Russians and Germans, about 5000 men, circling to the east and north-east against the Lutai Canal positions; the Japanese, Americans, British and French, also about 5000 men, making a frontal attack on the city of Tientsin. The first body made quick progress and was able to get within cannon-fire of the Black Fort, adjoining the site of the French cathedral. The second body made a dogged fight all day in a plain cut up by pools and ditches, and it lost one-seventh of its strength; the 9th U.S. Infantry, 445 in action, lost 17 killed (including its commander, Colonel Liscum) and 71 wounded, and the Japanese had about 500 casualties; the force clung to its position through the day and the following night, and at daybreak the Japanese blew in the outer south gate, scaled the wall, forced the inner gate, and Tientsin city was taken, July 14th, its Chinese defenders retreating without further resistance.[70]

[70] Gipps, McLeish, *passim*; Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, Tientsin, ii, p. 519; Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, p. 161-188; H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," pp. 43-82; Daggett, "America in the China Relief Expedition," pp. 27 seq.

§ 21. "The fall of Tientsin not only opened the road to Peking, but it relieved both Chefoo and Shanghai from a danger which was every day becoming greater." [71] It confirmed in their safe position of neutrality those officials who refused to attack the foreign powers, but who yet, being Chinese officials, must follow the cult of the jumping cat [72]; and it warned the common herd everywhere that even the consecrated Boxer was not invincible. Concurrently with the news, everywhere reported and everywhere believed, that the entire foreign community at Peking had been massacred, [73] it was also known and must be accepted as the truth, that Tientsin had been conquered and had been punished. For Tientsin was punished. During several days the city and its rich suburbs had been at the mercy of the Boxers, who had slaughtered and burned, and had plundered freely; for many other days they had been joined by the imperial troops, who, at the close of the nineteenth century, were the most accomplished plunderers in the world; and the mob of Tientsin were no degenerate imitators. Between them all, while it is impossible to estimate the loss of life, the destruction of property in one suburb alone was cautiously estimated at "tens of millions of taels." [74] Before withdrawing, the Chinese troops set fire to the city in many places, and further destruction ensued. As soon as possible the foreigners set up the Tientsin Provisional Government [75]; but before order could be restored in a proper degree, the foreign troops took their turn at looting. Ingots of silver were their principal object and were found by the ton—and appropriated; but the American soldier seemed to

[71] Decennial Reports, ii, p. 521. Also decision of consular body, Shanghai, as reported in consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, July 5th (China, No. 3, 1900, p. 101) and consul de Bezaure to M. Delcassé, July 5th (Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 70).

[72] At a time when the latest news from Peking which Yuen Shih-kai was able to report was that "the envoys were safe on July 11th," he was reported to be wavering in his fidelity to the policy of the viceroys.—Tel. Chefoo, July 19th, North-China Herald, July 25th, 1900.

Two days later Yuen Shih-kai was reported to have said on July 20th that, by his latest advices, the envoys were still safe, and "the proper Chinese authorities are devising means for their rescue and protection."—Tel. Chefoo, July 21st, *ibid*.

[73] Cf. *postea*, § 25.

[74] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 578.

[75] Cf. *postea*, chap. xi, § 2.

find his chief pleasure in smashing delicate porcelain.[76] "Some of the Russian, the French, the Indian, and the German troops distinguished themselves as highway robbers. . . . Military raids were made in all directions, and . . . it is certain that the three shortest of the Ten Commandments were constantly violated on an extensive scale." [77] China had broken the law of nations and defied the world, and the Western world recognised none of its own laws in its treatment of the law-breaker.

§ 22. After the short truce of June 25th the firing on the legations at Peking was constant, and at times it developed into a furious sound of rifle-shot, in which now the shell of field pieces was heard. During the two months' siege it was calculated that 2900 shell fell within the legation area, but it was one of the miracles protecting the besieged that the shell fire was not more abundant or more accurate. Credit for this is given to Junglu. He made what efforts he could to restrain the madmen now at the head of the administration, going even so far as to try to prevent the issue of special instructions to Yühsien to carry out the decree of extermination of June 24th [78]; and his rank was too high and his position at court too well established for his warnings to be entirely neglected. As commander-in-chief of the Chinese field force, less numerous but better trained than the Manchu corps, his power was too great to allow of any interference. He did not venture to go so far as to withhold his troops from joining in the attacks, but he would not allow their artillery to be used "so near to the imperial palace," and he refused point blank to sanction the use of his reserve guns—beautiful new pieces, not yet even unpacked.[79]

[76] Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, p. 201. On one day Tls. 1,400,000 in silver from Tientsin was landed at a Japanese port on government account.—Tokyo Press, Aug. 3rd, 1900.

[77] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 583.

[78] Chingshan, Diary, July 4th, p. 287.

[79] "Kangyi called to-day . . . he tells me that Tung Fu-siang called in person this morning on Junglu and asked him for the loan of the heavy artillery which is under his orders. Junglu is said to have ample armaments in stock in the city . . . sufficient to knock every foreign building to pieces in a few hours. Tung . . . began to bluster, whereupon Junglu feigned sleep—he gave no consent, but leant on his seat and slumbered. . . . Tung left in a towering rage," and appealed without success to the empress dowager.—Ibid., p. 284.

"The troops are still very wroth with Junglu, who refuses to lend his

§ 23. The Old Buddha was frequently in a bad temper because of the delay in destroying the legations,[80] but Junglu seemed to care nothing for her tantrums. He stood alone, except for the Chinese ministers, against his fellow Manchus,[81] and early in July he again memorialised, warning the empress dowager that "the persons of envoys are always held inviolate within the territories of any civilised state"; and that "this attack on the legations is worse than an outrage, it is a piece of stupidity which will be remembered against China for all time." [82] On July 12th he asked what would happen if the Boxers were defeated and Peking captured [83]; and soon after he informed the Old Buddha that he had "ascertained beyond doubt that the document, which purported to come from the foreign envoys, demanding her abdication,[84] was a forgery, prepared by Lien Wen-chung, a secretary of the Grand Council, on an order from Prince Twan." [85] This sturdy attitude, strengthened by the failure of the Chinese troops to hold Tientsin, produced its effect on the court and administration, and even on many of the commanders of the troops,[86] and the truce of July 18th followed thereon.

§ 24. Before this the outer world was horrified by the circulation of an item of news, which was afterwards found to be untrue. The murder of Baron von Ketteler on June 20th had been falsely reported six days before it occurred, but the news of the actual murder was not verified until July 1st, when it was communicated by their

guns, and his troops are so faithful to him that it is impossible to bribe them to disobey him. Junglu's courage is really extraordinary."—*Ibid.*, July 4th, p. 286.

"Junglu has explained, as his reason for not allowing the heavy artillery to be used, that it would inevitably have done damage on the Imperial Shrines and the Ancestral Temple."—*Ibid.*, July 16th, p. 291.

When the relief force occupied Peking, the reserve guns were found still in their straw wrappings within a quarter mile of the legations.

[80] Chingshan, Diary, June 30th, July 4th, 7th, 11th, 16th.

[81] "Kangyi declares that we shall never take the legations so long as Junglu continues to exercise his present great influence at court."—*Ibid.*, June 30th, p. 285.

[82] *Ibid.*, July 7th, p. 288.

[83] *Ibid.*, July 13th, p. 289.

[84] Cf. chap. viii, § 27.

[85] Chingshan, Diary, July 16th, p. 290.

[86] *Ibid.*

consuls to all the foreign powers. While the news of the assassination of an accredited envoy was producing its effect on a startled world, the moment seemed opportune to some element in the Chinese administrative machinery for sending an appeal to the allied foreign powers. This appeal, dated July 3rd, while the legations were being daily attacked, was addressed from the emperor of China separately to the ruler of each government, and in each case was based on a special ground. Each appeal attributed the troubles to the "dissensions" which had "arisen between the Christians and the people of Chihli and Shantung," and gave the seizure of the Taku forts as the actual cause of the hostilities; but to England it was pointed out that "of the foreign commerce of China more than 70 per cent. belongs to England," which therefore would suffer more than other countries from a continuance of disorder [87]; to America appeal was made to article i of the treaty of 1858 by which she might offer her mediation between China and her enemies [88]; to Germany regret was expressed for Baron von Ketteler's murder by rebels, whose punishment was promised [89]; to Japan reparation for Mr. Sugiyama's murder was promised, and stress was laid on the common interest of Eastern powers against the West [90]; and to France and Russia similar appeals were addressed. [91] The powers with one accord replied asking for an assurance that their envoys were still alive, demanding to be placed in immediate communication with them, and proposing that the Chinese troops should aid the relieving force in its task.

§ 25. On July 14th it was reported in Shanghai that Sheng Hsüan-hwai, Director General of the Telegraphs, had received a telegram from Yuen Shih-kai—"Messenger from Peking, July 8th, arrived to-day reports that the artillery of the Boxers and Tung Fu-siang's troops made a breach in the legion walls, afterwards taking them by

[87] Lo Feng-lu to Lord Salisbury, July 11th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 113.

[88] Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, July 11th, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 277.

[89] Tel. London, July 23rd, North-China Herald, July 25th, 1900.

[90] Tel. Kobe, July 20th, *ibid.*

[91] Tel. London, July 23rd, *ibid.* Trans. of the appeals to England, Russia and Japan in Bland and Backhouse, "China under the Empress Dowager," pp. 335 seq.; to France in Cordier, "Rélations de la Chine," iii, p. 522.



assault. Massacre followed, no one left alive. Chinese losses enormous. Foreign ammunition exhausted.”[92] From Newchwang this was independently confirmed by the Chinese servant of a foreigner, escaped from Peking, who reported that, on July 12th, the British legation was destroyed and the foreigners massacred.[93] Sheng Hsüan-hwai at once declared that he had not received the telegram reported to have been received by him; but the startling news had already been telegraphed to all parts of the world; and no editor or correspondent felt it safe to accept the denial. The news was generally believed [94]; the sensational newspapers published the most tragic and gruesome details, as circumstantial as if from eye-witnesses; and the world mourned. Three distinguished Englishmen, Sir Robert Hart, Sir Claude MacDonald, and Dr. G. E. Morrison, had the gratification of reading later a two-column obituary notice of each in the *Times* of July 17th, and those of other nationalities in their own papers.[95] The tragic news was so fully believed in London that a solemn memorial service was ordered at St. Paul’s cathedral on July 23rd, but, before that date, it was postponed on the urgent remonstrances of Mr. J. D. Campbell, who refused to admit the truth of the death of his chief, Sir R. Hart.

§ 26. One effect of the situation which culminated in the report that the foreigners in Peking had been massacred, and the general belief in its authenticity, was that arrangements were made for the continuing administration

[92] North-China Herald, July 18th, 1900.

[93] Tel. Chefoo, July 20th, *ibid.*, July 25th, 1900.

[94] “All Europe has clung with pathetic tenacity to the hope that . . . the Europeans in Peking . . . might have escaped a wholesale massacre. That hope, growing ever fainter for days past, is now finally abandoned by the public mind. . . . we have to recognise the horrible fact that, by an outrage unparalleled in Western experience, the Chinese government has flung a sanguinary defiance in the face of the whole civilised world.”—*Times*, edit., July 17th, 1900.

“On July 16th we regarded it as morally certain that Prince Twan and the Boxers, with the aid of Tung Fu-siang and his wild Kansu levies, had succeeded in their design to murder all the foreigners in Peking. We had it from the Chinese themselves. . . .”—North-China Herald, Aug. 1st, 1900.

[95] “Home papers are full of obituary notices, etc., of myself, and it is amusing to see how school and college days are remembered! A good letter I wrote Batcheler in 1886 has also been published by him—I ask, did I really write it? That confounded siege and the burning of my place appear to have blotted out the past from my memory, and I am living a new, or second, life.”—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Oct. 11th, 1900.

of the customs service. Even before the report of the massacre was circulated, the inconvenience of having no access to the head of the service and of being able to receive no instructions from him had been felt in many ways; there was no authority to issue funds for the maintenance of certain offices, or to draw on the official accounts at the banks; and, while the customs collection must continue to be available to meet the payments due on China's foreign loans, yet the foreign authorities were concerned that it should not be used for the war expenditure of the Peking administration, and were quite ready, if necessary, to sequester the receipts in order to prevent a hostile use. On the last head the consuls at Shanghai were especially anxious lest the revenue should be used to equip Li Ping-heng's force, then on its march north [96]; and the other causes had already set in motion some tendencies to disintegration. At Canton Li Hung-chang had already placed the Kwangtung offices under the commissioner at Canton, making his jurisdiction co-extensive with that of the Hoppo; the officer then in charge of the Hankow customs was suspected of aiming at a similar *imperium in imperio*; and at Shanghai certain intrigues were noted, aiming at placing at the head of the whole service a gentleman not in any way connected with the service.

§ 27. To fill the post during the "temporary seclusion" of Sir R. Hart there were, from the standpoint of regularity, three men available. The senior commissioner was Mr. Edward B. Drew, with thirty-five years' service and a commissioner since 1868, an official of considerable capacity, and much respected both by his colleagues and by Chinese and foreign officials; but he was tied to his important duties at Tientsin, and, being an American, his appointment would have contravened the agreement that a British subject should be at the head of the service, at a time when it was not wished to provoke international jealousies. At the head of the most important office, Shanghai, was Mr. Frank A. Aglen; he was British, but one of the junior commissioners, and he too must have dropped his serious responsibilities. The third was Mr. Francis E. Taylor, British, a commissioner of middling seniority, and an Inspectorate secretary in charge of the

[96] Cf. chap. x, § 1.

Statistical Department, with his office at Shanghai. Of these three the Inspectorate secretary, Mr. Taylor, was the logical choice, and, on July 10th, he was approached by a member of the consular body with the proposal that he should assume the temporary direction of the service. After consulting with Mr. Agten, he announced his readiness to undertake the charge; and, on July 14th, on the initiative of the consular body, the Nanking viceroy, as Nanyang Tachen, addressed to him a despatch instructing him to assume temporary charge of the customs. The foreign powers were already disturbed by the possible consequences of the interregnum, and the report of the massacre came at just that time to increase the uneasiness; and Mr. Taylor's appointment was accepted by them without hesitation.[97]

§ 28. The Yangtze viceroys had grasped the power to administer the affairs of the empire outside the radius of Boxer activity, and the hand of their associate, Li Hungchang, is plainly visible in the control of international relations. On June 10th Sir R. Hart sent him a telegram, followed by a letter on the 12th, explaining the state of affairs and advising him, as the empress dowager's oldest and most trusted adviser, to warn her that the advice of her Boxer counsellors would endanger the empire and the dynasty, and that envoys must be held sacred.[98] When the outbreak came Li announced, on June 21st, that he had been summoned to Peking; he did not go, but he instructed the Chinese envoys abroad to give such explanations to foreign powers as fitted in with the intentions of the viceroys and not with those of the rulers at Peking.[99] On July 13th he received an imperial decree of the 9th appointing him again viceroy of Chihli and Peiyang Tachen [100]; he left Canton on the 16th, fully expecting to be welcomed as the grand mediator between an offending China and the outraged foreign powers. He received satisfactory assurances from the various Foreign Offices that the powers sought no territorial acquisitions [101]; but at Hongkong the governor told him that his place was

[97] Mr. Taylor to Sir R. Hart, Sept. 7th, 1900.

[98] R. Hart, "Sinim," p. 18.

[99] Cf. *antea*, § 4.

[100] Text in U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 172.

[101] Mr. Hay to Wu Ting-fang, July 18th, *ibid.*, p. 279.

at Canton [102]; and at Shanghai he was told by the consuls that, if the envoys were alive, he must negotiate with them, and if they were dead, he must deal with the home governments.[103] Li Hung-chang was visibly much chagrined at his reception in Shanghai and the relations with foreign powers which were thus indicated to him; but to his own government there can be no doubt that, at this juncture, he gave salutary advice. Given then the fall of Tientsin and the shock caused thereby to the anti-foreign party, the renewal of Junglu's protests and admonitions, and the advice now strongly urged by Li Hung-chang and, probably, the Yangtze viceroys, we have a sufficient explanation of the "truce" of July 18th.

§ 29. At Peking that lull in the siege was preceded by a serio-comic semi-truce which began on the 14th, the day of the actual fall of Tientsin, five days after the issue of the decree calling Li Hung-chang from Canton to Chihli. On that day an intercepted legation messenger was returned unharmed, bearing with him a communication from "Prince Ching and others"—resembling the usual form adopted for heading despatches from the Tsungli Yamen, but one adapted for concealing the identity of those actually responsible for the contents of the despatch. Several such communications were received, "delivered at one point along our long front, whilst the rifle duel was continuing elsewhere with the same monotony." [104] The first letter expressed naïvely a pained surprise at the continued attacks by the legation guards, "causing alarm and suspicion among soldiers and people," and a fear that the strength of the Boxers would prevent the Chinese government from carrying out its intention of escorting the foreigners to Tientsin. The envoys were now requested to take refuge in the precincts of the Tsungli Yamen, with their families and the members of their staffs; "but there must not on any account whatever be taken any single armed foreign soldier, in order to avoid causing doubt and fear in the minds of the troops and people." An answer was required by noon of the next day.[105] This "dilly,

[102] Tel. Hongkong, July 18th, North-China Herald, July 25th, 1900.

[103] Ibid.

[104] Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 156.

[105] Trans. in Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 340; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 177 seq.

dilly, duck" invitation [106] was not accepted; but the answer pointed out that the persons of envoys were always and in all places regarded as sacred, and that all fighting had been in self-defence. In their reply to this "Prince Ching and others" promised to restrain their soldiers, and declared that "the Chinese government will exert all its efforts to keep order and give protection, in accordance with general law." [107]

§ 30. Firing ceased before July 18th, [108] and it was on the 17th that an imperial decree was dated, which was communicated to the foreign powers. It ascribed the conflict to "the long-standing antagonism between the people and Christian missions, and the subsequent fall of the Taku forts precipitated the meeting of force with force." The Chinese government had "refused to interrupt relations," and had "repeatedly issued decrees providing for the protection of the foreign legations, and also commanded the provincial authorities to protect missionaries." They were again directed to give protection to all. Deep regret was expressed for the killing of Mr. Sugiyama and the "violent removal" of the German envoy, and the murderers were to be arrested and punished. Further orders were issued for compensation to be given for murders and loss of property, and to "investigate the disturbances and take such measures for the punishment of the offenders and restoration of order as the necessities of the case demand." And the decree was to be generally published. [109]

§ 31. This decree was the culmination of efforts by Dr. Jekyll to adjust the evil doing of Mr. Hyde in the Chinese administration. During the first half of July constant efforts to minimise the effect on Western nations of the prolonged silence cast over the Peking legations had been made by the Chinese envoys abroad, especially by

[106] "I hear that not many days ago — persuaded Kisiu to have a letter sent to the foreign envoys, inviting them to come, without escort of troops, to an interview with the Tsungli Yamen, his idea being to have them all massacred on the way."—Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 5th, p. 295.

[107] Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 344.

[108] "There were only five rifle shots during the whole night" of July 17th–18th.—Ibid., i, p. 352.

[109] Decree July 17th, telegraphed by Liu Kun-yi July 20th, transmitted by Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, July 23rd, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 280.

Wu Ting-fang in America. He had incessantly assured the American government and representatives of the press that all was well with the legations; that, except for Baron von Ketteler, the envoys were alive; that the Chinese government was giving them full protection and was itself coerced by rebellious Boxers; and that the Western powers should not visit the sins of the Boxers on the unoffending Chinese administration; in effect he ascribed to the court of Peking all the virtuous and laudable intentions of the viceroys of the south. Mr. Hay imposed on him, as a test of the correctness of his attitude, that he should send Mr. Conger a telegram, and should get a reply, both in the State Department cipher. In the middle of the semi-truce, on July 16th, Mr. Conger received from the Tsungli Yamen a telegram which, deciphered, read "communicate tidings bearer." On asking explanations, he was informed that Wu Ting-fang had telegraphed—"The government of the United States is disposed to lend its aid to China, but it desires first to have news of Mr. Conger's situation." The envoy then, on July 17th, sent the following reply—"For one month we have been besieged in British legation under continued shot and shell from Chinese troops; quick relief only can prevent general massacre." [110] This telegram was duly transmitted and its receipt in Washington on the 20th relieved the minds of the many millions of anxious watchers as to the personal safety of the envoys; but it drew a disquieting picture of the plight of the legation staffs and the missionaries, and of their families and adherents, thus beleaguered.

§ 32. The truce, after the first day or two, was not complete, but it gave the besieged a much needed rest, at a time when they were almost at the last extremity [111]; there was also some exchange of amenities. On July 20th the Tsungli Yamen by imperial order sent a gift of vegetables and watermelons. Much was made of this generosity, and the Chinese envoys abroad let it be known that their government was supplying the legations with provisions,

[110] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, July 16th, U.S. For Rel., 1900, p. 156; Report by M. Pichon, sub July 16th, 17th, Doc. Dip., France, 1900, p. 214; North-China Herald, July 25th, 1900.

[111] "It is now [July 14th] said by those who seem to have the right to form a judgment, that the French will not be able to hold out in their legation more than two days."—Smith, "Convulsion," i, p. 339.

as well as giving them efficient protection.[112] The former assurance was as ludicrous as the latter was audacious, and the provisions so ostentatiously advertised abroad would not have sufficed for one day's maintenance of the beleaguered throng. For the well-being of their honoured administrator, Sir R. Hart, the Chinese ministers showed much concern. On July 21st a note asked his whereabouts, and another asked his opinion on the arrangement made by Liu Kun-yi for administering the customs; on the 25th he had sent to him a telegram of inquiry from Mr. Aglen; and at other dates up to August 10th he had four other notes, two of them enclosing telegrams of anxious inquiry from his family and from Mr. J. D. Campbell.[113] Both he and each one of the foreign envoys wished to send coded telegrams such as had been allowed to Mr. Conger; but the indulgence of the Chinese ministers was not to be stretched so far, and the envoys were informed that as "at present peace is not restored, your legation telegrams must be wholly *en clair*, stating that all is well, without touching on military affairs." [114] To this requirement, depriving the recipients of the only test of authenticity, the envoys could not accede.

§ 33. The Yangtze viceroys had faithfully carried out their part in their compact, and now Li Hung-chang took in hand his task of straightening out the tangle in China's international relations. Liu Kun-yi and Chang Chih-tung, after the fall of Tientsin, at the end of the truce, and after the relief of Peking, steadily declared their loyalty to the empress dowager and their opposition to the Boxer movement, but stated that their position of neutrality was contingent on a guarantee that the empress dowager's person should be respected [115]; and the policy of Li

[112] "From an inquiry made [in a telegram and a letter] it was evident it had everywhere been given out that the government was both protecting and provisioning the legations. We had always feared some such assurances would be our ruin, but fortunately for us the telegram of Mr. Conger exploded this idea, and the governments concerned woke up to the fact that their representatives were in danger."—Hart, "Sinim," p. 38

[113] Hart, "Sinim," p. 37.

[114] Prince Ching and others to Sir C. MacDonald, July 25th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 183; China, No. 4, 1900, p. 42.

[115] Consul Fraser (Hankow) to Lord Salisbury, July 17th; consul Warren (Shanghai) to same, Aug. 1st, 18th, 1900; cited in H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 196.

Hung-chang was based on the same postulate. His exact purpose being, however, not quite clear, the American consul at Shanghai was instructed to ask for an explicit declaration, and he reported—"Purpose attempt persuade throne send envoys Tientsin; afterwards hopes military operations will be suspended, then negotiations can follow; Boxers and troops can be stopped by Chinese government; asks is it possible, if envoys are escorted Tientsin safely, that military operations can be suspended? Assures envoys now safe." [116] Mr. Hay's answer was not prompt, but it was decided—"This government will not enter into any arrangement regarding disposition or treatment of legation without first having free communication with Mr. Conger. Responsibility for their protection rests upon Chinese government. Power to deliver at Tientsin presupposes power to protect and to open communication. This is insisted on." [117]

§ 34. All the powers had repeatedly insisted on the responsibility of the Chinese government for the lives of their envoys, but the question was how to enforce it. The consular body at Tientsin, on the same day, June 29th, on which they "handed over the situation to the military authorities," [118] unanimously agreed to suggest to the powers that "the Chinese government should be informed that, in case the persons of the foreign envoys are touched, the mausolea of the dynasty will be destroyed by the foreign troops"; and to this decision the commander-in-chief gave his support. [119] The proposal was not regarded favorably, as appearing "very unlikely to have any effect upon mutinous soldiery or a riotous mob"; but, on similar lines, it was proposed that a collective declaration should be made by all the powers that, "if any act of violence is committed against the legations, all authorities at Peking, of whatever rank, will be held responsible in person and property." [120] The declaration was made to

[116] Mr. Goodnow to Mr. Hay, July 24th, U. S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 260.

[117] Mr. Hay to Mr. Goodnow, July 30th, *ibid.*

[118] Gen. Dorward to War Office, July 4th, 1900, China, No. 3. 1900, p. 98.

[119] Consul Carles to Lord Salisbury, June 29th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 85.

[120] Lord Salisbury to Lord Gough, July 2nd, *ibid.*, p. 90; M. Delcassé to French ambassadors, July 4th, M. Paul Cambon and others to M. Delcassé, July 4th, 5th, Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 68 seq.



the Chinese envoys abroad,[121] but the acts of violence continued to be committed.

§ 35. Junglu and Prince Ching were credited in some quarters with having created a "counter-revolution" in Peking [122]; in any case the first proposal of July 14th that the envoys without guards should take refuge in the Tsungli Yamen, was on the 19th modified to a renewal of the proposal to send them under escort to Tientsin; and the warning was added that if the envoys "determine to stay in Peking and if there should happen any unforeseen disaster," the Chinese administration, having "faithfully given warning in advance, cannot accept the responsibility." [123] In their reply the envoys asked "why, if the Chinese government cannot insure the protection of the foreign envoys in Peking, they feel confident of their power to do so outside the city on the way to Tientsin"; and with reference to the warning, it declared that, "as the foreign envoys have come to Peking in reliance on the protection of the Chinese court, it is impossible for the latter to free itself from the responsibility for their safety." [124] In fact the foreign envoys considered that the proposal meant "certain death," [125] and their opinion was in strong contrast with the benevolent attitude assumed by the Chinese administration, which, under date of July 30th, assured the foreign powers—"Foreign ministers in Peking are all safe and well. Recently vegetables, fruit, and provisions have been repeatedly supplied to them. Relations most friendly. At present consultations are going on for the protection of various ministers going to Tientsin for temporary shelter, which will soon be concluded satisfactorily." [126]

[121] Lord Salisbury to consul Warren, July 5th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 99.

[122] Declared by Sheng Hsüan-hwai as true on July 3rd; communicated by Belgian consul at Shanghai; transmitted by French envoy at Brussels, July 8th; circulated by M. Delcassé to French ambassadors, July 9th; in Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 75, 76.

[123] Prince Ching and others to Sir C. MacDonald, July 19th, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 41; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 181.

[124] Sir C. MacDonald to Prince Ching and others, July 20th, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 42; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 181.

[125] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Aug. 3rd (rec'd Aug. 7th), U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 157.

[126] Tsungli Yamen, Peking July 30th, Shanghai Aug. 2nd, received by Wu Ting-fang Aug. 3rd, communicated Aug. 4th, *ibid.*, p. 282.

§ 36. The proposal was taken up by Li Hung-chang and his fellow viceroys a little later. They telegraphed on August 4th the summary of an imperial decree of the 2nd, which declared that, "throughout the disturbances recently caused by our subjects on account of Christian missions," effective protection had been given to the legations; but as this protection "may not secure absolute safety, the foreign envoys are being consulted as to the proposed plan of detailing troops to escort them safely to Tientsin"; Junglu was charged with the duty of escorting the envoys, and their telegrams in plain language would be transmitted.[127] The latter restriction was removed by a decree of August 5th, which sanctioned the transmission of cipher telegrams [128]; and this enabled Mr. Hay to reply on the strength of a telegram received on the 7th, that "imperial troops are firing daily upon the envoys in Peking," and to "demand the immediate cessation of hostile attacks by imperial troops"; further, as the envoys had done, he pointed out that "if the Chinese government cannot protect our envoy in Peking, it will presumptively be unable to protect him upon a journey from Peking to the coast"; he therefore again urged co-operation by the Chinese with the relief expedition.[129] In communicating the decree of August 2nd to the French minister, the Chinese envoy was instructed to ask "if, through the delay caused by the hesitation of the envoys, an accident should happen, who will be held responsible?" and the minister was urged to instruct his envoy to accept the proposal without further delay.[130] M. Delcassé's reply was categorical—"Without doubt the Chinese government will be held responsible; its strict duty is to protect the foreign envoys as much, or even more than itself"; it should and could open the ways from Tientsin to the capital and so fulfil the task of protection which was incumbent on it.[131] The British government held the

[127] Li Hung-chang, Liu Kun-yi and Sheng Hsüan-hwai to Chinese envoy at St. Petersburg, Aug. 4th, received by him Aug. 7th, communicated at Washington Aug. 8th (Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 283) and at Paris Aug. 9th (Yükeng to M. Delcassé, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 120).

[128] Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, Aug. 8th, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 283.

[129] Mr. Hay to Wu Ting-fang, Aug. 8th, *ibid.*, p. 284.

[130] Yükeng to M. Delcassé, Aug. 9th, *ubi sup.*

[131] M. Delcassé to Yükeng, Aug. 10th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 121.

same opinion.[132] The Japanese government proposed a suspension of fighting, on condition that the relief expedition might bring away the Peking community without opposition [133]; but by this time the relief had been effected against opposition and by armed force.

§ 37. The negotiations at Peking on the subject of the withdrawal to Tientsin continued from July 19th to August 6th.[134] During a part of this time, until July 28th, the quiet intermission continued with some sporadic outbursts of firing; but "during the 26th, 27th and 28th there were ominous signs that the truce was nearing its end"; and "the 29th marked the definite resumption of hostilities." [135] On that day Li Ping-heng, who had arrived a few days earlier, was received in audience by the empress dowager [136]; and from that day, four days before the issue of the décret of August 2nd, nine days before the issue of a decree of August 7th appointing Li Hung-chang to the task of opening his negotiations, and during the course of his negotiations and those of "Prince Ching and others," the legations were again subjected to a storm of shot and shell, and their inmates to all the privations and dangers of a siege.

[132] Sir E. Monson to M. Delcassé, Aug. 15th, *ibid.*, p. 126.

[133] M. Delcassé to French Ambassadors, Aug. 16th, *ibid.*, p. 129.

[134] Letters from "Prince Ching and others" on the subject of the withdrawal to Tientsin, July 19th, 25th, 28th, 31st, Aug. 1st, 3rd, 4th, 6th; China, No. 4, 1900, pp. 41 seq.; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 181 seq.; Report of M. Pichon, Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 216 seq.

[135] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 33.

[136] *Ibid.*

## CHAPTER X

### THE RELIEF OF THE PEKING LEGATIONS

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§ 1. LI PING-HENG was, in 1897, governor of Shantung, and in his jurisdiction occurred the murder of the German missionaries, which provided the ground for the occupation of the Kiaochow territory ; as part of the settlement he was cashiered and declared forever ineligible for any

official post.[1] Notwithstanding this degradation, in 1899 he was appointed High Commissioner to investigate the financial condition of Manchuria [2]; and, as Kangyi the Manchu had dealt with the Chinese officials of the centre and south, so the Chinese Li Ping-heng dealt with the Manchu officials in the home of the dynasty. Towards the end of 1899 he was appointed High Commissioner in supreme command of the naval forces on the Yangtze, and in that post was brought into a position of friction with the two viceroys, with whose general policy he was at variance. Early in June, 1900, before any overt act had been committed except by Boxers, he was ordered to "proceed north with all speed" [3]; and it was reported that, on his arrival, he was to be appointed viceroy of Chihli.[4] He tried to evade the proffered honour and pleaded the only excuse permitted to a Chinese official—illness; but his plea was answered by "urgent orders to come at once." [5] His orders, not later than June 10th, taken in conjunction with the appointment on that day of Prince Twan to the Tsungli Yamen, are a significant item in the account against the ruling powers in Peking. He left Yangchow on July 1st, but returned there as the troops at Tsingkiangpu, about 12,000 Hunanese, refused to follow him, or to obey any orders except those sent through their fellow-provincial, Liu Kun-yi.[6] He obtained other troops, and with them, on his way north, he effected the slaughter of over a thousand Chinese converts in the prefecture of Hokienfu in Chihli, an act which led the Yangtze and southern viceroys to send memorials of protest.[7] In that same prefecture, at the flourishing Roman Catholic mission of Hienhien 30,000 converts were then entrenched, 12,000 men of them being armed; they had sufficient food and ammunition, and successfully defended themselves for over two months.[8]

§ 2. Li Ping-heng had his first audience of the empress

[1] Cf. chap. v, § 6, 7, 9.

[2] Cf. chap. vii, § 16.

[3] North-China Herald, June 13th, 1900.

[4] Ibid., June 20th, 1900.

[5] Ibid., June 27th, 1900.

[6] Corresp. Chinkiang, July 7th, *ibid.*, July 11th, 1900. Cf. chap. ix, § 26.

[7] North-China Herald, Aug. 8th, 1900.

[8] Ibid., Aug. 15th, 1900.

dowager on July 22nd ; and, embittered as he was by his previous degradation, he threw his weight into the scale on the side of Prince Twan, Kangyi and Tung Fu-siang, and obtained the confidence of the empress dowager.[9] He struck at once at the peace party. Yuen Chang and Hsü Ching-cheng on July 23rd, while the negotiations with the foreign envoys were proceeding, "handed in the third of their memorials against the Boxers, in which they recommended the execution of several members of the Grand Council"; the chronicler observes that "their valour seems to be more laudable than their discretion, especially as the old Buddha is disposed once more to believe in the Boxers as the result of Li Ping-heng's audience with her yesterday." [10] While the empress dowager was in this mood, the matter of altering the text of the decree of extermination was brought up against them, and the two were decapitated July 28th.[11] Orders were also sent to Chang Yin-hwan, sentenced in 1898 to transportation to Turkestan,[12] to commit suicide, failing which he was to be decapitated.[13] These proscriptions were not only a stroke against the advocates of peace in Peking, but were a serious menace to the viceroys who were making agreements and negotiating conditions in the south.

§ 3. Li Ping-heng was at the same time appointed generalissimo in joint command, together with Junglu, of the Chinese field force [14]; the commander-in-chief who would not direct hostilities was too powerful to be disturbed, but he was neutralised by being given a colleague who was more willing to be active. From the day of his arrival, even during the truce, Li Ping-heng began to push

[9] "The Old Buddha places great confidence in Li Ping-heng."—Bland and Backhouse, "Empress Dowager," Chingshan, Diary, July 28th, p. 293.

[10] Ibid., July 23rd, p. 292. Trans. of three memorials, June 20th–July 23rd, in U.S. For. Rel., 1901, Appendix, pp. 75 seq.

[11] "It is most painful to me to think of the end of Yuen Chang, for he had many sterling qualities. As for Hsü, I knew him in the days when we were colleagues in the Grand Secretariat, and I never had a high opinion of the man; his corruption was notorious."—Chingshan, Diary, July 28th, p. 294.

The decree ordering their execution did not appear in the Peking Gazette until July 29th.

[12] Cf. chap. vi, § 22.

[13] North-China Herald, Aug. 15th, 1900.

[14] Ibid., Aug. 8th, 1900.

the court to a renewal of hostilities,[15] and within a week, on July 29th; the attack was renewed in all its fury. The broad facts of the continued existence and the extreme peril of the foreigners were known from Mr. Conger's telegram of July 17th, received July 20th; but the details were first made known to a startled world by a telegram sent on July 21st by Dr. G. E. Morrison, the *Times'* correspondent, and published in its issue of August 2nd. Letters were sent with the greatest difficulty; very few got through to Tientsin, and those few were a long time on the way; from August 5th, the belated permission to send cipher telegrams allowed a few curt appeals to go through, but these were, by this time, supererogatory, since Dr. Morrison's telegram of July 21st had sufficiently enlightened the powers. It was in July that news was wanting and was wanted; and but little authentic information from Peking was received between the receipt at Tientsin on June 29th of Sir R. Hart's note of June 24th—"*Besieged in British Legation. Situation desperate. MAKE HASTE*"—and on July 25th of a note from Mr. Conger, dated July 21st—"We have provisions for several weeks, but little ammunition. If they continue to shell us as they have done we can't hold out long. Hope relief can come soon." To the Tientsin date must be added two or three days [16] before a message could reach the cable end at Shanghai.

§ 4. During July then the powers knew from Sir R. Hart that the Peking community was besieged, that the situation was desperate, and that haste was imperative; on July 20th they learned from Mr. Conger that it was under continuous shot and shell fire; and from the 14th to the 20th they believed that the entire community had been massacred. Haste in relief was indeed imperative. The besieged looked for it from the Seymour force; after June 20th they looked for it even more eagerly and more

[15] "I went across to Duke Lan's house this morning and found Prince Twan and Li Ping-heng there. They were busy planning a renewed attack on the legations, and Li was strongly in favour of mining from the Hanlin Academy side."—Chingshan, *Diary*, July 23rd, p. 293.

[16] E.g. in *North-China Herald*, July 25th, 1900, appears a telegram, dated "Tientsin July 17th, via Chefoo July 20th"; and the capture of Tientsin, July 14th, is reported in a telegram "Chefoo July 17th." To Chinese officials communication was quicker.

confidently as day passed after day.[17] They knew nothing of the dire straits of the Tientsin settlements, but they did assume that large forces were gathering, and that these would soon brush aside the ill-disciplined masses of the Chinese troops and would bring them safety in no long time. Again and again over-anxious ears caught the sound of distant firing, which could only come from a relieving force—and this even before the capture of Tientsin; again and again the besieged reassured each other with the hope that relief, though not yet within hearing, must still come soon; again and again even hopes were found to be illusory; and when finally the relieving force did come, the besieged knew of its proximity only a few hours before.

§ 5. At the end of June the foreign forces between Taku and Tientsin numbered 14,000 in all, of whom 6000 were Russian and 4000 Japanese; of these 9228 were at Tientsin.[18] When Tientsin fell on July 14th the foreign forces there numbered about 12,000; and by the end of July they were increased to about 17,000, viz. Japanese, 8000, Russian, 4000, British, 2000, American, 1700, and the rest of the other four nationalities, chiefly French.[19] The question of the relief of Peking was much on the minds of all the commanders; some advocated an attempt at all hazards, with any forces available; others were daunted by the difficulty of campaigning under the burning sun, by difficulties of feeding the troops in the field, by the poisoned water supply, by difficulties of transport, and, above all, by the fear that a reverse would imperil the lives and fortunes of all foreigners in North China. Even the forward advocates demanded a field force of 25,000, besides the necessary guards from Taku to Peking; and the demands of the more cautious ranged from that figure to 80,000 for the field force alone.[20] All were agreed

[17] "Shell firing ceased July 16th; quiet now; hope it means relief force, having defeated Chinese, is nearing."—Dr. Coltman tel. July 20th, received Shanghai July 31st, North-China Herald, Aug. 8th, 1900.

[18] Adm. Bruce to Admiralty, June 30th, Adm. Seymour to same, July 2nd, 1900, China, No. 3, 1900, pp. 86, 99.

[19] Tel. Tientsin, July 26th, North-China Herald, Aug. 8th, 1900.

[20] At the beginning of July Adm. Alexeieff, commanding the Russian troops, estimated the necessary field force at "20,000 to 30,000 men," besides 20,000 to guard communication and hold the occupied points.—Marquis de Montebello to M. Delcassé, St. Petersburg, July 4th. Doc. Dip. 1900, p. 67.

But the council of admirals informed the American admiral the



that the necessary forces could not be assembled and their equipment and transport provided before September; and the earliest date at which an advance was considered probable was September 15th.

§ 6. England was in the midst of the war in South Africa and could send only Indian troops; France could, except after a long delay, send only Annamese tirailleurs; Germany mobilised a force of 7000 at home, but meantime could spare only a few naval ratings; a few thousand American soldiers were sent from the Philippines; and Italy and Austria-Hungary had no troops within call. Russia could hold down Manchuria, and sent some thousands into Chihli, but there was obviously a limit to their number. Japan alone could send unlimited thousands, and could send them promptly, and to her, sooner or later, the powers turned. The British government appealed to her at once and, on June 22nd, asked if further forces were to be sent—"the urgency of immediate action and the favourable geographical situation of Japan make her intentions a matter of very grave importance in this difficulty." [21] The Japanese administration had five years before come into collision with the European three-power coalition, and only two years before had noted with interest that it still held together, and it feared to be drawn into a difficulty; the Foreign Minister now declared that Japan was "desirous of conforming its resolves to those of the [other] powers interested"; and at a second interview he said that "of course Japan has troops at her disposal, but that it was impossible to foresee the consequences of sending them"; three days later, however, Japan mobilised a division in anticipation of a final decision. [22] Lord the field force must consist of "at least 60,000 men," besides the necessary guards.—Adm. Courrejolles to M. de Lanessan, Taku, July 7th, *ibid.*, p. 74; Adm. Kempf's report, July 8th, cited in Daggett, "China Relief Expedition," p. 43.

The Japanese government thought the field force should be 70,000 strong.—Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, Tokyo, July 4th, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 97.

At the end of July Gen. Dorward (British) put the field force required at 25,000 men (Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, p. 325); but the Russian and Japanese commanders held out for a larger force, one of them stipulating for 80,000 men. Cf. M. Delcassé to M. Paul Cambon Aug. 3rd, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 111.

[21] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, June 22nd, China, No. 3, 1900, p. 69.

[22] Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, June 23rd, 26th, *ibid.*, pp. 72, 76.

Salisbury then asked the Russian, German and French governments if they would approve.[23] The French minister, on June 27th, "did not give any intimation of his opinion"[24]; but, on July 4th, he thought it "essential that unity of action and unity of direction on the spot should not be hindered by any afterthought or jealousy," and he "hoped that the Japanese government would at once despatch the mobilised division which was available,"[25] Germany, on June 28th, was "unable to judge whether the interests of third powers would be affected" by Japanese intervention, "or whether the responsibility of supporting it could be undertaken by Germany,"[26] Then the news of Baron von Ketteler's murder was received, and, on July 2nd, the emperor made a warlike speech[27] and ordered the mobilisation of a brigade 7000 strong; and the government declared its policy to the Russian government, said to be identical with the Russian policy.[28] The Russian minister declared, on June 28th, that "we have no desire to hinder Japan's liberty of action," but did not commit himself further.[29] On July 3rd, he brought himself to declare that, while "in face of so grave a crisis there were objections to a mandate being given to any one power," still he "would welcome a Japanese or any other force of 20,000 or 30,000 men to co-operate in the common aim"; and he said that 10,000 Russian troops had already been landed.[30]

§ 7. Lord Salisbury had to be content with this and he telegraphed, indicating the extreme gravity of the situation and urging that "Japan is the only power which can send rapid reinforcements to Tientsin, and no objection has been raised by any European power to this course."[31] The Japanese government "considered the troubles in North China much more deep-rooted and of far wider bearings" than they seemed to others, and it wished to be "assured that Japan will be protected from complications,

[23] Lord Salisbury to ambassadors, June 25th, 26th, *ibid.*, p. 75.

[24] Sir E. Monson to Lord Salisbury, June 27th, *ibid.*, p. 80.

[25] Same to same, July 4th, *ibid.*, p. 96.

[26] Lord Gough to same, July 1st, *ibid.*, pp. 26, 91.

[27] Cf. chap. xi, § 24.

[28] Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, July 3rd, *China*, No. 3, 1900, p. 92.

[29] Same to same, July 28th, *ibid.*, pp. 81, 94.

[30] *Ibid.*, July 3rd, 4th, *ibid.*, pp. 92, 96.

[31] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, July 4th, *ibid.*, p. 98.

and indemnified for her outlay.”[32] Without waiting for an answer Japan decided to increase her force at Tientsin to 20,000 men without delay.[33] The British government undertook the financial responsibility demanded, “since a fatal expenditure of time would result from international negotiations on the point”; but to have given, alone, the first assurance would have added to the complications, and Lord Salisbury “wished to draw a sharp distinction between immediate operations which may be still in time to save the legations, and any ulterior operations which may be undertaken.”[34]

§ 8. Much time—a fortnight—had been lost, since without the Japanese reinforcements a forward movement was impossible. Some of these came in by the end of July, and some British and American reinforcements, and the matter was taken into consideration. Opinions were still divided, but there was now more inclination to take risks. As we have seen, Lord Salisbury had been steadily urging an advance, and his eagerness was reflected in the British commanders at Tientsin. However cautious the American government might have been, the receipt on July 20th of Mr. Conger’s telegram changed its attitude—“This despatch . . . presented a situation which plainly called for the urgency of a relief expedition rather than for perfection of preparation; it was made the basis of urgent pressure for an immediate movement upon Peking, without waiting for the accumulation of the large force previously proposed.”[35] Instructions in this sense were sent to General Chaffee, who arrived at Tientsin on July 30th. He reported that he did not believe the envoys could be relieved without a fight, and that the allied forces available for battle did not then exceed 14,000 men [36]; but his arrival, with orders to assume the aggressive, supported the British commanders in their wish to advance,

[32] Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, July 5th, *ibid.*, p. 100.

[33] Same to same, July 6th, *ibid.*, p. 102.

[34] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, July 6th, *ibid.*, p. 102.

[35] Report of U.S. Secretary of War (Mr. Elihu Root), 1900, p. 18. Mr. Conger’s telegram was not, however, universally treated as authentic. On July 28th its Washington correspondent telegraphed to the *New York World*—“The Conger despatch is now known to be a forgery. The Chinese know the code and concocted the answer.”

[36] Gen. Chaffee to Adjutant General, July 31st, 1900, Report *ubi sup.*

and overcame the reluctance of the Russian and Japanese generals, who, commanding two-thirds of the available troops, naturally exercised a predominating influence.[37]

§ 9. A first conference was held on July 27th, before General Chaffee's arrival, the senior American officer, Colonel Daggett, representing him. It was decided that preparations for a move should be made, but that the date should be left open. A second conference was held on August 1st, and a third on August 3rd, when it was decided to advance on the 4th; but "as no officer, whatever his rank, could give orders to officers of any other army, it was decided that a conference of commanders should be held every evening, or when necessary, to determine the movement of the following day or days, and that a majority should rule." [38] The troops moved out of Tientsin at 3 p.m. on August 4th, and went into bivouac four miles away; the march was to follow the river, the Russians and French forming the right wing and operating on the left (east) bank, and the Japanese, British and Americans as left wing on the right (west) bank. The field force was:

|                               |       |
|-------------------------------|-------|
| Japanese (Marshal Yamaguchi)  | 8,000 |
| Russians (General Linievitch) | 4,800 |
| British (General Gaseleo)     | 3,000 |
| Americans (General Chaffee)   | 2,100 |
| French (General Frey)         | 800   |
| Austrian                      | 58    |
| Italian                       | 53    |

These are the numbers reported by the respective commanders, making a total of 18,800 [39]; but "these figures are too large; the effective force probably did not exceed 16,000 men." [40] The Americans actually started 2500 strong. [41] Of the British, only the artillery and four companies of infantry were English, the rest being Indian troops. Of the French the greater part were Annamese tirailleurs. The Italians and Austrians were present in order that the flag might be represented. The

[37] Daggett, "China Relief Expedition," p. 58.

[38] Ibid., p. 55.

[39] Gen. Chaffee to Adjutant General, Sept. 1st, 1900, Report of Sec. War, 1900, p. 63.

[40] Daggett, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

[41] Ibid.; Report of Sec. War, 1900, p. 19.

absence of any Germans, even a similar "token" force, was the subject of much comment [42]; the French commander reported that "a small force of Germans, Austrians and Italians were present with the column to co-operate in the capture of Peking" [43]; but the Germans were, in fact, not represented.

§ 10. The decision to make an immediate advance brought about several results. Since the beginning of the troubles the Russians had been consolidating their hold on Manchuria, and at the end of June were in a position to give shelter to missionaries in mid-Manchuria [44]; after the slaughter of Blagovestchensk, July 14th, the movement became more pronounced. At the end of July they came into conflict with Chinese troops near Tashihkiao, the railway junction for Newchwang; the Chinese on the eastern side were driven back, but "to the northward near Kaipinghien" 5000 Russians were surrounded by 15,000 Chinese, and the situation was critical.[45] After the allied decision the Chinese troops on August 4th attacked the port of Yingkow (Newchwang) which was defended by Russian troops, and "it took a whole day's fighting before they were driven off"; the crews of two Japanese gunboats were on shore aiding in the defence; the Russian flag was then raised over the custom house, the native city, and the forts.[46] Elsewhere also, where there were only defenceless missionaries to encounter, the response to the call to arms was prompt. At Tatung, on the Yangtze, there were riots; and near Swatow seven English and American mission chapels were destroyed, six of them between August 5th and 12th.[47] In Szechwan the viceroy was reported to have received a new order to exterminate all foreigners, but instead he ordered them to leave for their own safety. All the accessible residents, missionaries, customs and consular staffs, about a hundred in all, left Chungking, except the French consul, M. Bons

[42] Cf. H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 86.

[43] Gen. Frey to M. de Lanessan, Aug. 9th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 117.

[44] Cf. chap. ix, § 18.

[45] Newchwang tel. to Japanese papers, Tokyo, Aug. 3rd, cited in North-China Herald, Aug. 15th, 1900.

[46] Tel. Chefoo, Aug. 9th, *ibid.* Cf. chap. xi, § 38.

[47] Tel. Hongkong, Aug. 13th, *ibid.*; consul Hurst to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 29th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1900, p. 9.

d'Anty, and three unofficial Englishmen ; and the viceroy was then as anxious for their return, guaranteeing their safety.[48]

§ 11. A second result was another short rest for the besieged legations from the incessant shot and shell fire. On the last days of July and on August 1st repeated letters arrived from "Prince Ching and others," urging the departure of the envoys to Tientsin, one even going so far as to promise protection to the Chinese converts who must be left behind ; all this time, daily and nightly until the morning of August 3rd "rifle shot without interruption," and shell fire at times during the day. On August 2nd the Tsungli Yamen sent in several intercepted letters, giving much misleading information, but conveying one undoubted fact—that, at the dates of writing, the relieving force had not yet started. On August 3rd, "day and night calm ; probably the Chinese wish to inspire confidence so that we may decide on going to Tientsin." A letter from "Prince Ching and others" insisted on the envoys' departure, and announced that Junglu had been charged with the arrangements. Sniping was renewed on the evening of August 4th.[49] A more probable explanation of the cessation of fire on the 3rd is that troops were withdrawn from the firing line in Peking to resist the advance of the relief force. Among these were Tung Fu-siang's Kansu men ; and Li Ping-heng was sent to take supreme command of the forces in the field.[50]

§ 12. The allied field force, with a heterogeneous variety of transport, left its bivouacs on August 5th. On the right bank the Japanese in advance started at 1 a.m. and struck the Chinese defences in front of Pehtsang at 4 a.m., and soon forced them. The whole left wing then attacked Pehtsang and, after some stubborn fighting, gained possession of it at noon ; the right wing (Russians and French) on the left bank were impeded by difficult

[48] Corresp. Ichang, Aug. 5th ; tel. Chingking, Aug. 7th, 12th ; North-China Herald, Aug. 15th, 1900.

[49] M. Pichon, Report, sub July 28–Aug. 4th, Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 219 seq. Sniping is the rendering given for "*une fusillade peu nourrie, presque continuelle*."

[50] "Li Ping-heng has gone to the front to rally the troops and check the foreigners' advance. He has impeached Junglu, but the Old Buddha suppressed the memorial."—Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 3rd, p. 295.

ground, and, at the final assault, were only in a position to threaten the Chinese defences. The Chinese fled in some disorder; their commander, Li Ping-heng, was reported to have been wounded. The next day, August 6th, the advance was continued, the British and Americans and a part of the Japanese crossing to the left bank, the entire right wing following the railway; the Chinese were struck at Yangtsun and, by 2.30 p.m., were put to rout, the brunt of the battle being borne by the Americans and British. After the defeat the viceroy, Yülu, committed suicide at Tsaitsun.[51] On August 7th the troops rested at Yangtsun, and a conference of the generals was held, at which it was decided to continue the advance to Tungchow, and to hold the next conference there. On the 8th the combined force crossed to the right bank and advanced; the Japanese, being the most numerous and most fully equipped, took the lead, followed in turn by the Russians, British and Americans. The Japanese started at 4 a.m.; and, with the whole force strung in a single column, the Americans did not start until 7 a.m.; but, by evening, all were concentrated at Tsaitsun; on the 9th at Hosiwu; on the 10th at Matow; on the 11th at Changkiawan; and on the 12th at Tungchow. Except from the burning sun and stinging dust, the only enemy impeding the advance was met between Changkiawan and Tungchow, the latter city being occupied at 4.30 a.m. on the 12th.[52]

§ 13. At this stage Li Hung-chang resumed his activity. He had already been putting out feelers at Shanghai. There, on July 24th, he had undertaken to suppress the "Boxers and rebellious troops," and to escort the envoys in safety to Tientsin, but had explicitly disclaimed any responsibility for the other foreigners, "the women and children, the preachers and teachers, customs people and guards"; no reference was made on either side to the three thousand converts protected by the legation

[51] "The foreigners are getting nearer and nearer. Yülu shot himself with a revolver on the 6th at Tsaitsun. He had taken refuge in a coffin shop, of all ill-omened places! His troops had been utterly routed thrice, at Pehtsang, Yangtsun and Tsaitsun."—Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 12th, p. 297.

[52] Gen. Chaffee to Adjutant General, Sept. 1st, Report Sec. War, 1900, p. 63; Daggett, "China Relief Expedition," p. 58; Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," i, pp. 339 seq.; North-China Herald, Aug. 22nd, 1900.

guards.[53] Being informed that no arrangement was possible without free communication with the envoys, he asked on July 31st—"if free communication is established between envoys and their governments, will America arrange that allies will not advance on Peking pending negotiations?"—firing on the legations had then already been resumed. He was informed in reply that it was not thought expedient to submit his proposition to the other powers; and being so informed he laid great stress on the continuance of the negotiations at Peking for sending the envoys to Tientsin.[54] On August 5th was received a message from Mr. Conger, dated July 21st—"enough provisions, little ammunition, hope speedy relief"[55]; and on the 8th Sheng Hsüan-hwai informed the consuls that "the viceroys were expecting an edict degrading them and ordering them to commit suicide." [56] The allied advance began on August 4th, and on the 6th the Chinese were decisively defeated at Yangtsun and the viceroy, Yülu, committed suicide. An imperial decree of August 7th appointed Li Hung-chang plenipotentiary to conduct negotiations with the powers by cable [57]; but the envoys warned the powers that arresting the advance of the relieving force would entail a general massacre.[58] On the arrival of the force at Tungchow on August 12th, Li Hung-chang tried to stop them there, pointing out to the powers that its entrance into Peking would cause great disaster to the imperial dynasty; but he was informed that no negotiations would be entered into until the legations were put in a position to go to Tientsin under the protection of an adequate foreign escort.[59] The force had already entered Peking two days before the date of this exchange of views.

[53] Consul Goodnow to State Dept., Aug. 2nd, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 262.

[54] Ibid.

[55] Same to same, Aug. 5th, *ibid.*, p. 264.

[56] Ibid., Aug. 8th, *ibid.*, p. 265.

[57] North-China Herald, Aug. 15th, 1900; Tsungli Yamen to Mr. Conger, Aug. 7th, Wu Ping-fang to State Dept., Aug. 12th, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 187, 285; M. Pichon to M. Delcassé, Aug. 9th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 119; Tsungli Yamen to Sir C. MacDonald, Aug. 8th, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 51.

[58] M. Pichon, *ubi sup.*

[59] M. Paul Cambon to M. Delcassé, Aug. 16th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 130.



§ 14. There was naturally much agitation in the whole empire. Around Tientsin, and between that city and Taku, there was seen, after the departure of the relief force, much movement of disorganised soldiery and Boxers, estimated to number between 15,000 and 25,000, but they did not come to close quarters.[60] At Shanghai and along the Yangtze much apprehension was felt, and the British authorities ordered up from Hongkong a force of 3000 Indian troops; it was stated that the viceroy and local authorities were informed and made no objection,[61] but they did, in fact, object by a protest addressed to the American government, and they refused to sanction the landing, on the ground that they were giving effective protection to the port.[62] The American government replied to the protest that, "if we consider it necessary for the protection of our citizens at Shanghai to land troops there, we should do so, as we have done at Taku, and we cannot question the right of any other power . . . to do the same." American patience was by this time exhausted by the Chinese envoy's utterances, so much at variance with the plain facts now becoming known, and he was further informed that, if this was to be regarded as "an appeal for our good offices" to restrain the other powers, "it is impossible that we should take any step in that direction so long as the Chinese government has not complied with the requirements of the president's letter of July 23rd." [63] This weakened the position of the viceroys, and when the consuls renewed their representations,[64] they gave way. The Indian troops, which had remained outside Wusung since August 12th, were landed at Shanghai on the 17th.[65] The other powers welcomed the protection given, but were not inclined to leave the duty of guarding Shanghai and the Yangtze to any one

[60] Tel. Chefoo, Aug. 9th, North-China Herald, Aug. 15th, 1900.

[61] Consul de Bezaure to M. Delcassé, Aug. 8th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 115.

[62] Tel. Li Hung-chang, Liu Kun-yi, Chang Chih-tung and Sheng Hsüan-kwai to Wu Ting-fang, Aug. 10th, communicated Aug. 11th, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 284.

[63] State Dept. to Wu Ting-fang, Aug. 11th, *ibid.*, p. 285. Cf. chap. ix, § 24.

[64] Consul de Bezaure to M. Delcassé, Aug. 15th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 127.

[65] North-China Herald, Aug. 22nd, 1900.

power, even to England [66]; and on the 18th the French landed 100 sailors, and 250 Annamese tirailleurs the next week.[67] These were followed, as soon as they could be sent, by detachments of troops of all the nations involved.

§ 15. As soon as the envoys learned that the relieving force had started, it seemed to them "very strange that no attempt had been made [at Peking] to stop its progress by negotiation; an occupation of the city and the enforced flight of the court seemed worth almost any effort to avert." [68] In fact the attempt was made, outside Peking, though it was made late and without the cognisance of the envoys. During the advance the envoys were in touch with the Chinese in three ways—they were fired on continually, with a varying degree of intensity, by the Chinese troops; the correspondence with "Prince Ching and others" was continued; and they received communications from the Tsungli Yamen, sent in proper form.[69] In both series of correspondence the withdrawal to Tientsin was urged as late as August 4th, the day on which constant firing was resumed; and the question of provisioning the legations for the support of the Chinese therein was discussed up to August 12th. On that day, the day on which the relieving force entered Tungchow, "Prince Ching and others" wrote proposing a "preliminary cessation of hostilities," and asking for a conference at the British legation; but, before the hour designated, 11 a.m. of the 13th, in another letter the charge was brought that the envoys showed implacable hostility from the fact that, on the preceding night, twenty-seven Chinese soldiers had been killed or wounded by the fire of the legation guards, and "the princes and ministers all have important official engagements and cannot proceed to the legation." In a later letter of the same day six telegrams were sent in, addressed to four legations; and in a third the question of provisioning was postponed for two or three days "until the posts on

[66] M. Delcassé to M. de Bezaure, Aug. 16th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 128.

[67] M. de Bezaure to M. Delcassé, Aug. 17th, *ibid.*, p. 130; North-China Herald, Aug. 22nd, 1900.

[68] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 20th, China, No. 4, 1900, p. 36.

[69] For the whole correspondence in both forms, cf. China, No. 4, 1900, pp. 37 seq.; U.S. For. Rel., 1900, pp. 177 seq.

each side are at peace." On August 10th, two days before the occupation of Tungchow, the war party in the Chinese administration had gained the upper hand, and had secured the execution of Lishan, Lienyuen and Hsü Yung-yi, three friends of the foreigners [70]; whether the overture of August 12th represented a revival of the hopes of the peace party, or was a politic move to show the conciliatory attitude of the administration, cannot be known; but it was soon brought to nothing, and the night of August 13th-14th was marked by the most furious and persistent assaults that the legations had experienced.

§ 16. When the relieving force started from Tientsin, the Russian and Japanese commanders explained their change of opinion by a statement that they had heard from their secret service that the Chinese troops between them and Peking had instructions to make a show of resistance, but no effective opposition, to the advance of the allies, and that it was intended to propose peace after a simulated defence at Tungchow.[71] Something, evidently, was to happen at or after Tungchow. On occupying that city on August 12th the Japanese pushed out an advanced force six-and-a-half miles (half-way) towards Peking. At a conference of commanders it was decided that the next day, 13th, should be devoted to reconnaissance; the Japanese and Russians were to reconnoitre on the right or northern side of the canal, the Russians along the canal and paved road, the Japanese further to the right; the Americans and British on the left or southern side of the canal, the Americans along the canal, the British further to the left. On the 14th all the troops were to be concentrated on the advanced line held by the Japanese, and a later conference was to decide what method of attack on Peking should be adopted. On the 13th the American and British reconnoitring was duly done, and the Japanese reconnoitred their front and also the front which properly belonged to the Russians; all three pushed on to within five or six miles of Peking.

[70] The Old Buddha was angry when she heard of the decapitation, without her express consent, of two Manchu nobles, Lishan being, moreover, an old friend of Junglu; the Chinese, Hsü Yung-yi, was eighty years old, and as he went to his death exclaimed "the power of the usurper [Prince Twan] is short-lived."—Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 10th, p. 296.

[71] Gen. Frey to M. de Lanessan, Aug. 9th, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 117.

§ 17. The Russian commander on August 12th proposed that the forces should rest on the 13th: he could not move; his men must have rest. The others could not agree, and the proposal to devote the day to reconnoitring was a compromise. The Russian troops remained in camp at Tungehow and marched out towards evening of the 13th. About 9 p.m. heavy firing was heard from the north-west, continuing through the night, and the next day this was ascertained to have been the sound of a Russian attack on the Tungpien Gate. At daybreak of the 14th General Chaffee was informed by a Japanese staff officer that the Russians "were not on the opposite side of the canal," on which they were supposed to be; and, between 5 and 6 a.m., a French officer leading 200 tirailleurs informed an American officer that he was marching to join the Russians in front of the Americans, where the Russians were supposed not to be. Learning at 10 a.m. that Russian troops were engaged on his right, and hearing the Japanese in action further to the right, General Chaffee ordered his troops to advance beyond the reconnoitring line, and about noon he found the Russians in occupation of the Tungpien Gate, but their "artillery and troops were in great confusion in the passage, the artillery facing in both directions." Some of his own American troops were also there, and, boldly climbing the wall of the Tartar city, and covered by troops and artillery below, they swept the top of the wall and, by 3 p.m., were abreast of the American legation. Their flag was the first actually on the wall.[72] The Japanese meantime were attacking

[72] The course of events is graphically described in Gen. Chaffee to Adjutant General, Sept. 1st, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 66: Darnell, "China Relief Expedition," p. 75. See also Putnam Weale, "The Relief Expedition," p. 209.

An explanation of the Russian action is given in Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," ii, p. 173, but it is not very convincing.

A Chinese account of the campaign for the relief of the legations will be of interest.

"We have repeatedly notified in our columns that our forces have been engaged twenty or thirty times with the foreign troops about Peking and Tientsin and have gained repeated victories. This news is reliable. A foreign telegram states that the allied troops at Yangtsun lost several thousands by drowning, owing to the strategy of Li Ping-heng, who dammed back the water and then let it go. We have received a further telegram from our Shanghai correspondent—'On August 7th the foreign troops lost over 20,000 men by drowning, and 8000 to 9000 by death in battle with our troops. The foreign troops are dispirited and the foreign

the Chihwa Gate, the point indicated by their line of advance; but, meeting with fierce opposition, they were the last to enter Peking.

§ 18. The British troops carried out their reconnaissance on the left, but, strictly adhering to the plan adopted, the main body remained at Tungchow; it thus happened that the American left was not covered until noon of August 14th. Learning at midnight closing the 13th that the Russians were engaged at the Tungpien Gate, General Gaselee marched out at 2 a.m. of the 14th. The line indicated to him by the plan led him to the Shakwo Gate, in the middle of the eastern side of the Chinese city. He arrived there with trifling opposition, and entered the gate unopposed. The British envoy, Sir C. MacDonald, himself an old soldier, had had the forethought to send out a cipher letter indicating to General Gaselee the water gate, south of the British legation, as the easiest way of entering the Tartar city. No time, therefore, was lost, beyond the delay dictated by military precaution, and the British had the honour of being the first to enter the Tartar city, and the first to enter the beleaguered legations, which they did at 3 p.m. The Americans, also entering by the water gate, soon followed.

§ 19. The scene of the relief of the Peking legations, unexampled since the relief of the residency at Lucknow, has been elsewhere described [73]; but no one of the

powers are willing to seek peace. They proposed that 2000 American troops, unarmed, should advance and camp nine miles from Peking; the Chinese should then escort the foreign envoys from the capital to the American camp, and they could then be taken to Tientsin. Hereafter if they want war, China will fight; if they want peace, they can have it, but it must be in accordance with No. 25 of China's regulations.' . . . Yesterday a foreign telegram stated that the foreign troops had entered Peking. We can only suppose that, as the danger of suffering has been great, China had agreed that a limited . . . of foreign troops should enter Peking to protect their envoys. We also hear that, although our troops have gained great victories, it has been impossible to avoid alarming the court. To guard against contingencies the emperor and empress dowager consented to leave the capital to go to the imperial hunting lodge at Wutaishan in northern Shansi and stay there until peace has been restored. We shall be pleased to publish further good news as it is received."—Canton Chungsaipao, Aug. 22nd, cited in North-China Herald, Sept. 19th, 1900.

[73] M. Pichon, Report, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 227; Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 461; Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 204; Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," ii, p. 186; H. C. Thomson, "China and the Powers," p. 99.

narratives is more graphic than that given in some unpublished MS. notes in the author's possession.[74]

"On the night before the troops arrived I was stationed in the Suwang Fu. . . . Suddenly one of the most furious rifle attacks that we ever sustained commenced. From all along the Chinese lines the firing was incessant. Lead was simply poured into us. . . . We thought that at last the Chinese were preparing to assault, so, to daunt them if possible, we four chaps began to cheer. For the moment, the fire slackened. The Japanese on our left then began cheering and blowing their bugle for 'the charge,' and the Italians on the extreme left began cheering and rattling stones in kerosene oil tins. The Chinese attack was renewed with even increased vigour. . . . Gradually the fire slackened off. . . . It rained all the time and it thundered too; we were wet through and the water in the trench was over our ankles. . . . Suddenly Mr. Sugi called out—'Listen! Do you hear that? Do you hear the machine-gun working outside the Hatamen? The relief force is outside the city!' We stood there listening, we laughed, we joked. . . . About nine o'clock our relief picket came over, and we went back to the legation for breakfast and rest. There we heard that the Mongol Market position had been equally vigorously attacked. . . . News now began to come in. The foreign troops were certainly outside. News too came from the Fu that the Chinese had quietly been slipping away. . . . Tiffin passed off with cheerfulness; we were all in a state of suppressed excitement and expectation. Afterwards we returned to picket in the Mongol Market. . . . Soon after Konovaloff rushed in with a shout—'The relief force is in! The Sikhs are in the legation! Listen to the shouting!' Such of us as could leave their post ran at once into the legation. What a scene there was! Men, women and children, every one out on the lawn, cheering, yelling, crying, mad with excitement and delight; and there coming in, line after line, waving their turbans and cheering, real, live, big, burly Indian troops, dripping with perspiration, covered with dust, and thoroughly tired. I rushed up to the first one I saw; I clapped him on the back; I shook his hand; I yelled, I cheered. My pent-up feelings had to be relieved in some way. I, who had thought I should never come out of this awful siege alive, could now realise and see that I was at last saved!"

§ 20. The strain was over, and the sense of relief found expression in the exuberance of joy. There was not one moment in the eight weeks of siege when any but the most optimistic thought that they could possibly win through the constant attacks by unnumbered thousands of armed Chinese, who "simply poured lead" in among them. The escape of the besieged was held to be a

[74] Personal narrative of Mr. J. H. Macoun, of the customs service, a volunteer through the siege.

miracle,[75] and their sufferings were great. A thousand foreigners, accustomed to great comfort, were shut in under the hot summer sun, and during the greater part of the time subsisted on rice and a scanty ration of horse-flesh; and three thousand Chinese converts had only rice, and, towards the end of the siege, a reduced ration of that. But all the discomfort and deprivation were as nothing compared with the actual peril experienced, and the far greater peril in apprehension of which they passed their days and nights.[76] The Chinese had unlimited supplies of ammunition; it was estimated that from one-and-a-half to two million bullets were fired at the legations; and by careful count that the shell finding their mark in the enceinte numbered about 2,900. The foreign guards, on the other hand, were scantily supplied; some detachments had less than one hundred rounds per rifle and none had over three hundred, apart from the supply for the four machine-guns; but some small quantities were bought towards the end of the siege from the Chinese soldiers engaged in the attack.[77] The volunteers were armed some with reserve rifles of the American legation, others with any rifle or sporting gun available, and their ammunition was what was left from the shooting season then ended. With such a difference in equipment, it is marvellous that all were not killed; as it was the casualties among the fighting men were sufficiently heavy.

§ 21. In considering the following table of casualties, it is to be noted that the British marines constituted the reserve, holding their own legation in which were sheltered

[75] "Should any one ask what is the evidence of the Providence which watches over the affairs of men, the compendious answer might well be—'The Siege in Peking.'" Then follows a list of ten distinct miracles—"In all these things we see the Hand of God in the Siege of Peking."—Smith, "Convulsion," ii, pp. 508-516.

[76] "I have lost everything and possess only two summer suits—it is at times maddening to think of all the precious (to me) treasures I had to abandon and which the flames have since completely destroyed! Man eventually departs naked, of course, but *this* nudity is a bit too previous, confound it! And yet what I and the others have to be grateful for—health preserved, life continued and all the horrors of a general massacre escaped: thank God!"—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Aug. 18th, 1900.

[77] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 514. The Americans and French had 300 rounds per head, the Italians 90, the Russians 65, and the Germans 40; but means were found to reload some during the siege.—Report of Lieut. General commanding the U.S. Army, 1901, iv, pp. 456, 459.

the entire non-combatant foreign community, and, for trench duty, had ordinarily only the north and west fronts of that legation to hold; the Russians held their own legation, exposed to attack on two sides, and supported the Americans; the Americans held their legation and the portion abreast of it of the wall of the Tartar city; the Germans held their own legation, which was strongly attacked; the Austrians supported 45 of the French in holding the French legation, a most dangerous salient and exposed to constant attacks and mining; and the Japanese, supported by 30 Italians and by the greater part of the volunteers, held the exposed and extended Suwang Fu. The Pehtang was held by 43 French and Italian marines and some armed converts.

### CASUALTIES DURING SIEGE OF THE LEGATIONS

|                | Combatants.   |             | Casualties. |          |        |
|----------------|---------------|-------------|-------------|----------|--------|
|                | Marine Guard. | Volunteers. | Killed.     | Wounded. | Total. |
| American . . . | 56            | 44          | 7           | 11       | 18     |
| Austrian . . . | 35            |             | 4           | 11       | 15     |
| British . . .  | 82            |             | 6           | 26       | 32     |
| French . . .   | 79            |             | 18          | 50       | 68     |
| German . . .   | 51            |             | 13          | 16       | 29     |
| Italian . . .  | 41            | 31          | 13          | 16       | 29     |
| Russian . . .  | 81            |             | 5           | 20       | 25     |
| Japanese . . . | 25            |             | 10          | 29       | 39     |
| Total . . .    | 458           | 75          | 76          | 179      | 255    |

Among the non-combatant foreigners the casualties during the siege were very few, except that six infants succumbed to the privations; but the nervous strain had been great and the seeds of disease were planted in many [78]; and not a few, months after the siege was raised, died in their own home land, as truly killed by the siege as if they had died during its course.

§ 22. The British troops occupied the defences through the night of August 14th-15th, but, after consultation with the American envoy, General Chaffee withdrew the

[78] "Pichon [French envoy] is down with typhoid, another 'after the siege' case."--R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Oct. 19th, 1900.



American troops outside the Tartar city, still holding, however, the Tsienmen Gate. Again after consultation with the envoy, he set to work to clear the Chinese troops from the Imperial city, from which they still threatened the legations. He swept the wall clear, and, being then fired on from the inner gates of the city, he forced in succession the first, second and third gates leading into the Forbidden City—the imperial palace. At the fourth gate his advance was stayed. In his official report he gives no specific reason, only saying that “at a conference that afternoon it was decided not to occupy the imperial city”; and he withdrew his troops. The conference was held after the withdrawal; and the only authority who gives a reason for staying the advance, ascribed it to the fact that “the Russian general had sent one of his aides to General Chaffee with a message,” which caused the latter to “receive the messenger in a manner and with words not usually employed by gentlemen in dealing with gentlemen.”[79] If the message was such as to provoke an outbreak of language and to cause the American commander to stay his troops when on the point of forcing the last gate leading to the very heart of the Chinese Holy of Holies, it was presumably one in harmony with another quotation—“‘*Toujours cette confusion, toujours pas d’ordres*,’ the French officers angrily commented, and in a few words they told me rapidly how from the very start at Tientsin it had been like this, each column racing against the others, whilst they openly pretended to co-operate.”[80] The American troops withdrew, obedient to orders, but sulky and sullen—“compelled to march away (barring the swearing) like so many lambs.”[81] The decision taken by the commanders on the 15th not to occupy the Forbidden City “was not concurred in by the envoys in a conference held by them the next day; in their opinion the imperial city should be occupied.” The American troops returned, therefore, and continued to guard the entrance up to the limit of their previous advance.[82] Meantime,

[79] Savage-Landor, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 209.

[80] Putnam Weale, “Indiscreet Letters,” p. 222, relating to this precise hour.

[81] Savage-Landor, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 211.

[82] Gen. Chaffee to Adjutant General, Sept. 1st, Report Sec. War, 1900, p. 69; Daggett, “China Relief Expedition,” pp. 95 seq.

on the 15th, in the eastern and north-eastern quarters of the Tartar city the Russians and Japanese were making their way against strong opposition, their course marked "by a heavy cloud of smoke which now rose blacker and blacker, until it spread like a pall on the bright sky . . . they were burning and sacking, and a huge conflagration had been started." [83]

§ 23. In the Pehtang was a crowd of Chinese converts, some 3000 in number; for defence it had 43 marines, and about 500 of the timid Chinese, turned into lions for the nonce, were armed with improvised spears; a few having rifles which were taken from dead assailants. The assaults were even more furious than on the legations, over 2400 shell being noted as fired within the enclosure, and mining was an even greater danger; and the privations were greater. Towards the end of the siege, from August 1st the daily ration, except for the marines, was only five ounces of food, and from the 8th only three ounces. Of its 43 marine defenders 11 were killed and 12 wounded; and during the two months over 400 of their dead Chinese were buried in the garden of the cathedral. Well might the heroic chief of the mission, Mgr. Favier, ejaculate—"C'est un miracle du ciel!"—and, sorrowing over the work of centuries undone, lament that "it is almost a pity that we were not all massacred; we should have died martyrs." At last relief came, but not until two days after the relief of the legations. On the morning of August 16th two forces converged on the cathedral; the Japanese coming from the north; and from the west a mixed force under General Frey, consisting of 400 each of French, British and Russian troops. The two forces arrived on the scene nearly simultaneously, but the Japanese had the honour of being the first to overcome opposition and force their way in, soon followed from the west by a body of French troops; and the Pehtang siege was raised. [84]

§ 24. The court fled. This was not a long prepared measure designed to continue the war, but a hasty action inspired by actual fear. Some days before, consequent on

[83] Putnam Weale, *op. cit.*, p. 218.

[84] Savage-Landor, *op. cit.*, pp. 227 seq.; M. Pichon, Report, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 223.

the defeats at Pehtsang and Yangtsun, there had been a plan to withdraw the court to Jehol, as had been done in 1860 ; but Junglu advised the empress dowager to remain in Peking, even if the allies should succeed in entering the city.[85] On August 12th all was in confusion, Junglu being received in audience eight times, and Prince Twan five times ; “ the Old Buddha said she would commit suicide and make the emperor do the same, rather than leave the capital ; Junglu besought her to take his advice, which was to remain in Peking and order the decapitation of Prince Twan and his followers, thus proving her innocence to the world.”[86] The empress dowager’s cards were good ; she had only to keep her place at the table and play her hand, and she would still have been in the game. The few, the very few, statesmen among the Manchus, with the resolute Junglu and the irresolute Prince Ching at their head, would have rallied to the side of their sovereigns ; the viceroys had already let it be known that their adhesion to the plans of the foreign powers was dependent on an assurance of the safety of their sovereigns, and the provinces would have supported the viceroys ; and the foreign powers, in their relief at finding their accredited envoys still alive, would certainly have considered expediency first, would have admitted the validity of the maxim — “ the king can do no wrong ” — and would have held the Manchu nobles and ministers alone accountable. But, outside the domain of diplomacy, no oriental could be expected to put up a game of bluff, none could doubt that the foreigner’s first act would be to take the life of every Manchu, high or low, on whom he could lay his hands. The empress dowager’s conscience was not clear, and she was entirely under the dominance of the leaders of the anti-foreign Boxer movement ; and the court fled.

§ 25. At 4 p.m. on August 14th Duke Lan and Kangyi rushed into the presence of the Old Buddha and informed her that the foreign troops were in ; Kangyi said — “ Your Majesty must escape at once, or they will murder you.” Towards midnight a Grand Council [87] was held, attended

[85] Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 9th, p. 296.

[86] *Ibid.*, Aug. 12th, p. 297.

[87] Cf. chap. viii. § 28.

only by Kangyi, Chao Shu-kiao and Wang Wen-shao; other ministers were otherwise engaged. The last named was excused on the ground of his advanced age; and, accompanied only by the first two and by the beilehs Pulun and Puchün, at 4 a.m. the emperor and the empress dowager secretly left the palace in a common cart, disguised in the clothes of Chinese peasants, and the empress with her hair dressed, for the first time in her life, in Chinese style. Before leaving the palace the empress dowager, mistress of the situation to the last, ordered the emperor's favorite concubine to be thrown down a well and drowned. The imperial refugees, bedraggled and dust-grimed, arrived at the Summer Palace at Yuenming-yuen at 8 a.m., and were there joined by four princes (Twan, Ching, Na and Su), several dukes, and some court officials. Thence they were escorted by a body of troops to Kalgan; and from there they proceeded to Sianfu in Shensi, where the court and administration of the empire were established.[88]

§ 26. Peking was humbled in the dust and suffered as Asiatic cities have always suffered when taken by assault by Asiatic armies—but now the invading forces were the armies of the Western powers. Strong men fled; those not so strong fled if they could find the means of transport, but that was scanty; many of the Manchu nobility and countless thousands of women put an end to their lives [89]; many thousands of men were killed in a wild orgy of slaughter [90]; and the survivors who

[88] For the flight, cf. Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 14-15, pp. 297 seq. Sianfu had once, fourteen centuries before, been the capital of the empire, and there, as at Mukden, were maintained simulacra of ministries, now recalled to life. Cf. the author's "Trade and Administration of China," pp. 211, 226.

[89] "I have just heard of the death of my old friend, Hsü Tung, the Imperial Tutor and Grand Secretary; he has hanged himself in his house and eighteen of his womenfolk have followed his example. Alas! Alas! From all sides I heard the same piteous story; the proudest of the Manchus have come to the same miserable end. The betrothed of Prince Chun, whom he was to have married next month, has committed suicide with all her family. . . . My wife and the other women, stupidly obstinate like all females, intend to take opium. I cannot prevent them from doing so, but I have no intention of doing anything so foolish."—Chingshan, Diary, Aug. 15th, p. 302.

[90] For the undisciplined slaughter and the sack of the city which followed, no better authority can be found than Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," pp. 227-301,

remained cowered like whipped hounds in their kennels. The city had been plundered, first by the Boxers, then by the Chinese soldiers, but they had only skimmed the surface. The foreign troops now set to work to sack it riotously, but systematically. At first they spread over the city without regard to districts, wherever their fancy led them; then each contingent plundered in the district assigned to it for policing [91]; and, in the final stage, the

[91] "Confusion has reigned since 14th when 'relief' arrived and Chinese think the end of the world has come; but improvement begins and 'touch'—lost through flight of officials—is now being regained through me. . . . The desolation all around is appalling,—what a punishment the court has brought on the capital! Granzella tells me there is lots of cargo waiting for export [at Tientsin], but that you can't get coolies to handle it: I hope the demand for hands will create supply and that you will do your 'possible' to start business again. Here [in Peking] men are seized and made to do all sorts of work and not paid: and so none are encouraged to approach—but in fact all is still disorder and confusion and one strong man with a clear head, definite plans, and tactful audacity is required to bring order out of chaos. The Japs show up better than others for deftness, discipline, organization and endurance."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Aug. 18th, 1900.

"Everything is topsy-turvey, and discomfort and disorder in the city."—Same to same, Aug. 30th, 1900.

"Such confusion and disorder I have never lived in."—Same to same, Aug. 31st, 1900.

"We are gradually getting into shape here, but it is very slow work, and I am rather disappointed in the methods of modern armies."—Same to same, Sept. 6th, 1900.

In their conduct and freedom from outrageous excesses, the Japanese troops were most highly spoken of.—H. C. F. . . ., "China and the Powers," p. 114.

A member of the Japanese House of Representatives praised the conduct of the American troops from every point of view; the Indian troops were addicted to petty larceny, but the English officers were beyond criticism; and he speaks of the "ferocity and callous cruelty displayed by the Russians."—Japan Daily Mail, Nov. 10th, 1900, cited in *ibid.*, p. 126.

The French looted methodically and thoroughly.—Putnam Weale, "Indiscreet Letters," p. 222.

"In the Russian district the most unspeakable excesses are said to have been committed. The same is said of the district entrusted to the French troops. . . . It is admitted that order was first established in the district entrusted to the Japanese, and soon afterwards in the British district . . . and in the American quarter."—McCarthy, "The Coming Power," p. 95.

"General Gaselee stated [at a conference of commanders on Sept. 11th] that there were many Chinese in all sections of the city except the Russian, where there were only dogs."—Report to Adj. Gen., War Dept. Report, 1901, iv, p. 482.

"Oct. 20th. The American section is now and has for a month past been crowded with Chinese. The German section, just across the street, is almost deserted, all the shops and marketing being on our side. The Chinese say they are robbed by the Germans."—*Ibid.*, p. 487.

As a part of their plunder the Germans levied on the beautiful bronze

commanders attempted to introduce some semblance of order in the prevailing disorder, by establishing prize funds and enacting that all plunder should be brought to the prize agent. This was probably done by the Japanese, but the prize funds of the contingents of the Western powers reached no large sum; for the troops were out of hand and looked on Peking and all it contained, persons and property, as prize of war, subject to their will; and, as at Tientsin, so to a greater extent at Peking, as China had broken the law of nations and defied the world, the world in its turn recognised none of its own laws in its treatment of the law-breaker.

§ 27. At their conference on August 16th the allied commanders divided the cities of Peking into districts for occupation and policing, each of the powers, Japan, Russia, England, America and France, represented by troops in the relieving force, having assigned to it a defined quarter of the three cities—Imperial, Tartar and Chinese—while the Americans continued for a time to supply the guards for the entrance to the Forbidden City. A force of German troops, 1200 strong, arrived on August 23rd, and 1000 more were expected in a few days; and a district was carved for them from that assigned to the Russians. The Japanese “went straight for the Treasury [Ministry of Revenue] and carried off from two to three million taels of sycee, transporting it to the Japanese legation” [92]; they also seized on government account the imperial silk stores and rice granaries.[93] In some districts comparative order was restored in a week or two, in others the disorder continued for several weeks, but in all the foreign forces held the conquered city under martial law.

§ 28. On the question of occupying the Forbidden City.

astronomical instruments in the Observatory, carrying them off to Berlin. At one time, when it was their policy to placate China, they offered to restore them to their owners. The Chinese envoy replied that China would be glad to have them restored, *in Peking*; the German government would not go so far, and, in July, 1914, they were still in Berlin.

[92] Japanese in *Japan Daily Mail*, Nov. 10th, 1900, *ubi sup.*

Gen. Yamaguchi reported that “up to the first week in October the Japanese troops captured 250,000 piculs [15,000 tons] of rice, 2,637,700 taels of silver, 1400 swords, 67 guns, 2988 rifles and large quantities of ammunition.”—*Nagasaki Press*, Oct. 22nd, cited in *North-China Herald*, Oct. 31st, 1900.

[93] Savage-Landor, “China and the Allies,” ii, p. 242; Oliphant, *op. cit.*, p. 171; *North-China Herald*, Oct. 3rd, 1900.

a compromise was accepted. It was agreed that it should not be occupied, but detachments of the foreign troops, accompanied by their envoys and legation staffs, entered its portals and marched through its courts on August 28th; the envoys and higher officers also inspected the imperial throne rooms and chambers. The troops entered in the following order: 800 Russians, 800 Japanese, 400 British, 400 Americans, 400 French, 250 Germans, 60 Austrians, 60 Italians. The Russians took entire charge of the formal entry, and their commander, General Linievitch, visited the several contingents, except the British, and received their salute [94]; during the entry the contingents cheered each other as they marched past, and "Colonel Shiba's little band of defenders of the Suwang Fu, who marched separately from the other Japanese, got their full and well-deserved share of the cheering." [95] The envoys, secretaries, and higher officers were much interested in the rooms which they visited, and scrupulously respected their contents, except possibly for a few trifling souvenirs. On September 8th the Russian admiral Alexeieff, with a small party, made another visit to the palace, and it was noted that "all small articles had been removed since previous visit; the Chinese attendants were in uniform and more numerous." [96] On his arrival in Peking in October, Count von Waldersee established his headquarters in the palace of the Chinese emperor. [97]

§ 29. To this depth the empire had fallen. In 1842 China had submitted to a treaty which was accepted as the cheapest way to end the war. In 1858 and 1860 she had been reduced to a state of submission and forced to grant concessions which infringed on her sovereign status, but she was spared many marks of humiliation. In 1895 she had been defeated by a power held to be of inferior standing, and subjected to great indignity. Now in 1900 the court and the administration at Peking had flung down their


[94] Report of Lieut. Gen. commanding U.S. Army, 1901, iv, p. 479. The report adds—"The French and German contingents were entirely out of proportion with the degree of their participation in the campaign, the French being very feebly, and the German not at all, represented in the attack on Peking; General Frey claimed he had 8000 troops in China."

[95] Oliphant, *op. cit.*, p. 181.

[96] Report Lt. Gen. comm. U.S. Army, 1901, iv, p. 482.

[97] Cf. chap. xi, § 26.

gage in the face of the whole world ; by insulting and threatening the lives of accredited envoys, by wholesale massacres of unoffending missionaries and their families, and by outrageous assaults upon the foreigners in Peking and Tientsin, they had broken the law of nations. For these offences retribution was inflicted on the guilty officials, and on the troops and Boxers who had been the active agents in massacre and destruction ; but the people, guilty perhaps in feeling but not active in slaughter, suffered terribly from the Boxers and Chinese soldiers, and then at the hands of the foreign troops enraged as they were by the peril of some and massacre of others of their fellow-countrymen. The empire was humiliated as it never had been from any of its previous wars, for it had lost, not only prestige, but reputation as well ; the court was punished by exile and a feeling of impotence ; and the administration, both the guilty Manchus in the north and the more far-seeing Chinese of the south, was now called upon to enter on a diplomatic battle, as a result of which the nation was subjected to still deeper abasement.





## CHAPTER XI

### DIVERGENT AIMS OF THE POWERS

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§ 1 PEKING was, on its occupation, divided into districts, each being administered and policed by the military forces of one of the allied foreign powers. These powers differed in their interpretation of the relations between the civil authority, represented by the envoy, and the military authority, represented by the general commanding; but the restoration of order did not seem to depend on these relations. Of the military powers, Japan most quickly and most completely brought her district under control, while the Russian district was the one in which outrage and excesses were most pronounced and most prolonged, and in the German the Chinese were systematically oppressed; of the democratic powers, the district assigned to the French was not well controlled, while the British and American districts were second only to the Japanese in the order maintained.[1] The work of clearing the city of hostile elements proceeded slowly,[2] the armed Boxer, and even the imperial soldier, easily and readily assuming the garb and mien of an inoffensive burgher; and the "enemy" pervaded the country around, even up to the city walls, sometimes singly, unarmed and without uniform,[3] sometimes in bands fully armed. The Chinese officials generally had fled the city, and those who had remained or returned were cowed to submission.[4] On

[1] Cf. chap. x, § 26, n. 91.

[2] "As to the enemy, there are some still in the city—scattered of course, but hostile still—and there are others all around."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 6th, 1900.

[3] "The country all along [from Peking to Tungchow] was desolate and practically deserted, except that now and then, as one came suddenly upon them, dozens of natives, mostly wearing soldiers' trousers but no coats, dashed across the road and disappeared in the high corn on the other side. The result of this imprudence was that a great number of them had been shot by new foreign troops just arriving up the country and not yet accustomed to the ways of the Celestials."—Savage-Landor, "China and the Allies," ii, p. 406.

[4] Towards the middle of September the foreign generals "received

September 10th the allied forces within the walls of Peking were reported to be 8000 Japanese, 5000 Russians, 3000 British, 2000 Americans, 2000 Germans, 1500 French, and a few Italians and Austrians.[5]

§ 2. As soon as the city of Tientsin had been taken and the Chinese forces cleared from its immediate vicinity, the allied commanders decided to form a provisional administration, to which should be entrusted the civil government and the policing of the city and its suburbs as far as the "mud wall,"[6] but not including the foreign concessions (British, French, German and Japanese) and not including arsenals, camps, railways, telegraphs and other military institutions already occupied by the allied troops. Within those limits the council of administration, known as the Tientsin Provisional Government, and most commonly referred to as the T.P.G., had full power of taxing and policing over all Chinese, and was authorised to "seize or take under its control all articles of value as well as documents which may be found in government buildings or in private houses abandoned by their owners." [7] The original limits, with the extensive exceptions, were territorially narrow, but they comprised the business and residence of all the Chinese population. For both police and taxing purposes the T.P.G. made repeated efforts to have the limits extended, but the superior military authorities constantly objected [8]; but later, after several powers had appropriated extensive national concessions,[9] the jurisdiction of the T.P.G. was extended to include the hien of Tientsin as far as the mouth of the river.

the visit of a high Chinese official, whose rank corresponds to that of minister of War, who came accompanied by several other ministers of the Yamen, to convey the thanks of the Chinese nation to the generals of the allies for their kindness in entering Peking so promptly and restoring peace and quiet!"—*Ibid.*, loc. cit.

[5] *North-China Herald*, Sept. 19th, 1900.

In U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, p. 483, the figures for the Russians, Japanese, Italians and French are higher; but "this statement is believed to be unreliable, each representative being interested in magnifying his importance and weight by exaggerating the number of his troops."

[6] Known to a generation of Tientsinners as "Sankolinsin's Folly." Cf. "Conflict," chap. xxv, § 5, n. 14.

[7] *Règlement d'Administration pour la Ville de Tientsin*.

[8] *Procès-verbaux des Séances du Conseil du Gouvernement Provisionnaire de la Cité de Tientsin* (hereafter referred to as T.P.G.), Sept. 24th, 29th, Oct. 4th, 15th, Nov. 15th, 1900.

[9] Cf. *postea*, § 42.

§ 3. The allied commanders assigned to the councillors a salary of £1500 per annum each.[10] Three were appointed: Colonel Wogack (Russian), Lieutenant Colonel Bower, afterwards replaced by Lieutenant Colonel O'Sullivan (British), and Lieutenant Colonel Aoki, afterwards replaced by Lieutenant Colonel Harada (Japanese) [11]; but, on the promotion of Colonel Wogack to major-general, his place was filled, during his "temporary absence" (from September 3rd, 1900, to January 31st, 1901) by Colonel Woronow. National jealousies at once arose. The first proclamation of the council recited the nationality and rank of each of the three councillors, and the commandant of the French forces complained of the omission of France; he was informed that there was no intention of claiming any national control, and the matter dropped for a time. On October 11th Count von Waldersee notified the council that he had "the intention of appointing a German member with the same rights and the same duties as the others." [12] This could not be resisted, and, as other nationalities claimed equal rights, three additional members joined the council: Lieutenant Colonel Arlabosse (French), Lieutenant Colonel Foote (American), and Major von Falkenhayn (German). Later Italy was represented by Commandant Casanuova; but a demand by Austria-Hungary to nominate a member was rejected.[13] The American representative was withdrawn on May 10th, 1901, and the Secretary General was charged with the duty of notifying to the American legation matters which might concern that government.[14]

§ 4. The first meeting of the council was held on July 30th. The government was organised by the appointment of heads of executive departments at a salary of £800 each, and of other subordinate agents. The heads of department, generally having a good knowledge of the language and customs of the Chinese, exercised much power and a great influence over an administration, the nominal heads of which had no such knowledge. As Secretary General was appointed Mr. Charles Denby, Jr., son of a

[10] T.P.G. Sept. 4th, 17th, 1900.

[11] T.P.G. July 30th, 1900.

[12] T.P.G. Oct. 11th, 13th, 1900.

[13] T.P.G. *passim*.

[14] T.P.G. April 21st, 1901.

former American envoy to China (1887-99), a man of some capacity and diplomatic experience; his duty was to act as executive officer of the ship—the working head of the T.P.G. The Chinese Secretary was Mr. C. D. Tenney (American), former missionary, then head of the Chinese University of Tientsin, and later (1909) Chinese Secretary to the American legation; he was the ordinary medium of communication and of administration in matters affecting the Chinese. The Chief of Police was Captain Mockler (British), whose functions included gendarmerie as well as ordinary police duty. The treasurer was Mr. C. Rump (German), whose financial skill and knowledge of Chinese fiscal conditions were of great value, not only to the T.P.G., but also to the foreign diplomatic body in settling the terms of the indemnity. The head of the Department of Justice was Mr. W. S. Emens (American), who brought to his task a thorough knowledge of the Chinese language and of Chinese law. The head of the Service de Santé was Dr. Depasse (French), who devoted his life to imposing the rules of sanitation and health on a race which habitually neglected both; he died in the discharge of his duty,[15] and was replaced in January, 1901, by Dr. Houillon.

§ 5. The council met generally three times a week, but one of its members exercised a permanent supervision over the routine details of each department; control of the Secretary General's department was claimed by the Russian representative,[16] and the others were assigned, Chinese Secretariat to the Japanese, Public Works and Health to the French, Police to the German, Treasury to the British, Justice to the American.[17] The council's authority over Chinese questions was unlimited; it taxed and policed all Chinese and tried them; and, for murder or active participation in the Boxer outbreak, it decapitated them; prisoners taken by the troops and tried by them were also handed to the council for decapitation. Over foreigners the council exercised no authority. Ques-

[15] "Depuis la formation du conseil le Dr. Depasse a exercé ses fonctions dans son service de la manière la plus capable et la plus dévouée; il s'est fait aimer de tous ceux avec qui il est entré en contact, et le conseil desire exprimer sa plus profonde sympathie aux parents qu'il laisse, ainsi qu'aux résidents français de Tientsin."—T.P.G. Jan. 10th, 1901.

[16] T.P.G. Jan. 23rd, 1901.

[17] T.P.G. Jan. 26th, 1901.

tions affecting civilians were passed on to the consul concerned; those affecting the troops were either rejected or were put in the hands of the councillor of the nationality concerned to be by him referred to his superior, the general commanding. The council was the creation of the generals commanding and subject to their control. An attempt to claim an independent status was promptly suppressed. In a scheme of government sent for discussion at Peking, in the sentence "*le conseil étant l'émanation de toutes les puissances,*" for "*puissances*" was substituted "*généraux en chef*"; and the words "*jouira sur le territoire qui lui est confié d'une indépendance absolue*" were struck out.[18]

§ 6. To provide funds for immediate use the allied commanders requisitioned each of the principal allied powers for an advance of 50,000 Mexican dollars,[19] and, one after the other, they provided £5,000, U.S. \$25,000, francs 125,000, marks 100,000, or yen 50,000. These advances were repaid in no long time, as the revenue came in. For a police force each general was requested to send soldiers to serve for the purpose—Russia and Japan 200 each, America, England and France 100 each [20]; as others came in, they too were requisitioned, Germany 100,[21] Italy 100 men.[22] These quotas were not kept up; numbers of the men were withdrawn without notice, and were replaced with much reluctance; and towards the end the ranks had to be reinforced by untrustworthy Chinese police agents. But, even with the means at its disposal, the T.P.G. did very effective work, and maintained a state of order which would have been greater but for its want of control over any units of the foreign troops. The taxes collected in normal times by the Chinese were by degrees collected by the T.P.G., supplemented by licence fees on boats vehicles, opium divans and places of entertainment, which had not before been collected. Even the *likin*, and transit dues on foreign goods, were brought within the grasp of the T.P.G. These had, on the restoration of order, been undertaken by the customs; but a claim to have their collection surrendered to the T.P.G. was at once

[18] T.P.G. Dec. 24th, 1900.

[19] T.P.G. Aug. 27th, 1900.

[20] T.P.G. July 30th, 1900.

[21] T.P.G. Aug. 10th, 1900.

[22] T.P.G. Sept. 10th, 1900.

acceded to by the commissioner, Mr. E. B. Drew,[23] and its incidence extended to Tangku [24]; but of the amount received, certain heads of collection were to be handed to the customs.[25] Under the Chinese regime the official report of these taxes had never exceeded the round sum of Tls. 100,000 [26]; but, under the impetus of the methods of the T.P.G. continued by the customs administration, the collection improved; and the total amount reported by the customs as collected for 1904 under these heads was Tls. 1,420,024.[27]

§ 7. One of the problems before the T.P.G. was to feed, in the present and during the coming winter, the population, mainly living on scanty wages [28] from day to day, in a city of which all business was dislocated, while access to its producing and consuming district was entirely cut off. The first step was to commandeer, at a fair price, all available commercial supplies, which were scanty [29]; and the China Merchants S.N. Co. was summoned to deliver the tribute rice in its possession, "this rice being necessary for distribution for urgent relief." [30] Besides this, large quantities of government rice had been seized by the military authorities, at Taku, Tangku and Tientsin, and on the march to Peking; and they were invited to deliver this rice to the T.P.G.[31] One after the other they acceded to the invitation, and chiefly by this means the population of Tientsin was saved from otherwise inevitable famine.

§ 8. A striking sight at Tientsin was the long row of mountains of salt lining the river bank, from opposite the French concession upwards, all the property of the Chinese government *régie*. On the occupation of the city by the allied forces these mounds were plentifully sprinkled with flags, chiefly Russian and French, and sentries were posted at them, to indicate that they had been seized by the

[23] T.P.G. Aug. 18th, 30th, 1900.

[24] T.P.G. March 6th, 1901.

[25] E.g. from Jan. 1st to Jan. 15th, 1902, of a total of Tls. 24,959 collected, an amount of Tls. 3734 was so handed over.—T.P.G. Jan. 20th, 1902.

[26] Cf. chap. vii, § 16, n. 96.

[27] Report on Tientsin Native Customs, 1904.

[28] Before the Boxer outbreak the ordinary wages of an unskilled labourer, on which he had to maintain a family, may be put at a maximum of 5 pence a day.

[29] T.P.G. Aug. 8th, 9th, 29th, 1900, etc.

[30] T.P.G. Sept. 12th, 1900.

[31] T.P.G. Aug. 4th, 1900.

power so represented. But this salt was needed by the T.P.G., partly to supply an article necessary for the well-being of the million and more of Chinese within its jurisdiction, partly for the revenue to be obtained by the sale of this government property. A demand was sent to the allied commanders claiming the salt as property of the Chinese government.[32] The American commander agreed, on condition that "the money from its sale should not be used to pay officers who are already in the service of the powers"[33]; the French commander questioned the authority of the council[34]; the Russian paid no attention to the demand[35]; and the council then appealed to Count von Waldersee, who replied that the ownership of the salt was not vested in the T.P.G.[36] Later on it became obvious that the need of the civil population was imperative, and in May, 1901, the various military authorities, one after the other, surrendered to the T.P.G. the salt which had been seized by them.[37]

§ 9. Next to sanitation and the repression of disorder, the most important function of the T.P.G. was in the department of public works. Over the river the Chinese had two bridges of boats, openable to let boat traffic through, one to the east, one to the north, of the city; to these the T.P.G. added a boat-bridge below the settlements, originally laid by the Russians and handed over in January 1901, and an iron swing bridge, the "International Bridge," leading to the railway station, actually completed under the subsequent Chinese regime but from funds left by the T.P.G. A broad bund was laid out along the river bank from the foreign settlements around the city to its north-western corner; owners of property intruding on the *tracé* were summarily ejected, but were fully compensated either in money or by land elsewhere.[38] In November, 1900, the council decided to destroy the walls of Tientsin, and this for three reasons: walls are the distinguishing badge of an administrative city, and to deprive Tientsin of this mark of honour would inflict on it a signal punishment for its misdeeds; from these walls a storm of shell

[32] T.P.G. Aug. 2nd, 1900.

[33] T.P.G. Aug. 21st, 1900.

[34] T.P.G. Aug. 10th, 1900.

[35] T.P.G. Aug. 25th, 1900.

[36] T.P.G. Sept. 25th, 29th, 1900.

[37] T.P.G. May 22nd, 1901.

[38] T.P.G. Jan. 2nd, 4th, 1901.



had been poured on the foreign settlements, and for military reasons they must not be allowed to remain; and their destruction would allow of the construction of broad boulevards, giving routes for communication and admitting the sun and breezes. The project was approved by each of the commandants [39]; and the work of demolition was entrusted to a contractor, who received the unbroken bricks for his payment; the broken bricks and other material were used by the T.P.G. in constructing metalled roads. In addition the T.P.G. introduced a water supply, taking the water from the Grand Canal above the city.

§ 10. One public work undertaken by the T.P.G. is its crown of glory. Tientsin is inland, thirty-five miles from Taku by road, but fifty-six miles by the winding course of the river. The distance is not important, but the long loops, with deep water constantly cutting further into the bights, have many long shoals in the stretches from bend to bend; and, owing to the impeded flow of its stream, as the surface of the water rose from the summer rains, the mud bottom rose even faster. Improvement was possible by cutting across the necks of bottle-shaped tongues of land, supplemented by dredging the bar; and the Chinese authorities took the matter in hand in 1898 under Mr. A. de Linde as engineer. Now the wisdom of entrusting the work to the T.P.G. was so obvious, that this was the chief factor in determining the allied commanders to extend its jurisdiction to the sea. The Haiho [40] Conservancy Board was constituted by the authority of Count von Waldersee as head of the council of allied generals, and was composed of the following delegates and members:

Colonel Arlabosse, the French member, representing the T.P.G.

The British consul, representing the consular body.  
Three members, one each nominated by the British, French, and German concessions.

Mr. G. Detring, commissioner of customs.

Mr. A. de Linde, engineer in charge.

[39] T.P.G. Dec. 7th, seq., 1900.

[40] The river is shown on foreign maps as the Peiho; but at Tientsin three streams meet—the Yüho (Grand Canal) from the south, the Peiho (North River) from the north, and the Haiho (Sea River) running east to the sea.

The necessary funds were provided jointly by the T.P.G. and by the mercantile communities of the foreign concessions, the amount contributed by the T.P.G. under this liability being Tls. 337,500. Before the council surrendered the government to the Chinese it had initiated the work on three cuttings, and provided the funds for them; two were completed during its term, and the third was opened in July, 1904. These three cuttings, of a total length of 4·3 miles, reduce the river distance Tientsin-Taku from fifty-six to forty-seven miles; and, combined with control of in-flowing and out-flowing channels, the work greatly improved the navigable channel. Two other cuttings were provided in the scheme, which would reduce the river distance to 36·5 miles.[41]

§ 11. These works were accomplished under powers which were exercised in anomalous conditions. Every measure of importance had to be referred to the commanding generals for their approval; and even a consul could interpose his veto in any matter which, in his judgment, might affect his national interests. The "International Bridge" led from the French concession to the railway station, at first claimed to be included in the Russian concession, but afterwards declared to be Chinese; but it crossed the navigable river, which was admittedly Chinese. On this ground the T.P.G. claimed the right to build it and to provide the funds for its construction and maintenance.[42] The French consul refused his consent, except on condition that the contract be given to the Fives-Lille Company [43]; the council declined to accept the condition; but finally the matter was compromised. The T.P.G. undertook the work, but agreed to act in conformity with the wishes of the consul; the T.P.G. was to provide not less than Tls. 64,000, and the French concession Tls. 40,000; and on the dissolution of the T.P.G. the bridge was to be placed under the control of the French concession "for the safeguarding of international interests." [44]

§ 12. In its relations with the military authorities

[41] T.P.G. *passim*; Decennial Reports, 1892-1901, Tientsin; map in latter at p. 500. For its later history, cf. chap. xiii, § 24.

[42] T.P.G. June 12th, 1901.

[43] T.P.G. June 24th, 1901.

[44] T.P.G. July 12th, 17th, 1901.

the T.P.G. was obliged to be most guarded, and many snubs were administered by the generals to the colonels who formed the council. One instance will illustrate their position. In October, 1900, Mr. Tenney, Chinese Secretary, laid before the council a letter from a former Customs Taotai at Tientsin, well known to foreigners, urging that troops should not be sent to Tsangchow (on the Grand Canal, eighty miles south of Tientsin) nor further south, and speaking of "the efficacy of the measures adopted by General Mei Tung-yi to suppress the Boxers in that region." The council, in sending the request to Count von Waldersee, supported the plea and certified that "General Mei enjoys a good reputation." [45] A punitive expedition was, nevertheless, sent consisting of German troops. English missionaries at Tientsin applied to the council to have some Chinese, for whose character they vouched and who had been taken prisoners at Tsangchow, brought to trial in order that the facts might be elicited. The German member of the council, Major von Falkenhayn, thereupon informed the council that "these prisoners had already been handed over, either to the authorities of the Chinese post-office [sic], or to the British troops, and that it was contrary to German custom to keep prisoners" [46]; and, at the next meeting, he declared, "as the result of his investigation, that the German troops had made no prisoners in their expedition to Tsangchow." [47]

§ 13. A few days later General Mei wrote to Mr. Tenney bringing certain definite charges against the German troops for their conduct at Tsangchow. These charges, at the request of the British member, Colonel Bower, he investigated by examining a number of witnesses; but, instead of laying the results before the council, he handed the entire dossier to Colonel Bower. By him it was sent to

[45] T.P.G. Oct. 17th, 1900.

"There must have been some misunderstanding to make the Germans attack General Mei. He has been one of Yuen Shih-kai's right-hand men; he has been noted for his vigor in suppressing Boxers, guarding the Shantung frontier, and protecting missions; and it would seem that the German commander has been misinformed by his interpreters or guides."—North-China Herald, Dec. 19th, 1900. Cf. also *postea*, § 28; and Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 30th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 102.

[46] T.P.G. Dec. 20th, 1900.

[47] T.P.G. Dec. 24th, 1900.

General Gaselee, British commandant at Peking, who transmitted it to Count von Waldersee. The last at once instructed the German member to demand from the council an explanation on the subject of these documents, which were type-written on paper with the heading "Gouvernement Provisoire de Tientsin—Bureau du Secrétaire Chinois." The council made no attempt to examine into the charges, nor did it touch on the complicity of their colleague, Colonel Bower; but, without delay or hesitation, it severely reprimanded Mr. Tenney, "1°. for not communicating to the council incidents which had come to his knowledge concerning the troops of an allied power and which had no truth in them, and 2°. for drawing up these accusations on paper bearing the T.P.G. letter-heading." [48] A little later the Italian commandant instructed the Italian member to demand from the council punishment of petitioners who had brought similar charges against the Italian troops, which had been proved to be false. [49]

§ 14. Against Chinese officials, however, the T.P.G. took a firm and unbending attitude. In its attitude to Li Hung-chang, on his arrival to take up the post of viceroy of Chihli, it acted on explicit instructions from Count von Waldersee, that "Li Hung-chang is regarded as a private person and that his presence is to have no effect on the working of the T.P.G." [50] Other officials were held in the same light. The prefect (Tientsin Fu) wrote communicating the fact of his appointment; in transmitting the letter to the allied commanders, the council expressed its opinion that "the said prefect evidently does not recognise the position occupied by his country *vis-à-vis* the powers, that the form of his letter, judged by Chinese custom, is not respectful, and that it should not be considered worthy of a reply." [51] In May the prefect's superior, the taotai having jurisdiction over Tientsin and Hokien prefectures, arrived at his post; he was summoned before the council and ordered to amend certain proclamations which he had issued, by a declaration that the

[48] T.P.G. Dec. 31st, 1900, Jan. 2nd, 4th, 1901.

[49] T.P.G. May 22nd, 1901.

[50] T.P.G. Sept. 21st, 29th, 1900.

[51] T.P.G. Sept. 21st, 1900.

territory under the T.P.G. was not within his jurisdiction, and to quit the T.P.G. territory within twenty-four hours. He was further requested to inform the viceroy, Li Hung-chang, that any territorial official sent in the future would be expelled from the jurisdiction.[52] Other officials who came on special missions connected with the peace negotiations were warned that they must exercise only the functions for which they were commissioned and which had been approved by the military authorities.[53]

§ 15. Li Hung-chang had resumed his peace negotiations as soon as the relieving force reached Tungchow on August 12th, and had tried in vain to restrain it from entering Peking.[54] As soon as the legations had been relieved he telegraphed on August 19th to all the powers, urging a cessation of hostilities, as the sole object for which the allied forces had advanced on Peking was accomplished, and asking that negotiations should be opened; and on August 21st he repeated his demand with more insistence.[55] At the same time the two Yangtze viceroys solicited, and received, an assurance that, "whenever the time for settlement arrives, their advice will be asked for and will receive due consideration." [56] The replies to Li Hung-chang were generally to the effect that negotiations could be entered upon only after consultation between the allies and obtaining the opinions of the envoys; no notice was taken of the demand for a cessation of hostilities.[57] The American government [58] rejected the plea that hostilities should cease because the allied forces had, without aid from China, accomplished their object, but would support a truce after China had established order in Peking, and shown both its will and its ability to enforce a cessation of fighting there and elsewhere; when this was done, it was willing to open negotiations under the conditions of its circular of July 3rd.[59] This

[52] T.P.G. May 13th, 1901.

[53] T.P.G. May 31st, June 3rd, 1901.

[54] Cf. chap. x, § 13.

[55] U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 15; French Doc. Dip., 1900, pp. 133, 134; Brit. China, No. 1, 1901, pp. 99, 101.

[56] China, No. 1, 1901, pp. 100, 101.

[57] Ibid., pp. 101, 104.

[58] Mr. A. C. to Wu Ting-fang, Aug. 22nd, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 16.

[59] Cf. ch. ix, § 3.

involved some conditions—notably the preservation of the territorial integrity of China and the maintenance of the open door—which had not explicitly received the adhesion of other powers; but from this policy the American government did not waver.

§ 16. The powers were for some time at cross purposes on the question whether Li Hung-chang should be recognised as plenipotentiary. His credentials could, obviously, not be examined until the negotiations were opened; but it was known that he had been appointed plenipotentiary by a decree issued, on August 8th, by such imperial authority as existed in Peking on that date; and, although the siege of the legations continued, the validity of the decree was accepted by the Chinese officials whose opinion the powers were bound to respect; and a later decree of August 24th, issued by the empress dowager in her flight, extended his powers and associated Prince Ching with him in the mission.[60] Before diplomatic action could be taken the admirals at Taku, or some of them, resolved to “interdict the plenipotentiary of the Chinese government, Li Hung-chang, from all communication with the Chinese authorities in the event of his arrival at Taku.” The Russian and American governments at once protested, and it was explained that the admirals had only taken this provisional decision pending the receipt of definite instructions from the envoys in Peking.[61] But their action, though not in agreement with the dogma that the foreign powers were not in a state of war with China,[62] was in full harmony with the military situation and the attitude of the army authorities; those authorities refused to recognise Chinese officials at Tientsin,[63] as their superiors, the generals and envoys, had done at Peking before.[64]

§ 17. The envoys in Peking, and therefore the home governments, were slow in coming to any united agree-

[60] Wu Ting-fang to State Dept., Aug. 12th, Sept. 10th, 11th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., pp. 14, 21.

[61] Ibid., pp. 17-19; Doc. Dip., p. 133.

[62] Cf. chap. ix, § 4.

[63] Cf. ante, § 14.

[64] “Seeing that Chinese officials are not allowed or recognised in Peking, I suppose Tientsin will follow suit and keep Hwang. [cf. § 14] away; and, things being as they are, this is the right course.”—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 7th, 1900.

ment.[65] The British government would not decide on opening negotiations with Li Hung-chang until it had heard from its envoy [66]; this was also the decision of Russia [67]; and the only power which returned a categorical answer was America,[68] guardedly favorable—but the American Association of China protested strongly, on September 3rd, against recognising Li Hung-chang as peace negotiator.[69] The British envoy's opinion was that "it is useless to attempt serious negotiations with the Chinese government until the Chinese military power is disheartened and completely crushed" [70]; and the Japanese government, recognising the unwillingness of the powers to accept Li Hung-chang's commission as plenipotentiary, considered it "absolutely necessary that the powers should at once take the necessary steps to induce the emperor and empress dowager to return to Peking and form a responsible government." [71] The envoys generally realised that "the weakness of the imperial government becomes daily more apparent, and the possibility of restoration of peace and order under Chinese authority more remote" [72]; and most of them remained without instructions.[73] In the divergence of aims of the home authorities, definite instructions could not be sent.

§ 18. Affairs were drifting into chaos, from which one man, Sir P. Hart, did his best to rescue them. A personal message from the empress dowager invited him to act as associate plenipotentiary; but he recognised the

[65] "I am sending you copy of what I wrote to legations re rendition of Tientsin customs, and consular immunity: you can't imagine how hard it is to put anything through here."—Same to same, Sept. 20th, 1900.

"No legation reply yet to demand for rendition of customs—it takes a month to put anything through here! . . . Just now the whole thing is a jumble; at first all were of one mind—relief of the legations: that done, they all fly apart and Heaven only knows how it will end."—Same to same, Sept. 28th, 1900.

[66] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. MacDonald, Aug. 23rd, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 104.

[67] Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 22nd, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 107.

[68] Cf. *antea*, § 15.

[69] North-China Herald, Oct. 24th, 1900.

[70] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 24th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 105.

[71] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, Aug. 30th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 127.

[72] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Sept. 13th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 33.

[73] Same to same, Sept. 16th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 34.

changed conditions, and returned answer that the personnel of the commission must be entirely Chinese and Manchu.[74] He set to work, however, to hunt up Prince Ching, whom he found at Hwailu, but "had trouble in finding him" [75]; and he had still more trouble in stiffening the wobbling prince's backbone.[76] The prince was filled with apprehension, but with no clear insight into the difficulty of his task,[77] and his record during the troubles was not clear [78]; but he undertook his mission and called, on September 6th, on each of the foreign envoys. He then invited them to a conference, but this failed owing to the refusal of two envoys to attend: the Russian envoy because he had been ordered by his government to withdraw the legation from Peking; the German chargé d'affaires because only the newly appointed minister, Dr. Mumm von Schwartzenstein, was authorised to represent the German government in the negotiations, and he had not arrived.[79] These reasons indicate two opposing lines of policy.

§ 19. Meantime where was Li Hung-chang? He was eagerly looked for in Peking, and expected from day to day—so confidently expected that Sir R. Hart kept his credentials and despatches in hand, lest they should miss him on the way from Tien-sin.[80] He was still in Shanghai, hoping that his appointment as negotiator might be accepted by the powers, and that they would decide that

[74] Personal statement of Sir R. Hart to author.

[75] R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Aug. 30th, 1900.

[76] "The prince will be here 1st, 2nd, or 3rd; if the demands are extravagantly heavy—and I fear they will be—he will probably bolt and join the war party. Tung Fu-siang & Co. are for holding out and not giving in—this, if gone on with, means years of anarchy and confusion."—Same to same, Aug. 31st, 1900.

[77] "I saw the prince on the 4th and he is calling on legations this morning. There's a hard task before him, and I doubt if he realises its magnitude: as for indemnity, how will it be paid?"—Same to same, Sept. 6th, 1900.

[78] "The Italians to-day are shooting a Boxer Chief, son of Teh, former governor of Kiangsu and Kiangsi, and, I think, brother of two Imperial Councillors—in fact everybody is a Boxer here, I believe. Prince Ching's name is down in their books for subscriptions and presents! The man that shot Ketteler belonged to the Chen-chi-ying (Prince Ching's Brigade) and now says he was ordered to shoot by 'A Prince!' Further questioning may get the Prince's name, and if it is Ching there will be a big rumpus, and still bigger difficulty."—Same to same, Sept. 23rd, 1900.

[79] Tel. Tokyo, Sept. 11th, North-China Herald, Sept. 19th, 1900.

[80] R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 2nd, 7th, 13th, 18th, 1900.



the time had come for military action to give place to diplomacy. In this he was disappointed, and finally decided, if not accepted as plenipotentiary, to take up his post as viceroy of Chihli; and after vainly begging a passage on a foreign ship of war, he embarked, September 14th, on a British merchant ship, arrived at Taku the 18th and at Tientsin the 20th. His seal as viceroy was not there and he was compelled to wait until October 1st, when he assumed the duties of the viceroyalty. He arrived at Tientsin in a "shocking bad temper" [81]; and during his stay there is reported to have consorted only with the Russians, and to have gone about accompanied by a Russian cavalry escort.[82] He left for Peking October 3rd. His earlier arrival there might have been of some benefit to China, but by this time the divergence of foreign aims had become marked.

§ 20. On August 28th the Russian government addressed a circular note to the other powers declaring that

"Russia has no designs of territorial acquisition in China; that, equally with the other powers, Russia has sought the safety of the legation at Peking and to help the Chinese government to repress the troubles; that, incidentally to necessary defensive measures on the Russian border, Russia has occupied Newchwang for military purposes,[83] and, as soon as order is re-established, will retire troops therefrom if the action of other powers be no obstacle thereto; that the purpose for which the various governments have co-operated for relief of legations in Peking has been accomplished; that, taking the position that, as the Chinese government has left Peking, there is no need for her representative to remain, Russia has directed the Russian envoy to retire with his official personnel to Tientsin; that the Russian troops will likewise be withdrawn; and that, when the government of China shall regain the reins of government and afford an authority with which the other powers can deal, and will express desire to enter into negotiations, the Russian government will also name its representative." [84]

The Russian minister spoke further of the

"serious fears he entertained with regard to the danger of confiding to a small international force the task involved in the re-establish-

[81] "I hear Li is in a shocking bad temper, and more inclined to dictate than to shang-liang [negotiate], much less obey; his passage through Tientsin will grieve and rile the poor old man."—Same to same, Sept. 21st, 1900.

[82] North-China Herald, Oct. 10th, 17th, 1900.

[83] Cf. chap. x. § 10.

[84] U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 19; China, No. 1, 1901, p. 113.

ment and maintenance of order in Peking, where no Chinese government exists at present, and where, as long as the troops of the foreign powers remain, none is likely to exist.”[85]

§ 21. The Russian intention of withdrawing the Russian diplomatic representative altogether from Peking aroused a feeling of dismay, and the world wondered what lay behind it. The most generally accepted explanation was that Russia had agreed to support Li Hung-chang in his plan of diplomatic campaign, in return for a free hand in Manchuria,[86] an explanation supported by the tendencies shown in the ensuing months. The powers generally objected, some partially, some wholly. The American government renewed its adherence to the proposals made in its note of July 3rd; it felt assured that the allied forces should not be withdrawn from Peking until *after* “the Chinese government shall have been re-established and shall be in a position to enter into new treaties with adequate provisions for reparation and guarantees of future protection,” but it recognised that “a continued occupation of Peking would be ineffective to produce the desired result unless all the powers unite therein with entire harmony of purpose,” since “any power which determines to withdraw its troops from Peking will necessarily proceed thereafter to protect its interests in China by its own method,” and this danger “would make a general withdrawal expedient”; and it welcomed the Russian assurances regarding acquisition of territory and the occupation of Newchwang.[87] France accepted the Russian proposal in principle, but thought that the question of withdrawing the troops could only be decided by the commanders on the spot, and that “the chief object to be pursued is to

[85] Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 29th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 122.

[86] “Did you see the leader in the S’hai Daily News of 17th, that Li offered to give Manchuria to Russia for evacuation of Peking? This is probably the keynote of present movements.”—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 28th, 1900.

“We knew here [Shanghai] that before Li Hung-chang went up to Peking from Shanghai, he had arranged with the Russian representative that Russia should do everything in her power to thwart the allies in their attempts to secure reparation from China for the crimes her government has committed, the *quid pro quo* being the acquiescence of China in Russia’s occupation of Manchuria.”—Ed. North-China Herald, Nov. 28th, 1900.

[87] Memorandum, Aug. 29th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 20.

terminate the present situation as expeditiously as possible, but to do this the establishment of a really responsible government is essential" [88]; but ultimately she accepted the Russian proposal without reserve.[89] Japan had already decided to reduce the unnecessarily large numbers of her troops, but, as regards the Russian proposal, thought "it would be prudent for the powers to continue jointly exercising their military pressure for some time longer." [90] Germany was not prepared to withdraw her forces from Peking at present.[91] England was still deeply involved in the war in South Africa and took no very decided attitude; the government was "not able to form a confident judgment" until it should hear from the British envoy and commander [92]; the envoy was dismayed and predicted that "a general massacre of Christian converts and of all Chinese who have shown themselves friendly to foreigners would most certainly ensue if all foreign troops leave now" [93]; and the government thereupon decided that "the time when it would be expedient to withdraw the British forces from Peking has not arrived." [94]

§ 22. The powers, other than Russia and, after some hesitation, France, were unwilling to withdraw their troops from Peking, thereby relaxing the military pressure exerted on China by the occupation of the capital, and by the latent possibility of the continuation of punitive expeditions into the country around. Russia then, on September 17th, inquired of the powers severally—1°. if they had the intention to transfer their legations to Tientsin; 2°. if they recognised the full powers of Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang as sufficient; 3°. if they were prepared to open negotiations with the plenipotentiaries.[95] The American government replied that, 1°. it had no present intention to withdraw its legation from Peking; 2°. it accepted the plenipotentiary authority of the two negotiators as *prima facie* sufficient; 3°. it was ready to enter

[88] Sir E. Monson to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 31st, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 128.

[89] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Herbert, Sept. 10th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 147.

[90] Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 7th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 139.

[91] Sir C. Scott to same, Sept. 11th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 148.

[92] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, Sept. 3rd, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 135.

[93] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 7th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 148.

[94] Lord Salisbury to Sir C. Scott, Sept. 10th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 146.

[95] U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 23; China, No. 1, 1901, p. 172.

into relations with them.[96] The British government replied to a similar effect[97]; but the presentation of the German note made the other powers less ready to consider these questions.

§ 23. On September 18th the German government sent a note to the allied powers declaring that it "considers, as a preliminary condition for entering into diplomatic negotiations with the Chinese government, a surrender of such persons as are determined upon as being the first and real instigators of the crimes committed in Peking against international law." Subordinate offenders were too numerous, and "a wholesale execution" would "go against the civilised conscience"; the envoys might designate those most guilty, but "it is not so important that a large number of persons should be punished as that the chief instigators and leaders should receive punishment." The allied powers were requested to instruct their envoys "to designate the principal Chinese personages as to whose guilt in instigating or committing the crimes there is no room for doubt." [98]

§ 24. All the powers had from the beginning granted to Germany a predominating influence in dealing with the Boxer revolt, due to the fact that it was her envoy who had been murdered; but this influence could not at first be exercised in military operations, because Germany had in the Far East no troops and only a small naval force. The principal rôle was necessarily left to Russia and Japan, the two powers which could at once send large forces to the scene; and Germany, unwilling to accept a subordinate military position, refused even to follow the example of Austria and Italy, and sent not even a corporal's guard to carry her flag in the force which relieved the legations.[99] But the German government allowed no doubt to be entertained that it intended and expected to take a leading part in the military and diplomatic proceedings which might be necessary to end the revolt and to exact reparation. Authentic news of Baron von Ketteler's murder was received in Europe on July 1st, and

[96] U.S. For. Rel., *ubi sup.*

[97] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Hardinge, Sept. 29th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 200.

[98] *Ibid.*, p. 175; U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 23. Cf. *postea*, § 35.

[99] Cf. chap. x, §§ 9, 27, n. 94; *antea*, §§ 3, 6.

the next day orders were given to form an over-sea expeditionary force of 7000 men. The first portion of this force left Bremerhaven on July 27th, and to it the emperor delivered a stirring speech in which the general policy of the German government was referred to in these words :

"When you meet the foe you will defeat him. No quarter will be given, no prisoners will be taken.[100] Let all who fall into your hands be at your mercy. Just as the Huns a thousand years ago, under the leadership of Etzel [Attila], gained a reputation by virtue of which they still live in historical tradition, so may the name of Germany become known in such a manner in China, that no Chinese will ever again even dare to look askance at a German." [101]

§ 25. Germany had less experience in over-sea expeditions and less adaptability in dealing with extra-European peoples than any of the allied powers, except Austria, but her right to lead was, at the outset, generally recognised ; and the emperor promptly grasped the opportunity. On August 7th the powers were informed that the emperor of Russia had stated to the German emperor that "it would afford him especial satisfaction to place the Russian troops operating in the province of Chihli under the supreme command of Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee. The German emperor is ready to undertake the task, as he has reason to assume that also other governments besides Russia consider that a German supreme command would be of advantage," Japan being ready to assent ; and the powers were asked for their views "on the subject of the supreme command, and as to the manner in which they

[100] Cf. *antea*, § 12.

[101] *Weser Zeitung*, Bremen, cited in *Times*, July 30th, 1900. The spirit of this speech was in keeping with a previous expression of the German emperor's opinion. In 1895, when Japan had shown her rising power and the three governments, Russia, France and Germany, had united to compel her to retrocede Liaotung to China, he designed a picture in which on the one side the Buddha of the East sat enthroned on a black cloud rising from a blazing conflagration ; on the other, under a radiant cross in the sky, stood figures, representing the nations of Europe. One male figure, St. Michael, with a flaming sword, stood appealing to the others ; the other seven, female figures, representing the powers, stood some ready, some reluctant ; one was trying to urge forward the most reluctant, Britannia. The original was presented to the Tzar ; the published engraving—"Nach einem Entwurf seiner Majestät des Deutschen Kaisers, Königs von Preussen, Wilhelm II, gez. v. H. Knackfuss, 1895"—has inscribed on it in German and French—"Nations Européennes ! Défendez vos biens sacrés !" with the imperial and royal autograph.

would be disposed to connect their troops in Chihli with the army operating under Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee.”[102] The answers seemed to indicate a dislike of the assumption of leadership, but an unwillingness to deny Germany’s rights in the matter. The Russian government gave no sign that it accepted the god-fatherly position assigned to it, but informed the allies that “the idea will meet with no objection” from it.[103] The French government replied that, to ensure unity of effort, “when Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee shall have taken in the council of generals the distinguished place assured him by his higher rank, the French commander-in-chief will not fail to establish proper relations with the field-marshal.”[104] The British government replied that it would “most gladly concur” and “view with great satisfaction an arrangement by which so distinguished a soldier is placed at the head of the international forces.”[105] The American government was “much gratified to secure the command of so distinguished and experienced an officer as Count Waldersee for any combined military operations,” but preferred to leave questions of method to be settled as they arose.[106] Japan accepted expressly on the ground that Count von Waldersee would be the officer of the highest rank in China.[107] Italy and Austria accepted without reserve.

§ 26. Count von Waldersee was a distinguished soldier, under whose command, if that were the only consideration, the soldiers of other nations might be proud to serve. With a good record in the war of 1870, he had been Moltke’s assistant on the Grand General Staff, up to the death of that great strategist; and was then appointed to the

[102] Sir F. Lascelles to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 7th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 60; Mr. Jackson to Mr. Hay, same date, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 331. Cf. also *postea*, n. 108.

[103] Sir C. Scott to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 8th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 64; Marquis de Montebello to M. Delcassé, same date, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 116.

[104] M. Delcassé to M. Boutiron, Aug. 14th, 1900, Doc. Dip., 1900, p. 125.

[105] Lord Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, Aug. 9th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 66.

[106] Mr. Adee to Mr. Jackson, Aug. 10th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1900, p. 331.

[107] Baron Hayashi in Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, Aug. 9th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 67.

command of the ninth army corps; he had several times commanded one of the armies at the imperial autumn manœuvres; and in 1900 he was one of the five Army Inspectors, with the rank of field-marshal. After many ceremonies in which undue emphasis was placed on his supreme command,[108] and the exuberance of which betrayed the newness of Germany's international position, he left Berlin on August 19th and arrived at Tientsin on September 25th. There he remained until October 15th; he then went to Peking, which he entered on October 17th, and, in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the allied forces, he established his headquarters in the imperial palace. One of his orders was that those matters of common interest which had before been laid before the council of commanders, or referred to each of the allied commanders, such as those relating to the Tientsin Provisional Government, should be referred direct to him, and it would lie with him to refer them to his colleagues on the council [109]; but the British commander (and doubtless others) expressly demanded that he should be referred to directly, and not through Count von Waldersee, in all matters other than military.[110]

§ 27. A general adhesion had been given by the governments to the proposal to place Count von Waldersee in supreme command, ranging from the warmth of the British acceptance to the coolness of the French; but none liked the arrogance of the assumption that it was a natural right, based on grounds other than the murder of the German envoy; and in China the acceptance of his position was reluctant and by no means general. England, with the memory of the German emperor's telegram to President Kruger, with present difficulties in intercepting

[108] At Cassel the emperor on August 18th presented a field-marshal's baton to Count von Waldersee, whom he addressed in these words—"I greet you as the head of the united troops of the civilised world. . . . I hail with joy the fact that, at the suggestion of the emperor of All the Russias, the whole of the civilised world, without distinction, spontaneously [? readily] entrusted to your Excellency the command of its troops. . . . In the interest of our people I wish our common expedition may turn into a firm guarantee of mutual appreciation and mutual peace for the European powers, so that, what we failed to obtain in peace, may now perhaps be obtained with weapons in our hands."—Times, Aug. 20th, 1900.

[109] T.P.G. Dec. 24th, 1900.

[110] T.P.G. Nov. 28th, 1900.

munitions for the Boers carried in German ships, and with an active anti-English campaign going on in the German press, had every reason to wish to be on good terms with the German government; and the British military authorities in China loyally subordinated themselves to the generalissimo. Russia, whose Tsar had, it was asserted, originated the proposal, had her own ambitions, which did not accord with subordination to the generalissimo, and which had already led her to propose that the powers should arrest all military operations and withdraw their troops from Peking; and the numbers of her forces in the Far East enabled her to follow her own course. Japan had supplied the driving force to the expedition which had relieved the legations, and, outside Manchuria, i.e. in Chihli, had troops nearly equal in number to those of all the other allies together; she was now expected to subordinate her military operations to the policy of a power which had contributed no force to the relief of the legations, and naturally feared that operations furthering German policy might bring her into conflict with Russia, which was evidently the power with which Japan must one day come into conflict; and now, as in July,[111] she moved with reluctant steps on a way of which she could not clearly see the end. Austria and Italy accepted the generalissimo, but together they supplied only a few companies. France might accept a German as head of a military council, but had no intention, and could not be expected, to place her troops under his orders. America was the one among the allied powers which could not be suspected of territorial aspirations in China, and which, therefore, had no fear that any political complication could affect her interests; but American policy avoided concerted action when possible, and accepted co-operation only when other methods were not available [112]; and the subordination of the American military commanders to the authority of the generalissimo was little more than nominal.[113]

[111] Cf. chap. x, §§ 6, 7.

[112] Cf. chap. ii, §§ 5, 11; viii, § 4, n. 20, § 16; x, § 8.

[113] Conference of commanders, Sept. 11th. "The French, Japanese and American generals stated that they had not received definite orders to place themselves under the field-marshal's command."—Report to Adj. Gen., U.S. War Dept. Reports, 1901, iv, p. 483. General Chaffee in



§ 28. On the capture of Peking the Chinese forces scattered. In the earlier days occasional parties were reported near Tientsin, though in no threatening force [114]; but generally they fled quadrivious—except that they did not turn towards the enemy. Their movements were not generally reported, except that, on two occasions, fugitive hosts of “Boxers and troops” trying to return to Shantung were met, defeated with heavy loss, and turned back, by Yuen Shih-kai’s troops: once, on August 23rd. near Tehchow, in the north-western corner of Shantung; once, on October 8th, near Tsangchow, in south-eastern Chihli.[115] On August 29th the Roman Catholic converts, beleaguered for more than two months at Hienhien, were relieved by a force under the command of the provincial treasurer of Chihli, Tingyung, temporarily acting viceroy, operating from Paotingfu and anxious to place himself on record as a good anti-Boxerite.[116] The organised army of the empire fled westward—south-west to Paotingfu and Shansi, north-west to Kalgan (Changkiakow) and beyond; and a considerable force, including Tung Fu-siang and his Kansu troops, accompanied the court in its flight by Taivuenfu to Sianfu.

§ 29. There were Boxers in Peking itself,[117] but in no long time they were reduced to submission; there were Boxers in the country immediately around, marauding and terrorising the villages [118]; at a safer distance there were disorderly bodies of disorganised soldiers; and still further off were imperial troops organised in their units. Sir R. Hart wrote—“I expect Christmas will see Peking completely surrounded—a wide circle, but one that will affect supplies and communications.”[119] The military authorities saw the danger and took the matter in hand, but, even before they took organised action, the missionaries, who themselves had just passed through great perils,

1900 and Admiral Dewey in 1898 took summary steps and used blunt language in dealing with foreign officers who interfered with their operations or their control of their own forces. Cf. chap. x, § 22, n. 79.

[114] T.P.G. *passim*.

[115] North-China Herald, Aug. 29th, Oct. 17th, 1900. Cf. *antea*, § 12.

[116] *Ibid.*, Sept. 19th, 1900. Cf. chap. x, § 1, *postea*, § 32.

[117] R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Aug. 21st, Sept. 6th, 1900.

[118] Cf. *antea*, n. 2 and 3.

[119] R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 6th, 1900.

took steps to carry relief to their converts in outlying villages, who also had been persecuted and had suffered much hardship. In these expeditions the missionaries were necessarily accompanied by an armed escort, and they were thus given the power to impose their terms on the villages which had been guilty of murdering and otherwise ill-treating Christians; they were able to constitute themselves, at the same time, prosecuting attorneys and judges, and to execute the writs of their own courts; and their action excited much unfavorable comment, especially, most of them being American, in the United States.[120] But, though they exercised their power rigorously, they did it justly; and the punishment they inflicted was almost invariably a money fine, which was devoted to providing food for the destitute converts of the same villages, who must otherwise have starved during the ensuing winter.

§ 30. The military authorities were at first so much engrossed in the task of restoring order in Peking and Tientsin, that no expeditions were sent out into the country. On September 8th a mixed column was sent to Tulu, fifteen miles south of Tientsin, a Boxer centre, and burned it. On September 11th a force of 1700 Germans marched from Peking to Liangsiang, fifteen miles down the Peking-Hankow railway; it took the city by assault after a stubborn defence. On September 16th three columns, one Anglo-American, one German, one Japanese, left Peking and marched to Sankiatien, eighteen miles west of the capital; an arsenal was destroyed, two temples, Boxer headquarters, were burned, and, as punishment for the burning of the British legation summer quarters on June 9th,[121] a pagoda was blown up; the Boxers themselves escaped owing to the failure of the German column

[120] One American mission, that of the American Board, made requisitions in the country around Tungchow to the following extent. In 23 villages 166 converts had been killed by Boxers, and 181 converts destroyed. As compensation the villages were fined Tls. 16,150 in money (used to relieve distress in the villages), and were made to give 98 acres of land; they were also made to rebuild 19 chapels, the property of the converts, which had been destroyed, and to give 20 small plots for cemeteries. No claim was made for property of the mission.—E. G. Tewksbury, Oct. 10th, in Gen. Chaffee to Mr. Conger, Oct. 23rd, 1900, U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, p. 453.

[121] Cf. chap. viii, § 11.

to connect.[122] These were the only organised expeditions up to the time of the arrival at Tientsin of Count von Waldersee, and their obviously sole object was to push the hostile forces further back from the cities of Peking and Tientsin and to facilitate provisioning them; after that date the policy of punishment, enunciated in the German note, led to a great increase in the number of punitive expeditions and vindictive punishments inflicted on many cities.

§ 31. Just before the generalissimo's arrival, however, it was decided by the allied commanders that the military security of their position would be endangered if the forts of Pehtang and Shanhaikwan were left in Chinese hands. The garrisons had given no signs of life during all the troubles, and apparently asked nothing more than to be left undisturbed; but Chinwangtao was the only ice-free port by which, for the three winter months, the foreign troops could maintain communication with the outer world. After a merely nominal resistance, orders to that effect having come from Li Hung-chang, the Pehtang forts were taken by assault on September 20th by a force made up from six nationalities, the Americans and Japanese not co-operating.[123] The forts at Shanhaikwan and Chinwangtao were found to have been abandoned by their garrisons, under Li Hung-chang's orders, and the principal fort at Shanhaikwan was actually occupied on September 29th by seventeen men from the British gunboat *Pigmy*. The forts, seven at Pehtang, one at Chinwangtao, and five at Shanhaikwan, were then distributed among the powers (Russia, Japan, England, France, Germany, and Italy) to be held severally but in the common allied interest.[124] Though the action was necessary for the purpose of keeping communications open, it was felt that hidden purposes might underlie it.[125]

[122] "The Japanese troops arrived at their position at the appointed hour; the Germans did not show up at all. It was a very large expedition to accomplish a small object."—Report to U.S. Adj. Gen., *ubi sup.*, p. 484.

[123] The British and Italians joined too late for the actual assault, which was delivered before the appointed date.

[124] *North-China Herald*, Sept. 26th, Oct. 3rd, 1900; *China*, No. 1, 1901, p. 178; *China*, No. 5, 1901, p. 3.

[125] "As to Pehtang—is not that a little late in the day? And what has it to do with relief of Peking, etc.? It probably is the beginning of another chapter in the evolution and development of foreign plans and aspirations."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 21st, 1900.

§ 32. The arrival of Count von Waldersee on the scene infused new activity into the military operations. On October 8th a force of 1000 French troops marched south from Tientsin; relieved the mission at Kata, "where for more than three months 1800 converts had remained closely besieged and constantly harassed by numerous Boxer bands"; destroyed villages which "had taken an active part in the massacre of Christians"; and left two companies to garrison the mission at Hienhien during the winter. At the same time another French force marched to Paotingfu; they met no opposition on the way or at that city, and entered it on October 13th, releasing several missionaries who were in the custody of the troops of the provincial treasurer, Tingyung; they also rescued other missionaries at Chengtingfu.[126] In the middle of October a column of 3500 troops, German, French, British and Italian, marched from Peking, and another of 4000, German and French, from Tientsin, and they arrived at Paotingfu on October 18th. As the city had already been occupied by the French column from Hienhien and was under French protection, the allied force waited for the Chinese garrison to evacuate it. This, in pursuance of Li Hung-chang's policy, was done; General Gaselee then tried to come to a settlement with the taotai, who came outside, but failed; and the troops forced their way through the gates on the 20th. An international military tribunal was then formed to investigate the murder of missionaries on July 1st [127]; it condemned to death the provincial treasurer, Tingyung, the Tartar-General, and a commandant of a battalion who had ejected the missionaries from the shelter they sought in his camp. Tingyung "had been the patron of the Boxer movement for the whole year,"[128] but latterly had tried to re-establish his reputation by suppressing the Boxers; but the judgment on all three was carried into effect. The taotai, Tan Wen-hwan, was sent to Tientsin, where he was tried, condemned, and, on December 7th, executed by decapitation and his head exposed for six days.[129] Besides this

[126] Decennial Reports (Tientsin), 1892-1901, ii, p. 524.

[127] Cf. chap. ix, § 15.

[128] Smith, "China in Convulsion," ii, p. 714.

[129] T.P.G. Dec. 5th, 1900.

the gates and one corner of the city wall were demolished, two temples connected with the murders were blown up, a fine of Tls. 100,000 was imposed, and Tls. 240,000 found in the provincial treasury was confiscated. A garrison of 2000 Germans and 1200 French was left in the city for the winter.[130] On the return of the main force, a detachment visited Yungtsing, the scene of murders on June 1st [131]; it destroyed one of the gates and three temples, and levied a fine of Tls. 40,000 (Tls. 4000 in cash and a security bond for Tls. 36,000).[132] This money was devoted to relieving the distress in Yungtsing.[133] The conduct of the troops on the Paotingfu expedition was made the subject of an official complaint by Li Hung-chang; the American, Russian and Japanese envoys left it unanswered, as they had no troops engaged; the British, German, French and Italian envoys, "considering the tone of the viceroy's letter, with whom we are not in official relations, to be altogether objectionable, decided to return it to him." [134]

§ 33. After this the powers, one after the other, began to disapprove of these expeditions; Germany alone persisting in them to the end. From December 12th, 1900, to the end of April, 1901, forty-six expeditions were sent out; thirty-five consisted only of German troops, and four only of Italian troops, the other seven being mixed forces, except one American and one British sent to deal with new troubles.[135] The Russians took no part in them; their policy was clear—to hold the sea-board (they afterwards joined in holding Peking and Tientsin), and to

[130] Decennial Reports, ubi sup.; U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, pp. 460 seq.

"The Paotingfu doings will, I fear, brand us for ever with treachery in Chinese estimation: we got the Prince to order Chinese soldiers out of the way, and the officials came out and met them in a friendly manner: we then turned round and tried a lot of the officials, sentenced them, etc., and, if report is true, the next step will be the looting of the city! It is a nasty business altogether."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Nov. 6th, 1900.

[131] Cf. chap. viii, § 6.

[132] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, Nov. 8th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 155.

[133] Smith, "Convulsion," ii, p. 717.

[134] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, Nov. 5th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 153.

[135] Roster of all expeditions made by allied forces, Dec. 12th, 1900, to May 10th, 1901, German Headquarters, Peking, Winter Palace, May 10th, 1901, in U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, p. 495.

require the Chinese authorities to suppress their own disorder. This, though perhaps from other motives, was also the policy of the Japanese, and they took part, and that reluctantly, in very few expeditions. The French, close bound to Russia, acted in harmony with Li Hung-chang's orders to the Chinese commanders—that they were never to offer resistance, but were on all occasions to withdraw on the approach of a foreign force. On one occasion the French, acting in co-operation with the Germans, formed the reserve in case of disaster, leaving to the Germans the part of striking force; on another occasion, also co-operating with the Germans, the French commander sent officers asking the Chinese commander to withdraw, which the latter did, thereby giving the Germans a facile victory.[136] The British maintained the appearance of entire unity of action; but through the whole of the punitive campaign General Gaselee did no more than send an officer with a corporal's guard to represent the flag on expeditions; and on January 1st the government expressed its opinion that "pending negotiations no further expeditions should take place unless the conduct of the Chinese should render them necessary." [137] The Americans disapproved of the policy and made no attempt to co-operate in its execution. General Chaffee ordered that, in all cases, "our troops must be fired upon before firing a shot, and, generally, that property should not be destroyed"; and he reported that "the American troops did not participate in either of the expeditions [to Pao-tingfu in October, to Kalgan in November], it being my opinion that the less the disturbance of the country by military operations, the sooner would arrive the opportunity to diplomatically arrange full reparation for all wrongs committed, and for the further reason that every indication pointed to the utter collapse of organised armed opposition by the Chinese." [138] American army opinion was that "the German contingent, not having arrived in season to take part in the relief expedition, they were anxious, as most military men are, to engage in active

[136] Decennial Reports, pp. 526, 527, 528.

[137] Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Jan. 1st, 1901, *China*, No. 6, 1901, p. 1.

[138] Gen. Chaffee to Adj. Gen., Nov. 29th, 1900, U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, p. 450.

service, and these expeditions afforded the only field for the indulgence of their desires.”[139] American popular opinion is fairly expressed by an editorial statement that “it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the greatest single obstacle to peace in China is the intransigent attitude of Germany. . . . It is to Germany that the primacy belongs in aggression and mischief-making.”[140]

§ 34. The official attitude is to some extent reflected in the movements of troops. Early in December there were in the province of Chihli the following troops as reported by the respective commanders [141]; but it is to be noted that, in the opinion of American officers, the least interested politically, these reports were generally overstatements.[142] The Russians had 37 companies and squadrons, a possible total of 5500 men; of these 25 were at Shanhaikwan and along the railway, and only 2 in Peking; and “by January 1st, 1901, the greater part of the Russian troops will be withdrawn from the province of Pechili”; but no report was made of the large numbers in Manchuria. The Germans had 72 companies, a possible total of between 9000 and 11,000 men; of these no less than 49 were at Peking and Paotingfu, with 19 at Tientsin. The French had 76 companies, or about 9500 men; of these 40 were at Peking and Paotingfu, and 18 at Tientsin. The Japanese had 80 companies, about 4000 men; of these 17 were at Peking. The Italians had 18 companies, 2000 men, 13 companies being at Peking. The British had 113 companies, about 12,000 men, entirely Indian troops except the artillery and 450 sailors; of these 45 were at and around Peking, 50 at Tientsin, and 18 at Shanhaikwan.

[139] Daggett, “China Relief Expedition,” p. 141.

[140] New York Nation, Oct. 18th, 1900.

One of Mr. John Hay’s colleagues in the cabinet wrote to him—“The approach of the much-prepared Waldersee seemed a peril. There was the danger that after all the emperor’s windy eloquence he might feel the necessity of kicking up a row to justify the appointment of Waldersee.” The author adds—“This was Hay’s view also.”—W. R. Thayer, “Life and Letters of John Hay,” ii, p. 245.

[141] Roster of the allied troops in the province of Pechili, China, December, 1900, Army H. Q. in East Asia, Peking, Winter Palace, Dec. 11th, in Gen. Chaffee to Adj. Gen., Dec. 19th, 1900, U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, p. 488.

[142] U.S. War Dept. Rep., 1901, iv, pp. 446, 483; Daggett, “China Relief Expedition,” p. 57.

The Americans had 16 companies, 1876 men,[143] of which 13 were at Peking and 3 at Tientsin; at the end of September the American force had numbered 5000 men.[144] America retained only a legation guard; the other powers maintained their hold on Shanhaikwan to prevent it from being taken by Russia for her sole benefit, but elsewhere their objects were different. England maintained an expectant attitude, having strongly reinforced her troops, but taking no part in the punitive expeditions. Japan had reduced her force to less than a fourth of its previous maximum, and she too refused to join in the expeditions. Italy concentrated her small force at Peking, ready for any opportunity. France co-operated with Germany, but her action was directed more to the protection of missions and of the Peking-Hankow railway, and to support of Russian policy, than to punishment. Germany concentrated her strength at Peking, and she alone entered whole-heartedly on the policy of punitive expeditions.

§ 35. This exposition illustrates the state of mind of the ministers of the powers who had to consider the German note.[145] The American government replied that it was fully determined to "hold to the uttermost accountability the responsible authors of any wrongs done"; and that "their punishment is believed to be an essential element of any effective settlement"; but it also "thought that no punitive measures can be so effective . . . as the degradation and punishment of the responsible authors by the supreme imperial authority itself"; and that the requirement of such punishment "is essentially a condition to be embraced and provided for in the negotiations for a final settlement"; it therefore proposed to open negotiations at once.[146] The Japanese government accepted the note in principle, but in giving practical effect to it they "anticipated grave difficulties," and suggested further exchange of views.[147] The Russian

[143] Daggett, *op. cit.*, p. 143.

[144] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[145] *Cf. antea*, § 23.

[146] Mr. Hill to Baron Speck von Sternburg, Sept. 21st, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 24; China, No. 1, 1901, p. 179.

[147] Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 22nd, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 180.



government thought the proposals "somewhat vague," and "would prefer that the rôle of executioner, if necessary, should be undertaken by the Chinese government." [148] France, Italy and Austria accepted the proposal. [149] The British government replied that it entered fully into the feelings which prompted the proposal, but that it was reluctant to give an undertaking not to open any negotiation until after the infliction of punishments which it might "not be in our power to inflict." [150]

§ 36. On September 25th a Chinese imperial decree was issued by which the princes Chwang and Yih and the beilehs Tsailien and Tsaiying were deprived of rank and office; Prince Twan was deprived of office, sent to trial, and his salary stopped; Duke Tsailan, Yingnien, Kangyi and Chao Shu-kiao were to be sent to trial. [151] The German government then sent a second note proposing that the allied powers should instruct their envoys at Peking to report on the following points: 1°. If the list of persons to be punished, contained in the decree, is sufficient and correct; 2°. if the punishments proposed are adequate for the crimes; 3°. in what manner will the powers be able to control the execution of these punishments. [152]

§ 37. After temporarily uniting for the relief of the legations, the powers were now obviously pursuing divergent aims. Russia was the first to take active steps to secure the objective of her policy. On September 24th Russian troops assaulted and occupied the Chinese city of Newchwang, on the 26th Anshanshan, and on the 28th Liaoyang; on October 2nd they occupied Mukden, and on the 4th Tiehling; on October 6th they crossed at Yingkow, the treaty port of Newchwang, to the west side of the river, and took possession of the terminus of the Chinese railway from Kowpangtze; and on the 10th occupied Tienchwangtai. [153] They had thus, in a short

[148] Mr. Hardinge to same, Sept. 20th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 184.

[149] Sir F. Lascelles to same, Sept. 24th, Mr. Herbert to same, Sept. 23rd, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 185, 197.

[150] Lord Salisbury to Sir F. Lascelles, Sept. 25th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 187; same to same, Oct. 2nd, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 2.

[151] Wu Ting-fang to State Dept., Oct. 2nd, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 25.

[152] *Ibid.*, p. 25; China, No. 5, 1901, p. 3. Cf. chap. xii, § 7.

[153] Corresp. Newchwang, North-China Herald, Oct. 17th, 1900.

campaign of little over two weeks, laid their grasp on the whole of southern Manchuria, from Port Arthur in the south to Tiehling in the north, and as far west as the line of the railway Peking-Shanhaikwan-Sinminfu; in the disorganised state of the Chinese army they had, in effect, established their control over the whole country as far as the borders of Chihli,[154] but Shanhaikwan escaped their grasp. In pursuance of Li Hung-chang's policy of constant withdrawal, the garrison at Shankaikwan evacuated the place, and a Russian force arrived a few hours afterwards, and only one hour after the landing party from the *Pigmy* had taken possession and, by hoisting the British flag, had secured the fort for the alliance of the powers. By virtue of her superior force at Tientsin, Russia had seized the railway from Tientsin to Peking, but was compelled to surrender it to joint use and occupation, and the coal mine at Tongshan, which she restored to the Chinese ownership of Chang Yen-mao, owing to Mr. Detring's influence with the Russian authorities [155]; she had also seized the railway from Tientsin to Shanhaikwan and thence north, and on this she still maintained her hold. At the end of November she was still refusing to surrender it, informing the British government that she could agree to do so only on condition that her expenses of occupation were repaid [156]; and her grasp on it was not relaxed until February, 1901.[157]

§ 38. Yingkow, the port of Newchwang, had been occupied on August 4th by Russian troops, who raised their naval flag over the custom house and the forts.[158] An assurance was given that "the temporary administration . . . will not infringe the rights and privileges which foreigners and Chinese have enjoyed previously in Yingkow" [159]; but, by regulations issued on August 9th, the Russian administration was subordinated to the military authorities, and the Chinese customs was placed

[154] "The Russian absorption of Manchuria is proceeding without material interruption."—*Edit.*, North-China Herald, Nov. 7th, 1900.

[155] Tel. Tientsin, Oct. 25th, North-China Herald, Oct. 31st, 1900.

[156] Same, Nov. 24th, *ibid.*, Nov. 28th, 1900; Times, Nov. 29th, 1900.

[157] Cf. *postea*, § 41.

[158] Cf. chap. x, § 10.

[159] Adm. Alexeieff to consul Fulford, Aug. 6th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 192.

under its supervision, the customs revenue being devoted to defraying its expenses.[160] On October 4th for the Russian naval flag over the custom house was substituted the Russian customs flag, a very significant change, though the political situation restrained the other powers from protesting at the moment; but the Chinese envoy assured the British government that "it was not the case that an agreement had been arrived at between China and Russia for the Russian occupation of Manchuria."

§ 39. At Tientsin the Russian authorities gave a signal illustration of their aims. In the siege of the foreign settlement the Russian troops defending it outnumbered all the others; in the relief on June 23rd the Russians preponderated, as they did in the detachment which relieved the Seymour expeditionary force; and even after the departure of the Peking relieving force, the Russian troops left behind outnumbered those of any other nation. In the operations around Tientsin the Russians were engaged on the east side of the river, and on that side they remained encamped, occupying the territory opposite to the British and French concessions, territory in which lay the railway station and its sidings. This railway was under Chinese management with no foreign share in its control, but its bonded debt had been financed by English banks.[161] During the stay of their troops at Tientsin the Russian authorities did not allow their predominating position to be lost sight of: thus, e.g., in the allocation of control of departments in the Tientsin Provisional Government, the Russian member claimed, as a right, the control of the Secretariat General, the fly-wheel of the machine, and the claim was conceded by his colleagues.[162] On October 4th the British commander informed the T.P.G. that "Russian soldiers had interrupted a British officer engaged in constructing a field telegraph line on the east bank of the river opposite the British concession, on the ground that the land belongs to the Russians"; and he claimed that "the land does not belong more to the Russians than to other nations but is under the control

[160] Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Jan. 15th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, p. 13; but cf. *antea*, n. 86.

[161] Cf. chap. iv, §§ 11, 15.

[162] T.P.G. Jan. 23rd, 1901.

of the Provisional Government"; and he asked the T.P.G. to intervene.[163]

§ 40. The Russian commander replied that he had acted by order of Admiral Alexeieff, whom the T.P.G. should address on the subject.[164] The admiral was in Manchuria, and matters drifted for a month, with British sentries jostling Russian sentries on their beats, and "a prod of a bayonet, accidental or intentional, would have put the fat in the fire." [165] The Russian authorities issued a circular on November 6th asserting that "since the 17th of June the imperial Chinese troops have joined the Boxers who attacked the foreign concessions and railway station occupied by the Russian troops, and on the 23rd of June the Russian reinforcements, which came to raise the blockade, swept the left bank of the Peiho . . . and have established themselves there by right of conquest in having taken possession by force of arms and at the price of Russian blood spilled"; this land, for a length of about two miles, and including the railway station, had "become the property of the Russian troops on the 23rd of June by act of war"; and it was declared to be under sole Russian control.[166] A protest from a power whose sentries were disputing the control over the land would have been a very serious matter, and the "Germans and French, in case of dispute, would have rushed to the rescue of the Cossacks" [167]; but the American envoy protested vigorously against this act of "grab" as constituting a breach of all the engagements made by the allies since the beginning of the troubles, and added that "now, under the present movement of the allied forces in China, there are still stronger reasons why this large tract of land, including, as it does, an important public railway station and other property necessary for international use, should not be appropriated by a single power." [168]

§ 41. The Russian envoy, with the curious contradiction of language which seems possible only with Russian

[163] T.P.G. Oct. 4th, 1900.

[164] T.P.G. Oct. 5th, 1900.

[165] Norman Stewart, "My Service Days," p. 340.

[166] Russian circular, Nov. 6th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 41.

[167] N. Stewart, "My Service Days," *ubi sup.*

[168] Mr. Conger to M. de Giers, Nov. 14th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 45.

officials, replied that "there is no question whatever of acquiring territory by conquest on the part of Russia nor of taking possession of the railway station," and that, if the circular "contains any expressions which could be so construed, they have certainly been erroneously used." [169] But the envoy was, apparently, not fully informed of the intentions of his government; and, in reply to the formal protest of the American consul at Tientsin, he was informed that "all questions concerning this matter are to be addressed to the Russian military authorities." [170] The Russian contention finally prevailed, and an area of nearly 1000 acres, with a river frontage of 11,000 feet, became a Russian concession; but the keystone of the dispute, the railway from Peking to Shanhaikwan, was handed over to the British authorities in February, 1901, by the double action of negotiations at St. Petersburg and the decision of Count von Waldersee as commander-in-chief; and by this transfer the area covered by the railway station and its approaches remained under Chinese control. [171]

§ 42. The game of "grab" thus begun was continued by the other powers. There were originally three concessions, dating from 1861, British, French and American; no American control was ever exercised over the last, but the right to it was not formally abandoned. The commerce of the port was mainly centred in the British concession, with a river frontage of 3000 feet; this, in 1897, was extended to the west, bringing its area to 700 acres, but the 550 acres of the extension were not granted as a "concession," but only as a "settlement," or "reserved area for residence." In 1895 a German concession was granted, next down-stream to the American, with a river frontage of 5000 feet; and, in 1896, a Japanese concession between the French concession and the suburbs of the city. These were the commercial nations interested in the China trade; and now, Russia having opened with a lead, the other powers followed suit. On November 7th, a day after the Russian circular, the Belgian consul gave formal

[169] M. de Giers to Mr. Conger, Nov. 16th, 1900, *ibid.*

[170] M. Poppe to Mr. Ragsdale, Dec. 5th, 1900, *ibid.*

[171] For the whole dispute on the railway and the station, cf. China, No. 7, 1901, *passim*. Waldersee's decision, Feb. 15th, 1901, at p. 122.

notice that the Belgian authorities claimed a Belgian concession down-stream from the Russian, with one kilometre (3300 feet) of river frontage with an area of 238 acres.[172] Then in succession the French authorities claimed an extension of the French concession west to the mud wall [173]; the Italians an Italian concession next above the Russian [174]; the Austrians an Austrian concession next above the Italian [175]; and the Japanese an additional Japanese concession extending from their original concession to the city of Tientsin, including much Chinese suburb, besides a large tract next down-stream from the German.[176] Against each of these claims the American envoy protested, urging that the powers concerned should wait until the diplomatic situation was cleared; but no attention was paid to his protests. In the next year the German and British concessions were both extended, but no protest was made. The American authorities for a time entertained the idea of reviving their claim to the old American concession, in order that they might not be entirely shut out from Tientsin; but, in the end, it was arranged to annex it, subject to right of recall, to the British concession.[177]

§ 43. If Russia had territorial ambitions, Germany also had hers—the one to be attained by withdrawing from

[172] Belgian circular, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, p. 42.

Of each of the foreign powers interested there were, in 1899, the following numbers of firms and residents in the treaty ports of China:

|                               | Firms. | Residents. |
|-------------------------------|--------|------------|
| All foreign nations . . . . . | 933    | 17,193     |
| British . . . . .             | 401    | 5,562      |
| Japanese . . . . .            | 195    | 2,440      |
| American . . . . .            | 70     | 2,335      |
| French . . . . .              | 76     | 1,183      |
| German . . . . .              | 115    | 1,134      |
| Russian . . . . .             | 19     | 1,621      |
| Italian . . . . .             | 9      | 124        |
| Austro-Hungarian . . . . .    | 5      | 90         |
| Belgian . . . . .             | 9      | 234        |

[173] French circular, Nov. 20th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 42.

[174] Sgr. Raggi to Mr. Conger, Dec. 1st, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 47.

[175] Herr Czikan to same, Nov. 28th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 46.

[176] Japanese circular, Dec. 28th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 47.

[177] Mr. Hay <sup>from</sup> to Mr. Conger, Feb. 26th–Nov. 27th, 1901, *ibid.*, pp.

China,[178] the other to be furthered by a policy of frightfulness. An attempt must, however, be made to retard the attainment of Russian aims; and to do this the Anglo-German agreement was made on October 16th, in four articles. The first declared that "it is a matter of joint and permanent international interest that the ports of China should remain free and open to trade and to every other legitimate form of economic activity for the nationals of all countries without distinction," and this the two governments agreed to uphold; the second declared that the two powers would "not make use of the present complication to obtain for themselves any territorial advantages in Chinese dominions, and will direct their policy toward maintaining undiminished the territorial conditions of the Chinese empire"; by the third, "in case of another power making use of the complications in China in order to obtain under any form whatever such territorial advantages," the two powers agreed to consult together "as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China"; and, by the fourth, the two powers were to invite the adhesion of the other allied powers.[179] The American government replied accepting the first two articles as being in full harmony with the policy which it had advocated from the beginning; and, on the third, it declared that, as it concerned the two powers, it did "not regard itself as called upon to express an opinion in respect to it." [180] France acceded in the terms of the American reply: Italy, Austria and Japan acceded without reserve; and Russia declared that she had already made her declaration of disinterestedness.[181]

§ 44. Russia continued to effect her absorption of Manchuria, though both Russia and China denied formally that there was any agreement between them touching those provinces.[182] Germany did not waive any of the exclusive rights she had asserted in Shantung, and actively

[178] Manchuria, it must always be remembered, though a part of the Chinese empire, was not in China.

[179] British and German ambassadors to Mr. Hay, Oct. 23rd, 1900, U.S. For Rel., 1901, App., p. 31.

[180] Mr. Hay to ambassadors, Oct. 29th, 1900, *ibid.*

[181] Mr. Hardinge to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 10th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 45.

[182] Sir C. Scott to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 6th; Chinese envoy to same, Jan. 15th, 1901; China, No. 6, 1901, pp. 4, 13.

pursued the policy of punitive expeditions. France, though inclined to co-operate in the German expeditions, still gave her diplomatic support to Russia whenever the occasion arose. Italy pursued an active policy within the measure of her limited force. Japan was fearful of the future, and kept a watchful eye on Russia. America adhered to the open door, pushed negotiation as distinguished from compulsion, and took no part in any military operations after the arrival of Count von Waldersee. England had her hands occupied with the war in South Africa, and could do no more than maintain a watchful attitude; on the diplomatic side a candid opinion was expressed by Mr. John Hay, the keenest observer then in the service of any of the powers—

“My heart is heavy about John Bull. Do you twig his attitude to Germany? When the Anglo-German pact came out, I took a day or two to find out what it meant. I soon learned from Berlin that it meant a horrible practical joke on England. From London I found out what I had suspected, but what it astounded me after all to be assured of—*THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW!* When Japan joined the pact, I asked them why. They said, ‘We don’t know, only if there is any fun going on, we want to be in.’ Cassini [183] is furious—which may be because he has not been let into the joke.”[184]

[183] Russian ambassador at Washington.

[184] John Hay to Henry Adams [his most intimate friend], Nov. 21st, 1900, W. R. Thayer, “Life and Letters of John Hay,” ii, p. 248.



## CHAPTER XII

### THE DIPLOMATIC SETTLEMENT

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§ 1. WHILE the allies, considered as a concert of the powers, had their difficulties, the Chinese plenipotentiaries had no easy task. The government was disorganised, and such authority as existed in the empire was in the hands of the viceroys, who during the troubles had appealed from Philip drunk to Philip sober, and who now ranged themselves solidly on the side of their emperor and empress dowager, against both those foreign ministers who would hold the empress dowager to strict accountability for her misdeeds, and those Manchu nobles who would lead her further on the road of Boxerism. Against the one party they demanded entire immunity for the empress dowager, and full security for her person [1] ; against the other they denounced the Manchu leaders in a memorial to the throne, urging the empress dowager to "punish those who have brought the empire and the court to the present pass." This appeal was countered by the question—"What punishment do you recommend ?"—and, as the legal penalty for the crime charged against these members of the higher nobility was execution by the lingering process, the viceroys were in a quandary.[2] The two Yangtze viceroys were, on the suggestion of the foreign envoys, joined as coplenipotentiaries with Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang.[3] In the original commission Junglu was included as joint plenipotentiary, but he was objected to on grounds which appeared valid at the time, though now known to be unreasonable.[4]

§ 2. The sovereigns and the court were still under

[1] Identical note of viceroys to consuls, consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, Aug. 18th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 95 ; viceroys to Lo Feng-lu, Aug. 20th, *ibid.*, p. 99 ; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 30th ; *ibid.*, p. 200.

[2] North-China Herald, Oct. 31st, 1900.

[3] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 23rd, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 181 ; imp. decree dated Sept. 13th in Chang Chih-tung to Lo Feng-lu, Oct. 31st, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 60.

[4] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 10th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 150 ; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Sept. 27th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 36.

anti-foreign domination. On their way westward they lingered for a short time at Taiyuenfu, where Yühsien, "infamous forever," still held the reins as governor; and, even after their arrival at Sianfu, the principal persons in the administration were the princes Twan and Chwang, and the greater part of the troops protecting them were those under the command of Tung Fu-siang. Assuming that the sovereigns were fully resolved to accept the statesmanlike policy of Li Hung-chang and to follow the course recommended by him, they were powerless to give effect to their resolve—they could do no more than give it expression in imperial decrees which were merely appeals *ad misericordiam* of the powers; but in fact every act of administration ordered from Sianfu only served to accentuate the continuance of the anti-foreign and pro-Manchu tendencies of the court. In October it was noted that "the viceroy of Nanking is being gradually surrounded by Manchu, instead of Chinese, officials"; and, in the three provinces under his jurisdiction, two of the three governors and all three lieutenant-governors (treasurers) were then Manchus.[5] At Wuchang the other Yangtze viceroy had imposed on him as governor of Hupeh (his seat being also at Wuchang), Yüchang, the notoriously anti-foreign governor of Honan.[6] It was generally felt that this nomination made the position of the Yangtze viceroys critical and jeopardised the Yangtze agreement,[7] and the foreign powers protested; finally by imperial decree Yüchang was ordered to vacate the post to which he had been appointed.[8] In October the viceroy at Foochow was ordered to arrest all members of the reform party [9]; a protest was made and the order was countermanded.[10] The situation of the court may be summarised in the following phrases—"Their majesties, being in the power of the reactionary ministers, must proceed with caution" [11];

[5] Consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, Shanghai, Oct. 6th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 7.

[6] North-China Herald, Oct. 24th, 1900.

[7] Ibid., Oct. 31st, 1900.

[8] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Nov. 23rd, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 105.

[9] Consul Warren to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 24th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 49.

[10] Sir E. Satow to same, Oct. 30th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 55.

[11] Viceroy Chang Chih-tung, quoted by consul Fraser, Oct. 6th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 89.

"the court at Sianfu is completely dominated by Tung Fu-siang" [12]; "the empress dowager is under the thumb of Tung Fu-siang—she is like a man riding a tiger—he dares not get off for fear the tiger will turn and rend him." [13]

§ 3. Li Hung-chang's slow progress north delayed the Chinese overtures, [14] even if the officials then available had been ready to make them, or were at all aware of the seriousness of the position in which China stood. [15] Ever after, on October 15th, the first steps were taken, the powers and their envoys could come to no decision: before agreeing with the Chinese plenipotentiaries, they had first to come to an agreement among themselves. [16] Russia and Germany stood for two opposing policies. The Russian envoy, in accordance with the Russian declaration, left Peking on September 29th; but, as none of the other powers followed his example, he returned on October 21st; and the new German envoy delayed his arrival until he could have the backing of Count von Waldersee and his force. [17] The indecision of the concert of powers was clearly manifest to one observer—"I have been hard at work here ever since the middle of August, but all I have to show for it is a couple of Chinese plenipotes waiting for the powers to make up their minds as to what they will demand from China." [18]

§ 4. After the American note of July 3rd, the French

[12] North-China Herald, Nov. 28th, 1900.

[13] Ibid., Nov. 21st, 1900.

[14] "It is a pity the prince did not go in for negotiation at once; had he done so, or had Li hurried up, we could have got our train started before the Germans, by their 'punishment first, negotiation afterwards' note, destroyed the line."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 28th, 1900.

[15] "One thing is curious: I don't think any of the officials have an adequate idea of the gravity of the situation or of the seriousness of the offence, or of the change events have made in China's standing and position."—Same to same, Oct. 8th, 1900.

[16] "Ministers are consulting, and when they agree in their demands, probably this week, they'll see Prince Ching and Li."—Same to same, Oct. 28th, 1900.

"Negotiations not begun here yet. Ministers are trying to come to an agreement among themselves first."—Same to same, Oct. 31st, 1900.

[17] "As to people's ideas and policy, I can't make any of them out: the Russians by their departure suggest one set of ideas, and the Germans by their late arrival another."—Same to same, Oct. 6th, 1900.

"De Giers [Russian envoy] arrived: Germans expected this week—must follow the Russian lead, I fancy."—Same to same, Oct. 21st, 1900.

[18] R. Hart to A. D. Drew, Dec. 5th, 1900.

government had proposed a *via media* [19]; now, after the German note of September 18th, [20] a French note of October 4th submitted the following points as bases of the negotiations.

- 1°. Punishment of the principal culprits to be designated by the envoys of the powers at Peking.
- 2°. Maintenance of the prohibition of import of arms.
- 3°. Equitable indemnities for states, societies and individuals.
- 4°. Formation at Peking of a permanent guard for the legations.
- 5°. Dismantling of the forts at Taku.
- 6°. Military occupation of two or three points on the road from Peking [21] to Taku, which would thus be always open for the legations to reach the sea, or for forces from the sea with the capital as their objective point.

The French government thought it "impossible that, presented collectively by the representatives of the powers and supported by the presence of the international troops, such legitimate conditions as these should not speedily be accepted by the Chinese government." [22]

§ 5. On the second and third of these proposals there was no dispute. The allies must exercise their power to prevent China, whether the administration or disaffected bodies, from obtaining war material to be used against them; and all the powers were agreed in demanding substantial indemnities, as compensation for great losses actually incurred, and as reimbursement of the exceedingly heavy military expense to which they had been put. The fourth was not objected to in principle; but the American government noted that it was "unable to make any permanent engagement of this nature without the authorisation of the legislative branch," pointing out, however, that it had "stationed in Peking an adequate legation guard" [23]; and Japan [24] and Russia [25] expressed

[19] Cf. chap. ix, § 3.

[20] Cf. chap. xi, § 23.

[21] The British blue-book has it "Tientsin to Taku," but the error was corrected in later despatches. The U.S. For. Rel. has it "Tientsin to Peking." The intention was to guard the whole route from the sea to the legations.

[22] Memorandum of French ambassador, Oct. 4th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 5; U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 26.

[23] Sec. State to French ambassador, Oct. 10th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 27.

[24] Mr. Whitehead to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 14th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 34.

[25] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Hardinge, Oct. 23rd 1900, *ibid.*, p. 49.

a preference for separate, national, legation guards. The French government accordingly modified its proposal to read :

4°. Formation by each power of a permanent guard for its legation at Peking.[26]

The fifth was not disputed, except that the American government reserved its opinion.[27] On the sixth the American government made the same objection as to the fourth ; while the powers generally thought it inadvisable to guard the road by an international force, and preferred that each power should hold a fort of its own within reach of the sea.[28] This was then modified to read—

6°. Military occupation of certain points, to be determined by agreement between the powers, with a view to keeping the road always open, etc.[29]

§ 6. The punishment of the guilty had been accepted as one of the bases for negotiation ; but the German note had also been accepted in principle, by France [30] as well as by some others ; and, as punishment constituted the whole of the German note, and was only a clause in the French note, the concert of powers naturally gave the German note the right of way. A long delay occurred before any negotiations on the other demands were opened with the Chinese plenipotentiaries, but punishment was taken in hand forthwith. The imperial decree of September 25th [31] professed to inflict punishments, which it professed were severe, on those who, it professed, were the most guilty. The decree was criticised for the reasons that “ the punishments are grossly inadequate ; titles of nobility can easily be restored, and it is not uncommon for a Chinese officer to be degraded, and soon thereafter to be reinstated or promoted to a higher place ” ; and the omission of the names of Yühsien and Tung Fu-siang,

[26] Same to Sir E. Monson, Oct. 17th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 41.

[27] Sec. State to French ambassador, Oct. 10th, 1900, *ubi sup.*

[28] Lord Salisbury to Sir E. Monson, Oct. 11th, to Mr. Hardinge, Oct. 23rd, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, pp. 24, 49.

[29] Same to Sir E. Monson, Oct. 17th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 41.

[30] Sir E. Monson to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 7th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 8.

[31] Cf. chap. xi, § 36.

"who were the worst of all," was especially noted.[32] The British envoy reported that, "although this decree does not in itself prove that the throne has either the will or the power to inflict adequate punishment, it may be accepted as a step in the right direction." [33] The Chinese official view was that enough had been done, and that negotiations might now begin [34]; but this was not the opinion of the foreign envoys at Peking.[35]

§ 7. A decree of October 19th forbade the degraded nobles to continue their attendance at court, and dismissed Yühsien from his office of governor of Shansi [36]—a measure quite inadequate to satisfy foreign expectations. The envoys at Peking, on October 27th, unanimously agreed that "the punishment of death should be demanded for eleven officials . . ." viz., Prince Twan, Prince Chwang, Puching Prince of Yi, the two beilehs Tsailien and Tsaiying, Duke Lan, Tung Fu-siang, Yühsien, Kangyi, Chao Shukiao and Yingnien.[37] A proposal that these officials should be decapitated at Peking, in the presence of delegates of the powers, was considered, but it was decided to leave the execution and manner of the death penalty to the Chinese government. The Chinese plenipotentiaries urged the powers to "appreciate the most difficult position in which China is now placed and be lenient in the demand [for the death penalty,] to open negotiations, to suspend military operations and to withdraw the troops." [38] This met no response, and the court moved so far as to issue, on November 13th, an imperial decree by which Prince Twan and Prince Chwang were to be deprived of office and rank, and imprisoned for life; Prince Yi and Tsaiying imprisoned for life; Tsailien deprived of his hereditary rank; Duke Lan and Yingnien degraded;

[32] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 4th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 39.

[33] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 3rd, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 7.

[34] Chinese envoy to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 6th; Sir C. MacDonald to same, Oct. 13th, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 18, 38.

[35] Sir C. MacDonald to same, Oct. 9th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 22.

[36] Sir E. Satow to same, Oct. 26th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 52.

[37] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 27th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 43.

[38] Plenipotentiaries to Chinese envoys at foreign courts, Nov. 7th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 82.

Kangyi, dead, excused from punishment; Chao Shu-kiao degraded but left in office; Yühsien banished to the frontier; Tung Fu-siang's punishment reserved for further consideration, on account of his being in command of imperial troops.[39]

§ 8. The Chinese court was indeed "riding the tiger." Except under the most extreme compulsion, it dared not inflict the death penalty on Manchu nobles of the imperial blood, such as Prince Twan and Duke Lan, who were among the most culpable [40]; and in the attempt to save imperial clansmen, such as Kangyi and Yühsien, it was driven to adopt customary oriental subterfuges. Kangyi was reported to have died from the hardships of the flight to Sianfu; the report was taken under advisement, then doubted, then disbelieved, but finally accepted as true. Yühsien was officially reported to have committed suicide; it was even declared that "this information is perfectly true." [41] Though dead, he was dismissed from his office [42]; then the report of his suicide was doubted, but he had left the province of Shansi [43]; he lived to start on his way to banishment, and, on the way, to be overtaken by a decree ordering his decapitation, which was carried into effect. Tung Fu-siang presented the greatest difficulty. Commander of fifteen thousand of the most serviceable troops then guarding the court, and exercising great personal influence over the commanders of other troops, he was in a position to dictate his terms, and to refuse to submit to any sentence of punishment; and his name was, for the present, dropped from discussion.[44]

[39] Same to same, Nov. 15th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 91.

[40] "I believe the German demand would obtain the punishment of all but members of the imperial family. I think the court would sacrifice Prince Chwang, for instance, but I don't believe Prince Twan or Duke Lan could be got without catching them, and that means a military expedition—to go one knows not where, to last—one knows not how long, and to start—one knows not how many other difficulties."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Sept. 29th, 1900.

[41] Li Hung-chang to Mr. Conger, Oct. 27th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 44; Chang Chih-tung to Lo Feng-lu, Oct. 25th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 51.

[42] Imp. decree, Oct. 28th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 56.

[43] Chang Chih-tung to consul Warren, Nov. 7th, 1900, *ibid.*, pp. 82, 87.

[44] Mr. Conger wrote, "I urged my colleagues to leave his name out of the first demand, so that he might carry out the imperial order for the execution of the others."—Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Nov. 20th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 48.



At this stage the envoys contented themselves with recording their unanimous opinion that the terms of the decree of November 13th were "inadequate and absurd." [45]

§ 9. In order to get out of the diplomatic chaos, the powers generally were agreed that it was most important that the court should be induced to return to Peking without delay. The wisdom of urging this step was apparent to the Japanese government before the end of August [46]; and by the middle of September all the envoys were agreed that "negotiations might be greatly facilitated if the emperor and empress dowager could be induced to return to Peking," and so be "withdrawn from the influence of Prince Twan and other pernicious advisers," and an informal note in that sense was sent by each envoy, except the German, to Prince Ching. [47] The latter replied that he had already written urging the court to return. [48] The court declared its intention of remaining at Sianfu, because "the capital is now occupied by foreign troops," and for fear of a pestilence following the "military operations" in Peking [49]; on October 18th Li Hung-chang stated officially that "the emperor has determined to proceed to Peking and expects to arrive in six weeks' time" [50]; but the court itself announced in an imperial rescript that it would "return when the preliminaries of peace were settled." [51] Then followed the military expedition to Paotingfu, [52] from which the Chinese troops guarding the city withdrew by superior order, while negotiations opened by General Gaselec proved fruitless. Besides punishing

[45] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Nov. 19th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 94. "The punishments are all grossly inadequate and by no means commensurate with the crimes."—Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Nov. 20th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., ubi sup.

[46] Lord Salisbury to Mr. Whitehead, Aug. 30th, 1900, China, No. 1, 1901, p. 127. Cf. chap. xi, § 17.

[47] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Sept. 16th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 34; Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Sept. 23th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 100.

[48] Sir C. MacDonald, ubi sup.

[49] Yangtze viceroys to Lo Feng-lu. Oct. 4th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 17.

[50] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 18th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 42. "It is said the emperor is coming back. I hope it is true; his return would simplify everything."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Oct. 19th, 1900.

[51] Sheng Hsüan-hwai to consul Warren, Oct. 24th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 49.

[52] Cf. chap. xi, § 32.

the city—for a second time—and leaving a foreign garrison, three of the officials were summarily executed. These included the provincial treasurer, Tingyung, who, if he did not order, certainly permitted the massacre of the missionaries, and was a leader of the Boxers; but who, as acting viceroy, had in August and September shown his repentance by protecting converts and suppressing Boxers. His execution was “richly deserved” [53]; but Li Hung-chang sent to the envoys a formal complaint, “the whole tone of which is objectionable” [54]; and the friendly viceroy Chang Chih-tung wrote complaining that the execution of Chinese subjects ought to have been left to the Chinese authorities, suggesting that the Chinese people would feel a natural resentment at what they considered an act of treachery in again punishing a once punished city, and urging that military expeditions should cease.[55] The punishment of Paotingfu “greatly frightened the court and made its early return to Peking more difficult and less probable” [56]; the mouse was less inclined to trust itself within reach of the claws of the cat.

§ 10. In the British legation Sir C. MacDonald was replaced by Sir E. Satow, carrying into effect arrangements made before the siege; the American legation was strengthened by the appointment of Mr. W. W. Rockhill as commissioner of the United States [57]; the Russian envoy returned; M. Paul Beau replaced M. Pichon at the French legation; and the new German envoy, Dr. Mumm von Schwarzenstein, arrived. Before the organisation of the diplomatic body was complete, the Chinese plenipoten-

[53] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Nov. 16th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 47.

[54] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, Nov. 5th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 82.

[55] Chang Chih-tung to Mr. Rockhill, Nov. 11th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 46. Cf. chap. xi, n. 130.

[56] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Nov. 16th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 47.

“Everything seemed to be going well until this promenade of Waldersee’s to the city, which I fear will have very unfavorable results upon . . .” Private letter of John Hay, Oct. 16th, 1900, cited in Thayer, “John Hay,” ii, p. 245.

[57] “Hay sent Mr. W. W. Rockhill—whom he regarded as being, next to Mr. Henry White, the best diplomat in the [American] service—to China.”—Thayer, “John Hay,” ii, p. 244.

Mr. Rockhill was envoy to China 1905–9, ambassador to Russia 1909–11, ambassador to Turkey, 1911–13; he died in 1915.

tiaries took the first step toward opening negotiations; and, on October 15th, in an identic note to the legations, they submitted a draft of "the preliminary convention we propose." By Art. 1 China recognised that the attack on the legations was contrary to international law, admitted her culpability, and gave an assurance that it should not occur again. By Art. 2 China admitted her liability to pay indemnities. By Art. 3 it was proposed that each foreign power should decide whether to amend existing commercial treaties or negotiate new treaties. By Art. 4 the offices and archives of the Tsungli Yamen were to be restored to China. Art. 5 provided that, negotiations having been opened, hostilities should cease forthwith.[58] The foreign envoys considered the proposals presumptuous, but the Chinese negotiators hoped that, at least, they might serve as a fulcrum from which to set negotiations going [59]; the envoys took no steps—they had, in fact, no authority—to take the proposals into consideration, and they fell still-born. The Chinese plenipotentiaries, it was understood "from the most reliable authority," were quite prepared to take the proposals of the French note as the basis of negotiation [60]; but the envoys were not ready to open the discussion; even at a later date, only the Russian, Japanese and Italian envoys were authorised to make any communication of the bases of negotiation.[61]

§ 11. The envoys of some of the powers held conferences on October 10th and 26th, and of all the powers on October 28th and 31st to consider the French note.[62]

Art. 1 was made stronger by demanding capital punishment for the officials guilty of directing the attacks on the legations and the massacre of missionaries, especial mention being made of Tung Fu-siang and Yühsien; and by requir-

[58] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 16th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 39; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 19th, 1900, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 40.

[59] "The prince and Li have sent the legations a draft convention for consideration: the legations think it somewhat cheeky—which I don't quite see; but it has opened the ball, and, at all events, supplies 'boxes' to pack stipulations in, expressing regret and promising reparation."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Oct. 19th, 1900.

[60] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Salisbury, Oct. 20th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 44.

[61] Sir E. Satow to same, Oct. 30th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 55.

[62] Cf. *antea*, § 4.

ing the publishing of an imperial decree throughout the empire, declaring that officials in whose districts anti-foreign disturbances occurred, would be immediately cashiered.

Art. 2 was accepted as it stood.

Art. 3 was accepted; the American and Russian governments having expressed an opinion that the amounts of the indemnities should be referred to the Hague Tribunal, this was approved; and it was thought right that compensation should be given to those Chinese who had suffered loss in consequence of being in the service of foreigners.

Art. 4 was modified to ensure "the right of each power to maintain for its legation a permanent guard"; and it was proposed to set out a legation quarter, within which Chinese should have no right of residence.

Art. 5 was extended to cover forts elsewhere than at Taku.

Art. 6 was amended to read—"The powers may arrange between themselves for the military occupation of certain points for the maintenance of communication between the capital and the sea."

Other proposals were made at the conference and discussed.

Art. 7 provided that an imperial decree should be posted for two years in every district, prohibiting, under pain of death, membership in any anti-foreign society. This was adopted.

Art. 8—"A minister for Foreign Affairs should be appointed, and the Tsungli Yamen abolished."

Art. 9—"Relations with the court on a sensible basis should be established."

These two articles were accepted in principle, but their formal adoption was effected later. On November 5th the form of reparation which should be demanded for the murders of Baron von Ketteler and Mr. Sugiyama was agreed to, on the lines proposed by the German and Japanese envoys.[63]

§ 12. With this apparent agreement, the questions at

[63] Sir E. Satow to Lord Salisbury, Nov. 8th, 1900, *China*, No. 5, 1901, p. 155; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 27th, 30th, Nov. 2nd, 1900, *U.S. For. Rel.*, 1901, App., pp. 43 seq.

issue between the allied powers were, nevertheless, not yet fully settled. The British, American, Japanese, Russian and French governments "deprecated jeopardising the negotiations by insisting on capital punishment in the cases of highly placed Chinese officials whom the Chinese government might not be able to produce," and even expressed "grave doubts as to the possibility of enforcing the demand." [64] The Russian, Japanese and American envoys at Peking believed it "impossible at present to secure the death penalty" for the members of the imperial family, Prince Twan and Duke Lan [65]; the American envoy pointed out that "Tung Fu-siang has command of all the troops with the court and is practically master of the situation," [66] and, after he was ordered to Kansu, thought that "severer punishment for him may be opportunely demanded a little later on" [67]; and the Russian envoy agreed to accept the draft note only on condition that "severest punishment" was substituted for "death penalty." [68] The envoys accepted this change for the sake of unanimity, and so did the governments, though the strength of the original words was preferred by the British, German, Austrian and Italian governments. [69] At the end of February, nearly two months after the Chinese acceptance of the draft note, the supplementary list of officials designated for punishment was laid before the envoys; it contained one hundred names: ten, it was proposed, should be executed, and the rest cashiered, some being also exiled. The Russian envoy declared that his government was opposed to demanding of the Chinese further capital punishment; the American envoy said that it was the president's earnest wish that the effusion of blood should cease, and he would be pleased if the powers would agree not to ask for more death sentences [70]; and no

[64] Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Nov. 23rd, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 104.

[65] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 26th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 69.

[66] Same to same, Nov. 20th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 48.

[67] *Ibid.*, Dec. 12th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 55.

[68] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5th, 1900, *ibid.*, p. 54.

[69] *Ibid.*, Dec. 5th, *ubi sup.*; Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Dec. 9th, 1900, China, No. 5, 1901, p. 121.

[70] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, Feb. 28th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 94; Sir C. Scott to Lord Lansdowne, March 15th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, p. 118.

more heads were demanded from China for the siege of the legations, only the officials in the provinces receiving punishment for the massacre of missionaries.

§ 13. Some minor points were also in dispute. The draft note was at first described as an "ultimatum." It was felt that this word implied a time limit, however, and the phrase was changed to "irrevocable conditions." The American envoy proposed to change "irrevocable" to "absolutely indispensable," on the ground that the former word might preclude the foreign powers themselves from accepting changes; this was agreed to by the envoys for the sake of uniformity, but in the end the word "irrevocable" was retained. The American envoy also proposed that the forts should be "dismantled," and not "razed," but this was not agreed to. After more discussion, during which the American and British governments expressed a preference for separate identic notes, the demands were presented, on December 24th, in the form of a joint note.[71] It was telegraphed to Sianfu, and its terms were accepted by a telegraphed rescript dated December 26th; and this, on the demand of the envoys, was supplemented, on January 16th, by a copy of the note for each power, sealed with the imperial seal.[72]

§ 14. The Yangtze viceroys had received an assurance that, in the settlement, their views would be taken into consideration,[73] but they had not been formally consulted. They now intervened, desiring that, "in the case of members of the imperial family [Prince Twan and Duke Lan], perpetual banishment should be substituted for the death penalty"; pointing out that a prohibition of the import of arms was not compatible with the duty of repressing disorder, which was imposed on the Chinese officials; and putting in a plea for moderation in some others of the demands. They accepted the note, however, unconditionally, but hoped that their views would be taken into consideration in the final settlement.[74] The

[71] Text in *ibid.*, p. 59; *ibid.*, p. 60.

[72] *Ibid.*, p. 64; *ibid.*, p. 71.

[73] Cf. chap. xi, § 15.

[74] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 4th, 5th, 17th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, pp. 3, 119.

chief plenipotentiaries, Prince Ching and Li Hung-chang, accompanied the final acceptance of the joint note by a memorandum of their observations. They agreed to press for severer penalties, and, as a result, the penalties accepted in the final protocol were ordered by imperial decrees of February 13th and 21st [75]; they made the same objection on the prohibition of the import of arms as was made by the viceroys; they expressed the hope that the indemnities to be claimed would accord with China's financial resources; clauses relating to the murders and the desecration of cemeteries they accepted without reservation; and they asked that they might be consulted on the details in other matters, such as legation guards and the legation quarter, the razing of forts, the maintenance of communication with the sea, the protection of missionaries, etc. [76]

§ 15. The eight months next ensuing were spent in negotiations, not with the Chinese plenipotentiaries, but between the foreign powers, represented by their envoys; and they are best illustrated by the final protocol itself, which was signed on September 7th. Their course was checkered by two episodes which again marked the divergent aims of the powers. Foreign ministers might flatter themselves that they had clipped the generalissimo's wings [77]; but the punitive expeditions continued during these negotiations [78]; and, on February 15th, Count von Waldersee issued a general army order which, if he were not acting under the orders of his government, showed his contempt for the civil arm, represented by the envoys of the allied powers. He began—"Although the peace negotiations are still continued, their present course gives me cause to allude to the possibility of being obliged to

[75] Cf. *postea*, § 22.

[76] Plenipotentiaries to envoys, Jan. 16th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, pp: 14, 122; U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 66.

[77] "The success we had in stopping that first preposterous German movement [note of Sept. 18th] when the whole world seemed likely to join in it, when the entire press of the continent, and a great many on this side were in favor of it, will always be a source of gratification. The moment we acted, the rest of the world paused, and finally came over to our ground; and the German government, which is generally brutal but seldom silly, recovered its senses, climbed down off its perch. . . ."—John Hay to an intimate friend, Oct. 16th, 1900, Thayer, "John Hay," ii, p. 246.

[78] Cf. chap. xi, § 33.

resume very soon active military operations on a large scale"—and he then "requested" that preparations be made and equipment be prepared for a movement "toward the end of this month." [79] The British commander and envoy, but not the British government, approved [80]; the American commander did not approve, and the American envoy protested. He noted a "constant disposition on the part of most of the military commanders to do something or go somewhere with their troops upon the flimsiest of excuses"; and he made his protest "not so much against this particular proposed movement [Sianfu being the supposed objective] as against the assumed right of any independent action which might endanger the success of negotiations." [81]

§ 16. Russia, having established herself in Manchuria, [82] proceeded to consolidate her position. The existence of an alleged convention between Russia and China regarding southern Manchuria was first made known by the *Times'* correspondent in Peking, Dr. Morrison, in a telegram of December 31st. [83] The British envoy at Peking had "little doubt of the authenticity" of the convention, but added that "ratification at Peking is not likely to take place." [84] It appears that, after the hostilities of October, the Chinese commander asked for an armistice; but the Russian authorities refused, except on condition that "the arsenals and all munitions of war should be surrendered." Subsequently, on November 11th, a convention was signed at Port Arthur, by which the Chinese were to "see that no resistance was offered to the construction of the railway" [from Harbin to Port Arthur], and were to furnish supplies for the Russian guards; they were to disband their troops and surrender all munitions; forts in southern Manchuria not occupied by the Russians were to be dismantled, but the Chinese were to maintain a gen-

[79] Text in U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 92; China, No. 6, 1901, p. 78.

[80] Gen. Gaselee to Lord G. Hamilton, Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Feb. 18th, Lord Lansdowne to Sir F. Lascelles, Feb. 19th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, pp. 75, 77, 79.

[81] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Feb. 21st, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 91.

[82] Cf. chap. xi, §§ 37, 38.

[83] *Times*, Jan. 3rd, 1901.

[84] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 2nd, 4th, Feb. 5th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, pp. 3, 37, 72.



darmerie for police purposes ; " Yingkow and other places " occupied by the Russians were to be administered by them until they " shall be completely satisfied as to the pacification of the country " ; and " the Tartar-General must give the Russian Resident at Mukden full information respecting any important measure he may make. "[85]

§ 17. The Russian government denied the existence of the alleged agreement,[86] and so did the Chinese [87] ; but it was reported that negotiations were proceeding at St. Petersburg for the modification of this non-existing convention,[88] and, in February, that Russia was insisting on its immediate ratification.[89] Then the Russian government declared that the arrangements made were " purely of the temporary character of a *modus vivendi*," and did not constitute an international convention.[90] Notwithstanding this disclaimer of any ambitious views, the American, British, German and Japanese governments warned the Chinese government that the conclusion of separate treaties with any one of the powers would be a source of danger to China.[91] The Chinese government had denied the existence of the agreement, but the viceroy at Wuchang produced a summary of it and asked how far England would support China in refusing to ratify it [92] ; and the Chinese throne appealed to England, America, Japan and Germany for their conjoint mediation.[93] The Russian government refused to communicate the official text of the agreement or to discuss it, and declared that, if the powers showed distrust of the Russian assurance given in August, " Russia would take care to safeguard her

[85] Text of Russo-Chinese Convention ; explanatory letter, Chow Mien to Li Hung-chang, Nov. 11th, 1900 ; *ibid.*, pp. 72, 73.

[86] Sir C. Scott to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 6th, Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, Jan. 12th, 1901, *ibid.*, pp. 4, 11.

[87] Chinese envoy to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 15th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 13.

[88] Sir E. Satow to same, Jan. 6th, Sir C. Scott to same, Jan. 22nd, *ibid.*, pp. 4, 29.

[89] Sir E. Satow to same, Feb. 5th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 37.

[90] Sir C. Scott to same, Feb. 6th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 39.

[91] Lord Lansdowne <sup>to</sup> ~~from~~ Sir C. MacDonald, Feb. <sup>13th</sup> ~~15th~~, Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, March 23rd, 1901, *ibid.*, pp. 41, 107 ; Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Dec. 6th, 1901, U.S. For Rel., 1902, p. 271.

[92] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Feb. 27th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, p. 90.

[93] Imp. decree, Feb. 28th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 93.

own interests.”[94] The light of publicity having been thrown on the transaction, Russia now found it necessary to make considerable modifications in the agreement, all in a sense favorable to China,[95] and even to refrain from pressing for a definite convention [96]; but, none the less, the Russian grip on Manchuria tightened,[97] and two years later the situation there was to become an important factor in the international relations of the Chinese empire.

§ 18. Separate action of another kind was also taken, but it was of a nature to reconcile the divergent aims of the powers. Two subjects were likely to excite the selfish aims of each of the powers, the indemnities to be paid for actual damage and for military expenses, and the revision of the commercial treaties; the Russian and American governments had been in favour of referring to the Hague Tribunal the settlement of the indemnities [98]; and now, in January, the American government proposed that these two subjects should be removed from the heated and biased atmosphere of Peking, where their settlement “would be extremely difficult,” to Washington or any other capital of the allied powers.[99] The other powers generally felt that the expert knowledge of the envoys at Peking was essential in any discussion on these matters, and that the transfer of the negotiations to another capital would cause delay and was inadvisable; and the proposal was at once withdrawn.[100] One more attempt was made to restrain the powers in their demands for indemnities. In February and again at the end of March the American envoy at Peking proposed, for the amount of the indemnities, “the adoption of a lump sum which should be within the ability of China to pay, and, as this would evidently be not sufficient to pay the demands in full,

[94] Sir C. Scott to Lord Lansdowne, March 7th, 11th, 13th, 1901, *ibid.*, pp. 113, 116, 117.

[95] Sir E. Satow to same, March 17th, 19th, Sir C. Scott to same, April 5th, 1901, *ibid.*, pp. 131, 134, 168.

[96] Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, April 5th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 169.

[97] “What mean those July proclamations? Is the Russian grip hardening and spreading, and did any changes thereon follow?”—R. Hart to C. A. V. Bowra, Aug. 21st, 1901.

[98] Cf. *antea*, § 11.

[99] Mr. Choate to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 4th, 1901, *China*, No. 6, 1901, p. 2.

[100] Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Jan. 11th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 10.

each power would have to agree to a scaling down proportionate to their claims." This proposal was not at all well received by his colleagues, none of them favoring it except the Japanese.[101]

§ 19. There was not much negotiation with the Chinese plenipotentiaries, who had perforce to accept such terms as were offered; but there was much negotiation between the allied powers, and at times fears were felt that no settlement was possible.[102] The negotiations between the allies were carried through by a sort of "log-rolling": on some subjects, such as the death penalties, the minimum demands were, for the sake of unanimity, accepted by those who preferred more severe punishment; on others, such as the indemnities, each power was allowed to prefer its own claim without check; and the final protocol[103] was signed on September 7th, 1901, eleven months after the first formulation of the allied demands. The protocol was signed by the plenipotentiaries of China, Yikwang, Prince of the 1st rank Ching,[104] and earl Li Hung-chang, and by the plenipotentiaries of the foreign powers, as follows:

Germany: A. MUMM VON SCHWARTZENSTEIN.  
Austria-Hungary: M. CZIKANN VON WAHLBORN.  
Belgium: M. JOOSTENS.  
Spain: B. J. DE COLOGAN (doyen).  
United States of America: W. W. ROCKHILL.  
France: PAUL BEAU.  
Great Britain: SIR ERNEST SATOW.  
Italy: MARQUIS SALVAGO RAGGI.  
Japan: JUTARO KOMURA.  
Netherlands: F. M. KNOBEL.  
Russia: M. DE GIERS.

[101] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Feb. 18th, Mr. Rockhill to same, March 29th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., pp. 86, 121.

[102] "I fully recognise the extent of the difficulties with which you have had to contend and your success in surmounting so many of them, and I congratulate you heartily on the termination of this important phase of the negotiations."—Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Sept. 7th, 1901, China, No. 1, 1902, p. 236.

[103] Text in Treaties, i, p. 111; China, No. 1, 1902, p. 237; U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 306.

[104] By others than British and American, this prince's title, Ch'ing, is romanised as K'ing.

Of the nations having treaties with China, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, Brazil, Peru, Mexico and Korea were not represented; and of the protocol powers, Belgium, Spain and the Netherlands had taken no part in the relief of the legations or in the military operations afterwards.

§ 20. Art. 1 provided for the reparation due for the murder of Baron von Ketteler. An imperial prince, Tsaifeng [105] Prince of the 1st rank Chun, had left Peking on July 12th to express in person to the German emperor the regret of the Chinese emperor and government for the assassination. This regret was also to be expressed by an inscription, in Latin, German and Chinese, on a monument to be erected at the scene of the murder, and by a monumental arch the whole width of the wide street on which it occurred.

§ 21. Art. 2 recited the punishments for the Boxer atrocities. By imperial decrees of February 13th and 21st the following punishments were inflicted on "the principal authors of the outrages and crimes committed." The princes of the blood, Prince Twan and Duke Lan, were sentenced to be tried and executed; but it was agreed [106] that the emperor might commute this to exile to Turkestan (Sinkiang) and imprisonment for life, [107] no further commutation being permitted. The Manchus Prince Chwang and Yingnien, and the Chinese minister Chao Shu-kiao, [108] were condemned to commit suicide. Yühsien, Kisiu and Hsü Cheng-yü were condemned to death by decapitation. Posthumous degradation was inflicted on Kangyi, Hsü Tung and Li Ping-heng, this degradation having "the same effect and legal consequences as would have been produced if they had been condemned to death," including confiscation of their estates. [109] Tung Fu-siang, who could not then be touched, was deprived of his command "pending the determination of the final punishment to be inflicted on him." In addition an imperial decree had

[105] Born brother of the emperor.

[106] Conference of plenipotentiaries, Feb. 5th: Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Feb. 6th, 1901, *China, No. 1*, 1901, p. 160; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Feb. 7th, U.S. For Rel., 1901, App., p. 71. The punishments settled at this conference were those ultimately adopted.

[107] Cf. chap. vi, § 22.

[108] Cf. chap. viii, § 28.

[109] Conference of plenipotentiaries, Feb. 5th, *ubi sup.*

rehabilitated the memories of Hsü Yung-yi, Lishan, Hsü Ching-cheng, Lienyuen and Yuen Chang.

§ 22. The punishment of the culpable officials in the provinces was less easy. Much of the proof was on hearsay evidence through Chinese channels, and the Chinese plenipotentiaries availed themselves of every doubtful point to plead for mitigation. The Russian envoy was instructed not to insist on any more capital punishments, and he abstained from sharing in any demand for further penalties. The American government was opposed to calling for more death penalties, but was resolute in requiring proper punishment; Mr. Rockhill succeeded in persuading his colleagues to reduce their demand for heads from ten to four, these four being notoriously active in the slaughter of missionaries. He then joined his colleagues in demanding and insisting on a total of 96 punishments, viz.—4 death penalty, 11 sentence of death, commuted to perpetual exile, 13 exile for life, 4 imprisonment for life, 2 imprisonment for a term of years, 58 cashiered for life, 2 censure, 2 posthumous degradation. Owing to his advanced age, seventy years, the penalty on the governor of Chekiang was commuted from exile to cashiering, but other pleas in mitigation were rejected.[110]

§ 23. The literate class, the gentry of China, were normally the leaders in any anti-foreign movement; they were recruited through the examinations, and the examinations provided the gateway for their entrance into public life. By Art. 2 (b) they were struck at by the issue, on August 19th, of an imperial decree ordering "the suspension of official examinations for five years in all cities where foreigners were massacred or submitted to cruel treatment." Forty-five cities were enumerated; six in Manchuria, twelve in Chihli, twenty-two in Shansi, two in Honan, one in Hunan, one in Shensi, one in Chekiang.

§ 24. Art. 3 provided for the despatch of Natung as envoy extraordinary to express to the emperor of Japan regret for the murder of Mr. Sugiyama.

§ 25. Art. 4 provided for the erection of an expiatory monument in each cemetery which had been desecrated.

[110] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, April 2nd, June 5th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel. 1901, App., pp. 123, 192.

To provide the cost the Chinese government had already paid a lump sum based on an estimate of Tls. 10,000 for the Peking cemeteries and Tls. 5000 for those in the provinces. The sum of Tls. 70,000 was paid for seven at and near Peking (one British, five French, one Russian) [111]; but the amount paid for those in the provinces is not on record.

§ 26. Art. 5 prohibited the importation of arms and war material for two years, until August, 1903. During the Boxer hostilities all the powers were agreed, but, in time, to some the loss of a profitable trade loomed larger than the restraint on rebellion and disorder, and it was clearly seen that the later co-operation of all was a vain dream. A solution was found, to the general relief, by asking the Chinese government to undertake the enforcement of the prohibition. A term of two years was set, the prohibition to be then renewed for another two years; but it was considered "very unlikely that a renewal will be asked for." [112]

§ 27. Art. 6 related to the indemnities. America and Russia had proposed that all claims should be referred for settlement to the Arbitral Court at the Hague, but this was not accepted by the other powers. The American envoy then urged that a demand for a lump sum, within China's ability to pay, should be made, and that the claims of each power should be scaled down to fit this sum; he estimated this sum at £50,000,000, which was sufficient to justify a demand for an indemnity of £40,000,000. The Russian and French envoys preferred to await the report of the sub-committee before discussing the proposal. The Japanese envoy "believed that the powers might have to consider a reduction of the indemnity; that, while common principles had been accepted by most of the powers for assessing private claims, no such principles, so far as he knew, had been applied to assessing war expenses." [113] The German envoy "saw no reason why the powers should show excessive generosity in the matter" of cutting down claims [114]; the "position of Germany on

[111] Same to same Aug. 8th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 296.

[112] *Ibid.*, Aug. 8th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 297.

[113] *Ibid.*, April 23rd, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 141.

[114] *Ibid.*, *loc. cit.*

the question of the indemnity was most uncompromising," and her representative rejected all proposals for any reduction.[115] The British envoy at first expressed the opinion of his government that the demand should not exceed a reasonable amount.[116]; but later, owing to "the urgent necessity for England to maintain her entente with Germany in China," she made "numerous concessions to German insistence on being paid the last cent of her expenses." [117] This American plea for moderation, therefore, also failed.

§ 28. A committee to consider the extent of the financial resources of the Chinese government had been sitting since March 23rd, consisting of the German, French, British and Japanese envoys. It had to deal with the finances of an empire of which, according to the best information obtainable, the annual budget showed reported receipts under Tls. 100,000,000, while the reported expenditure was over Tls. 110,000,000. During its sittings it received verbal testimony or written communications from Sir R. Hart, Sir E. Satow, Mr. Guy Hillier, Mr. Pokotiloff, Mr. Rump, Mr. Alfred E. Hippisley, Mr. Komura, M. Augustin; all experts well qualified to express an opinion; and it considered the question in conference with delegates of the Chinese plenipotentiaries. The problem before the committee was partly to indicate sources of increased revenue, and partly to divert to the service of the indemnity a portion of the large sums which were actually collected from the people, but which were retained by the tax collectors and their patrons, by the mandarinat of the empire; and, on May 1st, it presented a report dealing with every suggestion, and on it the final settlement was based.[118] The committee estimated that, from certain specified sources, the revenue could be increased by about Tls. 18,000,000, while the national claims handed in amounted to about £67,500,000, or about Tls. 450,000,000.[119]

[115] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, May 25th, 1901, *ibid.*, p. 175.

[116] Same to same, April 23rd, 1901, *ubi sup.*

[117] *Ibid.*, May 25th, 1901, *ubi sup.*

[118] *Procès-verbaux de la Commission chargée d'étudier la question du paiement des Indemnités*, privately printed for the information of the foreign envoys. The report alone, in U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 146; China, No. 1, 1902, p. 147.

[119] Though the amount of the indemnity was expressed in taels as

§ 29. The envoys accordingly demanded a lump sum for indemnities amounting to Tls. 450,000,000, and this was accepted by an imperial decree of May 29th. Interest at 4 per cent. was to be paid from July 1st, 1901; amortisation was to commence January 1st, 1902, and to end December 31st, 1940; and both principal and interest were to be paid in gold by annual payments which, calculated at a fixed exchange, would amount to Tls. 18,829,500 in 1902, Tls. 19,899,300 from 1911, Tls. 23,383,300 in 1915, Tls. 24,483,800 from 1916, and Tls. 35,350,150 from 1932 until the end; the whole amount so payable for principal and interest being Tls. 182,238,150. A proportionate amount was to be paid monthly to a commission of bankers, one representing each of the interested powers; and to secure these payments certain revenues were assigned, viz. 1°. the balance of the maritime customs revenue, plus the proceeds of raising the existing tariff on foreign imports to an effective 5 per cent.; 2°. the native customs at each open port, to be administered by the maritime customs; 3°. the balance of the salt revenue. In consideration of the re-adjustment of the customs tariff, it was agreed that "the channel of the Peiho and of the Hwangpu shall be improved with the financial participation of China."

§ 30. No common principle had been accepted in assessing the amounts claimed for war expenses, and the figures submitted by each government were subjected to no critical examination. The public and private claims of each power, as estimated to July 1st, and as finally settled in the protocol, were as shown on opposite page.[120] Private claims duplicated on the lists of two legations

the one currency common to all the powers, it was declared to be a "gold debt" calculated at the following fixed rates:

|          |                                                  |
|----------|--------------------------------------------------|
| 1 tael = | English, 3·0 shillings.                          |
|          | German, 3·055 marks.                             |
|          | Austro-Hungarian, 3·595 crowns.                  |
|          | American, 0·742 dollar.                          |
|          | French, Italian, Spanish, Belgian, 3·750 francs. |
|          | Japanese, 1·407 yen.                             |
|          | Netherlands, 1·796 florin.                       |
|          | Russian, 1·412 gold rouble.                      |

[120] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, June 8th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 225.

The total of the estimate to July 1st is as given in the despatch and in the report of the commission.



THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CLAIMS OF EACH POWER, AS ESTIMATED TO JULY 1ST, AND AS  
FINALLY SETTLED IN THE PROTOCOL.

|                 | Estimated to July 1st, 1901. |                   |                          |             | Protocol Settlement. |                        |
|-----------------|------------------------------|-------------------|--------------------------|-------------|----------------------|------------------------|
|                 | Public claims.               |                   | Private claims,<br>Tael. | Total Tael. | Amount Tael.         | Per cent.<br>of whole. |
|                 | National Currency.           | Tael.             |                          |             |                      |                        |
| Russia          | Roubles 177,000,000          | 125,316,000       | 8,000,000                | 133,316,000 | 130,371,120          | 29.0                   |
| Germany         | Marks 255,600,000            | 83,581,200        | 7,705,843                | 91,287,043  | 90,070,515           | 20.0                   |
| France.         | 193,500,000                  | 50,979,250        | 24,800,000               | 75,779,250  | 70,878,240           | 15.75                  |
| Great Britain   | £ 6,285,933                  | 41,839,173        | 9,824,856                | 51,664,029  | 50,620,545           | 11.25                  |
| Japan           | Yen 47,574,000               | 33,777,540        | 1,775,000                | 35,552,540  | 34,793,100           | 7.7                    |
| U.S. America    | U.S. \$ 25,000,000           | (Inclusive claim) |                          | 34,072,500  | 32,939,055           | 7.3                    |
| Italy           | Lire 77,000,000              | 20,366,500        | 6,747,427                | 27,113,927  | 26,617,005           | 5.9                    |
| Belgium         | Francs 31,175,000            | —                 | —                        | 8,607,750   | 8,484,345            | 1.9                    |
| Austria-Hungary | Krone 14,240,000             | 3,958,720         | 20,800                   | 3,979,520   | 4,003,920            | 0.9                    |
| Netherlands     | Florins 885,000              | 492,763           | 307,237                  | 800,000     | 782,100              | 0.2                    |
| Spain           | Pesetas 454,000              | 120,000           | 158,055                  | 278,055     | 135,315              |                        |
| Portugal        | —                            | —                 | —                        | —           | 92,250               |                        |
| Sweden          | —                            | —                 | 110,000                  | 110,000     | 62,820               | 0.1                    |
| Other claims    | —                            | —                 | —                        | —           | 149,070              |                        |
|                 |                              |                   | TOTAL                    | 462,538,116 | 450,000,000          | 100.0                  |

were stated to amount to Tls. 4,000,000, and other private claims were supposed to be susceptible of considerable reduction; and the commission on indemnities was "of opinion that the sum of 450,000,000 taels would not be exceeded up to July 1st, 1901." [121] The American government, in harmony with its previously declared preference for a lump sum, announced at an early stage that the American claim would be for U.S. \$25,000,000, to include both public and private claims, and that it would "remain unchanged irrespective of the duration of the military operations" [122]; and, in 1908, a portion of this indemnity was remitted to China, on condition that the money so remitted should be devoted to education. [123] On the above table it may be noted that the Russian and German claims were together nearly as great as the total of the other six allied powers, with France a good third; and that the public claim of Italy was disproportionate to her military effort. The Belgian claim was, for the most part, for damage done to the Peking-Hankow railway. It is probable that the future historian will subject the figures to a more critical scrutiny than is possible to-day.

§ 31. By Art. 7 China agreed that "the quarter occupied by the legations shall be considered as one specially reserved for their use and placed under their exclusive control, in which Chinese shall not have the right to reside, and which may be made defensible"; and she "recognised the right of each power to maintain a permanent guard for the defence of its legation." A military commission appointed to consider the question proposed that each power should maintain the force given below [124]:

|                           | Men. | Guns.  | Machine-guns. |
|---------------------------|------|--------|---------------|
| Austria-Hungary . . . . . | 250  | 2 to 4 | 6 to 8        |
| France . . . . .          | 250  | 2      | 2             |
| Germany . . . . .         | 300  | 5 to 6 | 6             |
| Great Britain . . . . .   | 250  | 6      | 4 to 6        |
| Italy . . . . .           | 200  | 2      | 2             |
| Japan . . . . .           | 400  | 4 to 6 | some          |
| Russia . . . . .          | 350  | 2      | 4             |
| United States . . . . .   | 100  | 2      | 2 to 3        |

[121] Letter of chairman, in *ibid*.

[122] Committee on indemnities, sitting of March 25th, 1901; Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, May 29th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 181.

[123] The condition was proposed by Mr. Rockhill, then American envoy at Peking.

[124] U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 84.

The British envoy proposed scaling these forces down to a maximum of 200 men each for five powers and 50 to 100 men for each of the other three (Austria, Italy and America); but Germany was building barracks for 300 men and her envoy thought it would be inconvenient for the governments if the limits were reduced.[125] General Chaffee had considered one company sufficient for the American guard, and the envoy considered that "there is no valid reason to be found in the state of the country to double it at present," and that "it would be impolitic to do so, especially as some of the other powers might be disposed to avail themselves of the fact to increase their already large guards." [126]

§ 32. The legation quarter may be considered as the provision of a defensible fortress in the heart of the capital of a hostile power—for which purpose it was much too large; or as the happy grasping of the opportunity to provide spacious quarters for the diplomatic representatives of the powers, in park-like surroundings, free from the old-time insanitary conditions, and at the cost of China—and in that case it was not justified. The quarter set apart was a solid block, approximately 1200 metres from east to west, and 650 metres from north to south, with an area of about 200 acres; around this was an open space 40 metres wide, carrying the quarter on the north to a distance of 100 metres from the wall of the Imperial City, and on the south including the wall of the Tartar City with its projecting bastions. On the west the ministries of War, Works and Justice were partly, and the imperial Carriage Park was wholly, taken in, but on the north the Hanlin (Imperial Academy) was not included.[127] The British legation was extended to the west, its area increased three-fold, from 12 to 36 acres. The Russian legation was also extended to the west, increased four-fold, from 5 acres to 19 acres. The American area was extended for the guard, but the legation itself was nearly unaltered; it reached, cut into by other premises, from the Tsienmen to the Water

[125] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, March 20th, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, p. 136.

[126] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, March 8th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., App., p. 101.

[127] See map.



Gate, thus—U.S. parade ground, U.S. guard, Netherlands legation, U.S. legation, Russo-Chinese Bank, Banque de l'Indo-Chine, U.S. legation students—and it carried with it the duty of guarding 700 metres of the Tartar City Wall. Germany grasped the opportunity and extended her legation area from  $2\frac{1}{2}$  to  $25\frac{1}{2}$  acres, undertaking at the same time to guard 800 metres of the Tartar City Wall. The French legation was extended from 6 to 20 acres, being now entirely covered by other légations, and having no longer a front to guard. The Austrian legation exchanged its previous area of less than 2 acres for an area of 10 acres, from which to superintend political and commercial interests in China which were of small importance. The old Italian legation, sufficient for the small Italian interests, measured one acre, and Italy now claimed a new area of  $12\frac{1}{2}$  acres. In it were included the offices of the Inspectorate General of Customs and the houses of the Inspector General and of the Inspectorate Secretaries; but some at least of the powers were deeply concerned at this disturbance of a semi-foreign Chinese department,[128] and, on representations being made, the Italian envoy made some abatement of his claim; he still retained his hold on the offices and houses of the staff, but he restored to Sir R. Hart his house and a part of its grounds, giving also for customs use his old legation; but he demanded as compensation some land formerly destined for France. By this readjustment the Italian area was 10 acres. A further portion of the land of the Inspectorate of Customs was taken for the International Club; but within the legation quarter the customs received, in five pieces, a total of about 11 acres. The Japanese legation expanded so as to include the whole of the Suwang Fu, which its guards had so gallantly defended, thereby increasing its area from one acre to  $14\frac{1}{2}$  acres. The Netherlands legation remained in its old site, increasing its area four-fold, to 2 acres; it had been suggested that, as it did not share in the defence of the Tartar City wall, it should be removed from its vicinity,[129] but the suggestion was not acted on. Belgium received a site within the legation

[128] Lord Lansdowne to Sir E. Satow, Feb. 23rd, 1901, China, No. 6, 1901, p. 88; Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, Feb. 26th, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 93.

[129] Report of military commission, *ibid.*, p. 84.

# PEKING LEGATION QUARTER.

1900-1902





quarter, double the size of its old site on the Hatamen Street. The Spanish legation was extended to about 2 acres.

§ 33. By Art. 8 China agreed to raze the forts at Taku and "those which might impede free communication between Peking and the sea." This was largely interpreted, so as to include the forts at Pehtang, Chinwangtao, and Shanhaikwan. The work of demolition was entrusted to the Tientsin Provisional Government, and was undertaken in a businesslike way. Contracts were made in November for twenty-five forts at Tientsin, Taku, Lutai, Pehtang and Shanhaikwan at a total cost of \$177,475, and the work was completed in June, 1902.[130]

§ 34. By Art. 9 the right was given to occupy certain points "for the maintenance of communication between the capital and the sea." The Chinese plenipotentiaries had asked that the points should be settled in accord with them, but all they could obtain was a recital in the protocol of the "points occupied by the powers"—twelve in all along the railway from Peking to and including Shanhaikwan.

§ 35. By Art. 10 the Chinese government agreed "to post and to have published during two years in all district cities" certain imperial decrees already issued: (a) prohibiting membership in any anti-foreign society; (b) enumerating the punishments inflicted on the guilty; (c) prohibiting examinations in all cities where foreigners were massacred or subjected to cruel treatment; (d) holding provincial officials personally responsible in the case of anti-foreign troubles or other infractions of the treaties.

§ 36. Art. 11 referred to the negotiation of "amendments deemed necessary by the foreign governments" to the existing treaties; and, with reference to the improvement of the courses of the Peiho and Hwangpu, provided for in Art. 6, China agreed as follows: (a) as soon as the administration of Tientsin should be handed back to China, she was to be represented on the commission,[131] and was then to pay Tls. 60,000 a year for the works; (b) for the Hwangpu a mixed conservancy board was to be

[130] T.P.G. *passim*. Amounts of contracts, sitting of Nov. 27th, 1901.

[131] Cf. chap. xi, § 10.

created, and the cost of the work, estimated at Tls. 460,000 a year for twenty years, was to be "supplied in equal portions by the Chinese government and the foreign interests concerned." A set of minute "Regulations for the improvement of the course of the Hwangpu" formed annex No. 17 to the protocol.

§ 37. Art. 12 recited the fact that, by an imperial decree of July 24th, the "office of Foreign Affairs (Tsungli Yamen)" had been transformed into a "ministry of Foreign Affairs (Waiwu Pu)," taking precedence over the other ministries; and recorded an agreement on "court ceremonial as regards the reception of foreign representatives," the details of which were set forth in annex No. 19.

§ 38. Finally it was declared that, for the protocol and such annexes as originated with the foreign envoys, "the French text only is authoritative"; and the foreign powers agreed that, except for the legation guards, the foreign troops should be withdrawn from Peking on September 17th, and, with the exception of the twelve places enumerated in Art. 9, should be withdrawn from the province of Chihli on September 22nd.

§ 39. For a brief outburst of midsummer madness, made serious by the support of nobles and ministers, China had been required to pay a heavy price. She had sent special ambassadors, one of them of the blood imperial, to apologise for the foul murder of accredited envoys; she had herself executed justice, by death and by degradation, on the highest among her ministers; she had suspended the examinations, the natural opening to a career for her scholars; for the expenses incurred in suppressing her rebellion against civilisation she had undertaken to pay a sum which would tie her hands for forty years; she had accepted a foreign fortress and garrison in her capital, as the only means by which, in the opinion of the world, envoys accredited to her court could remain in safety; and, besides other minor concessions, she had agreed to the principle of revision of the treaties which she had resisted in 1854 and 1856,[132] and again continuously since 1870.[133] China, after seventy years of direct relations

[132] Cf. "Conflict," chap. xv, §§ 13-19.

[133] Cf. "Submission," chap. x, *passim*.



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with Western nations, had by successive steps—1842, 1858, 1860, 1885, 1895—now, in 1901, reached a stage of national degradation so low that she still retained few of the attributes of a sovereign and independent state. If her throne was to remain intact, if her existence as a nation was to continue, it was clear that she must modify the procedure she had followed from 1834 to 1900.

## CHAPTER XIII

### THE COMMERCIAL SETTLEMENT

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§ 1. THE final protocol was signed on September 7th, 1901, and, when he signed it, Li Hung-chang was a dying man. He died, in his seventy-ninth year, on November 7th, and his sovereigns recognised the greatness of their loss

by creating him marquis and bestowing on him the highest posthumous honours ever accorded to a Chinese subject of the Manchus.[1] After the death of Wensiang in 1876, he had been the one statesman China possessed with a sound knowledge of international affairs.—“He was a strong man, as the order he maintained wherever he ruled shows; he was a very able man, if unscrupulous; and he did not live in a world of unrealities as most Chinese statesmen do, but he did appreciate facts, and had a good working knowledge of the real relation between China and the outside world.”[2] In the course of forty years’ holding of high office he had accumulated a great fortune, but he had also accumulated a vast store of experience, which he used for his country’s benefit, as it lay in him to see the benefit. In 1896 he had come to the conclusion that no Western power but Russia was in a position to do China much mischief or to give China any effective support, and to secure the latter he was willing to pay the price demanded.[3] Part of this price was the Russo-Chinese Manchurian convention, and this, in an amended form,[4] was awaiting his signature at his death. The viceroys, his colleagues, were protesting against it; the Russian envoy was urging its completion [5]; but he died without signing; and even in his death, by failing to carry out his latest plan, he served his country best.

§ 2. A year later, on October 6th, 1902, the greater and sturdier of the two Yangtze viceroys, Liu Kun-yi, also died, at the age of seventy-four.[6] In him the Hunan party lost its recognised leader, as in Li Hung-chang the Anhwei party; Junglu died, at the age of sixty-seven, on April 11th, 1903; and the service of the state was left to be carried on by lesser men. Of these the most marked was Chang Chih-tung; a distinguished scholar,[7] famed for

[1] Tel. Peking, Nov. 8th, North-China Herald, Nov. 13th, 1901.

[2] Edit., *ibid.* Cf. also a very discriminating appreciation of him in V. Chirol, “The Far Eastern Question,” p. 25; and in Bland “Li Hung-chang,” p. 311.

[3] Cf. chap. iv, § 12; chap. xii, § 16.

[4] Cf. chap. xii, § 17.

[5] Tel. Peking, Nov. 7th, North-China Herald, Nov. 13th, 1901.

[6] By imp’l decree of Oct. 7th (U.S. For Rel., 1902, p. 268) Liu Kun-yi was raised to the rank of baron and appointed to the high distinction of Grand Tutor.

[7] He passed third for the doctorate in the metropolitan examinations of 1863.

the classical style of his state papers, exceeding honest and devoted to the welfare of his people, in public life he was a trimmer.[8] On Liu Kun-yi's death he returned to his former post as acting viceroy at Nanking. On the death of Li Hung-chang, Yuen Shih-kai was at once appointed to succeed him as viceroy of Chihli and imperial commissioner for Northern Affairs.[9] Another official of great natural ability, Sheng Hsüan-hwai, director-general of railways and telegraphs, might now have found his opportunity, but it was his misfortune that his honesty was trusted neither by Chinese nor by foreigners; for his services in connexion with the Yangtze agreement and the preservation of peace in mid-China, he received the distinction of Junior Guardian. By the same decree the same distinction was conferred on Sir R. Hart, "for his valuable assistance and advice in carrying through the peace negotiations." [10]

§ 3. The court was now apparently freed from the domination of the anti-foreign party, and, in December, 1901, the heir apparent who had been selected in January, 1900, Puchün, son of Prince Twan,[11] was formally deposed from his prospective honours [12] and sent to join his father in banishment.[13] At the same time a measure of rehabilitation was taken, which the American envoy had vainly urged should be included in the final protocol.[14] An imperial decree of December 28th ungraciously stated that, at the request of the British and American envoys, Chang Yin-hwan [15] was "as a mark of special mercy, restored to his former official status in order to promote friendly relations." [16] This rehabilitation was a benefit to his family, and they were duly grateful.[17]

§ 4. On the signing of the final protocol and the with-

[8] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 10, 11, 21.

[9] Tel. Peking, Nov. 8th, North-China Herald, Nov. 13th, 1901.

[10] Imp. decree, Kaifeng, Dec. 11th, *ibid.*, Dec. 18th, 1901.

[11] Cf. chap. vii, § 29.

[12] Imp. decree, Kaifeng, Nov. 30th, North-China Herald, Dec. 4th, 1901.

[13] *Ibid.*, Dec. 18th, 1901.

[14] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, July 3rd, Aug. 29th, 1901; U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., pp. 254, 303.

[15] Cf. chap. vi, § 22; chap. x, § 2.

[16] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 2nd, 1902, U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 140.

[17] Same to same, Feb. 25th, 1902, *ibid.*, p. 141.

drawal of the foreign troops from Peking, the court resolved to return to that capital. The Yangtze viceroys had demanded entire immunity for the person of the empress dowager, and they also, in conjunction with Li Hung-chang and Yuen Shih-kai, insisted that an early return to Peking was imperative if the dynasty was to be preserved—"The continued existence of the empire must depend upon the throne's decision upon this matter." [18] The decision was made, and the court started from Sianfu on October 6th, [19] and, after a short rest at Honanfu, made a long stay at Kaifengfu. It was during its stay there that Li Hung-chang died at Peking. Kaifengfu was left on December 14th, and the court took train—that diabolic foreign contrivance—at Chengtingfu; it arrived at the Peking station (Makiapu) at noon of January 7th, 1902, and went, with the usual imperial ceremonies, directly into the palace—in which Field-Marshal Count von Waldersee had for a year established his headquarters. "As the empress dowager was borne past the balcony on which the party from the legations stood she leaned forward in her chair and returned their salutations with evident cordiality." [20] This desire for a reconciliation was also manifest at the first audiences to be held under the new protocol. The foreign envoys were received on January 28th.—"The audience was conducted throughout with more formality and dignity and with a greater outward show of respect for the foreign representatives than heretofore; the event was especially noteworthy as being the first occasion on which the empress dowager has openly appeared in an audience;" and not behind the screen of gauze. On February 1st the empress dowager received "the ladies of the diplomatic corps"; she was "cordial"; and, having asked that those who had gone through the siege should be presented, she "showed great feeling in greeting these ladies, and wept as she spoke to them." [21] The Manchu rulers of China had perhaps learned something; possibly they only wished to have it believed that

[18] Joint memorial cited in Bland and Backhouse, "China under the Empress Dowager," p. 395.

[19] Tel. Sianfu, Oct. 6th, North-China Herald, Oct. 9th, 1901.

[20] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Jan. 7th, 1902, U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 142.

[21] Same to same, Feb. 5th, 1902, *ibid.*, p. 205.

they had so learned ; but, beyond a doubt, they had forgotten much, and hoped the world had forgotten it too.

§ 5. Peking was evacuated, but Tientsin was an "occupied point" guarding the communications to the sea, and its military occupation was continued. The Chinese authorities, speaking through the viceroy, Yuen Shih-kai, expressed their desire that Tientsin "should at once be restored to the administration of the Chinese authorities, so that the viceroy may assume full charge of his office"; and the proposal was approved by the foreign envoys at Peking.[22] The American government supported the restoration, and took steps to ascertain the views of the allied governments.[23] They were strongly in favour of the speedy withdrawal of the provisional government; except the German government, which would have approved, "but for the one thing which stands in the way, namely, the Chinese delay in improving the channel of the Peiho." [24] Count von Waldersee had always considered that the administration ought not to be restored to the Chinese so long as foreign garrisons occupied Tientsin [25]; but, under diplomatic pressure, the military commanders in north-China agreed to the restoration, at a meeting held on April 12th, 1902. Premising that "all the commandants were of opinion that the situation of the contingents at Tientsin will be difficult without the provisional government, but if, for political reasons, the diplomatic corps considers the restoration of the Tientsin government necessary," they were prepared to agree; but it should be effected only on the acceptance of twenty-eight conditions and two recommendations which they proposed.[26] These propositions were cut down by the envoys, on the urgent insistence of the American envoy; he, however, had no official status in the matter, as the American delegate on the Tientsin provisional government had been withdrawn. The reduced conditions were proposed to the

[22] Wu Ting-fang to Mr. Hay, Jan. 20th, 1902, U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 184.

[23] Mr. Hay to American ambassadors, Jan. 29th, 1902, *ibid.*, p. 185.

[24] Mr. White to Mr. Hay, Feb. 26th, 1902, *ibid.*, p. 187.

[25] Count von Waldersee to M. de Cologan, May 25th, 1901, *ibid.*, 1901, App., p. 179.

[26] "Proposition, etc.," in Mr. Conger to same, June 11th, 1902, *ibid.*, 1902, p. 190.

Chinese and accepted [27]; and orders were given to make arrangements for the restoration.

§ 6. On August 15th, 1902, the 329th and last meeting of the council of the Tientsin provisional government was held, the viceroy, Yuen Shih-kai, being present. To him were delivered:

- 1°. A copy of the minutes of the council's proceedings.
- 2°. A statement of its financial operations for two years.
- 3°. Cheques for the amount required to complete works in hand, and for the cash balance now handed over.
- 4°. A list of judicial sentences not yet completed.
- 5°. A list of works in hand.
- 6°. A list of contracts entered into by the council and not yet carried out.

The viceroy acknowledged receipt of the cheques, took note of the documents, and undertook to carry out the sentences, works, and contracts.[28]. In these two years the council had collected from taxation Tls. 2,758,651, and had expended Tls. 2,573,627; it had come to a city with ruined trade and an empty treasury; order had been restored and trade revived, and great improvements had been taken in hand; and it left Tls. 185,024 in the treasury. In its administration of the government of a Chinese city, the Chinese officials might, if they so desired, find an example of honest and efficient service.

§ 7. Foreign troops had been landed at Shanghai, for the purpose of maintaining order, at a time when the relief of the legations was far from certain and the disorder in the north great and wide-spread; and the first to arrive, British (Indian) troops, had speedily been followed by others, jealously apprehensive lest a single power should obtain a predominant position in the Yangtze basin. In 1902 four powers (England, France, Germany and Japan) had there in garrison from 2000 to 3000 men each. At the end of July the Chinese authorities urged the "evacuation of Shanghai by the foreign troops at the same time that Tientsin is handed back." The four powers agreed to withdraw their troops, conditional on the others withdrawing simultaneously, and on retaining the right to re-occupy

[27] Mr. Conger to M. de Cologan, July 15th, 1902, *ibid.*, pp. 198, 200.

[28] T.P.G. Aug. 15th, 1902.

Shanghai should any of the others do so ; but Germany added the condition that "the Peking government and the Yangtze viceroys shall engage not to grant to any power special advantages of a political, military, maritime or economic nature, nor to allow the occupation of any other points commanding the river either below or above Shanghai." The German government, while retaining absolute domination in Shantung and, apparently, having large views of German ambitions in north-China, still explicitly claimed the principle of the open door in the Yangtze basin. The other three powers had already acceded to that principle, but they objected to making it a condition precedent to the common evacuation of Shanghai ; and they protested to China. The viceroys undertook to sign no secret agreement on the subject ; but the German government professed to have "received, both from the Chinese central government and from the viceroys, the general declaration in binding terms demanded by it, that the Chinese government will not part with any of China's sovereign rights, and that they will not agree to any preferential right which is opposed to the principle of the open door." The text of the agreement was not communicated, though it was asked for ; and, in fact, the Wuchang viceroy declared in a despatch that "the pledge proposed, if confined to the Yangtze region, is objectionable . . . if applied to all the Chinese dominions it is superfluous." Both England and Japan protested to China that they "would not recognise as in any way affecting them any arrangement which China might have made with any of the powers concerned in connexion with the evacuation of Shanghai," to which they were not a party.[29]

§ 8. To some of the powers the most important of the provisions of the final protocol was that relating to the revision of the commercial treaties, but to others that on the indemnities was the more important. These latter were those whose claims constituted the largest percentage of the total, and were not properly proportioned to the military effort made to relieve the legations and to repress the disorders occasioned by the Boxer movement.[30] Of

[29] Correspondence, July 30th to Nov. 16th, 1902, China, No. 3, 1902.

[30] Cf. chap. xii, § 30.



the powers which sent expeditionary forces to join in the common effort, three only seem to have exercised some restraint in presenting their claims. The British claim must be considered moderate, considering the extent of their military effort. So too must that of Japan, whose ministers, moreover, figured so closely that the fixing of the interest on the indemnity at so low a rate as 4 per cent. drove them to ask that they might be allowed to increase the amount of their claim.[31] The American government had claimed a lump sum of U.S. \$25,000,000, which was not, in any contingency, to be increased, and which was to cover both public and private claims [32]; and the public claim was made, not to cover the entire cost of the military and naval forces employed, but to provide only for the increase of cost of campaigning above that of the peace establishment.[33] All the powers had seized silver bullion at both Tientsin and Peking [34]; but the American government was the only one which, so far as shown in the records, returned any of it to the Chinese government. In July, 1900, a sum of Tls. 500,000 was seized by the American troops in the yamen of the Salt commissioner at Tientsin, and, on January 24th, 1902, its equivalent, the sum of U.S. \$376,300, was restored to China.[35]

§ 9. The indemnities had, in order that they might be stated in one common currency, been converted into Haikwar taels at the fixed rate of 3 shillings, and corresponding rates in other currencies; but they were expressly declared to be a gold debt. The value of silver in thirty years [36] had fallen from 80 pence to 36 pence, and the value continued to fall until, in 1902 and 1903, the average through the two years was below 32 pence. In 1871, when silver had its full value, the amount of silver required to pay £100 sterling was Tls. 300; in 1901, the date of the final protocol, it was Tls. 666·67; and in 1903 the Chinese government was obliged to pay not less than

[31] Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Hay, June 22nd, 1901, U.S. For. Rel., 1901, App., p. 250.

[32] Cf. chap. xii, § 30.

[33] Reference lost.

[34] Cf. chap. ix, § 21, chap. x, § 27, n. 92.

[35] Mr. Hay to/from Wu Ting-fang, July 13th, 1901, to Jan. 24th, 1902, U.S. For. Rel., 1902, pp. 129 seq.

[36] See chart, "Submission," p. 408.

Tls. 750. But, while the indemnities constituted a gold debt, the resources of China on which the debt was based were purely silver resources, and they had, moreover, been fully pledged as security for her existing debts. The Chinese then appealed to the words of the imperial decree which constituted their acceptance of the liability, and which recognised a tael obligation. The powers could not accept this, as their expenses had been stated in their respective gold currencies; but the American government had "always understood it to be the meaning of the agreement that the indemnity was payable in silver." [37] In 1903 the Belgian envoy proposed that China should be allowed to pay provisionally in silver, and should pay the differences between silver and gold at the end of the amortisation period. [38] After long hesitation and discussion, the Chinese government, "dreading the uncertainty of the Belgian proposal," proposed to accept the gold liability on certain conditions regarding interest and the rate of exchange. [39] Finally, in October, 1905, the foreign envoys gave their assent to proposals made in July, [40] by which the arrears due were taken at Tls. 8,000,000; the national bonds were to be signed; interest was to be allowed from actual date of payment of the monthly instalments to the indemnity interest date, which was half-yearly; and matters were to be adjusted before the end of the year. Apart from the payment of Tls. 8,000,000 by China, the adjustment at the end of that year resulted in a credit, in favour of China, of Tls. 273,855. [41]

§ 10. The final protocol provided that the specific duties of the customs tariff on imports should be raised to an effective 5 per cent., and that, provisionally, import duties should be collected at 5 per cent. *ad valorem*. The protocol provided for a delay of two months, and China granted an additional delay of four days; and the collection at the provisional rate began on November 11th,

[37] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, July 11th, 1902, U.S. For. Rel., 1904, p. 184.

[38] Mr. Joostens to dean of diplomatic corps, Oct. 1st, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 177.

[39] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 26th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 182.

[40] Joint note to Prince Ching, Oct. 2nd, 1905, *ibid.*, 1905, p. 156.

[41] Joint note to same, Dec. 23rd, 1905, *ibid.*, p. 159.

1901.[42] No change was made in the levy on opium, the new rate did not apply to export or coast-trade duties, and it was not introduced at the custom houses on the land frontiers; but duty was now levied on many important categories of goods formerly imported duty-free, such as wine and spirits, foreign tobacco, soap, etc. Work was begun by a joint commission on the adjustment of the specific duties of the new import tariff, at the rate of 5 per cent. based on the average market value during the preceding three years; it was completed by September, 1902, and took effect from October 31st.[43] At that date it had been accepted by eight powers only; among the eight were the commercial powers, England, America, Germany and Japan; but it was necessary, under the principle of extraterritoriality, to give to merchants of the other eleven treaty powers the option "to pay the protocol 5 per cent. duty *ad valorem* on any one commodity he may import, instead of the specific duty of the revised tariff"; and, under the "most-favoured nation" clause, if the option was exercised for any commodity by any merchant of any non-accepting power, the same option for the same commodity could be claimed by any merchant of any accepting power.[44] This state of extraterritorialised confusion lasted for two years, until, on September 19th, 1904, it was notified that "the only power not yet a signatory is Portugal, with whom treaty negotiations are now being conducted at Shanghai." [45] The tariff at 5 per cent. based on the obsolete values of 1858 was now corrected in China's favour to the basis of the years 1897-99; excluding opium, the foreign import duty collected in 1899 was Tls. 6,656,881, or 25 per cent. of the total customs revenue; in 1915 it was Tls. 14,233,801, or nearly 39 per cent. of the total.

§ 11. The revision of the commercial treaties was a common interest, and China proposed that a "round-table conference" should be held for the common consideration of the subject. This was, in principle, acceptable to at least one of the foreign powers [46]; but the general sentiment was that, whereas the final protocol had been a co-

[42] I.G. circ., Sept. 30th, 1901.

[43] Ibid., Oct. 14th, 1902.

[44] Ibid., Dec. 6th, 1902.

[45] Ibid., Sept. 19th, 1904.

[46] Cf. chap. xii, § 18.

operative act, the treaty revision must be negotiated with each power separately, and this was the course followed. In the negotiations the Chinese plenipotentiaries throughout were Lü Hai-hwan and Sheng Hsüan-hwai, assisted by Sir R. E. Bredon, Mr. A. E. Hippisley and Mr. F. E. Taylor, of the customs service, appointed officially to that function. The first treaty to be negotiated was that with England, the British special commissioner being Sir James L. Mackay,[47] assisted by Mr. Charles J. Dudgeon, a merchant of Shanghai; this treaty [48] was signed on September 5th, 1902. The American [49] and Japanese [50] treaties were both signed on October 8th, 1903; the American plenipotentiaries were Mr. Edwin H. Conger, envoy to Peking, Mr. John Goodnow, consul-general at Shanghai, and Mr. John F. Seaman, merchant at Shanghai; the Japanese plenipotentiaries were Hioki Eki, secretary of legation, and Odagiri Masnoske, consul-general. The American treaty, except as will be indicated, followed closely, often textually, the model of the British; and the Japanese was, in effect, a detailed "most-favoured nation" covenant. Negotiations were then opened with Germany; but, before they had proceeded far, the Chinese plenipotentiaries discovered that each of the others of the nineteen treaty powers had every intention of demanding its special price for the quittance in full which would be given to China by the revision of the treaties; and all negotiations were suspended, and were never resumed. The British and American treaties constitute the code to which China is now required to conform, and it will be sufficient to consider their provisions.

§ 12. The stipulations fall naturally into three categories: those in the general interest of foreign trade; those necessary for the reform of the Chinese state; and those considered to be required for special British or American interests. In the first category was one of the first importance, an elaborate scheme to enable China to abolish her cumbersome system of *likin*, a tax on every internal movement of commodities, which was responsible for much of the international friction of the preceding forty

[47] Afterwards Lord Incheape.

[48] Text in Treaties, i, p. 351; China, No. 2, 1902.

[49] Text in Treaties, i, p. 536; U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 91.

[50] Text in Treaties, ii, p. 1345.

years. The subject was so important and so full of complications that the article dealing with it [51] was greater in length than all the rest of the sixteen articles contained in the British treaty. "All barriers collecting likin or such-like dues or duties" were to be "permanently abolished"; but existing custom houses might be maintained. Foreign goods on importation, in addition to the effective 5 per cent., were to pay a special surtax of one-and-a-half times that duty to "compensate for the abolition of likin, of transit dues in lieu of likin, and of all other taxation on foreign goods"; but the existing taxes on foreign opium were to remain unchanged, and there was "no intention of interfering with China's right to tax native opium"; an excise on salt was to be substituted for the likin on its movement. China was to be allowed to revise the export duties to an effective 5 per cent., and a special surtax of "one-half the export duty payable, in lieu of internal taxation and likin, may be levied on goods exported either to foreign countries or coastwise," except in the case of silk and its cocoons. Native goods circulating in the interior might be charged with a "consumption tax," levied only at the place of consumption. An excise was to be collected from "products of foreign type turned out by machinery." Officers of the customs service were to be selected for each province "for duty in connexion with Native Customs affairs, Consumption tax, Salt and Native Opium taxes"; and cases of complaint were to be examined into by courts of Joint Investigation. Every precaution was taken that the stipulations should be carried out honestly and effectively, by the issue of an imperial decree, and by placing responsibility on the provincial officials.

§ 13. Had there been no likin to abolish, and if the organisation of the Chinese state had been capable of organising and collecting a consumption tax, the abolition of likin would have been feasible; and had there been only two powers interested, the concordat might have been carried out. The conditions on which the agreement was made were:

1°. That all the powers who are now [nineteen in number] or who may hereafter become entitled to most-favoured nation treat-

[51] Br. treaty, 1902, art. viii, and Annex B; Am. tr., 1903, art. iv.

ment in China enter into the same engagements as those undertaken by the British (American and Japanese [52]) governments.

2°. And that their assent is neither directly nor indirectly made dependent on the granting by China of any political concession or of any exclusive commercial concession.

These conditions inevitably nullified the whole agreement. England made the agreement, America followed suit, and Japan accepted the engagements without reserve; to have accepted any special condition imposed by Germany would have been a small price to pay, had that course been permitted, as these four countries (including their dependencies) supplied about 86 per cent. of China's imports; of China's exports about 55 per cent. went to these four countries, 25 per cent. represented the value of silk products exported to France and Italy, and 15 per cent. the value of exports, chiefly tea and chiefly by trans-frontier routes, to Russia.[53] Had it been a question only of the legitimate trade, agreement with these four countries might have settled the matter, except for the export of silk and tea; but, under the principle of extra-territoriality, every power, even the smallest and most remote, must give its consent,[54] and, for that consent, could exact its price. In a new country, having a clean slate in fiscal matters, the arrangement proposed would have been wise and statesmanlike; but the smaller powers had to be reckoned with and could not be coerced, British and American merchants distrusted the honesty of the Chinese in carrying out the scheme, China was not capable of creating an honest and efficient civil service, and the agreement never came into operation.

§ 14. Certain customs matters were regulated. During forty years drawbacks issued for the return of duties paid could not be cashed, but must be used only to pay other duties, except that, from 1876, a demand might be made to have drawbacks specially marked for cashing; it was now

[52] Jap. tr., 1903, art. i.

[53] Report on trade of China, 1905, p. vi.

[54] When the Shanghai municipality took in hand the task of suppressing gambling houses, by successive changes of ownership the venue was changed from one consulate to another; and in the end declarations of ownership by a citizen of the Argentine Republic in one case, and of the Cuban Republic in another, created so complicated a situation that the campaign had to be stopped. Cf. Shanghai Municipal Reports, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1907.

agreed that all drawbacks for the import duty on foreign goods were payable in cash.[55] The revised tariff was formally accepted,[56] and provision made for its revision, if demanded, at intervals of ten years.[57] Bonding privileges were to be extended,[58] and additional facilities given for inland steam navigation [59]; Mukden, Antung and Tatungkow in Manchuria,[60] Changsha in the province of Hunan,[61] and Kongmoon in the province of Kwangtung,[62] were opened as treaty ports; the opening of three other ports (Wanh sien in Szechwan, Anking in Anhwei, Waichow in Kwangtung) was also included in the scheme for the abolition of likin which failed.

§ 15. The British treaty dealt also with certain specifically British interests. China agreed that "the duties and likin combined levied on goods carried by junks between Hongkong and treaty ports in Kwangtung shall together not be less than the duties charged by the Imperial Maritime Customs on similar goods carried by steamer" [63]; and undertook to remove the artificial obstructions to navigation in the Canton river,[64] which had been placed there in 1884 and 1894. China also accepted a restriction placed on her power to prohibit shipments of rice along the coast.[65] These special stipulations, in the interest of the trade of Hongkong and the British shipping interest, were moderate and reasonable, but they gave other powers a pretext for the consideration of their special interests.

§ 16. The American treaty regularised some privileges which had hitherto been enjoyed only under the "most-favoured nation" clause. It was now agreed that the American envoy might reside at the capital, and, while there, was to be received "in a manner befitting his high position" [66]; American consuls in China were to be shown the same consideration as was shown to Chinese consuls in the United States [67]; and citizens of the

[55] Br. tr., 1902, art. i; Am. tr., 1903, art. viii.

[56] Am. tr., 1903, art. v.

[57] Br. tr., 1902, art. xv; Am. tr., 1903, art. xvii.

[58] Br. tr., 1902, art. vi; Am. tr., 1903, art. vi.

[59] Br. tr., 1902, art. x; Am. tr., 1903, art. xii.

[60] Am. tr., 1903, art. xii; Jap. tr., 1903, art. x.

[61] Jap. tr., 1903, art. x.

[62] Br. tr., 1902, art. x.

[63] Br. tr., 1902, art. iii.

[64] Br. tr., 1902, art. v.

[65] Br. tr., 1902, art. xiv.

[66] Am. tr., 1903, art. i.

[67] Am. tr., 1903, art. ii.

United States might "reside and carry on trade, industries and manufactures,[68] or pursue any lawful avocation," in any of the open ports.[69] The British treaty [70] merely provided for a commission to investigate the missionary question. By the American treaty [71] full protection was given to missionaries and converts in all matters relating to their faith; missionaries were not to interfere with Chinese jurisdiction over converts, but officials were to make no distinction between converts and non-converts; and the right to hold property in all parts of the empire, which had been enjoyed by Roman Catholic missions since 1860, was now given to American missionary societies.

§ 17. Other provisions of the treaties were intended to guide China in the path of reform. Within the empire there were some reformers, as had been manifest in 1898; but the result showed that their opinions had obtained no hold on the nation; and the fact that, with the possible exception of the morphia clause, not one of the provisions has, in fifteen years, been carried fully into effect, would seem to indicate that this attempt at reform from without was premature. The foreign powers agreed that China might prohibit the importation of morphia and of instruments for its injection, unless imported for medical purposes; and China agreed to prohibit their manufacture in China.[72] Consequent on the prohibition, the import fell from a maximum of 195,133 ounces in 1902 to practically nothing; but it was generally believed that "the falling off is explained, not by a diminished demand, but by smuggling." [73]

§ 18. The most urgent need for China, and for the commercial nations trading with China, has for over half a century been a reform of her currency and the provision of a standard coinage for the international exchanges. Previous to the middle of the nineteenth century the need was not obvious to the foreign trader, since all international exchange and foreigners' buying and selling were based on

[68] Cf. "Submission," chap. xv, § 9.

[69] Am. tr., 1903, art. iii.

[70] Br. tr., 1902, art. xiii.

[71] Am. tr., 1903, art. xiv.

[72] Br. tr., 1902, art. xi; Am. tr., 1903, art. xvi.

[73] H. B. Morse, "Trade and Administration of China," p. 362.



the Spanish dollar. This coin the Chinese traders accepted as a stable token currency; foreign traders conducted their transactions in it; and foreign banks quoted their rates of exchange in that exotic coinage, issued by a nation which had no trade with the Far East, and the minting of which ceased nominally in 1808. The dislocation of all trade caused by the Taiping rebellion drove traders to the adoption, for the international trade, of the dollar issued by the Mexican Republic in south-China, and of the Chinese unit of the tael of silver in mid-China and the north. The collection of exports and distribution of imports was, however, in Chinese hands, and a long time elapsed before the foreign trader realised that he had to do business, not only in the accepted currency of his port, but in an infinite variety of currencies in a great number of places—or that some Chinese agent did it for him, and reaped the profit therefrom.[74]

§ 19. In the question of the China exchange there are three factors. In the first place there is the supply and demand for negotiable bills causing fluctuations above and below the cost of sending bullion, common to all international exchanges; lastly there is the infinite variety of exchange between the currency of the importing and exporting trader and any other one or a dozen of the thousand currencies of China; but between the two is the fact that all the Chinese currencies are based solely on silver, without even the limping standard of some Asiatic dependencies of Western powers, while the currencies of Europe and North America are based on gold. The fluctuations in exchange caused by this divergence of standard were so great as to introduce an element of gambling into all trading; and the evil called for redress; but to remedy it, the negotiators made no attempt to deal with it, but dealt instead with the other, purely domestic, evil of the absence of any one currency common to the whole empire. The British and American treaties did not go even so far as this, and only required China to "provide for a uniform national coinage" [75]; but the Japanese treaty required

[74] Cf. "Conflic.," chap. viii, § 35, chap. xviii, §§ 11-14; "Submission," chap. xix, §§ 18, 19; "Trade and Administration," chap. v, The Currency; G. Vissering, "On Chinese Currency."

[75] Br. tr., 1902, art. ii; Am. tr., 1903, art. xiii.

China to "establish a system of uniform national coinage and provide for a uniform national currency." [76] This reform was calculated to free the Chinese banker and trader from the minor but engrossing operations of the money changer, and to allow the one to devote himself to purely banking transactions, and the other to engage in buying and selling in one common currency, passing by count and not by weight; but the benefit to foreign trade could only have been indirect. In fifteen years the times have not been sufficiently propitious or the treasury full enough to allow of any decisive measures being adopted, except the appointment of Dr. G. Vissering as financial adviser, and the reform has not been carried out. The Japanese treaty also provided for a much needed unification of the weights and measures of China, [77] but no reform has been accomplished in this direction.

§ 20. A greater evil in the Chinese state was the condition of the administration of justice, but from the effects of this the foreigner was freed by his privilege of extraterritoriality. [78] This privilege was a grievance to the Chinese, and it was their constant aim to procure its abrogation, as Japan had succeeded in doing; while, on the other hand, foreigners were not prepared to lay aside the protection it gave, so long as they were not assured of equitable decisions in any judicial case in which they might become involved. The law of China was not the law of the West; the real point at issue, however, was not the difference in law, but the uncertainty in its application—or, in plain terms, the certainty of corruption and bias in its administration. The negotiators provided for reform under this head by a non-committal article, which, in the present or in the visible future, neither added to nor detracted from the aspirations of the one side or the privileges of the other. It was stipulated [79] that China was to receive assistance in reforming her judicial system; and that the foreign power would "also be prepared to relinquish extra-territorial rights when satisfied that the state of the Chinese

[76] Jap. tr., 1903, art. vi.

[77] Jap. tr., 1903, art. vii. Cf. "Trade and Administration," chap. vi, *Weights and Measures*.

[78] "Trade and Administration," chap. vii, *Extraterritoriality*.

[79] Br. tr., 1902, art. xii; Am. tr., 1903, art. xv.

laws, the arrangements for their administration, and other considerations warrant it in doing so."

§ 21. The mineral wealth of China had attracted the attention of foreign observers from an early date, and in later times its extent had been reported by exploring observers, among whom many be mentioned Mr. Elias Ney, Baron von Richthofen, Mr. Thomas Kingsmill, Mr. Archibald J. Little, Mr. E. C. Baber, M. Emile Rocher, all of whom had traversed many of the provinces with observant intelligence, but not all with expert knowledge. In still more recent years much useful investigation had been done by mining experts, and some attempts had been made in opening mines, especially of coal; but the Chinese, officials, or capitalists, or official-capitalists, notwithstanding many failures, were determined that the profits from mining enterprise should accrue to China and the Chinese; and foreigners, officials or capitalists, were convinced that no mining undertaking could possibly succeed without competent foreign expert supervision, or without the participation of foreign capital. The foreign interests were ready to supply both, but only on condition of exercising financial and engineering control; the Chinese were ready to accept both, but would not generally concede the control. The negotiators attempted to reconcile these conflicting views by an article [80] by which China agreed to "recast her present mining rules in such a way as, while promoting the interests of Chinese subjects and not injuring in any way the sovereign rights of China, will offer no impediment to the attraction of foreign capital nor place foreign capitalists at a greater disadvantage than they would be under generally accepted foreign regulations." The article did not compel the foreigner to supply capital or the Chinese to concede control, nor did it meet the standing difficulty that the introduction of the foreigner's person or capital into the interior necessarily carried his extraterritorial rights there also; and it cannot be said that these articles of the treaties made any great change in the existing procedure, unsatisfactory as that might be.

§ 22. The foreigner's person and property were alike subject to the jurisdiction of his own courts alone; in the case of the infringement of trade-marks, a foreign offender

[80] Br. tr., 1902, art. ix; Am. tr., 1903, art. vii.

must be charged before the offender's court, and a Chinese offender before the Chinese courts. Chinese law gave no protection to trade-marks, and this was remedied by an article [81] by which China agreed to "afford protection to [foreign] trade-marks against infringement, imitation, or colourable imitation, by Chinese subjects," and to establish offices for their registration. The efficacy of this provision was not brought to the test. The Chinese government was willing to register and proposed to bring its rules into effect on October 23rd, 1904, and the later results of the new procedure would have depended solely on the quality of the decisions of the Chinese courts. But several of the foreign powers made difficulties; in the case of identical trade-marks registered by different owners in different countries, there seemed to be no way of deciding between the rival claimants; and the difficulty was increased by the fact that, of these dual registrations, one usually covered an infringement, an imitation, or a colourable imitation, of a prior valuable invention in another foreign country.[82] When the foreign merchants discovered that they had obtained nominal protection against infringement by Chinese only, and not by those of other foreign nationality, they ceased to desire any Chinese registration [83]; and, with this impelling force withdrawn, the international difficulties were found so strong that registration was not introduced.[84] The same fate attended stipulations for the protection of copyright [85] and patents.[86]

§ 23. Some questions were settled outside the supplementary treaties. Jurisdiction over the Chinese residing in the foreign settlement at Shanghai had not been absolutely defined. This was due to two different causes: the Chinese authorities claimed jurisdiction over cases between Chinese subjects, even when one or both parties resided in the foreign settlements; and the French authorities claimed

[81] Br. tr., 1902, art. vii; Am. tr., 1903, art. ix.

[82] Correspondence with American envoy at Peking, March 28th, 1904, to Dec. 21st, 1906, in U.S. For. Rel., 1906, pp. 234-59.

[83] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 13th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 242.

[84] The obstruction came chiefly from Germany and France. There is no mention of Japan in the correspondence, but it was notorious that the principal offenders in the matter of trade-marks were the Japanese.

[85] Am. tr., 1903, art. xi; Jap. tr., 1903, art. v.

[86] Am. tr., 1903, art. x.

an exclusive jurisdiction within their settlement, and an equal voice in the judicial affairs of the international settlement. Now the Chinese were forced to abandon their claim, while the inter-foreign rivalry was compromised; and, on June 10th, 1902, the following agreement [87] was made.

1°. In all civil cases between Chinese the plaintiff will follow the defendant, and will sue him before the Mixed Court of his (the defendant's) residence.

2°. In all criminal cases of Chinese against Chinese, where foreigners are not concerned, and in all police cases against Chinese residents in the Settlements the Mixed Court of the Settlement in which the crime or contravention has been committed is alone competent.

3°. In mixed civil cases—

- (a) If the plaintiff is a foreigner (not of French nationality) and the Chinese defendant is a resident of the International Settlement, he is to be sued before the Mixed Court of the International Settlement.
- (b) If the plaintiff is French and the Chinese defendant is a resident of the French Settlement, he is to be sued before the Mixed Court of the French Settlement.
- (c) If the plaintiff is a foreigner (not of French nationality) and the Chinese defendant is a resident of the French Settlement, the latter shall be sued before the Mixed Court of the International Settlement, whose warrant or summons for his appearance, after counter-signature by the French Consul-General, will be executed or served by the runners of the International Mixed Court, with the assistance of the police of the French Settlement, without previous hearing in the Mixed Court of the French Settlement.
- (d) If the plaintiff is French and the Chinese defendant is a resident of the International Settlement, the latter shall be sued before the Mixed Court of the French Settlement, whose warrant or summons for his appearance, after counter-signature by the Senior Consul, will be executed or served by the runners of the French Mixed Court, with the assistance of the police of the International Settlement, without a previous hearing in the Mixed Court of the International Settlement.

4°. In criminal cases where a foreigner (not of French nationality) is complainant, the Mixed Court of the International Settlement is competent; if a Frenchman is complainant, the Mixed Court of the French Settlement is competent.

The provisions under clauses 3°. (c) and 3°. (d) as to executing warrants also apply under this clause.

§ 24. Of the questions not covered by the supplementary treaties, those most affecting the foreign trading interest were the improvement of the Peiho and Hwangpu. The Haiho (Peiho) improvement had been carried out conjointly by the Chinese and foreign interests involved [88] so effectively that in 1913 the river course from Tientsin to Taku had been reduced from 56 to 40 miles; and the work of deepening the channel over the bar, taken in hand in 1906, was so far successful that steamers of a previously unheard-of draught, 13 feet and over, could enter and ascend the river to Tientsin—44 in 1914 and 84 in 1915. In 1913, however, a break in the river-bank far up the Peiho, above Tungchow, allowed water to escape and find its outlet at Pehtang, thereby reducing the scour in the river and causing greater deposits of silt.[89] In these later years ice-breakers were introduced to keep the port open during the winter months in which, normally, it is closed by ice.

§ 25. The Hwangpu conservancy was created to deal with the problem of the Wusung Bar. The Shanghai mercantile community had agitated for its improvement during forty years. In 1874 they had induced the diplomatic body to lay the matter before the Chinese government, without success [90]; and again in 1880, with the result that the Chinese authorities bought a dredger and set it to work,[91] with no enduring results. In 1899 they proposed that the whole course of the river should be taken in hand, from the upper anchorage limits of the port of Shanghai down to the Yangtze at the outer bar, a length of twenty statute miles. It was proposed that a commission of nine members should be appointed :

- 2 foreign merchants selected by the consular body ;
- 2   "           "           "           "   chamber of commerce ;
- 2   "           "           representing the shipping interests ;
- 2   "           members representing the municipal councils ;
- 1 commissioner of customs representing the Harbour authority.

The work was to be financed from the following sources ;

[88] Cf. chap. xi, § 10.

[89] Report on the trade of Tientsin, 1915.

[90] Cf. " Submission," chap. xiii, § 14.

[91] Ibid., chap. xv, § 11.

- (a) 0.1 per cent. on assessed value of land and houses in the foreign settlements (estimated to produce about Tls. 33,000 a year);
- (b) 0.1 per cent. on assessed value of riverside property on both banks;
- (c) 0.1 per cent. on the value of imports and exports (estimated at Tls. 55,000);
- (d) Tls. 0.05 a ton registered, on all shipping entering or leaving Shanghai and Wusung (estimated at Tls. 52,500);
- (e) 3/10 of tonnage dues, actually diverted by the Chinese government from navigation to education [92] (Tls. 120,000).

The proposals were approved by the diplomatic body, but were too important to be settled in Peking, and the question was shelved for a time.[93] The inherent weakness of the scheme was that the foreign mercantile community of Shanghai were too conscious of their old, rejected, claim to be a self-governing republic [94]; they wished to undertake a work required for the interests of their port, but, in undertaking it, they proposed to exercise sovereign rights properly belonging to China; and, supplying about half of the money required, they gave no share in controlling the expenditure to China, but proposed that the control should be vested in a commission of nine members, of whom eight would be drawn from their own body; even the ninth member, though a loyal servant of the Chinese government, was to be a foreigner, in order that all chance for Chinese official corruption might be excluded.

§ 26. By the final protocol, annex No. 17, "Regulations for the improvement of the course of the Hwangpu" were enacted, almost identical with the proposals of 1899. Of the sources of revenue of the Conservancy Board, heads (a) to (d) were left unchanged; but, in place of the 3/10ths of the tonnage dues, was substituted—(e) an annual contribution from the Chinese government equal to that supplied by the various foreign interests. On the Board the Chinese representation was increased from one to two by the addition of the Taotai. On the foreign side was added (in addition to the two representatives of the collective shipping interests) "a representative of each country

[92] Cf. *ibid.*, chap. vii, § 17; "Conflict," chap. xxiv, § 17.

[93] *North-China Herald*, Aug. 14th, 1899; *China*, No. 1, 1900, pp. 291, 396, 400.

[94] Cf. "Submission," chap. vi, §§. 11-14.

the total tonnage of whose ships entering and clearing at Shanghai exceeds 200,000 tons a year"; on the basis of the figures for 1903 this increased the foreign representation from eight to fifteen. In addition to this predominance of control by the foreign community, the Board was made suable before the Court of Consuls, and in other ways was subjected to the consular body; it was entirely independent of the Chinese territorial and judicial authorities, who must, however, be called upon to execute its decisions. In this almost exclusively foreign control there were also elements of possible discord, due to the clashing of industrial interests. In May, 1904, the German government appointed its consul-general at Shanghai to represent permanently German shipping interests, and a German engineer as his permanent proxy, whereas the regulations provided that these members, representing national interests, were to be appointed for one year. The other nationalities were much concerned, and foresaw the prospect of being compelled to act in a similar way.[95]

§ 27. On drawing breath after the Boxer crisis, the Chinese government came to see that it must buy back those of its lost sovereign rights which could be ransomed for money,[96] and the Hwangpu Conservancy was one of the interests so ransomed. The scheme of 1899 and the scheme of the final protocol had both been drawn up without consulting the Marine department of the customs, the only authority which had, or could have, any precise and continuing knowledge of the hydrographic conditions of the problem. In May, 1904, at the date when the Germans were obviously making a strong bid for a predominant position in the Board, the viceroy of Nanking, on the suggestion of Mr. Alfred E. Hippisley, brought forward a new proposal, in substitution for the scheme of the final protocol, designed to restore the control to China and to utilise the technical knowledge of the Customs Marine department. The foreign contribution had been estimated at Tls. 230,000 a year. This was dropped, and it was proposed [97] that China should assume the entire charge and

[95] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 12th, 1904, U.S. For. Rel., 1904, p. 186.

[96] Cf. *antea*, chap. iv, §§ 19, 25.

[97] Senior Consul to dean of diplomatic body, May 9th; Prince Ching to foreign envoys, June 9th, 1904; U.S. For. Rel., 1904, pp. 187, 189.



“contribute Tls. 460,000 to cover the cost, this appropriation continuing until the work is completed”; the work of the Hwangpu Conservancy was to be under the direction of the taotai of Shanghai and the commissioner of customs; engineers were to be appointed within three months; quarterly accounts of receipts and expenditure were to be sent to the consular body in Shanghai; and finally, as all the funds were to be provided by China, annex No. 17 to the final protocol was abrogated, “nor will it be lawful to collect any tax for this purpose at or near Shanghai upon vessels, merchandise or land.” The foreign envoys, filled with admiration for their own excellent project, refused to “take into consideration propositions presented in such an irregular manner,”[98] presented first, as they had been, by the Nanking viceroy. The American [99] and British [100] home governments approved the new proposal in principle—it being still true that “the agreement of the powers can be much more easily secured directly by the home governments than by their representatives at Peking.”[101] The Chinese offered certain unpledged revenue from native opium as security, since large loans would have to be obtained to start the work; and the American government placed the question before the powers by a circular note in November.[102] There was still some discussion on the securities for the proper execution of the work; but finally, on September 27th, 1905, a set of twelve regulations, carrying out the new Chinese proposal, was signed by the representatives of China and the eleven foreign protocol powers.[103]

§ 28. Mr. J. de Rijke, a distinguished Dutch engineer, with a wide experience of similar work in Holland and in Japan, had made surveys on behalf of the Shanghai community at intervals during the previous years, and had submitted several reports on the existing conditions and made proposals for the work of improvement. He had the confidence of the shipping and mercantile interests, of

[98] Minutes of British and German envoys, May 24th; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 22nd, 1904; *ibid.*, pp. 188, 189.

[99] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, June 25th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 190.

[100] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Aug. 20th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 196.

[101] Same to same, Aug. 12th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 193.

[102] Mr. Hay, circular note, Nov. 19th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 199.

[103] Text in Treaties, i, p. 150; U.S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 122.


the diplomatic body, and of the Chinese officials ; and, by universal consent, he was in January, 1906, called to the post of engineer-in-chief. In November, 1907, the German Association (*Deutsche Vereinigung*) at Shanghai attempted to upset him by criticising the incomplete results of the works then undertaken [104] ; but he retained the confidence of the community in general, and was left in his post to carry out his proposals. The work of organisation was in the capable hands of the Shanghai *taotai*, Jui Cheng, and the commissioner of the Shanghai customs, Mr. H. E. Hobson ; and the secretarial staff was supplied from the customs service. Under this triumvirate of *taotai*, commissioner, and engineer, the work of improvement was carried on with success ; at the end of four years the deeper ship channel, crossing the river diagonally, had been closed, and the former junk channel, now known as the *Astraea Channel*, had acquired a considerable depth ; and in effect the Inner Wusung Bar had been eliminated.

§ 29. At this stage an embarrassing situation arose. The funds were nearing exhaustion : the government grants would soon be entirely absorbed to cover interest and amortisation of loans, and there would be no balance left available for maintenance. Further, the 1905 agreement had been understood in general to be only in respect to the Wusung Bar, but it was now considered that additional work beyond the defined scope of that agreement should be undertaken. The Board reported that, for the maintenance of existing works and further improvements, an additional sum of eight million dollars was needed. The Chinese ministers were naturally much annoyed. Their view was that they had contributed a large sum for a definite and complete scheme, and had entrusted the Board with the operations. The purpose of the scheme was so far from being attained that apparently twice the amount of the original estimate was needed. Under the circumstances the government declined to renew the contract of Mr. de Rijke which terminated in December, 1910 ; and, on his departure, a Board of Maintenance was substituted for the previous Conservancy Board and a Swedish engineer, Mr. H. von Heidenstam, was appointed engineer-in-chief. To the new Board was assigned the

[104] *Journal of the American Association of China*, Nov. 1907, p. 64.


# WHANGPOO CONSERVANCY.

**MAP OF THE WHANGPOO, IN MARCH 1906, BEFORE THE START OF CONSERVANCY WORKS.**



MAP OF THE WHANGPOO, IN MARCH 1911, AND PLAN OF CONSERVANCY WORKS EXECUTED 1906-16.

**DREDGING AND TRAINING WORKS HAVE BEEN  
CONTINUED UP TO KIANGNAN ARSENAL.**



**H. VON HEIDENSTAM**  
**ENGINEER IN CHIEF**



balance of the government grant, after providing for the service of the Conservancy loan.

§ 30. The Board of Maintenance was composed of the Chinese commissioner for Trade and Foreign Affairs, the commissioner of customs, Mr. H. F. Merrill, and the harbour-master, Captain W. A. Carlson; and it found itself confronted by a difficult task in carrying out important works with insufficient means. The difficulty was recognised by the Shanghai community, whose commercial interests were seriously threatened. The head of the Customs Marine department, the Coast Inspector, Captain W. Ferdinand Tyler, now made informally a proposal which was acceptable to all interests, and which was sent up to the foreign legations with the united support of the consular body, the Chamber of Commerce, and the several national Associations. The revolution came, the empire fell, and Yuen Shih-kai became president of the republic; and, on April 4th, 1912, the "provisional agreement for the administration of the Hwangpu Conservancy" was signed. By this agreement the Board of Maintenance ceased to draw a grant from the government, and, instead of it, obtained its funds from "wharfage dues" at the rate of one-and-a-half per mille on the value of all goods imported or exported; in addition, at a later date, it was granted the proceeds of sale of "Sheng-ko" land—tidal accretion or reclamation, which, by the law of China, is crown land. The jurisdiction of the Board was extended over the Hwangpu River from the Yangtze to its tidal limit—i.e. to a point inland well beyond the 30-mile radius of the Taiping rebellion. The agreement further declared that "the authority with which the Conservancy Board is invested is delegated to it by the Chinese government"; and the interests of the Shanghai community were safeguarded by the creation of a consultative committee of five foreign and one Chinese members.

§ 31. There was a certain amount of dredging the channel at the outset, and of cutting off corners later on; but the principal feature in the work was the guidance of the river by mattresses of willow work into long sweeps and gentle curves, reducing the deposit of silt and deepening the bed. By this process of reinforcing nature by art, the river has been greatly improved. The outer bar had in

1907 a depth of 16 feet in January, and  $16\frac{1}{2}$  feet in December, below low water datum level; this bar disappeared, and in place of it there was in 1913 a channel 900 feet wide with a depth 24 feet below low water datum. The inner bar was on a diagonal crossing, of which, in 1907, the channel had a depth ranging from a maximum of 14 feet in February to a minimum of 11 feet in September below low water datum; this bar also had disappeared, and in its place the new Astraea channel, following the course of the stream, has a depth of nowhere less than 24 feet below low water datum. This is the depth carried all the way from the Yangtze up to Putung Point, except that, in 1913, for a short distance at one place there was a depth of 23 feet. The total expenditure for the ten years 1906-15 was Sh. Tls. 9,892,389, and the receipts Sh. Tls. 9,926,807. Of the latter, government grants furnished Tls. 3,550,448, loans Tls. 4,390,229, and Conservancy taxes and other receipts Tls. 1,986,130.[105] The Hwangpu conservancy is an encouraging example of the application of Western engineering skill and administrative methods to Chinese conditions, and is one of the many instances of efficient service rendered by the Chinese customs to the Chinese nation.

[105] Cf. Appendix C. The amounts are in Shanghai taels, 10 per cent. less in value than Customs taels.

## CHAPTER XIV

### THE CUSTOMS IN THE SETTLEMENT

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§ 1. THE Chinese customs service was, apart from the watchful jealousy of the foreign powers, the instrument by which China was carried without disaster through the period of helpless drift from the Boxer settlement to the end of the empire. Originating in the brilliant conception of Sir Rutherford Alcock [1] that it was necessary to introduce an element of probity and vigilance into the Chinese administration—that part of it with which alone foreigners then came into touch—it was set on its feet by Horatio

[1] Cf. "Submission," chap. i. §§ 21, 22.

Nelson Lay, and was organised, developed and brought to completeness by the genius of Robert Hart. It was a service which did much more than collect the customs revenue, and at a very early date in its history the Chinese government showed that it estimated rightly the great value of the work done by the customs for the empire.[2] The head of that service had impressed on all his subordinates "the necessity of remembering that they are Chinese, and not foreign, officials, and that they must not forget that fact in their intercourse with the Chinese authorities," and had declared that "the Inspectorate of Customs is a Chinese and not a foreign service" [3]; and this spirit animated the service from top to bottom.

§ 2. By the Chinese system the expenses of any government office or service are provided for by a fixed annual grant, which may not be exceeded, and which is invariably drawn in full. This system was also adopted for the customs; but, whereas other offices in China invariably supplemented their "allowance" (king-fei) by unreported receipts which were applied to the maintenance of the staff, the customs service was strictly limited, and it adhered, to moneys received and reported officially. For the direct maintenance of the customs an allowance was issued in monthly instalments, amounting at first to Tls. 748,200 a year, which was increased, from January, 1876, to Tls. 1,098,200. The simultaneous collection of likin on foreign opium gave an opportunity to apply for an increase in the allowance, and, from April, 1888, it was increased to Tls. 1,738,200, of which Tls. 330,000 came from the opium likin. To provide for the frontier ports and the Chinese customs staff detached for duty in Korea, it was increased in July, 1893, to Tls. 1,858,200; the loss of the Formosan ports in 1895 cut it down to Tls. 1,786,200; but it was again raised, from October, 1896, to Tls. 1,968,000. In the third of a century which had elapsed since the

[2] "That the Chinese government is equally satisfied with the general working of the service and the results already obtained, is made sufficiently evident by the fact that, a month ago, the Tsungli Yamen, in a memorial reporting the approaching final payment on account of the English and French indemnities, presented to the throne the continuance of the foreign Inspectorate, and that the throne, issued in reply, conveyed the imperial approval of the proposal."—I.G. circ., Feb. 20th, 1866. Cf. chap. vii, § 1.

[3] Cf. Appendix D.



allowance was first issued, the salaries, which had been settled originally on a just and liberal scale, fell in their purchasing power no less than a half for the foreign staff, whose natural currency was on a gold basis; and even for the Chinese staff, whose marketing currency was copper, the loss in purchasing power was over a quarter. The danger to the state in having an underpaid staff charged with great responsibility was obvious; and, from July, 1898, the government increased the allowance by Tls. 1,200,000, raising it to Tls. 3,168,000 a year.

§ 3. For its Marine work the Inspectorate was provided with additional funds, specially ear-marked for that use. It had assumed the task of providing lights, buoys and beacons along the coast; and, to provide for the cost, the government, though not obliged to do so,[4] assigned seven-tenths of the tonnage dues collection. For the ten years 1906-15 the average annual amount received from these seven-tenths was Tls. 942,048. From this fund the customs in 1915 had provided and maintained 182 lights (of which 16 were of the first order and 53 flashing or occulting), 5 light-vessels, 44 light-boats, 171 buoys (of which 25 were automatic whistling or gas-lighted), and 798 beacons (of which 649 were on the course of the Sungari in the Harbin district). It also maintained the Coast Inspector's staff, charged with surveys and conservancy; the Marine staff, but the upkeep of only one light-tender was charged to this fund, the other cruisers being maintained from general customs funds; the Engineers staff, merged in later years in the Works department; and the Harbours staff at Shanghai, those at other ports being provided from the customs staff and the customs allowance.

§ 4. The personnel of the service increased from small beginnings to 424 foreigners and 1417 Chinese in 1875; in 1906, when it was still charged with postal work, the numbers were 1345 foreigners and 10,625 Chinese; and in 1915, after the Post-office was set on its own feet, the numbers were 1327 foreigners and 6150 Chinese. This service had, at one time and another, been of great help to the Chinese administrators, during a period when they were without experience in the handling of international questions. It had been the channel for paying the indem-

[4] Cf. "Submission," Appendix B.

nities due under the British and French treaties of 1858 and 1860 ; it had helped with several loans ; and in all international questions, from negotiating a treaty to settling a land dispute, the Tsungli Yamen in those days of inexperience had constant resort to the advice and help of the Inspector General at Peking, and viceroys, governors and taotais constantly consulted and acted in conformity with the advice of the commissioners at the ports. From being distinctly hostile,[5] the foreign merchants and consuls learned in time that the customs smoothed away difficulties, and did not create them ; the foreign envoys had always supported its authority [6] ; and the Chinese officials, metropolitan and provincial, found that, through its aid, they could obtain all that it was right for them to obtain, and could avoid the perils of uncharted seas. From a position of much distrust Sir R. Hart and the service under him had won, by their efficiency and trustworthiness, the confidence of Chinese and foreigner.

§ 5. To this service was entrusted the control of all work which was, in any of its aspects, non-Chinese in its nature—lights and other aids to navigation, pilotage, the municipal work of some ports, instruction in foreign languages and science ; it had itself originated the postal work, had developed it to a great administrative organisation, and retained control of it until 1911, when it was severed from the customs [7] ; and, in 1898, it had been given a partial supervision over the likin. To provide cover for the third loan (the second Anglo-German loan) after the Japanese war, the revenues from six collectorates of likin and of salt tax in the Yangtze basin were pledged to the extent of Tls. 5,000,000 annually ; these collectorates were placed under the supervision of the Inspectorate of Customs, and, in case of default, the Inspectorate was to undertake their administration.[8] Everyone, especially the collectors of likin in these collectorates, fully expected that the opportunity would be grasped to extend the sphere of usefulness and the power of the customs service ; but Sir R. Hart was too prudent, and too well acquainted with

[5] Cf. "Submission," chap. vii, §§ 4-6, 15.

[6] Ibid., §§ 1, 15.

[7] Cf. "Subjection," chap. iii.

[8] Ibid., chap. ii, § 35.

the perils of his exceptional position in the Chinese official world, to allow him to intervene, without absolute necessity, in the internal administration of the empire. He appointed deputy commissioners to supervise the working of the collectorates; but, so long as there should be no default—and there never was default—he came, after the first period of investigation, to the decision that the customs should not take an active part in the collection.

§ 6. After the Boxer year, however, both China and the foreign powers found in the customs service an instrument for undertaking duties which had been imposed on China, but which required more skill and greater honesty of purpose than, in the opinion of the powers, was possessed by the Chinese mandarinates. The Peiho and Hwangpu conservancies were entrusted to the executive control of the commissioners at Tientsin and Shanghai respectively [9]; the special stipulations for the benefit of Hongkong [10] were necessarily to be carried into effect by the customs; the ambitious scheme projected in Art. 8 of the British treaty [11] required for its proper working the intervention of customs officials at several points outside the sphere of their previous activities; the registration of trade-marks [12] was in the hands of the customs until questions of international politics led to its abandonment; bonding would, of necessity, be under it; and, to provide sufficient cover for the indemnities, the offices of "native customs" at all treaty ports were placed under the control of the foreign Inspectorate.[13]

§ 7. This was a point towards which Sir R. Hart had been working during the whole of his official life—to have one office controlling the entire customs of the empire, even while he still hesitated to encounter the jealousies which his control of the native customs must have evoked.[14] In 1887 the junk trade between Hongkong and Macao, and Chinese ports, was placed under the Inspectorate.[15] In 1889 junks from Singapore were

[9] Cf. "Subjection," chap. xiii, §§ 24-9.

[10] Ibid., chap. xiii, § 15.

[11] Ibid., chap. xiii, §§ 12, 13.

[12] Ibid., chap. xiii, § 22.

[13] Ibid., chap. xii, § 29.

[14] Cf. "Submission," chap. xviii, §§ 18, 19 and n. 101.

[15] Ibid., chap. xviii, § 25.

required to report at the south end of Hainan in order to pay duty on opium carried by them ; and in 1893 the procedure was strengthened in order to stop a leakage which had been discovered.[16] These steps were, however, the direct consequence of the opium work at Hongkong and Macao, and led no further. The trade between Ichang and Chungking, conducted under an "additional article to the Chefoo agreement," signed March 31st, 1890, and put into force in 1891, was necessarily carried in river junks ; and these, when chartered to foreign merchants, were for control and duty payment under the Inspectorate of Customs ; but this, too, led no further. Now, by the final protocol, the Inspectorate was to assume the control of the native customs at all the treaty ports ; and, as interpreted by the legations, what was to be controlled was the collection of dues and duties, of every sort which was not akin, on merchandise carried otherwise than in foreign bottoms, at every treaty port without exception, and within a radius of 50 li (17 miles) around.[17] The control was to begin simultaneously with the introduction of the effective 5 per cent. tariff, November 11th (1st day of 10th Chinese month), 1901.

§ 8. To Sir R. Hart was now assigned a harder task than he had in the early sixties, when he undertook the organisation of the "foreign" [18] customs. Then he was given full authority, and there was no interference with his control over his staff ; now he was required to work rather by diplomacy and influence than by authority, and his first step was to ensure that the commissioners at the ports worked by the same methods. While the question was still pending he wrote—"Revenue, of course, must be collected, but what is mainly of importance is to encourage trade and facilitate all trading operations ; customs procedure ought therefore to be as liberal as possible, and its

[16] In the five years 1888-92 the foreign opium paying duty at the Kungchow and Pakhoi customs decreased from 2206 to 904 chests, while the junk-borne shipments from Singapore increased from 600 to 1786 chests, much of the latter evading report, search and payment of duty.—R. Hart, memorandum, April 3rd, 1893.

[17] I.G. circ., Sept. 17th, Oct. 22nd, 26th, Nov. 1st, 1901.

[18] This term is one of the ambiguities of the Chinese language. Yang means primarily "ocean," hence transoceanic, i.e. foreign. So the Yangkwan, controlling the transoceanic trade, carried the idea of the "Foreign Customs" to Chinese and Western minds alike.

aim should be to promote growth and open up new business, rather than to interpret rules too literally or enforce them too strictly, while liberality and common sense should be everywhere so evident as to make traders feel that conformity with regulations is not merely their duty as law-abiding people, but is also what helps trade most.”[19] Even four years after control was assumed he found it necessary to protect the Chinese public—“Dismiss at once any foreign officer guilty of assault, and hand over to the magistrate for punishment any Chinese employee who misuses or abuses his position.”[20] These instructions are evidence of Sir R. Hart’s full comprehension of Chinese conditions. Public opinion in China was still inarticulate, but it could make itself felt in many hidden ways; and popular discontent would certainly have been seized on by the mandarinates, intensely hostile to any change of this character, affecting their emoluments.

§ 9. Another element which had to be taken into account was the official staff of the offices concerned, which was a recognised wing of the mandarinates army. Its members regularly and openly bought their posts, the sums paid being a part of the personal emoluments of the official in charge of the office; in return they received a nominal salary, a regulated share in certain subsidiary sources of taxation which were pooled, the right to buy again appointments in charge of subordinate offices, and opportunity to exact gratifications for performing the duties which their office required them to perform. Their relations to the government and to the public were complicated and hard to define; they were a part of the Chinese system of small salaries and large perquisites, and a necessary preliminary to any reform must be the paying of adequate salaries. Regarding these people Sir R. Hart wrote:

“Remembering how largely a great body of men, the old staff, are personally interested in keeping things as they were and in their own hands, and how irritating it must be to know that the reason for the change is the payment of a foreign indemnity, not only must we allow time for gradual transformation, but we must also submit to the certainty that opposition will not disappear quickly, and that misunderstanding and mistake will cause difficulties, if not trouble, at the start.”

[19] I.G. circ., May 10th, 1901.

[20] Ibid., Nov. 6th, 1905.

He then directed that, at the start, no man was to be displaced—

“For the work to be done old employees ought by preference to be employed, and the guiding principle must be to retain and not to oust the men of the former regime; in due course they will all fall into line, and only those who are indisputably inefficient or unnecessary are to be discharged; but even this step is not to be proceeded with at once or hurriedly, and then only after report to and authority from myself.”[21]

The effect of this was that the offices were encumbered with a quantity of dead-wood, and the redundant staffs were reduced in number only by omitting to fill death vacancies.[22]

§ 10. It was important to deal even more tenderly with the Superintendents—Hoppo, Tartar General, or Taotai—at each of the ports affected; they were officials of high position, who not only lost a considerable portion of their emoluments, but were thereby compelled to reduce the contributions made by them to their own superiors in the provinces and at the capital.[23] The loss was inevitable, but it was occasioned by China's position after the Boxer outbreak, and Inspector General, commissioner and superintendent were all subject to the conditions of the diplomatic settlement. By this settlement the Inspectorate of Customs had been thrust into a position of opposition to the mandarinat: it had become, in effect, the collecting agent of the foreign creditor of China; and it was now required to interfere with the individual emoluments of the official class. The situation was delicate, and Sir R. Hart saw that he must walk warily. He first instructed the commissioners to explain to each superin-

[21] I.G. circ., Nov. 11th, 1901.

[22] At Canton in 1903 an important part of the author's time was taken up in resisting the eager desire of the Hoppo to fill death vacancies. Having ceased to be sufficiently lucrative, the Hoppo's post was abolished in 1904. Cf. *antea*, n. 14.

[23] It was in 1906 a matter of common knowledge that a reforming minister, a pluralist (as customary) holding four offices, the combined official salaries and allowances of which would not amount to Tls. 10,000 a year, was allowed to fix the amount of his salary, and to refuse to accept no extra emoluments. After careful inquiry into the salaries of the posts to his predecessors, he fixed the amount at Tls. 360,000 a year—ten times the salary of an English Secretary of State, twenty-five times that of an American cabinet minister.

tendent that "it was not intended to make any but necessary changes in procedure or staff." [24] The superintendent was also to be informed that

"the contemplated transfer has not for object the ousting of a native and the introduction of a foreign staff, but is forced upon those in authority by the necessities of the situation and the pecuniary difficulties of the empire, and that the two branches of the revenue department, whether called native or foreign, belong to one and the same family and must work together harmoniously, honestly, and efficiently in the general interests of officials and people." [25]

§ 11. The work of the native customs was "to be carried on just in the usual way by the same staff and under the same comptroller, but with the commissioner for a colleague; the new colleague, the commissioner, is, however, not a sleeping but an active partner, and his position is not to be subordinate but leading." [26] The commissioner's first duty was to study the working of the offices and to devise methods for reorganising them, but, "in doing this he was to keep steadily before him the interests of the revenue, the interests of the merchants, and the interests of the old staff." [27] The last interest was considered by the retention of the old staff in its offices; but their work was now under a supervision which introduced an element of probity and vigilance, and, for the future, the "cost of collection will be the fixed pay of a recognised working staff, and not the division of an excessive surplus among hangers-on far and near, or the outcome of underhand bargainings and the disappearance of revenue through the doings of underlings." [28] For hwa-hung (an open distribution of a realised surplus or of special supplementary taxes) adequate salaries were substituted; but it would be too much to say that "underhand bargainings" were entirely suppressed or that there was no dishonesty in the administration. Still the improvement was marked and the service was reformed.

§ 12. The revenue was improved. It was stated officially [29] that "the negotiators reckon on a collection of at least 5,000,000 taels a year," but this did not exactly

[24] I.G. circ., Oct. 1st, 1901.

[25] Ibid., Oct. 26th, 1901.

[26] Ibid., Nov. 11th, 1901.

[27] Ibid.

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid., Oct. 1st, 1901.

accord with the opinions expressed by the highest authorities in their testimony before the diplomatic commission. [30] M. Pokotiloff estimated the revenue to be derived from the native customs at Tls. 3,000,000 a year; Sir E. Satow at a minimum of Tls. 3,000,000 with probable increase to Tls. 4,000,000; Mr. A. E. Hippisley stated that the reported receipts were Tls. 2,125,000; Sir R. Hart estimated the revenue at Tls. 3,000,000, with probable increase to Tls. 5,000,000; Mr. Guy Hillier estimated the probable receipts at Tls. 5,000,000; Mr. Komura stated that the actual receipts were Tls. 1,370,000, but considered that they could be increased to Tls. 5,000,000. In its final report the commission estimated on the basis of a minimum of Tls. 3,000,000 and a maximum of Tls. 10,000,000—a sum which no authority had even suggested. The revenue actually realised from the native customs during the three years 1908–10 averaged Tls. 2,981,757 a year, but during the three years 1913–15 Tls. 3,367,661 a year; in 1915 it was Tls. 3,784,570. [31] The cost of administration was provided for by the deduction of a fixed amount of one-tenth of the collection.

[30] Minutes of meeting of the “Commission chargée d'étudier la question du paiement des Indemnités,” privately printed. Cf. chap. xii, § 28.

[31] It will be of interest to compare Mr. Komura's figures for the actual receipts reported from each port with the revenue realised in 1915:

|                                | Komura.                | 1915.            |
|--------------------------------|------------------------|------------------|
| Nowchwang . . . . .            | Tls. 118,300 . . . . . | Tls. 171,702     |
| Tientsin (a) . . . . .         | 65,100 . . . . .       | 1,109,345        |
| Chefoo . . . . .               | 36,600 . . . . .       | 72,681           |
| Ichang and Shasi . . . . .     | — . . . . .            | 78,273           |
| Kiukiang . . . . .             | 303,200 . . . . .      | 407,932          |
| Wuhu (b) . . . . .             | 139,200 . . . . .      | 637,054          |
| Yangchow and Hwaiian . . . . . | 92,600 . . . . .       | —                |
| Shanghai . . . . .             | 37,200 . . . . .       | 228,155          |
| Ningpo and Wenchow . . . . .   | 29,000 . . . . .       | 143,356          |
| Fukien ports . . . . .         | 201,100 . . . . .      | 336,915          |
| Kwangtung ports (c) . . . . .  | 201,800 . . . . .      | 599,157          |
|                                | <u>1,370,200</u>       | <u>3,784,570</u> |

(a) The Tientsin customs had been a rich pasturage, but a flood of light had been thrown on its working by the administration of the Tientsin Provisional Government.

(b) Anhwei (Wuhu customs) was the special pasturage of the family of Li Hung-chang. See also *postea*, § 16.

(c) The Kwangtung customs had had its special sources of revenue taken away one after the other.



§ 13. The staff was looked after, the interests of the mandarinatè were considered as much as was compatible with the national obligations, and the revenue was increased, though not to the extent hoped for ; but the chief gain was to trade and the traders. Every effort was made to consider the interests of the traders, but at the outset they regretted the "facility with which customs house business is conducted in China under Chinese supervision," for which, in 1856, the foreign traders also had momentarily yearned.[32] One reform was strongly resisted. It was the general custom to make an under-declaration of quantities, fixed for each class of commodities, and to pay the tariff duty (with extras) on the quantity declared, the generosity of the customs officers in accepting the under-declaration being fittingly recognised. This was ended after a time,[33] and the change was soon acquiesced in by the traders. Apart from loss of the "facility" of a Chinese administration, the changes were all for the benefit of traders. Tariffs were published ; this seems elementary, but it had not been done. Most offices had more than one tariff, some had several, all cumulative ; wherever the responsible Chinese heads could be persuaded to consolidate the tax into one tariff, it was done, but this was in only two or three collectorates.. Sir R. Hart's attitude was—"Everything that is collected is to be entered and reported as revenue, but, until further orders, the local name of each variety of collection is to be retained and each item is to be recorded under its special designation and according to its distinctive category" ; but at the same time he noted that "it may possibly be proposed that the cargoes of junks shall pay duty according to the same tariff as those of foreign vessels pay at treaty ports."[34] He constantly laid emphasis on the difference between the "native" customs and the "foreign" customs, in their spirit and in the treatment of traders and cargoes [35] ; and was content to carry on the native customs with the addition only of the element of probity and vigilance which was the foundation of the foreign branch. From this it is a maxim

[32] Cf. "Submission," chap. ii, § 3 and n. 0.

[33] I.G. circ., Aug. 4th, 1902.

[34] Ibid.

[35] Ibid., Nov. 6th, 1905.

of fiscal procedure that traders profit more than from any degree of facility.

§ 14. At the outset, in the years 1860-64, it was the opinion of the foreign envoys and traders that the Inspectorate of Customs should be established at Shanghai, the commercial centre, and not at Peking, the political capital; and there was much complaint when, on the initiative and by direct order of the government, it was transferred to Peking. It was feared that, "residing at Peking in a quasi-diplomatic capacity," the Inspector General might "act as the adviser of the Chinese in matters not pertaining to his office" [36]; and this fear was realised. The Inspectorate of Customs was charged with control over foreign ships and over the goods of foreign merchants, both being extraterritorialised and strictly subject to the treaties with foreign powers; it was from 1860 the disbursing agent for paying the indemnities to England and France; it was the only medium of information and advice to the Chinese ministers in their novel and difficult international relations; and for these reasons it was naturally placed under the Tsungli Yamen, China's agency for dealing with foreign affairs, developing in time to a cabinet of the imperial government. The Inspector General was, therefore, not only a servant of the Chinese government, but was specifically a subordinate of the Tsungli Yamen; and he was, naturally, often asked for his advice, not only on fiscal and commercial questions, but on diplomatic questions and in matters of internal politics.[37] His subordinates at the ports, the commissioners of customs, were also consulted by the provincial authorities on all manner of international questions arising within, or affecting, their jurisdiction.[38]

[36] Cf. "Submission," chap. ii, § 22 and n. 82.

[37] Mr. W. Cartwright informed the author that one day in 1867, he being then an Inspectorate secretary, going to the Inspector General's office, he drew his chief's attention to a decree in the Peking Gazette appointing X to be viceroy of Yunnan. Mr. Hart took up his diary and showed Mr. Cartwright an entry of the fact that he had advised the appointment of X to the Yunnan-Kweichow viceroyalty and Y to the viceroyalty of Szechwan, two jurisdictions with which there was no foreign trade. X had been gazetted, and a month after this episode Y was also gazetted.

[38] In 1894-95 the author, being then commissioner in north Formosa, was much struck by this dependence of the high officials of the empire on the commissioners of customs for information and advice on

§ 15. The Inspector General thus inevitably acquired a position of great influence. A man such as was Mr. Lay would have tried to convert this influence into power; he might, in the disordered state of China in the sixties, have succeeded for a time; but in no long time he must have fallen from power, since the Chinese, while always welcoming honest advice, have never accepted any dominating control until after 1901, and then only under compulsion. Sir R. Hart was a man of a different type. He understood the Chinese character as no foreigner in China, since the early Jesuits, has understood it; he plumbed the Chinese mentality and, a master of the Chinese language, could present a case in a style which, appearing defective and childish to the Western reader, appealed to the subtle but restricted Chinese intellect with a force that was irresistible; while weak in the fiscal and economic field, he was a marvel in organisation and the direction of the work of others; but his most distinguishing quality was his caution. Under attack he never abandoned his guns, and he never threw over a commissioner who had acted unwisely, even when the latter had misunderstood explicit instructions; but he never put his foot forward so far that he could not withdraw it, and, before making a serious proposal on an important subject, he was certain that it would be accepted, either because he had carefully prepared the way, or because he had insight into the tendency of events.

§ 16. Sir R. Hart's caution was exhibited in many ways, and an example has been shown in detail in his treatment of the novel situation created by having the "native" customs placed under his control. The meticulous care he exercised in this respect led to many anomalies, and the control of the Inspectorate varied from a direct administration inherited from the Provisional Government at Tientsin to a supervision which was merely nominal. Such a nominal supervision was exercised at Wuhu, where the influence of the great Li family, based on the high positions held so long by Li Hung-chang and Li Han-chang, was predominant—and an influence which it was unwise to antagonise. There the "control" consisted in receiving from the Superintendent a statement of the amount col-

any matter relating to international law, Western laws of war, foreign diplomacy, or other questions which the Chinese had to take up after 1860..

lected; reporting that amount to the central administration, and taking the fixed allowance of one-tenth for office expenses; the commissioner was a sleeping, and not an active, partner, and the only change made by the Inspectorate assumption of control was the receipt of the allowance, which might be regarded as a payment made to let sleeping dogs lie. The revolution made it necessary to remove all the assigned revenues from the control of any of the medley of governments which existed for a few months, and gave the Inspectorate a stronger hold on their collection, enabling it to over-ride all obstructing influences; and its control over the "native" customs offices was strengthened and assimilated to that exercised at Tientsin. Among the offices so brought under stricter control was that at Wuhu, with the result that the reported collection, which in 1911 was Tls. 138,256, increased to Tls. 637,054 in 1915.

§ 17. But the most marked manifestation of this caution was the manner of handling the revenue. The customs duty was paid into a special "Customs Bank," of which the first office was opened at Shanghai in 1852, before the institution of the Inspectors of Customs.[39] At each port this bank was local, under the direct and sole control of the Superintendent, and the commissioner had no right of intervention in any respect. On receiving any duty the bank issued its receipt, corresponding to the "memo." issued by the customs office, and the money was at once at the disposal of the Superintendent. The bank's receipt was returned to the customs office and formed the basis of its quarterly report of revenue received, which was sent to the Superintendent, Inspector General, Tsungli Yamen (or Waiwu Pu) and ministry of Revenue. The Inspectorate office assessed, the Superintendent received, and the Inspectorate reported; but at no Chinese port did any office of the Inspectorate handle any of the revenue.[40] This was the system which was organised and maintained by Sir R. Hart, and it continued in force so long as the authority of the imperial government remained unchallenged.

[39] Cf. "Submission," chap. i, § 11.

[40] Kowloon (Hongkong) and Lappa (Macao) customs were exceptions, the revenue there being collected directly by the Inspectorate office and surrendered monthly to the Chinese authority concerned.

§ 18. Mr. F. A. Aglen was appointed Inspector General in October, 1911,[41] and, within a few days after his appointment, was confronted by new conditions created by the revolution, which compelled him to abandon this attitude of caution and to adopt an entirely new procedure. I am permitted to reproduce a memorandum which he has written on the procedure then adopted.

### “ MEMORANDUM

#### “ The Chinese Revolution of 1911 and the Maritime Customs Service

“The political upheaval of 1911 brought in its train for the customs service new duties and increased responsibilities. At the ports these took the form of having to receive and account for the revenue collection in cash. At the Inspectorate the duty of auditing the port collections and of accounting for them to the Chinese government devolved upon the Inspector General with its corollary the creation of a Loan and Indemnity service to provide for payment of all China's foreign loan obligations secured on the maritime customs revenue, as well as of all payments on account of the 1901 Boxer indemnity secured as a first charge on the native customs revenues and the unmortgaged balance of maritime customs revenue. Previous to the Revolution the commissioners of customs had merely accounted for the revenue they were instrumental in collecting, but had not handled the actual cash which was paid into Customs receiving Banks against receipts. Production of these receipts at the Custom House was necessary to procure release of cargo and they constituted in the commissioner's hands the vouchers for his collection. The Customs Banks were under the control, not of the commissioner, but of his colleague, the Superintendent who in many cases was a territorial official owing his appointment directly to the Throne. It was the Superintendent, who in the first instance was responsible for the disposal of the maritime customs collection at the ports to the higher provincial authorities and these in turn accounted for it to the ministry of Revenue. Only a portion of the revenue was actually remitted to Peking, and, so far as is known, none of it was specifically allocated as such for payment of the obligations secured on it. China's foreign loan service was concentrated at Shanghai in the hands of the Shanghai Taotai to whom were remitted funds from the provincial treasuries—each province being responsible for a fixed annual quota. The central government having once fixed the amounts to be contributed would appear to have exercised very little control over the loan service, and a good deal of elas-

[41] Mr. Aglen had been Officiating Inspector General from April, 1909, and received the definitive appointment from Oct. 1st, 1911.

ticity seems to have prevailed both as regards the sources from which the funds were derived and the dates of remittance, at any rate to the time of the Boxer outbreak. But even during that period of disturbance loan payments were regularly met by the Shanghai Taotai as they fell due. The 1901 Boxer indemnity enormously increased the burden of debt carried by the provincial exchequers, and it is probable that the combined Loan and Indemnity service for which the Taotai was thenceforth responsible necessitated more method and greater regularity in the provincial remittances. There is some obscurity as to the actual procedure followed, but the results were satisfactory, and no creditor had to complain of any want of punctuality in meeting the payments due. Needless to say the foreign receiving banks on their part were satisfied with matters as they were, and raised no question concerning the disposal by the government of the revenues pledged. When however provinces began to throw off allegiance to the central government it was at once apparent that the system by which the foreign debt had been served would break down, and the need for conserving every cent of the revenue, pledged as security for foreign loans and indemnity, by removing it from the control of the provincial authorities became a pressing one.

"The startling suddenness with which the anti-dynastic movement began in October, 1911, and its rapid spread allowed of no prearranged plan of action, even if the necessity for such an emergency could have been conceived. Each commissioner of Customs, as the imperial authorities at the ports either were ousted, fled, or went over to the revolutionary party, instinctively assumed control of the Customs Bank and the revenue collection in the name of the Inspector General. For the sums collected up to the date of such assumption of control no responsibility was taken. Very little difficulty was experienced in establishing control, and it speaks well for the patriotic feelings of the revolutionary leaders and their sense of national obligation that scarcely any attempt was made to interfere with the customs collections at a time when command of ready money for fighting purposes was of vital importance. At most places a word of explanation sufficed: at a few ports an assurance was demanded from the Inspector General that customs revenue would not be placed at the disposal of the imperial government, and one independent governor was only satisfied when the Inspector General agreed to prefix the word "neutral" to the title of his local revenue account. In few countries would a matter of this kind have been approached in such a spirit of common sense and sweet reasonableness, for it must be remembered that the Inspector General was the official subordinate of the imperial government and at the northern ports where that government still retained control, the very considerable revenue that he and his commissioners were instrumental in collecting continued to flow unchecked into the imperial coffers. The falsity of the position in which the Inspector General was thus placed soon of course became intoler-

able, and, as the legations were becoming anxious about the service of the foreign debt which had completely broken down, and were on the point of making demands, the Inspector General suggested to the imperial government that the customs revenues of the northern ports, which had not seceded, should be placed under his control on precisely the same footing as the revenues at those ports where control had already been assumed. The suggestion was immediately complied with—a proof that the imperial authorities were in no way behind the revolutionary leaders in their desire to do what was right and proper for the maintenance of national credit. The legations moved in due course and were told in reply to their representations that measures had already been taken to secure for the foreign loan and indemnity service all revenues pledged. International arrangements were then made placing the Loan and Indemnity service in the Inspector General's hands [42]; and it is to be noted that these arrangements were made with, and sanctioned by, the imperial government before its fall, and that they had been scrupulously respected by the republican governments which succeeded it. Some unavoidable delay occurred at the outset in meeting loan payments that had been deferred pending the conclusion of the above arrangements, but all payments were eventually and easily met from the funds that had in the meantime accumulated. The indemnity arrears offered more difficulty and special measures had to be taken to pay them off: but once this had been effected, the combined Loan and Indemnity service worked smoothly and automatically. With assistance from the Salt revenues pledged as second security for the indemnity, there have always been ample funds to meet all requirements. The Loan and Indemnity service is conducted at Shanghai by the commissioner of customs under instructions from the Inspector General. Periodical accounts are rendered by the latter to the Chinese government and to the commission of bankers representing the interests of the foreign creditors. The sensible compromise of which these arrangements are the expression—leaving in China's hands the management of her debt with absolute security for her foreign creditors, is eminently characteristic of the country; but without an organisation of the peculiar nature of the customs service it would have been impossible. Indeed it is by no means an overstatement to maintain that the service in 1912 stood between its employers and the establishment of a 'Caisse de la Dette.'"

Mr. Aglen may be held to have been well justified in expressing, in March, 1912, his satisfaction with the manner in which his colleagues, the commissioners of customs, dealt with a difficult situation.

[42] Cf. China, No. 1, 1912, No. 121; China, No. 3, 1912, Nos. 1, 59, 81, 92, 113; China, No. 3, 1913, Nos. 24, 25, 31, 37, 40, 63, 73.

"The important part which the service has played in maintaining national credit at a time of complete financial disorganisation, and the services rendered by the commissioners of customs in the general interest have, I am glad to see, been publicly recognised. I desire now, while on the subject of the past, to express my own appreciation of the ready manner in which all have risen to the occasion, and have met and overcome unusual difficulties, in some places under circumstances of danger and discomfort."

§ 19. While Sir R. Hart's position under the Chinese government was one of great influence, but not of power, over the customs service his power was unsupervised and his control unchecked. In the early years his natural caution kept him under a self-imposed restraint—he imposed on himself a regulation that, apart from selection for commissionership, promotion should as a rule be by seniority, only one in five being reserved for his own selection, for special merit; but with the growth of his power he threw aside all restraint, and he allowed "merit" to be almost his sole guide—but public opinion in the service did not always agree with his estimate of merit. Sir John Lawrence, when viceroy of India, was once asked by a near relative—"Why don't you give me the post? I am as fit for it as anybody else." Sir John replied—"That's just it; you are *as* fit for it as anybody else, but as you are a near relative, you ought to be better fitted for it than any one else, to justify me in giving it to you." [43] Sir R. Hart, especially in his later years, would have accepted the logic of the relative, and extended relationship to many outside the blood connexion. Towards the end of his career the dissatisfaction in the service was very great, but he was strongly entrenched in the gratitude of the Chinese administration, and nothing could have availed to weaken him; no criticism served to modify the autocracy of his rule—a *sic volo sic jubeo* rule.

§ 20. None the less, he had lost his authoritative position. His influence with the administration increased year by year, and reached its culminating point about 1887; from that time it steadily declined. [44] This was partly due to the loss of personal esteem, but was

[43] H. Bosworth Smith, "Life of Lord Lawrence," ii, p. 465.

[44] Cf. "Submission," chap. xvii, § 30; chap. xviii, § 24.





*Robert Hart*

SIR ROBERT HART IN 1887.



mainly caused by the resentment of the official class at his diplomatic policy. The loans of 1895, 1896 and 1898 to provide for the Japanese war indemnity were secured on the customs revenue,[45] leaving only a small surplus for the needs of the empire; and the official class now realised that their foreign customs service existed chiefly as a collecting agent for their foreign creditors, and no longer fulfilled the purpose which was the foundation of its continued existence—collecting efficiently and reporting honestly a gratifying amount of revenue for the use of the imperial government. Moreover the service had grasped the control of the junk trade with Hongkong and Macao—a mandarin (even more, a Manchu) preserve; had been injected into supervision of a part of the Chinese internal revenue collection; and directed and operated the growing postal service. Now, in the hour of China's humiliation, it was made master of its master through several of the stipulations of the final protocol of 1901 and the commercial treaties of 1902 and 1903; it was now the foreign interest which was concerned to magnify its importance, and no longer the Chinese; and, losing the favour of the Chinese, it lost also much of its importance.

§ 21. The roots of the importance of the customs service, and of the influence exercised by the Inspector General, were the direct dependence of the Inspector General on the ministry of Foreign Affairs, Tsungli Yamen or Waiwu Pu (now Waichiao Pu), and the absolute subordination of the service to the Inspector General. Vexed as the Chinese authorities were with the situation, anxious as they were to find a solution, they made no disturbance of the latter relation; but they cut at the other root, the connexion of the Inspector General with the ministry which had control over the relations with foreign powers and the foreign envoys, and which, until 1901, was in effect the cabinet of the administration. An imperial decree of May 9th, 1906, appointed Tiehliang, president of the ministry of Finance, to be High Commissioner, and Tang Shao-yi, vice-president of the ministry of Foreign Affairs, to be Associate Commissioner, "to control customs business and customs staff"; and a later decree created the Shuiwu Chu—"Department of Customs Affairs"—of

[45] Cf. *antea*, chap. ii, §§ 34, 35.

which they were to be the heads.[46] Of the two, Tieh-liang, Manchu, was moderately progressive; Tang Shao-yi, Chinese, was leader of the extreme Cantonese reform party.

§ 22. The dismay in foreign circles was immediate and nearly general. The bottom seemed knocked out of everything when the foreign customs, the mainstay of foreign policy at the time, was struck at. Diplomats feared a political upheaval; merchants feared a reversion to Chinese methods in the customs; creditors feared a weakening of the security for their loans; the English press feared that it was a subtle oriental way of evading the obligation that the Inspector General should be a British subject.[47] Sir R. Hart hastened to calm the troubled waters, loyal as ever to the government and not solicitous of his own standing. He explained to his new chiefs the fears of the public, and was specifically authorised by them and by the Waiwu Pu to publish the instruction given to him that customs work was to proceed as before—"While the Inspector General will have the same relations with the Shuiwu Chu that he had with the Waiwu Pu and his duties continue to follow the same general lines, commissioners and port staff will also continue to work just as before and remain in the same relation to the Inspector General." [48] In his private correspondence he was equally emphatic in asserting that the change of control had effected no alteration of his position.[49]

[46] I.G. circ., May 14th, July 27th, 1906.

[47] Cf. chap. v, § 26.

[48] I.G. circ., Sept. 22nd, Oct. 30th, 1906; China, No. 1 and No. 2, 1906; U.S. For. Rel., 1906, pp. 280 seq.

[49] "It is still a case of 'as you were' with me. I report to the Shuiwu Chu and not to the Waiwu Pu, but work goes on just as—indeed, if anything, better than—before. . . . The critics have all overlooked the facts that China is only bound to work on a uniform system and is not obliged to keep up the Inspectorate, and that I have never been independent, but always under control, the office of control being now the Chu and not the Pu. . . . The service will live as long under the Chu as under the Pu, but China for the Chinese is in the air. . . . The Chu is not as big a chief to look up to as the Pu, but our status will depend more on our own work than on the department we belong to, and we'll do just as good work under the Chu as under the Pu."—R. Hart to C. Hannen, Dec. 28th, 1906. Mr. Hannen was already a commissioner when Sir R. Hart was appointed his chief, and is now (1917) living in retirement in England.

"The service will have its work under the Shuiwu Chu just as it had under Yamen and Pu. . . . The character and prestige of the service will

§ 23. None the less a serious blow had been struck at his personal position. Even before the creation of the Shuiwu Chu he had observed that the Waiwu Pu was less inclined to summon him to its aid,[50] and afterwards he came to realise that he was no longer the guiding spirit in China's international relations.[51] In 1885 he had resigned in order to take up the post of British envoy to Peking, but had cancelled his resignation when he found that he could not prevent the appointment, through the influence of Li Hung-chang, of Mr. G. Detring as his successor.[52] In 1888 he was seriously alarmed by the state of his health and had thoughts of retiring; had he resigned then, his successor would probably, through the influence of Liu Kun-yi, have been Mr. William Cartwright, an Englishman, of an incisive mind and independent character. In 1896 he again thought of retiring, and it was then probable that his successor would have been Mr. Alfred E. Hippisley, also an Englishman. From 1897 his indicated successor was his brother-in-law, Sir Robert E. Bredon; but, when Sir R. Hart died in 1911, he was succeeded by Mr. Francis A. Aglen. From 1888 on, year by year, his private correspondence was filled with references to his health and the urgent need for rest, and to his intention of leaving off his harness; but year after year he was detained by some crisis in China's international relations, such that the administration would never consent to his going; and year after year he forced his creaking machinery

depend more on itself, its character, and its work, than on the name of the Chinese department which is to control it. If I had thirty years more work in me, I'd serve the Chu as willingly as the Pu, and it is age, not disgust, and increasing infirmities, not clipping of wings or interference with work, that compel me to think of leaving."—Same to H. B. Morse, Dec. 20th, 1906.

[50] "The Waiwu Pu does not want my help or advice now to any great extent outside my own domain; and, as it leaves that very much in my own hands, the occasions for intervention are not very numerous. Besides the ministers [envoys] abroad give full information and advice, and the three or four linguists in the Pu make it independent of me, and able to manage—or mismanage—its own business."—R. Hart to E. B. Drew, Nov. 5th, 1905.

[51] "The Shuiwu Chu does not interfere unpleasantly with my work, but the position is no longer what it was; for, having lost touch to such an extent with the Waiwu Pu, the Inspector General is simply a Chu man: this will be felt more and more as days pass by."—Same to same, Oct. 20th, 1907.

[52] Cf. "Submission," chap. xviii, §§ 1-4.

to do its allotted work. In the spring of 1908 he took his third—and final—leave, and, while still officially on furlough, died on September 20th, 1911, after having been for half a century at the head of the great service on which he had left a distinctive impress. In that half century he had accomplished a work which was of great value to China and to the countries with which China had treaty relations; and his work was recognised by the honours conferred upon him by the nations.[53]

[53] For a list of the honours conferred on him, cf. Appendix E.

## CHAPTER XV

### THE DOWNFALL OF THE EMPIRE

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§ 1. THE Chinese empire had sunk low in 1860, when its forces had been defeated by two of the Western powers, while a third had appropriated the trans-Ussuri portion of its Manchu dominion, and when scarcely a single one of its Chinese provinces was free from the incursions of rebels ; but in 1902, with the settlement for the Boxer rising, it reached the nadir of its existence under the Ta-tsing dynasty of the Manchus. To the Western powers the settlement was a just retribution which had fallen on an empire, whose rulers and leaders, disregarding the wise counsel of its most experienced statesmen, had flung the gauntlet in the face of the world and had broken every rule of international law ; but to the mass of the Chinese people the retribution appeared less proportionate to the offence. There were some anti-foreign riots for a few years,[1] directed against the missionaries ; but, in general, these were mixed up with discontent at increased and novel taxes, imposed by the provincial officials to supplement the resources of their treasuries—and their own emoluments—depleted by the requirements of the imperial administration for payment of indemnities. Resentment against the government, both central and provincial, was strong, manifesting itself by brigandage in many provinces and reaching the height of armed rebellion in Kwangsi and in Kiangsi ; and the discontent was sedulously fomented by the active anti-dynastic party headed by Sun Yat-sen, practically the whole of Kwangtung, and by the followers of Kang Yu-wei, in most of the provinces, taking the line of constitutional reform.[2]

[1] U.S. For. Rel., 1902, pp. 159 seq. ; 1904, pp. 200 seq. ; 1906, pp. 308 seq.

[2] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 3, 4, 5.



§ 2. The Manchu rulers of the empire were dimly aware that some reform was necessary. On February 1st, 1902, the day on which the empress dowager Tzehi received the ladies of the diplomatic corps,[3] she issued, in her own sole name, two imperial decrees.[4] The first, after reciting that, after two and a half centuries of existence of the dynasty, "the customs and beliefs of Manchus and Chinese are now alike," abolished the old prohibition of intermarriage between the two, and commanded that it be permitted; it reprobated the Chinese custom of binding the women's feet; but it ordered that Manchu girls must still be chosen as palace attendants, "lest we fall into the corrupt practices of the former Ming dynasty." The second ordered that youths should be carefully selected from the imperial clansmen and the eight (Manchu) banners and sent abroad for travel and study, "that they may assist the court in its purpose to cultivate talent for the service of the government." These decrees appear trivial to the uninformed Western reader, but they indicate a portentous change in the attitude of the conquering Manchu to the subject Chinese, far more significant than a similar change would have been under the first two Norman kings of England; but they did not touch the root of the evils impending over the empire, and they left the nation unaffected.

§ 3. Another reform touched a more vital interest, education. Two decrees of January 10th, 1902,[5] ordered a classification of the members of the Hanlin Academy "according to their abilities," and re-established the Imperial University of Peking, with Chang Po-hsi as chancellor; of the foreign faculty of the latter the veteran sinologue and educator, Dr. W. A. P. Martin, American, was president. Education in Western knowledge—in the science originating in the East, taken by the West and developed in recent times, and now reintroduced to the East—has followed four lines: the education movement of the missionaries; the Tungwenkwan at Peking and Canton; the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States; and, finally, the measures adopted by the government to make it general throughout the empire.

§ 4. The earliest foreign teachers of the Chinese were

[3] Cf. chap. xiii, § 4.

[4] Text in U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 208.

[5] Ibid., p. 182.

the Jesuit fathers. Under the Ming emperors their scientific knowledge was recognised and utilised; Matteo Ricci [6] translated Euclid into Chinese, and Sabatin de Ursis [7] was charged by the emperor with the task of correcting the calendar. Under the Manchu emperors the tradition of these great names was carried on by many others of the Society of Jesus, the most famous being Adam Schaal [8] and Ferdinand Verbiest, [9] and they rose to high political position; but such a position has its dangers, and, in 1724, began a great persecution of the Roman Catholic church, its missionaries being expelled from China. The Russians, in their treaty of Kiakhta of 1728, obtained the right to establish a school of instruction in Peking; it did some work in filling the void created by the expulsion of the Jesuits, but a century later there remained no trace of its existence. The Dutch colonists in Formosa (1624-61) seem to have done no teaching of its backward inhabitants. The true Protestant mission work was begun in the nineteenth century, the English dating from the arrival of Robert Morrison in 1807, the Americans from the arrival of E. C. Bridgman in 1829; twenty years after the latter date there were, of adult males, 19 English, 44 American, 2 Swiss, and 2 German, Protestant missionaries in China. In those earlier years the missionaries were students themselves, and the instruction given by them was necessarily limited to training their assistants; but their wives often taught Chinese youth [10]; and at Macao was the Morrison School, established by missionaries, and under the Rev. S. R. Brown of the American Board.

§ 5. For half a century it was especially the Americans who, themselves generally college graduates, utilised their ability to teach and made it a help in carrying the Gospel to China. [11] Among the earlier educators special

[6] Arrived in China in 1582; died in 1610.

[7] Arrived in China in 1611.

[8] Arrived 1629, died 1665.

[9] Arrived 1662, died 1688.

[10] For example, Yung Wing was taught first by Mrs. Gutzlaff in 1839.

[11] "The Rev. Timothy Richard, Litt.D., himself an Englishman, has called attention to the fact that nearly all the modern colleges in China have been started and are manned by Americans."—R. E. Lewis, "The Educational Conquest of the Far East," p. 171.

mention may be made of Rev. C. W. Mateer of Tengchowfu, Shantung; Rev. D. Z. Sheffield of Tungchow, Chihli; Rev. Young J. Allen of Shanghai; and, in a later generation, of Rev. F. L. Hawks Pott of Shanghai and Rev. H. H. Lowry of Peking.[12] Under the auspices of these and numerous other teachers, many hundreds of schools were opened for teaching Chinese youth. In 1905 the total number of schools under Protestant mission control in China was 2585, of which 14 (including 12 American and 2 English) may be said to have been of full collegiate standing; the number of pupils was 57,683, including 47,754 male and 9929 female.[13] From these and from the government schools in Hongkong it was that, until 1900, China drew her stock of men and women with at least some knowledge, however imperfect, of Western science, and the ability to use the English language, however incorrectly, in the three R's.

§ 6. In 1860 the Chinese government was, for the first time, brought into direct relations with foreign envoys; and in 1862 the Tungwenkwan, or School of Languages, was opened by the direct order of Prince Kung, and was attached to the newly created Tsungli Yamen. In 1865 science was added to the curriculum, thereby raising the school to the status of a college; and control over the institution was given to the Inspector General of Customs, who had then established his office in Peking. In 1869 Dr. W. A. P. Martin was appointed president, a post which he held until 1894; and in 1884 there were classes in the English, French, Russian and German languages, in International Law, Chemistry, Mathematics, Astronomy and Physiology. The students were drawn exclusively from the ranks of the Bannermen, and received a subsistence allowance, the number of "paid scholarships" in 1887 being 120. This college, and a similar smaller one at Canton, supplied for over thirty years all the interpreters for the Tsungli Yamen and the legations abroad, but it did not produce much effect on the educational system of the empire.[14]

[12] These were, respectively, of the Presbyterian, Congregational, Methodist, Episcopalian and Methodist missions.

[13] "A Century of Protestant Missions in China," Shanghai, 1907.

[14] For a more detailed appreciation of the Tungwenkwan at Peking, cf. Appendix F.

§ 7. Yung Wing, born in 1828 in Kwangtung, learned English in the Morrison School at Macao, and in 1847 was taken by his teacher, Mr. S. R. Brown, to the United States. In 1854 he graduated at Yale and then returned to China. He was convinced that China needed men like himself, thoroughly equipped with Western learning, and in 1870 he succeeded in enlisting the support of the three leading Chinese statesmen of the empire, Tseng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Ting Jih-chang. On their initiative an imperial decree was issued in August, 1871, sanctioning the Chinese Educational Mission, of which the directors were to be Yung Wing and Chen Lan-pin. A body of 120 students was selected with great care, a fourth of the number being sent to New England in each of the years 1872-75. There they were distributed among different towns and villages, entrusted to the care of selected private families, no more than two students in one family; thence in time they were sent to the best academies and high-schools, and thence those who were qualified passed on to colleges or scientific schools. In a few years the conservative instincts of the Chinese government were excited by persistent reports that the students were losing their Chinese characteristics and had become Americanised; and, in 1881, the mission was broken up and all the students recalled. On their return they were treated with great indignity by an irate mandarin, and were assigned to the most subordinate clerical work [15]; but, by degrees, especially after the war with Japan, their marked ability produced its effect, and, one by one, they emerged from the obscurity to which they had been relegated. Of the 120 students who had been sent to America, 80 were still living in 1907, and of these, 23 had then already attained the rank of expectant taotai or higher.

§ 8. State encouragement of Western learning was slow in coming, but a beginning was made in the foundation of the Imperial University of Peking, the Peiyang College at Tientsin, and the Nanyang College at Shanghai, after the war with Japan. All three had strong official backing; and with three well-equipped American educators

[15] An excellent brief account in "History and Outcome of the Chinese Educational Mission to the United States," by Tong Kai-son, Tientsin, 1888.

as their presidents,[16] and large staffs of professors, mostly American and English, they were soon qualified to serve as pivots for a general scheme. This was, indeed, the function which would have been put upon them in the projects of Chang Chih-tung and Kang Yu-wei [17]; but these projects were swept away in the counter-revolution, and, after the Boxer rising, nothing was left but the three universities, standing on no educational foundation, and depending for their supply of students on the schools established by the missionaries.

§ 9. After the Boxer rising the province of Shansi accepted a scheme of state-endowed schools as a means of escaping other punishment for the revolting crimes committed within its borders. Dr. Timothy Richard, well known and much respected as a missionary, philanthropist and educator,[18] had been foremost in carrying relief to the starving people of Shansi in the great famine of 1876-78,[19] and made the province his field of work during the next ten years. In 1901 he was invited by the governor of Shansi and the Chinese peace plenipotentiaries to act as mediator between Shansi and the foreign powers. Among other proposals, he declared that ignorance was the principal cause of China's woes, and this he desired to remove by a scheme of education for the province which was so guilty but so dear to his heart; and, to accomplish this, he proposed that the province should pay an indemnity of Tls. 500,000, spread over ten years, to establish a university at Taiyuenfu and schools in all the principal cities.[20] The Chinese welcomed the plan; the mission societies had no wish to demand vengeance for their murdered missionaries, and were eager to extend the philanthropic side of their work; and the foreign powers accepted this solution of a problem which had baffled their military and diplomatic advisers. The money was forthcoming; and the university and schools established with it, though under foreign control,[21] were state schools.

[16] W. A. P. Martin, Charles D. Tenney and John C. Ferguson.

[17] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 9, 11, 12.

[18] For many years permanent secretary of the Christian Literature Society of China.

[19] Cf. "Submission," chap. xv, §§ 1, 2.

[20] Smith, "China in Convulsion," ii, p. 729.

[21] Moir Duncan was president of Taiyuenfu University.

§ 10. At the close of 1901, while the court was on its way back to Peking, an imperial decree ordered that preparations be made to institute state education in Western knowledge, and a definite scheme was promulgated for the advancement of students having this knowledge; and in 1903 a new ministry, the Hio Pu, ministry of Education, was created. All steps in reform were then arrested by the Russo-Japanese war; but in 1905 a scheme of graduated schools was brought into effect. Under this scheme there were established, at the end of 1909, a total of 5 universities, 85 technical schools, 440 high and normal schools, and 57,011 other schools, with 90,095 teachers and 1,637,441 pupils.[22] For so vast an empire this was only a beginning, but it was one filled with hope for the future, tempered only by the thought that there were no teachers properly equipped for so great an undertaking, and that the expenditure of the ministry for the year above noted was only Tls. 1,155,631.[23] There was no attempt made to absorb, or even to recognise in any way, the many excellent colleges and schools established and conducted by the foreign missionaries, though probably none, and certainly very few, imposed any religious test on their pupils, or adopted any direct measures for influencing their religious tendencies. In addition to the pupils in the state colleges, many went abroad for the education they could not get at home—some thousands in every year to Japan, some hundreds to America, and some dozens to England and other European countries; of these foreign-educated students of the later era, in 1909 there were 13 admitted to the rank of Hanlin, 52 to Chinshih and 190 to Kūjen.[24]

§ 11. The nation went over in a mass to the "foreign" learning. That it was which had equipped foreign nations and had enabled them to hold China in subjection; that

[22] Statement of ministry of Education, cited in "China Year Book," 1912.

[23] The "salary" of the minister of Education was Tls. 180 a year, but "allowances" brought it in that year to about Tls. 5000.—"China Year Book," 1912, p. 321.

[24] Ibid. "Almost 100 Chinese students left Shanghai on Sept. 9th, on the s.s. *China* for the States, where they will enter various colleges and universities for school courses of 4 and 5 years. Fifteen girls were included in the party. Most of the students are going on government indemnity scholarships."—*St. John's Echo*, Shanghai, Sept., 1916.

was the instrument which had enabled Japan to rise from a similar state of subjection to a position of equality in the family of nations ; and nothing else was required to endow China with the same qualities. To attain that end China, Manchu and Chinese alike, was ready to throw to the dust-heap all the learning which had made the Chinese what they were, and to sacrifice all they had gained in twenty-five centuries of adherence to Confucian philosophy. But there was a party in the state which wished to retain the old learning and to keep China as she was ; and they procured the issue, on December 30th, 1906, of an imperial decree raising the sage Confucius from the level of the sun and moon—to which the high ministers of state paid worship—to the level of the heaven and earth—to which the emperor alone made ceremonial offerings. A decree of January 6th, 1907, established at Kūfowhien in Shantung, the birthplace of Confucius, a college devoted exclusively to the perpetuation of his teachings ; and one of January 14th ordered that Western teaching was to be subordinate to Chinese studies.[25] This movement was headed by Chang Chih-tung, who thus abjured the last of his suggestions of reform [26] ; but even the magic of his name could not stem the flowing tide, and this reactionary measure failed of its purpose.

§ 12. The year 1902 opened with the Russian forces in undisputed military possession of the whole of Manchuria.[27] After the declarations of disinterestedness which had been made by all the powers, such a position was full of danger to all the foreign interests, as well as to those of China, the nominal lord of the soil. To counter it England and Japan concluded the Anglo-Japanese agreement of January 30th, 1902,[28] the *pourparlers* for which had been begun in the April previous. This agreement was for a term of five years, and provided that either power might take such action as was necessary to protect its interests in China and Korea ; that if, in taking such action, either power were attacked, the other contracting power would “ maintain a strict neutrality and use its

[25] “ Our own corresp.,” Peking, Times, London, April 20th, 1907.

[26] Cf. chap. vi, §§ 11, 21.

[27] Cf. chap. xi, §§ 37, 38 ; chap. xii, §§ 16, 17 ; chap. xiii, § 1.

[28] Text in U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 514.

efforts to prevent other powers from joining in hostilities against its ally"; but "if any other power should join in hostilities against that ally, the other power will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it." This agreement was justly characterised as a "defensive treaty of alliance" [29]; it was declared that "it contains no provisions which can be regarded as an indication of aggressive or self-seeking tendencies" [30]; and Russia, the power directly affected, recognised this character, while also reserving to herself the right to take any action to which circumstances, "jeopardising the integrity and free development of China," might impel her.[31]

§ 13. The immediate result of this action was to hasten the conclusion of the Russo-Chinese convention relative to Manchuria, which had hung fire, but which was signed at Peking on April 8th, 1902.[32] By this convention Russia agreed to the re-establishment of Chinese authority in Manchuria; subject to the due fulfilment of pre-existing contracts,[33] Russia agreed to withdraw her troops from the territory west of the Liao within six months, from the rest of Shengking and Kirin within twelve months, and from Tsitsihar within eighteen months; Chinese troops were to re-occupy the restored provinces only after previous agreement with the Russian authorities; and special arrangements were made for the restoration of Chinese railways, for any new construction, and for reimbursement of Russia's expenses. Under the convention the territory west of the Liao, and the railway Shanhaikwan-Yingkow-Sinminfu, were duly restored to Chinese control within the six months.[34] Yingkow (the treaty port of Newchwang), on the east bank of the Liao, was on the western edge of the "rest of Shengking," and was due to be evacuated on or before April 8th, 1903. There the Russian authorities were in full possession: the foreign customs was required

[29] Mr. Choate to Mr. Hay, Feb. 12th, 1902, *ibid.*, p. 513.

[30] Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, Jan. 30th, 1902, *ibid.*

[31] Memorandum of the allied governments of Russia and France, pres'd to Lord Lansdowne, March 11th, 1902, *China*, No. 2, 1904, p. 35.

[32] Text in *ibid.*, p. 40; U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 280.

[33] Cf. chap. iv, §§ 12-15, 26.

[34] Sir E. Satow to Lord Lansdowne, Oct. 3rd, Nov. 6th, 1902, *China*, No. 2, 1904, pp. 48, 50; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Oct. 6th, 30th, 1902, U.S. For. Rel., 1902, p. 281.



to work in consultation with them; the native customs was in their hands; and the duties collected by both were paid, not into a Chinese bank, but into the Russo-Chinese Bank, which was Russian. The status of the port and the question of its evacuation were, therefore, a matter of some concern to the commercial nations.

§ 14. Yingkow was not evacuated at the due date, the reason assigned by the Russian envoy at Peking being that satisfactory arrangements for quarantine regulations, with the medical staff Russian, had not been completed [35]; at Yingkow the reason assigned was the absence of the taotai [36]; at St. Petersburg the Chinese envoy was informed that it was due to the presence of foreign ships of war in the port [37]; and at London the Russian ambassador declared that "if the retirement from Newchwang had not taken place, it was only delayed for some special and sufficient cause." [38] The first three reasons were obviously mere pretexts, and it is in the last that the true causes are to be found. Russia meant to be master in Manchuria, west of the Yalu, as Japan was already in Korea, east of the Yalu; and the Russian authorities had seen some indications that Japan would challenge their supremacy. [39] It was at this time that the first official mention was made of "timber concessions which private Russians might have acquired" in the valley of the Yalu, and it was admitted that General Bezobrazoff, "a retired Russian officer," had acquired such a concession [40]; but the imperial ambitions of Russia, and the equally

[35] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, April 18th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 53.

[36] Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 9th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, p. 51.

[37] Sir C. Scott to same, April 15th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 52.

There were then in the port two Russian, one British and one American gunboats, for the protection of the foreign residents against tumult.—Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 17th, 1903, *ibid.*

[38] Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, April 22nd, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 53.

[39] "Something has happened in the Yalu neighbourhood. I rather think the Japanese have made some advance there and Russia does not like it; but action is taken on the spot, I understand, and the matter is not discussed here. . . . The Waiwu Pu is silent on the subject of the delay."—R. Hart to C. A. V. Bowra, April 12th, 1903.

The Japanese government on the other hand had received disquieting reports of the movement of Russian troops towards the Yalu.—Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 8th, Sir C. Scott to same, April 15th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 52, 71.

[40] Same to same, *ubi sup.*

ambitious aims of Japan, are sufficient causes to explain the actions of the two powers in that year.

§ 15. At this time, too, a Russian member of the customs staff was appointed to be commissioner in charge of the Newchwang customs. The question of such an appointment had been raised a year earlier, but Mr. C. A. V. Bowra, an Englishman, was then in charge, and was told that he was to "hold the fort"[41]—much as Mr. J. McLeavy Brown had been holding the fort in Korea.[42] A year later the Russian pressure on the Chinese government was too strong to be resisted on such a minor point, and Mr. N. A. Konovaloff, Russian, was appointed to succeed Mr. Bowra.[43] The appointment "caused much dissatisfaction; at Newchwang Russia will now have the commissioner of customs, the native customs, and the customs taotai"[44]; but the dissatisfaction was not well-founded. To customs offices in a foreign sphere of influence Sir R. Hart had always, under compulsion from the foreign power or instruction from the Chinese government, appointed commissioners who were acceptable to the foreign power. The commissioner of the Dairen customs has, since 1905, been Japanese; of the Kiaochow customs German; of the Kowloon customs (Hongkong) British; of the Tongking frontier customs usually French or American; of the Tengyueh customs British; and, since 1905, of the Harbin customs Russian. In Mr. Konovaloff, as in all his colleagues, the "proper cosmopolitan spirit was ingrained and assimilated," and neither Russian hopes nor the fears of others were realised.[45]

[41] "As to a Russian commissioner for Newchwang, I have heard nothing about it, and I look on you as a fixture there for fully another year. If your health allows you, hold on: you are not only in the running now as regards your own career, but you are 'holding the fort,' and it is not the time to change the garrison."—R. Hart to C. A. V. Bowra, March 17th, 1902.

[42] Cf. chap. i, § 19.

[43] R. Hart to C. A. V. Bowra, April 12th, 1903.

[44] Mr. Towrley to Lord Lansdowne, April 17th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, p. 52.

[45] "Of course there are reasons for the Konovaloff appointment, and I hope the result, later on, will demonstrate its wisdom; but, at the start, it is natural for it to disturb people's minds, elicit adverse criticism, and perhaps evoke opposition. Konovaloff will have a delicate and difficult position, but he has worked with and under my immediate eye three or four

§ 16. At this time also Russia set to work to consolidate her position in Manchuria by a new agreement with China, the so-called "convention of seven points." These seven points, which Russia required China to accept as conditions precedent to the further evacuation of Manchuria, were: no new treaty ports or foreign consuls in Manchuria to be allowed; no foreigners other than Russians to be employed in the public service in north-China; the status of the administration of Mongolia to remain unchanged; the receipts of the Newchwang customs to continue to be deposited in the Russo-Chinese Bank; the sanitary commission at Newchwang to be dominated by Russians; Russia to retain control of the Port Arthur-Yingkow-Mukden telegraph line; no territory in Manchuria to be alienated to any power.[46] In the second point the Chinese ministers "assured me confidentially that . . . Chihli is also intended to be included" in the area in which the employment of non-Russian foreigners was prohibited.[47] The American government at once protested to China against the acceptance of the first two points, and reserved discussion on the others [48]; the British government warned the Chinese ministers of the danger of accepting the Russian demands; and Japan "served both a note of warning and a protest." [49] The prohibition of the opening of treaty ports and the admission of consuls in Manchuria was vital. The American commissioners for treaty negotiation had already demanded the opening of Antung and Tatungkow, on the Yalu, and of Mukden, as treaty ports [50]; and now, in May, they reported that "the Chinese commissioners, having no instructions from the Chinese government, decline to discuss the opening of Manchurian ports." [51]

years, and the proper cosmopolitan spirit is ingrained in and assimilated by him, and I expect he will satisfy myself, and in the end, the public. The maker of the appointment, myself, will of course be pitched into all round: but that comes in the day's work, and I always have to decide for myself and act on my own responsibility."—R. Hart to C. A. V. Bowra, April 19th, 1903.

[46] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, April 23rd, May 4th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, pp. 53, 56; Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 23rd, 24th, 27th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 54-6.

[47] Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 27th, 1903, *ubi sup.*

[48] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, April 25th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 54.

[49] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, April 29th, 1903, *ibid.*

[50] Cf. chap. xiii, § 14.

[51] Mr. Goodnow to Mr. Hay, May 2th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 55.

§ 17. On a former occasion the authenticity of an alleged agreement on the Manchurian question was categorically denied by both Russia and China.[52] Now China not only admitted the fact, but at once communicated the text of the Russian demands to the other foreign envoys.[53] Russia denied vigorously; her minister of Foreign Affairs and her ambassadors and envoys in other countries all declared categorically and authoritatively that there was no truth in any of the reports [54]; only one, the Russian chargé d'affaires in Peking, was so candid as to say that "the delay in the evacuation was due to the military party in Russia," but even he declared that "in his opinion Newchwang would shortly be evacuated." [55] These denials were, of course, not believed; and England, Japan and America assured each other that each would support the others in urging China to resist the demands.[56] America, however, could only

[52] Cf. *antea*, n. 27.

[53] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 4th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 56; Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 27th, 30th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 56, 61.

[54] U.S. For. Rel., 1903, pp. 54, 56; China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 58, 59, 63.

[55] Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, April 30th, 1903, *ubi sup.*

"We have the positive and categorical assurance of the Russian government that the so-called 'convention of seven points' has not been proposed by Russia to China. We have this assurance from Count Cassini here, from Mr. McCormick [American ambassador to Russia] directly from Count Lamsdorff in Petersburg, and through Sir Michael Herbert [British ambassador at Washington] from the Russian ambassador in London. . . . *Per contra*, we have from Conger in Peking, from our Commissioners in Shanghai, from the Japanese legation here, and from the British embassy, substantially identical copies of the 'convention of seven points,' which there is no shadow of doubt the Russians have been, and perhaps still are, forcing upon the government of China. . . . I have intimated to Cassini that the inevitable result of their present course of aggression would be the seizure by different powers of different provinces in China, and the accomplishment of the dismemberment of the empire. He shouts in reply: 'This is already done. China is dismembered and we are entitled to our share.'"—Mr. Hay to Pres. Roosevelt, May 12th, 1903, in Thayer, "John Hay," ii, p. 368.

[56] Lord Lansdowne <sup>from</sup> to Sir M. Herbert (at Washington) and Sir C. MacDonald (at Tokyo), April 27th, 28th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 56-8.

These were the three powers chiefly interested in the foreign trade of Manchuria by sea. In 1903 the imports of cotton goods were approximately as follows:

|                    | Pieces.   | Lbs.                |
|--------------------|-----------|---------------------|
| British . . . . .  | 216,000   | and yarn 19,765,000 |
| American . . . . . | 1,733,000 |                     |
| Japanese . . . . . | 79,000    | and yarn 3,941,500  |

exert a moral influence [57]; England was not prepared to go beyond diplomatic pressure, supplemented by her agreement to keep the ring for Japan; and Japan was necessarily the protagonist in withstanding Russian designs in Manchuria, on which she also had designs as ambitious as those of Russia.

§ 18. The course of Russian diplomacy may be illustrated by the steps taken in regard to the opening of new ports. England stood on Art. 54, the "most-favoured nation clause," of her treaty of 1858, and protested—to China [58]; America had asked for the opening of certain Manchurian ports, and her envoy in Peking was instructed to insist on the demand [59]; to Russia both powers made friendly representations and asked for some declaration of Russian intentions.[60] On April 29th the Russian minister, Count Lamsdorf, informed the American ambassador, and the Russian ambassador also informed Mr. Hay, that "the reports of the proposed convention were wholly untrue, that Russia had no intention to exclude other countries from advantages now enjoyed in Manchuria . . . that nothing would be done to close open door or hamper American commerce." [61] On May 4th Mr. Conger reported that the whole matter was left to be adjusted by the Russian envoy at Peking, on his return to his post.[62] On May 19th the Russian chargé

[57] "The Manchurian matter is far more delicate and more troublesome. Russia, as you know, has given us the most positive assurances that the famous 'convention of seven points' never existed. We have a verbatim copy of it as it was presented, with preamble and appendix, by Monsieur Plançon, to the Chinese government. If they choose to disavow Plançon, and to discontinue their attempts to violate their agreements, we shall be all right; but, if the lie they have told was intended to serve only for a week or two, the situation will become a serious one. The Chinese, as well as the Russians, seem to know that the strength of our position is entirely moral, and if the Russians are convinced that we will not fight for Manchuria—as I suppose we will not—and the Chinese are convinced that they have nothing but good to expect from us and nothing but a beating from Russia, the open hand will not be so convincing to the poor devils of Chinese as the raised club. Still we must do the best we can with the means at our disposition."—John Hay to Henry White, May 22th, 1903, in Thayer, *op. cit.*, ii, p. 369.

[58] Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Townley, April 23th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, p. 54.

[59] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, April 25th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 54.

[60] Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, April 28th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, p. 58.

[61] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, April 29th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 54.

[62] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 4th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 56.

d'affaires at Peking had received no instructions that Russia had no objection to opening of ports or appointment of consuls [63]; on May 27th he notified the Chinese ministers that they must consult with the Russian government before they sanctioned the opening of new ports or the appointment of consuls [64]; and on May 30th and June 6th he was still without instructions.[65] On June 4th the Russian ambassador at Washington assured Mr. Hay that his government was "not opposed to the opening of the ports" [66]; and on June 6th, at his request, negotiations were suspended at Peking and opened at Washington.[67] Mr. Lessar, the Russian envoy, returned to Peking on May 29th—without instructions [68]; on June 16th, at the request of Count Lamsdorf, Mr. Conger was instructed to formulate the American demand for new ports and communicate it to Mr. Lessar, who "will be authorised to state frankly to the Chinese government the attitude of Russia" [69]; Mr. Lessar received the communication, but he "has no instructions . . . and can make no statement to the Chinese government, nor anyone, concerning Russia's attitude." [70] China, in the meantime, was quite ready to open the ports, and would "do so at once, but for the difficulties presented by the Russian occupation." [71] On July 11th the Russian government formally withdrew, at Washington and London, its opposition to the opening of new ports, an exception being made in the case of Harbin, which was vital for the Russian railway system.[72] This withdrawal was not communicated to the Chinese government, which was, therefore, reluctant to act "so long as Russia was

[63] Mr. Townley to Lord Lansdowne, May 19th, Sir M. Herbert to same, May 23rd, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 70, 72.

[64] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 28th, 29th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, pp. 60, 61.

[65] Same to same, May 30th, June 6th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 63.

[66] Sir M. Herbert to Lord Lansdowne, June 4th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, p. 74.

[67] Same to same, June 6th, 1903, *ibid.*; Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, June 6th, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 63.

[68] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, May 30th, June 9th, 1903, *ibid.*, pp. 63, 64.

[69] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, June 16th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 64.

[70] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, June 18th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 65.

[71] Same to same, July 1st, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 66.

[72] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, July 14th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 67; Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, July 11th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, p. 79.

in possession of Manchuria" [73]; but finally Mr. Hay consented to accept, and Prince Ching agreed to give, a formal assurance that the treaty, including the opening of the new ports, would be signed on October 8th, six months after the day on which, by the Russo-Chinese agreement, the evacuation of eastern Shengking should be completed.[74]

§ 19. The convention of seven points of April appears now to have faded away; but in September Russia proposed a new agreement of a much milder character.[75] The British government saw "objectionable features in the new conditions proposed," but wanted more precise information.[76] Japan at once instructed her envoy at Peking to oppose two of the conditions, as being "in entire opposition to the open door": one by which China agreed never to cede to any foreign power any portion of the three Manchurian provinces; the other giving trading rights along the Sungari River.[77] Japanese patience with Russia's delay in withdrawing her troops from Manchuria was exhausted; and, as this fact had become obvious to the Russian authorities, they took steps to free themselves from the embarrassment of other opposition than that of Japan, in the case that, contrary to their expectation, Japan should proceed to armed resistance to Russian ambitions. At the end of November Lord Lansdowne declared that England was, as always, prepared to "recognise the predominating interest of Russia as the limitrophe power in Manchuria," but that "it was essential that British treaty rights in all parts of the Chinese empire should be respected"; and, as a test of Russian sincerity, he asked whether, "at any rate in the case of Newchwang, it could not be arranged that an early evacuation should take place," and he "expected the Russian government to put an end to the arrangement under which the Newchwang customs [receipts] were at present paid to the Russo-Chinese Bank, and a part of the proceeds intercepted

[73] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, July 23rd, 1903, U.S. For. Rel., 1903, p. 68.

[74] Mr. Hay <sup>to</sup> Mr. Conger, <sup>July 26th,</sup> <sub>from Aug. 14th,</sub> 1903, *ibid.*, pp. 70, 71.

[75] Viscount Hayashi to Lord Lansdowne, Sept. 11th, Sir E. Satow to same, Sept. 9th, 1903, China, No. 2, 1904, pp. 86, 87.

[76] Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. MacDonald, Sept. 30th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 89.

[77] Sir C. MacDonald to Lord Lansdowne, Sept. 15th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 88.

by the Russian government.”[78] On January 8th, 1904, the Russian government declared formally that “from this day forth Russia has no intention whatever of placing any obstacle in the way of the continued enjoyment by foreign powers of the rights acquired by them [in Manchuria] in virtue of the treaties now in force.”[79] Lord Lansdowne expressed his regret that no concrete evidence, such as the evacuation of Newchwang, had been given of Russia’s intention to make good her promises.[80]

§ 20. Japan had for some time been seriously alarmed by the Russian threat to her domination in Korea and to the extension of her trade in Manchuria; and, to avert both these dangers, she resolved that, if necessary, she would fight out the issue with Russia. She first demanded that Russia should complete the evacuation of Manchuria, and should recognise Japan’s predominant position in Korea. This was not accepted, and Japan then proposed that a line should be drawn across northern Korea, the territory to the north of that line being recognised to be in the Russian sphere of influence, and that to the south within the Japanese. Russia attempted to follow her usual dilatory tactics in diplomacy, but Japan was ready and refused to permit delay; and on February 8th, 1904, she broke off diplomatic relations. This initiated a war to decide which of two foreign powers should exercise a predominating influence over three provinces of the Chinese empire, the original home of the dynasty and the ruling race; a war fought, on the land side, entirely on Chinese soil, while China, maintaining her neutrality, looked on, interested only to the extent of a decision whether, in Manchuria, her territory and her subjects should be under Russian or Japanese domination.

§ 21. Japan struck promptly. The day after her declaration of war, the Japanese fleet attacked the Russian fleet off Port Arthur and defeated it; one unsuccessful sortie was made, but otherwise the Russian fleet in Port Arthur was kept locked up there, and the fleet in Vladivostock was so closely beset that it could accomplish nothing. Troops were landed at Chemulpo, and by the

[78] Lord Lansdowne to Mr. Spring-Rice, Nov. 25th, 1903, *ibid.*, p. 96.

[79] Count Benckendorff to Lord Lansdowne, Jan. 8th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 97.

[80] Lord Lansdowne to Sir C. Scott, Jan. 8th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 98.



middle of March Japan had 100,000 between that point and the Yalu. That river was crossed on May 1st with little opposition, a second army was landed at Pitzewo on May 4th and a third at Takushan on May 19th; the Russian army was then pushed back by a series of actions in May, until the force holding Port Arthur was separated from the main army to the north. The Japanese occupied Talienwan (Dalny, Dairen) on May 30th. Then began the siege of Port Arthur, conducted with a reckless sacrifice of life on both sides; on November 30th the Japanese took by assault, with very heavy loss, the fort known as 203-metre Fort, completely dominating the town and harbour; the fleet tried to escape, some ships being sunk and others getting away more or less seriously damaged; and, on January 1st, 1905, General Stoessel surrendered the fortress and its garrison to General Nogi. The campaign in the field continued in the meantime, with its introduction of trench warfare and of battles lasting several days, the principal among them being the following:

May 26th.—Kinchow and Nanshan. Russian forces separated.

June 14th-15th.—Telisze. After this Kuropatkin takes command in person.

August 24th-September 4th.—Liaoyang.

October 12th-14th.—Shaho.

January 25th-29th.—Heikowtai and Hunho.

February 23rd-March 10th.—Mukden.

March 16th.—Tiehling.—Linievitch succeeds Kuropatkin.

March 21st.—Changtufu occupied by Japanese. The Russian Baltic fleet, under Admiral Rodjestvensky, left Libau on October 15th, 1904, and, after many vicissitudes, arrived off Tsushima on May 27th, 1905. There it was struck by Admiral Togo's fleet on that day and the next in the battle of the Sea of Japan, and practically annihilated.[81]

§ 22. On the outbreak of war China issued her proclamation of neutrality.[82]. Two days earlier Mr. Hay

[81] Summarised mainly from the concise account in F. L. Hawks Pott, "Sketch of Chinese History," pp. 216-20. A careful study of the war, very critical of Japanese strategy, in Chasseur, "Russo-Japanese War."

[82] Imp. decree Feb. 12th, 1904, officialising a previous declaration. Cf. n. 84.

had urged this step in the desire that "the neutrality of China and her administrative entity be respected by both parties . . . and that the area of hostilities be localised and limited, so that undue excitement and disturbance of the Chinese people may be prevented, and the least possible loss may be occasioned to the commerce and peaceful intercourse of the world." [83] On the same day the envoys of the four other powers "whose troops occupied various points in Chihli from Peking to Shanhaikwan," England, France, Germany and Italy, agreed to send an identic telegram urging their respective governments "to suggest to the belligerents that they declare that they will avoid sending their troops into Chihli"; and it was pointed out that "this step would have the advantage of reassuring the imperial court and of preventing the government from fleeing in a moment of panic." [84] The foreign neutral powers accepted the suggestion, the two belligerents agreed to act in conformity with it, and the Chinese court was reassured—"The one fixed purpose of the court is to remain here and preserve order; the capital is of great importance and there must not be any journeying of the Imperial Chariot." [85] In accepting the suggestion localising the war area, Russia claimed that the whole of Manchuria must be included in it, even the part already surrendered to China, west of the Liao; and China thereupon kept back, guarding the Chihli frontier, the troops, 18,000 in number, intended for the maintenance of order in the surrendered territory. [86]

§ 23. As regards the enforcement of neutrality in connexion with belligerent vessels, China began badly because of her failure to realise that her obligations were essentially of an executive police nature, and were not a suitable subject for diplomatic discussion. [87] On the outbreak of war the Russian gunboat *Manjur* was in Shanghai unable to leave except at the risk of being sunk or taken if caught

[83] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Feb. 10th, 1904, U.S. For. Rel., 1904, p. 118.

[84] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Feb. 10th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 119.

[85] Waiwu Pu to Mr. Conger, Feb. 11th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 123.

[86] Mr. Hay <sup>to</sup> Mr. Conger, <sup>Feb. 19th.</sup> <sub>from</sub> <sup>March 4th,</sup> 1904, *ibid.*, pp. 125, 128.

[87] China's case is presented in a memorandum prepared for the International Congress at the Hague, given in Appendix G.

outside national waters; and after the Russian naval sortie from Port Arthur on August 10th, 1904, the *Askold* and the *Grozovoi* took refuge in Shanghai. China's neutrality proclamation provided for such cases by ordering the internment of belligerent vessels which did not leave within forty-eight hours; but, instead of acting executively on that proclamation, negotiations were entered into. At Shanghai the Taotai—advised by the commissioner of customs—and the two belligerent consuls discussed the matter, and at Peking the government and the envoys of the two belligerent powers. Eventually after lengthy negotiations the vessels were disarmed and interned.[88] The Chinese authorities learned their lesson from this experience, and on the arrival of Admiral Rodjestvensky's fleet in Eastern waters, the Coast Inspector, Captain W. F. Tyler, formerly in the British navy, but then in the Chinese service, was appointed as neutrality adviser to the naval commander-in-chief. Towards the end of May, 1905, Russian transports functioning with the Russian fleet—which a few days later was defeated and annihilated—arrived at Wusung. They were promptly declared war vessels by Admiral Yeh, the Commander-in-Chief, and were given the choice of proceeding or of being interned. Admiral Yeh refused to discuss the matter with the consuls or to allow the local Chinese civil officials to interfere. Recalcitrant Russians, who after internment refused to give parole, were placed under arrest; and the important principle was enunciated and given effect to that in the performance of neutrality duties China was in no way limited by the extraterritorial rights of the belligerents. Prior to this, on August 11th, 1904, several ships escaped from Port Arthur. Of these the destroyer *Ryeshitelni* took refuge in the treaty port of Chefoo, forty miles distant across the strait from Port Arthur. At the time three Chinese cruisers under the command of Admiral Sah were in Chefoo. In the course of the same day the *Ryeshitelni*, which was anchored close to the Chinese flag ship, submitted to internment and her disarmament was practically completed. Before dark two Japanese de-

[88] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, March 4th, Aug. 26th; Mr. Goodnow to Mr. Loomis, Aug. 26th, 1904; U.S. For. Rel., 1904, pp. 128, 138, 140.

stroyers ran into port, reconnoitred and left. After dark these or others returned and anchored in the vicinity of the Chinese squadron. Admiral Sah himself visited the senior Japanese officer and told him that the *Ryeshitelni* was interned. In reply the Japanese captain said he would leave soon. About 3 a.m. the *Ryeshitelni* was suddenly seized by the Japanese, in spite of the protests of the Chinese officer of the guard, who was on board, and was towed out to sea. The Russians resisted and several are said to have been killed on each side. This was a gross outrage on China's neutrality for which no redress was ever given.[89]

§ 24. The chief brunt of maintaining Chinese neutrality fell on the customs, the commissioners at the two ports being engaged even in the affairs noted above. Both belligerents desired to draw on Chinese supplies for provisions for their troops in the field, and both belligerents included provisions, rice, etc., in their lists of contraband; and China responded, from a wish to please all parties, by prohibiting the transport of rice and other grains, and of flour, [90] from Chinese treaty ports to ports in Manchuria,[91] and in Korea [92]; and the prohibition was later extended to bran, beans, beancake and other oilcake, and eggs.[93] Vessels calling at a Chinese port on the way from a neutral port to a belligerent port or one in the war zone, were required to land in the Chinese port all "purely warlike supplies, such as arms and ammunition" [94]; but later on the overlooked rights of neutrals were more fully recognised, and the transit of dynamite, on the way to Japan, was permitted, "being an ordinary mercantile operation." [95] Towards the end of the war the export of coal for use of the belligerents was prohibited [96]; and the shipment of "coal packed in bags ready for transhipment

[89] Same to same, Aug. 26th, 1904, enclosing Japanese official statement in Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Aug. 26th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 138. Moore, "International Law Digest," v, pp. 555 seq., vii, p. 1091.

[90] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Aug. 26th, *ubi sup.*

[91] Prince Ching to Mr. Conger, March 9th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 129; I.G. circ., March 10th, 1904.

[92] I.G. circ., March 24th, 1904.

[93] *Ibid.*, April 20th, 1904.

[94] *Ibid.*, April 27th, 1904.

[95] *Ibid.*, Sept. 17th, 1904.

[96] *Ibid.*, May 25th, June 9th, 1905.

at sea" was absolutely prohibited.[97] These restrictions it fell to the customs to enforce.

§ 25. This was the first occasion on which China was called upon to preserve her own neutrality, and she did it in the helpless blundering way imposed on her by her own powerlessness and the inexperience of her officials in such a situation. The Chinese traders were as eager to seize the chance of extraordinary profits as were the foreign traders in the treaty ports of China and in their own countries; and all who had the opportunity, furnished supplies with great impartiality to both sides, so that the diplomatic representatives of both belligerents were constantly protesting against breaches of neutrality in favour of the other.[98] In China's helpless position Mr. Hay instructed the American envoy at Peking to "support the government of China in its demand for neutrality in its waters; China is unable to force compliance with its rules, and an abuse of neutrality by one of the belligerents will, therefore, naturally provoke reprisal by the other; abuse of Chinese ports by either belligerent should be prevented by the judicious exercise of neutral influence." [99] On the same day Mr. Conger gave China a certificate of character in reporting that he was "satisfied that the Chinese government, so far as its knowledge of international law and precedents and its ability to execute and enforce it are concerned, is doing its best to preserve a strict neutrality, and if it fails it will be on account of unauthorised acts of its provincial or military officials or of unjustifiable proceedings of one or both of the belligerents." [100]

§ 26. By the end of May, 1905, the Russian fleets had been swept from eastern seas, and the Russian land forces had been driven back from latitude 38° 49' N. (Port Arthur) to latitude 43° N. (twenty miles north of Changtufu). In January the situation was already well indicated, and, as usual in all wars of recent years, rumours of inter-

[97] I.G. circ., May 30th, 1905.

[98] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, March 26th, April 29th, Aug. 22th, 26th, 1904, Jan. 14th, March 9th, April 28th, 1905; Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, March 30th, May 14th, 16th, Aug. 26th, 1904, May 2nd, 4th, 1905; U.S. For. Rel., 1904, 1905, *passim*.

[99] Mr. Hay to Mr. Conger, Aug. 26th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 137.

[100] Mr. Conger to Mr. Hay, Aug. 26th, 1904, *ibid.*, p. 138.

vention were in the air.[101] In that month the German emperor was filled with apprehensions lest a coalition of Russia, France and England should work for a partition of China ; and, on his suggestion, Mr. Hay sent a circular note asking the neutral powers to join in an undertaking not to demand compensation in any shape for themselves for any service rendered to the belligerents in the making of peace or otherwise. This was agreed to without delay by England, France, Germany and Italy.[102] It may be noted that Germany's intervention in Moroccan affairs occurred in the following June, and that M. Delcassé's resignation from the post of minister of Foreign Affairs was on June 7th.

§ 27. On June 8th, 1905, President Roosevelt sent an identic note to Russia and Japan urging the two powers to appoint plenipotentiaries to consider terms of peace, but disclaiming any intention of mediating, or even of intervening in the discussions.[103] The two governments promptly accepted, and agreed that the meeting should be held in Washington ; but this was changed to Portsmouth, New Hampshire, as a more suitable place in the heat of August. Before the plenipotentiaries met, the Chinese government addressed a note to the American, Russian and Japanese governments, stating that " in the present conflict Chinese territory has been made the theatre of military operations ; therefore it is hereby expressly declared that no provision affecting Chinese interests without the approval of China previously obtained, which the treaty of peace may contain, will be recognised as valid." [104] There is no evidence that the belligerent powers paid any more attention to this protest than they had paid to China's sovereign rights in Manchuria during the war. At Portsmouth met the plenipotentiaries of the two powers : for Russia, M. Sergius Witte, Secretary of State and president of the Council of Ministers, and Baron Roman Rosen, formerly envoy to Tokyo, then ambassador at Washington ; for Japan, Baron Komura Jutaro, minister of Foreign

[101] Diary of John Hay, Jan. 3rd, 1905, Thayer, " John Hay," ii, p. 384.

[102] Diary, Jan. 5th-19th, 1905, *ibid.*, pp. 385-87.

[103] Text of note in U.S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 807.

[104] Prince Ching to Mr. Rockhill, July 6th ; Chinese envoy, Washington, to Sec. State, July 10th, 1905 ; *ibid.*, p. 818.

Affairs, and Mr. Takahira Kogoro, then envoy at Washington.

§ 28. The Russian plenipotentiaries accepted, in the main, the arbitrament of war, and an agreement was soon reached on the points relating to Korea and Manchuria: Japanese domination in Korea was recognised; both powers were to evacuate Manchuria, which was to be restored to the exclusive administration of China, with the exception of the Liaotung Peninsula, the lease of which was to be transferred to Japan; the sovereignty of China in Manchuria and the open door were expressly recognised; Russia ceded to Japan the railway from Port Arthur as far north as Kwanchengtze (Changchun), retaining the railway north of that point. Then difficulties arose. The Japanese plenipotentiaries, filled with the sense of victory, wished to gather its fruit; the Japanese forces were in occupation of the southern half of the island of Sakhalin, and the plenipotentiaries demanded the cession of the whole island; in addition they demanded an indemnity; the amount which it was well understood they proposed to claim being 1,600,000,000 roubles. But there was still a war party in Russia, convinced that the Japanese had passed their high-water mark, and had reached a point where they had neither the men nor the money to continue the conflict; and with this belief the Russian plenipotentiaries were in full sympathy. They therefore declared—"No indemnity, no cession of Russian territory." On August 25th the discussion came to a deadlock, and the Russian plenipotentiaries received peremptory orders to break off negotiations on the 29th, if a satisfactory agreement was not then reached. Then two impetuosities concerted to ensure peace. On August 27th President Roosevelt telegraphed to the German emperor asking him to urge the Tsar to make peace on the basis of no indemnity, and the return to Russia of the northern half of Sakhalin; and at the same time caused arguments to be addressed to the Japanese plenipotentiaries which would induce them to obtain instructions to that effect. The war party in Russia protested, but the Tsar sent orders making for peace, and, at the meeting of August 29th, the Japanese made no claim for an indemnity, and offered to restore to Russia the half

of Sakhalin north of 50° N. The treaty of Portsmouth was then signed, in French and English, on September 5th (N.S.), 1905.[105]

§ 29. The result of the Boxer rising had given a shock to the court and the Manchus, who had counted on it to produce an improvement in their position; but on the Chinese people in general its effect had been rather one of bewilderment in some provinces and of sullen rage in others. It had convinced the Manchus and the literate classes of the Chinese that some constitutional changes, of a character not to interfere with their privileges or injure their prestige, were advisable, but it had not created any new enthusiasm for reform among the masses of the people. The result of the Russo-Japanese war, on the contrary, electrified the nation. In this war the Asiatic had inflicted a signal defeat on the European power, and had stepped into its place as the dominating influence in southern Manchuria; Japan had reversed the relations which had long been recognised as those naturally existing between the East and the West; and what one small Asiatic power had done might surely be done by another, greater in area, in population, and in resources. Every Chinese, even to the unlettered peasant, began to ask by what means Japan had worked this result; and there were many fluent tongues ready to explain that it was by the wholesale adoption of Western ways. Japan had absorbed Western learning, had adopted a constitution, had created a parliament, had remodelled her army on modern lines, had accepted the Western calendar, had taken to European clothes and style of dressing the hair; and China had only to do the same.

§ 30. The first manifestation of the newly aroused sense of nationality was the boycott of American trade, adopted by the people of China as a means of strengthening the hands of their government in coercing the American government to permit the unrestricted immigration of Chinese into the United States.[106] The first warning

[105] Compiled chiefly from personal statements made to the author in 1908 by Mr. Melville E. Stone, manager of the Associated Press of America, who took a part in the intervention. He subsequently embodied the story in an article in the *Saturday Evening Post*, Philadelphia, Jan. 30th, 1915.

Text of treaty in U.S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 824.

[106] Cf. "Submission," chap. viii, §§ 18, 19.



came from Shanghai in May, 1905 [107]; but the movement was started and encouraged from San Francisco, in which city the Chinese consul publicly declared that the boycott had the support of the Chinese government.[108] The boycott was put into force at many places, chief among them being Canton, Amoy, Foochow, Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin and Newchwang; it was most successful at Canton and Shanghai, and had most life in it and produced its greatest effect at Shanghai. Other foreign powers, as represented both by official action and by their press, recognised the solidarity of all foreign interests in the matter; the movement was suppressed by strong measures in Hongkong, in Tsingtau, and by the Japanese in Newchwang. The Chinese government did what it could to suppress it; the viceroy Yuen Shih-kai stamped it out at Tientsin, and governors and taotais issued strong proclamations in the other ports. The imperial government issued peremptory orders to the same effect, and informed the envoy that it was "most anxious that the agitation should be at once stopped"; at one time, August 26th, at the height of the boycott, Prince Ching lost his nerve, and informed the envoy that "the Chinese government assumes no responsibility for the boycott, that the movement was started by the traders, and that it has taken action as a proof of friendship"; but in general its attitude was correct. It was in fact a great popular movement, engineered by the Cantonese in Canton and San Francisco, and fomented by the students of the new era, especially by those who had studied in Japan. The Chinese government was notified that it would be held responsible for any losses occasioned by this "conspiracy in restraint of American trade," but, even with that spur to action, its measures were not fully effective. The boycott faded away, however, in September, because the Chinese traders who had bought American cotton piece-goods on long-time contracts, found that they could not dispose of their holdings; and, when the traders began to agitate against a trade boycott, the boycott ended.[109]

[107] State Dept. to Peking legation, May 26th, 1905, U.S. For. Rel., 1905, p. 204.

[108] Report of inspector J. E. Gardner, San Francisco, July 17th, 1905, *ibid.*, p. 209.

[109] Mr. Rockhill to State Dept., July 6th-Nov. 25th, 1905, *ibid.*, pp. 205-232.

§ 31. A popular manifestation of the new feeling of nationality which had a better, because a moral, character, was the revival of measures for checking the evil of opium smoking. The earlier attempts to attain this end had been movements from above: those of 1729, 1800, 1838 and 1850 were initiated by the will of the emperor, were supported by few, very few, among his officials, and failed to secure the obedience of his apathetic and unwilling subjects [110]; the revived agitation of 1881 was designed to help China in an attempt to obtain tariff reform, and the principal result was a largely increased revenue from imported opium.[111] Now the students took up the question, and young China imposed its will on old China. The students felt that this form of vice was one which relegated their country to a lower plane in the family of nations. In 1903 the students in America protested against the inclusion of opium-smoking appliances among the Chinese exhibit at the Louisiana Purchase Exhibition at St. Louis, and the imperial commissioner, Prince Pulun, acceded to their expressed wish. The thousands of students in Japan received their inspiration from a country which absolutely prohibited the import and the use of opium, and they added this to the list of causes which had brought Japan forward, while their own country had lagged behind in the race of nations. The long years of teaching by the foreign missionaries had produced their effect on the hundreds of thousands of Chinese brought directly under their influence, and through them on millions more. Foreign powers were ready to help China in raising herself from the low level to which she had been thrust by the folly of her rulers, and were more ready than on former occasions to recognise an international duty in the matter. The government of China has always placed itself on record as the leader in social reform and in uplifting the people; and now it found a reform which it could not only lead, but which it could also make effective without, apparently, impairing the supremacy of the dynasty and the Manchus. The student agitation swept the country, and the government took action, with a fair prospect of receiving from the people the support which previously had always failed.

[110] Cf. "Conflict," chaps. viii, ix, xxiii, *passim*.

[111] Cf. "Submission," chap. xviii, §§ 10-14.

§ 32. An imperial decree of November 21st, 1906, ordered that all land then planted in poppy should by instalments be withdrawn from its cultivation within ten years; that all smokers must take out a licence, those under sixty years of age gradually reducing their consumption; that restrictions should be placed on the sale of opium appliances, and on the extension of smoking divans; that smoking be absolutely prohibited to all in the government service; and that negotiations be opened for the gradual reduction of the import of foreign opium, and for its absolute cessation within ten years.[112] The effect on the nation was electrical. Compulsion was exercised to reduce cultivation and, with the police enlisted in the cause of social reform, this end was attained. Smokers abandoned the habit by millions; it became unfashionable to smoke in public; and the young were constrained not to acquire the habit. Many millions continued, of course, to smoke, but a generation of Chinese is growing up of whom few have acquired this habit which had for two centuries been peculiar to the Chinese.

§ 33. The foreign opium imported into China was produced almost entirely in British India and Persia, and was shipped solely from British ports. Persia had no treaty with China and was, therefore, not entitled to the privileges of extraterritoriality or to most-favoured nation treatment. The British government responded readily to the request for support in this great moral movement and, in December, 1906, agreed to restrict the export from India by one-tenth in each year from 1908. This agreement was provisional for three years, but at the end of that time it was found that China was actually reducing her production of native opium beyond the stipulated rate; and a new convention on May 8th, 1911, provided for continuing the co-operation and the reduction in the import, until, at the end of 1917, the foreign import should entirely cease. The import of 1907 had been assumed to be 51,000 chests; this, it was agreed, was to be reduced by 5100 chests in each year, and in 1915 the import was 4186 chests.[113]

[112] For text of the regulations, see H. B. Morse, "Trade and Administration of China," Appendix F.

[113] The net import in 1907 was 48,530 chests, containing 54,475 piculs.

It had been further agreed that the introduction of foreign opium might be prohibited in all provinces in which it was clearly demonstrated that cultivation of the poppy and production of native opium had entirely ceased; and in 1915 foreign opium was overtly imported into three provinces only—Kiangsi, Kiangsu and Kwangtung.[114] Finally, in February 1917, the Chinese government agreed to purchase "for medicinal purposes" the certificated stocks of imported opium, about 2000 chests, at the price of 8200 taels a chest.

§ 34. It was still open to other countries to produce opium and, under existing treaties, their nationals were free to import it, wherever produced; and to meet this, an international conference was held at Shanghai in February, 1909. The American government and the American people since 1848, and government, people and merchants since 1856, had steadily supported China in her anti-opium efforts; now it was the American government which issued the summons to the conference; and, quite fittingly, an American, Bishop Charles Henry Brent, presided over its proceedings. It adopted resolutions recog-

The total net import of opium in each year following 1907 was as follows:

|                |               |                |               |
|----------------|---------------|----------------|---------------|
| 1908 . . . . . | 48,347 piculs | 1912 . . . . . | 21,930 piculs |
| 1909 . . . . . | 48,917 "      | 1913 . . . . . | 18,138 "      |
| 1910 . . . . . | 35,358 "      | 1914 . . . . . | 7,484 "       |
| 1911 . . . . . | 27,808 "      | 1915 . . . . . | 4,447 "       |

[114] Appended is a table showing the provinces cleared from opium, while in others not included in the list poppy growing is rapidly disappearing:

| Names of Provinces.    | Dates Declared Free. |
|------------------------|----------------------|
| Fengtien . . . . .     | September 11th, 1911 |
| Kirin . . . . .        | do.                  |
| Heilungkiang . . . . . | do.                  |
| Szechwan . . . . .     | do.                  |
| Shansi . . . . .       | do.                  |
| Chihli . . . . .       | March 1st, 1913      |
| Kwangsi . . . . .      | do.                  |
| Hunan . . . . .        | June 15th, 1913      |
| Anhwei . . . . .       | do.                  |
| Shantung . . . . .     | do.                  |
| Fukien . . . . .       | May 1st, 1914        |
| Hupeh . . . . .        | June 1st, 1914       |
| Chekiang . . . . .     | June 16th, 1914      |
| Honan . . . . .        | do.                  |
| Sinkiang . . . . .     | June 1st, 1915       |
| Kansu . . . . .        | November 1st, 1915   |

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nising the "unswerving sincerity of the government of China in their efforts to eradicate the production and consumption of opium throughout the empire"; and urging the foreign governments represented at it to adopt regulations which would aid China in accomplishing her declared purpose.[115] A second international conference was held at The Hague in January, 1912, at which were represented China, America, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, Persia, Portugal, Russia and Siam; over this conference also Bishop Brent presided. An international convention was agreed to and signed, providing:

- "that the powers should enact effective laws or regulations for the control of the production and distribution of raw opium;
- "that they should take measures for the gradual and effective suppression of the manufacture of, internal trade in, and use of, prepared opium, and should prohibit its import and export;
- "that they should pass laws to control the trade in and use of morphia, cocaine, and their respective salts; and
- "that they should co-operate in preventing the smuggling of these drugs into and from China."

Thus, after more than a century of conflict on the fiscal and commercial aspects of the opium question, China and the foreign powers came to an agreement based on its moral aspect; and the price, in loss of revenue, was paid without hesitation by China and Great Britain.

§ 35. The ferment which had initiated the American boycott and the revived agitation against opium, continued to stir the country. The young students of the post-Boxer period still supplied the impelling force; but by this time the small group of American students of the Yung Wing mission, less than a hundred in number, had emerged from the obscurity to which they had been relegated,[116] and had taken their rightful place in the movement for reform. To them, and to a few others educated elsewhere, was assigned the leading part in drawing up a new constitution, the most prominent being Tang Shao-yi, Liang Tun-yen and Liang Cheng among the

[115] U.S. For. Rel., 1906; China, No. 1, 1908; Report of the International Opium Commission, 2 vols., Shanghai, 1909.

[116] Cf. *antea*, § 7.

American students, and Wu Ting-fang, a member of the English Bar; they were backed by the strong support of Yuen Shih-kai, and it is a tribute to the sober sense of the Chinese race that the dominant inspiration in this constitutional movement was not the radical and revolutionary spirit filling the students taught in Japan, but the sane conservatism animating the select few educated in democratic America and England.

§ 36. In September, 1906, an imperial edict was issued, promising reform of the administrative system, of the laws, and of the finances of the empire, and re-organisation of the army and navy; and undertaking to introduce constitutional government within a few years, when the nation should be educated to it. On November 6th a further decree abolished the old ministries, substituting for them thirteen new ministries, and created a national consultative Assembly of elected representatives. In 1907, in September a decree placed the National Assembly on a working footing; in October provincial consultative Assemblies were created; and a decree of December 25th held out a promise of a future elected Parliament, enacting laws and controlling the executive government. A decree of August 27th, 1908, laid down a programme of progressive constitutional reform through nine years, at the end of which time the Parliament was to be summoned and full constitutional government established; the intervening period of nine years was, it was announced, required for training the electorate and legislators in their duties. At the same time the draft of a proposed constitution was published, of which the first article declared that "the Tatsing dynasty shall rule over the Tatsing empire for ever, and shall be honoured through all ages"; other articles defined the powers of the emperor, the duties of his ministers, the privileges and obligations of the subject, the rights and procedure of Parliament, and the qualifications for the franchise.

§ 37. It was a period of great political activity, when the intellect of the coming men in China was devoted to building up on the old foundation a new China, fitted to take her place in the modern world. Their work was worthy of being placed beside that of Sieyès, the Maker of Constitutions; and it shared with his the defect of being

adapted for Utopia rather than for a vast empire, with traditions established for more than two thousand years, and with a people accustomed to the old and dreading the new.[117] Their reform began from the apex of the pyramid, and left unaltered its body and its base. What was really needed was a reform which would secure equal justice for the subject, would protect the tax-payer from extortion, would substitute definite salaries for perquisites of undefined amount, and would require the official to pay into the Treasury all he received as taxes from the people. These humble reforms, less magnificent than those actually proposed, might perhaps have been carried out by a parliament, if its members had an inherited capacity for self-government; but in an Asiatic country, with its tradition of government by the strong hand through bureaucratic agents, they could only have been effected by an Augustus or a Napoleon, resolved on clearing the Augean stables.

§ 38. The Manchus Prince Kung, Wensiang and Junglu, the Chinese Tseng Kwo-fan, Li Hung-chang and Liu Kun-yi, statesmen and loyal ministers of the dynasty, had all passed away. On November 15th, 1908, the only strong character that had held the imperial power in China for over a century, whether as emperor or as regent, the empress dowager Tzchi, died at the age of seventy-three. Her death was preceded twenty hours earlier, on the evening of November 14th, by that of the emperor Kwanghsü. He died after refusing to allow himself to be removed from the pavilion in which he was confined in 1898, to the Pavilion of Peaceful Longevity, in which an emperor should properly die; and he died without having donned the robes emblazoned with the dragon, prescribed for a dying emperor.[118] The unexpected death of the Old Buddha, so soon after that of the emperor, excited general suspicion of foul play to her [119]; the more natural explanation, considering her age, is that, having been for nearly half a century the undisputed ruler of the empire,

[117] "The principle that an institution which, instead of being deliberately planned, is evolved slowly, will develop in harmony with its environment, or force its environment into harmony with itself."—A. Lawrence Lowell, "The Government of England," i, p. 251.

[118] Our own corresp., Peking, Nov. 15th, Times, Nov. 16th, 1908.

[119] Ibid.

she recognised the immeasurable calamity of allowing the neurasthenic emperor to guide its destinies in so grave a period of its development; and, being the undisputed mistress in the palace,[120] and foreseeing her own impending end, she took the steps necessary to avert the calamity.

§ 39. The power retained to the last by the empress dowager Tzchi, in the imperial family, in the palace, and in the empire, was shown in her last act. In the evening of November 14th she proclaimed Puyi, the three-year old son of Prince Chun, to be emperor, and appointed the father to be Regent and Controller of the nation.[121] The new emperor was at once seated on the throne under the reign title of Hsüantung. Yuen Shih-kai had been transferred from the viceroyalty of Chihli and appointed to the Grand Council, the highest dignity possible for a subject; and one of the first acts of the new reign was his appointment in conjunction with Chang Chih-tung, on December 18th, to be Senior Guardian of the Heir Apparent. But Yuen Shih-kai's position was precarious: he had alienated the reform party in 1898; he had incurred the serious displeasure of the reactionary Manchus by refusing his support to the Boxer movement in 1900; and, in the death of Tzchi, he had lost his principal support in the state. An imperial decree of January 2nd, 1909, alleging an affection in the foot which prevented him from performing the due ceremonies, ordered him to resign his offices and return forthwith to his home in Honan. Fearing a worse fate, he took refuge in the foreign settlements at Tientsin; but, on the personal assurances of Manchus in high position, he returned to Peking, and thence went banished to his home.

§ 40. The Manchus had learned nothing, and they still considered the empire theirs. At the end of 1909 in the eleven principal ministries, of the fifteen highest posts, nine were held by Manchus, one by a Mongol, five by

[120] Tzchi left behind her in the vaults of the palace a private treasure in bullion, amounting to Tls. 99,000,000 of silver and Tls. 1,200,000 of gold (about £22,000,000 sterling).—Chinese press cited in *North-China Herald*, April 17th, 1909.

[121] Kwangshü was born the son of Yihwan Prince Chun, and was adopted as son of Hienfeng. Puyi was son of that Prince Chun's son, Tsaifeng Prince Chun. Cf. genealogical table at end of "Submission," chap. xiii.



Chinese ; of the eleven posts next in seniority, seven were held by Manchus, one by a Mongol, three by Chinese [122] ; and this period was selected by several empresses dowager—three relicts of Tungchih and the Lungyü consort of Kwanghsü—to squabble for power within the palace.[123] In the provinces the Chinese reformers renewed their activity. The provincial Assemblies met for the first time in October, 1909 ; and, although constitutionally they were little more than debating societies, they made a collective demand that the meeting of the national Parliament should be expedited, and should take place within two years. This demand was rejected in a decree of January 10th, 1910. The first national Assembly was opened at Peking on October 3rd, 1910, Prince Pulun presiding. It at once urged that the first Parliament be summoned earlier ; there was some hesitation, but ultimately a decree was issued summoning Parliament in the year 1913. This did not satisfy the Assembly, which demanded an immediate summons, insisting further on the responsibility of the Grand Council to Parliament. This was resisted, but inquiry was promised, and the Assembly was prorogued on January 11th, 1911.

§ 41. By an imperial decree of May 8th, 1911, the three higher councils of state were abolished, and in their place were created a Cabinet and a Privy Council ; Prince Ching, president of the abolished Grand Council, was appointed Prime Minister, and elaborate regulations were published defining the duties and powers of the Cabinet and ministers. Prince Ching was an imperial clansman who had been adopted into the imperial family ; he was made a prince of the fourth rank on his adoption in 1852, raised to the third rank in 1871, to the second rank in 1884, to the first rank in 1894, and to hereditary first rank in December, 1908. He had had offices and honours heaped upon him—and yet this prince and high minister of state was a man of mediocre ability. Seventy-three years of age, he was much married, and was connected by his marriages with a great number of the highest princes and officials in the empire. “ His palace in Peking has been the place of pilgrimage of expectant officials for a generation

[122] Our own correspondence, Peking, Nov. 9th, 1909, Times, Jan. 4th, 1910.

[123] North-China Herald, Dec. 24th, 1909 ; Times, Sept. 6th, 1910.

past; 'his front door is a market place' is a common saying among the Chinese; every official who enters the precincts of his palace has to pay toll to the gate-keeper." He was characterised as "a decrepit old man, irresolute, wily, corrupt, and inefficient,"[124] and to his irresolution and incapacity were due some at least of the ills of the government of China in recent years. And yet the court, which had summarily dismissed Yuen Shih-kai, could find no minister more capable than this decrepit old man to whom to entrust the guidance of the empire.

§ 42. The second meeting of the national Assembly was appointed for October, 1911. On the 11th day of that month an outbreak at Wuchang precipitated the revolution. There was some fighting at and around Hankow and Hanyang, ending in favour of the revolutionaries. This was followed by risings in others of the principal cities of China; in these there was little fighting, and the movement, having the character rather of a general strike than of a rebellion, was uniformly successful throughout central and southern China. Yuen Shih-kai was now recalled from his seclusion and given the most ample powers in the vain hope of saving the dynasty. He was able to retain control over the northern provinces, and even to recover Hankow and Hanyang by fire and the sword; but the united and resolute attitude of the revolutionaries in the centre and south, and the irresoluteness and Bourbonism of the Manchu court and nobility, combined to make impossible the task he had undertaken of preserving the dynasty as head of a constitutional monarchy. The followers of Kang Yu-wei were brushed aside, the adherents of Sun Yat-sen took charge of the revolution; and, on February 12th, 1912, the emperor abdicated and the court withdrew to Jehol, which had been its city of refuge when the English and French occupied Peking in 1860.

§ 43. For three-fourths of a century there had been international, as distinguished from mercantile, relations between the Chinese empire and the nations of the West. In 1834 Lord Napier had acted as an envoy of the British

[124] Our own corresp., Peking, April 27th, Times, May 17th, 1911. If Yuen Shih-kai may be considered the potential Chatham of the Chinese empire—"I know I can save the country, and I know no other man can"—Prince Ching certainly had some of the qualities of the Duke of Newcastle of that period.

crown must have acted ; the Chinese court and the viceroy at Canton had acted as must have been expected of them [125] ; and the result was the ignominious failure of Lord Napier's mission. In 1839 a conflict broke out in which all the foreign merchants at Canton were concerned, but the brunt of which was borne by England ; to China and the Chinese people the sole apparent cause of the conflict was the opium question ; to the British government and people its sole causes were the equal status of nations, and the right to protection for life and property for foreign traders commorant in the Chinese empire.[126] In the settlement effected by the treaties, 1842-44, the opium question was not settled, but the other questions were dealt with as far as Western opinion was then prepared to go.[127] Chinese opinion did not accept this settlement, and friction continued between China and the West until, in 1856, cause was given to England and France to begin the second war. This was ended by the four treaties of 1858, which settled the relations between China and the West.[128] A third war, that of 1860, was required to overcome the opposition of the war party. The settlement of 1860 consolidated that of 1858, and, as the result of three wars, the Chinese learned, and they accepted as their law, that whereas formerly it was China which dictated the conditions under which international relations were to be maintained, now it was the Western nations which imposed their will on China.[129] This ended the Period of Conflict.

§ 44. Then followed the Period of Submission, in which China accepted the decision of war. Officials in the provinces may have taken the natural course of interpreting treaty stipulations in their own favour ; but the empire was exhausted by the great Taiping rebellion,[130] while its prestige was shaken by its foreign wars ; and the central administration was unable to resist the demands of the foreign powers. For some years these demands were directed solely to the enforcement of the treaties, and the

[125] Cf. "Conflict," chap. vi, §§ 24-8.

[126] Ibid., chap. ix, §§ 45-9.

[127] Ibid., chap. xi, §§ 1, 19.

[128] Ibid., chap. xxiv, § 2.

[129] Ibid., chap. xxvi, § 29.

[130] Ibid., chap. xvii ; "Submission," chaps. iv, v.

envoys at Peking were united in supporting the government [131]; but gradually national ambitions asserted themselves. During these years China lost the control of nearly all her vassal states—the fringe of buffer states which had encircled the empire and protected it from direct contact with the outer world—Liuchiu, [132] a fringe of Ili, [133] Siam, [134] Burma, [135] Annam [136]; and, in 1894, there remained only Tibet, Mongolia and Korea. This was the period in which a wise and strong government, with a disorganised and exhausted empire, would have reformed and strengthened its administration and its finances; and in which any rulers, worthy to rule, would at least have looked to the defences of the empire. But this plain duty was neglected by the imperial government, and the period of submission—and of peace—was wasted.

§ 45. Then followed the Period of Subjection. In 1895 the war with Japan brought to the empire deep humiliation, and the loss of Korea. In 1898 four powers seized for themselves naval stations and commercial ports on the coast of China, and the break-up of the empire seemed to be impending. Then came the mad outbreak of 1900, supported by the Manchus, but, of the Chinese, only by those in the provinces immediately around Peking; and, in punishment, China was reduced to a state of subjection so low that, if the empire was to survive, it was clear that radical reforms were essential. The period of submission had been wasted; of the period of subjection, the first part, 1895 to 1900, had been wasted; the second part, 1901 to 1905, had been spent in futile reforms which should not touch the prestige and the emoluments of the ruling race; and in the last part the empire tried by belated and reluctant reform to stem the tide of the rising Chinese sense of nationality. All these belated efforts failed, and the Manchu empire fell, leaving to the republic, which was erected on its ruins, an inheritance of disorder and corrupt administration, and a status of subjection to the foreign powers.

[131] Cf. "Submission," chap. vi.

[132] *Ibid.*, chap. xv, § 17.

[133] *Ibid.*, chap. xvi.

[134] *Ibid.*, chap. xvii, § 1.

[135] *Ibid.*, chap. xviii, § 5.

[136] *Ibid.*, chap. xvii.

## APPENDICES

# APPENDIX A

## FOREIGN LOANS OF CHINA, 1874-1911

| Title.                                                           | Issued. | Amount.         | Rate of interest. | Repayment. |       | Principal paid off to December, 1911. | Principal outstanding January, 1912. |
|------------------------------------------------------------------|---------|-----------------|-------------------|------------|-------|---------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
|                                                                  |         |                 |                   | Begins.    | Ends. |                                       |                                      |
| NATIONAL LOANS.                                                  |         |                 |                   |            |       |                                       |                                      |
| 1. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .           | 1874    | £ 627,615       | 8                 | 1875       | 1884  | £ 627,615                             | —                                    |
| 2. Oriental Bank . . . . .                                       | 1874    | Tls. 2,000,000  | 9                 | 1875       | 1884  | 666,667*                              | —                                    |
| 3. Jardine, Matheson & Co. . . . .                               | 1875    | Tls. 1,000,000  | 8                 | 1876       | 1885  | 333,333*                              | —                                    |
| 4. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .           | 1878    | £ 1,604,276     | 8                 | 1878       | 1884  | 1,604,276                             | —                                    |
| 5. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .           | 1878    | Tls. 1,750,000  | 8                 | 1879       | 1884  | 583,333*                              | —                                    |
| 6. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .           | 1881    | Tls. 4,000,000  | 8                 | 1883       | 1887  | 1,333,333*                            | —                                    |
| 7. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .           | 1885    | £ 1,505,000     | 7                 | 1886       | 1895  | 1,505,000                             | —                                    |
| 8. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .           | 1886    | £ 750,000       | 6                 | 1887       | 1895  | 750,000†                              | —                                    |
| 9. Baring Bros. & Co. . . . .                                    | 1886    | £ 1,500,000     | 6                 | 1887       | 1895  | 1,500,000                             | —                                    |
| 10. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation, Series E. . . . . | 1886    | Tls. 767,200    | 7                 | 1888       | 1917  | 75,500†                               | 39,700†                              |
| 11. Berliner Handels Gesellschaft . . . . .                      | 1887    | Mk. 5,000,000   | 5½                | 1893       | 1902  | 250,000                               | —                                    |
| 12. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .          | 1894    | Tls. 10,900,000 | 7                 | 1904       | 1913  | 1,308,000†                            | 327,000†                             |
| 13. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .          | 1895    | £ 3,000,000     | 6                 | 1900       | 1914  | 2,400,000                             | 600,000                              |
| 14. Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China . . . . .       | 1895    | £ 1,000,000     | 6                 | 1900       | 1914  | 733,300                               | 266,700                              |
| 15. National Bank für Deutschland . . . . .                      | 1895    | £ 1,000,000     | 6                 | 1900       | 1914  | 733,300                               | 266,700                              |
| 16. Franco-Russian Loan . . . . .                                | 1895    | Fr. 400,000,000 | 4                 | 1896       | 1931  | 4,452,527                             | 11,367,473                           |
| 17. Anglo-German Loan . . . . .                                  | 1896    | £ 16,000,000    | 5                 | 1897       | 1932  | 3,602,575                             | 12,397,425                           |
| 18. Anglo-German Loan . . . . .                                  | 1898    | £ 16,000,000    | 4½                | 1898       | 1942  | 1,977,375                             | 14,022,625                           |
| 19. Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation . . . . .          | 1905    | £ 1,000,000     | 5                 | 1906       | 1915  | 800,000                               | 200,000                              |
| 20. Japanese Loan . . . . .                                      | 1911    | £ 1,000,000     | 5                 | 1921       | 1936  | —                                     | 1,000,000                            |
|                                                                  |         |                 |                   |            |       | 25,236,134                            | 40,487,623                           |

# INDEMNITIES.

|               |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |            |   |      |      |           |            |
|---------------|---|---|---|---|---|------|---|------------|---|------|------|-----------|------------|
| 21. Series A. | . | . | . | . | . | 1901 | £ | 11,250,000 | 4 | 1902 | 1940 | 1,493,862 | 9,756,138  |
| 22. Series B. | . | . | . | . | . | 1901 | £ | 9,000,000  | 4 | 1911 | 1940 | —         | 9,000,000  |
| 23. Series C. | . | . | . | . | . | 1901 | £ | 22,500,000 | 4 | 1915 | 1940 | —         | 22,500,000 |
| 24. Series D. | . | . | . | . | . | 1901 | £ | 7,500,000  | 4 | 1916 | 1940 | —         | 7,500,000  |
| 25. Series E. | . | . | . | . | . | 1901 | £ | 17,250,000 | 4 | 1932 | 1940 | —         | 17,250,000 |
|               |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |            |   |      |      | 1,493,862 | 66,006,138 |

# RAILWAYS.

|                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |        |     |            |    |          |      |           |            |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|--------|-----|------------|----|----------|------|-----------|------------|
| 26. Imperial Chinese Railway (British)                            | . | . | . | . | . | 1899   | £   | 2,300,000  | 5  | 1905     | 1944 | 402,500   | 1,897,500  |
| 27. Peking-Hankow Railway (Belgian)                               | . | . | . | . | . | 1899   | £   | 4,500,000  | 5  | Paid off | (36) | 4,500,000 | —          |
| 28. Shansi Railway (Russian)                                      | . | . | . | . | . | 1902   | £   | 1,600,000  | 5  | 1913     | 1932 | —         | 1,600,000  |
| 29. Kaifeng-Honanfu Railway                                       | . | . | . | . | { | 1903   | Fr. | 25,000,000 | 5  | 1915     | 1934 | —         | 1,640,000  |
| 30. (Franco-Belgian)                                              | . | . | . | . | . | 1907   | Fr. | 16,000,000 | 5  | —        | 1953 | —         | 2,900,000  |
| 31. Shanghai-Nanking Railway (British)                            | . | . | . | . | . | 1904-7 | £   | 2,900,000  | 5  | —        | 1935 | —         | 700,000    |
| 32. Taokow-Tsinghua Railway (British)                             | . | . | . | . | . | 1905   | £   | 700,000    | 5  | —        | 1915 | 660,000   | 440,000    |
| 33. Canton-Hankow Railway (British)                               | . | . | . | . | . | 1907   | £   | 1,100,000  | 4½ | 1906     | 1915 | —         | 1,500,000  |
| 34. Canton-Kowloon Railway (British)                              | . | . | . | . | . | 1908   | £   | 1,500,000  | 5  | 1920     | 1937 | —         | 1,500,000  |
| 35. Shanghai-Ningpo Railway (British)                             | . | . | . | . | . | 1908-9 | £   | 1,500,000  | 5  | 1919     | 1938 | —         | 1,500,000  |
| 36. Tientsin-Pukow Railway                                        | . | . | . | . | { | 1910   | £   | 5,000,000  | 5  | 1919     | 1938 | —         | 8,000,000  |
| 37. (Anglo-German)                                                | . | . | . | . | . | 1910   | £   | 3,000,000  | 5  | 1921     | 1940 | —         | 5,000,000  |
| 38. Peking-Hankow Railway (Anglo-French)                          | . | . | . | . | . | 1908   | £   | 5,000,000  | 5½ | 1919     | 1938 | —         | 450,000    |
| 39. Peking-Hankow Railway (Anglo-French)                          | . | . | . | . | . | 1910   | £   | 450,000    | 7  | 1916     | 1920 | —         | 258,300    |
| 40. Manchurian Railway (Japan)                                    | . | . | . | . | . | 1909   | £   | { 225,000  | 5  | —        | 1934 | —         | —          |
|                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |        | £   | { 33,300   | 5  | —        | 1927 | —         | —          |
| 41. Hukwang Railways (British, American, French and German Group) | . | . | . | . | . | 1911   | £   | 6,000,000  | 5  | 1921     | 1951 | —         | 6,000,000  |
|                                                                   |   |   |   |   |   |        |     |            |    |          |      | 5,562,500 | 31,885,800 |

# TELEGRAPHS.

|                  |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |         |   |      |      |             |             |
|------------------|---|---|---|---|---|------|---|---------|---|------|------|-------------|-------------|
| 40. Anglo-Danish | . | . | . | . | . | 1900 | £ | 210,000 | 5 | —    | 1930 | —           | 210,000     |
| 41. Anglo-Danish | . | . | . | . | . | 1901 | £ | 48,000  | 5 | —    | 1930 | —           | 48,000      |
| 42. Anglo-Danish | . | . | . | . | . | 1911 | £ | 500,000 | 5 | 1911 | 1929 | 13,888      | 486,112     |
|                  |   |   |   |   |   |      |   |         |   |      |      | 13,888      | 744,112     |
| TOTALS           | . | . | . | . | . | —    | — | —       | — | —    | —    | £32,306,384 | 139,123,673 |

\* At exchange £1 = Tls. 3.

† At exchange £1 = Tls. 6-667.

‡ 4½ per cent. after 1923.

# APPENDIX B

## LIST OF THE RAILWAYS ON CHINESE TERRITORY IN 1915, COMPLETED, UNDER CONSTRUCTION, OR ACTUALLY CONTRACTED FOR.

*Compiled mainly from information supplied by the Ministry of Communications, Peking*

| Railway.                                   | Length completed. |               |               |        | Under Construction. | Capital Cost. | Bonded debt incurred. |                            |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------|--------|---------------------|---------------|-----------------------|----------------------------|
|                                            | Main line.        | Branch lines. | Sidings, etc. | Total. |                     |               | Amount.               | From what source.          |
|                                            | Kilom.            | Kilom.        | Kilom.        | Kilom. | Kilom.              | £             | £                     |                            |
| <b>FOREIGN RAILWAYS</b>                    |                   |               |               |        |                     |               |                       |                            |
| Transiberian (Manchurian Section) . . .    | 1,529             | —             | —             | 1,529  | —                   | 12,225,000    | —                     | Built by Russian capital   |
| North Manchurian (Harbin-Kwanchengtze) . . | 212               | —             | —             | 212    | —                   | 1,300,000     | —                     | Do.                        |
| South Manchurian (Kwanchengtze-Dairen) . . | 705               | 122           | ?             | 827    | —                   | 20,000,000    | —                     | Do. (transferred to Japan) |
| South Manchurian (Mukden-Antung) . . .     | 304               | —             | —             | 304    | —                   | —             | —                     | Built by Japanese capital  |
| Shantung Railways . .                      | 394               | 59            | ?             | 453    | —                   | 2,645,520     | —                     | Built by German capital    |
| Yunnan Railway (1 metre gauge) . . .       | 465               | —             | —             | 465    | —                   | 6,600,000     | —                     | Built by French capital    |
|                                            | 3,609             | 181           |               | 3,790  |                     | 42,770,520    | —                     |                            |
| <b>CHINESE GOVERNMENT RAILWAYS</b>         |                   |               |               |        |                     |               |                       |                            |
| Changchun-Kirin . .                        | 128               | —             | 23            | 151    | —                   | 619,359       | 225,000               | Japanese                   |
| Peking-Mukden . .                          | 845               | 114           | 264           | 1,223  | —                   | 5,821,752     | 33,300                | Japanese                   |
| Peking-Kalgan (Changkiakow) . .            | 211               | 27            | 84            | 322    | —                   | 1,294,031     | 2,300,000             | British                    |
| Kalgan-Suiyuan . .                         | 191               | —             | 36            | 227    | —                   | 955,326       | —                     |                            |
| Peking-Hankow . .                          | 1,214             | 94            | 272           | 1,580  | —                   | 10,257,980    | 5,000,000             | Anglo-French               |



|                                |       |     |       |        |            |            |            |                |
|--------------------------------|-------|-----|-------|--------|------------|------------|------------|----------------|
| Shansi Railway (1 metre gauge) | 243   | —   | 81    | 324    | —          | 2,309,215  | 1,600,000  | Franco-Russian |
| Taokow-Tainghwa                | 150   | 2   | 32    | 184    | —          | 728,114    | 700,000    | British        |
| Kaifengfu-Honanfu              | 185   | —   | 18    | 203    | ?          | 1,335,578  | 1,000,000  | Franco-Belgian |
| Tientsin-Pukow                 | 1,013 | 98  | 205   | 1,316  | —          | 9,423,728  | 9,800,000  | German         |
| Hukwang Railways               | —     | —   | —     | —      | abt. 1,000 | —          | 6,000,000  | Anglo-French   |
| Hankow-Canton                  | —     | —   | —     | —      | abt. 1,000 | —          | —          | British        |
| Hankow-Canton (in Kwangtung)   | —     | —   | —     | —      | abt. 235   | —          | 1,100,000  | German         |
| Pingsiang-Chuchow              | 97    | —   | 10    | 107    | —          | 474,304    | —          | French         |
| Shanghai-Nanking               | 311   | 16  | 70    | 397    | —          | 3,043,615  | 3,050,000  | American       |
| Shanghai-Hangchow-Ningpo       | 258   | 6   | 55    | 319    | 125        | 1,562,025  | 1,500,000  | British        |
| Canton-Kowloon                 | 143   | —   | 20    | 163    | —          | 1,570,841  | 1,500,000  | British        |
| Canton-Samshui                 | 49    | —   | 22    | 71     | —          | 326,249    | —          | British        |
|                                | 5,038 | 357 | 1,192 | 6,587  | 2,360      | 39,822,117 | 33,808,300 |                |
| CHINESE COMPANIES              |       |     |       |        |            |            |            |                |
| Amoy-Changchowfu               | 28    | —   | —     | 28     | 22         | 216,000    | —          |                |
| Swatow-Chaochowfu              | 40    | —   | —     | 40     | —          | 337,460    | —          |                |
| Sunning-Kongmoon               | 60    | —   | —     | 60     | —          | 259,137    | —          |                |
|                                | 128   | —   | —     | 128    | 22         | 812,597    | —          |                |
| TOTAL                          | 8,775 | 538 | ?     | 10,505 | 2,382      | 40,634,714 | 33,808,300 |                |

Notes :—Gold commitments converted at exchange : 25 francs = 20 marks = 10 yen = £1 sterling.  
The capital cost of the Chinese Government Railways was stated in silver dollars and has been converted at nominal exchange 10 dollars = £1 sterling.  
Bonded debt is the original amount without deduction for amortisation.  
The bottom line gives the length of all railways, but the capital cost is that of Chinese lines only.

## APPENDIX C

## HWANGPU CONSERVANCY BOARD

## ANNUAL RECEIPTS

| Year.  | Chinese Govern-<br>ment Annual<br>Grant. | Conservancy<br>Loan. | Conservancy<br>Tax. | Unclassed<br>Receipts. | Overdraft<br>from Deutsch-<br>Asiatische<br>Bank. | Grand Total. |
|--------|------------------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|------------------------|---------------------------------------------------|--------------|
|        | Shai. Tls.                               | Shai. Tls.           | Shai. Tls.          | Shai. Tls.             | Shai. Tls.                                        | Shai. Tls.   |
| 1906 . | 124,001.19                               | —                    | —                   | 119.38                 | —                                                 | 124,120.57   |
| 1907 . | 552,731.78                               | —                    | —                   | 2,356.96               | —                                                 | 555,088.74   |
| 1908 . | 1,544,840.00                             | 750,000.00           | —                   | 4,262.23               | —                                                 | 2,299,102.23 |
| 1909 . | 437,145.00                               | 1,500,000.00         | —                   | 4,342.98               | —                                                 | 1,941,487.98 |
| 1910 . | 467,609.00                               | 1,500,000.00         | —                   | 82,887.58              | —                                                 | 2,050,496.58 |
| 1911 . | 390,700.16                               | 375,000.00           | —                   | 279.32                 | —                                                 | 765,979.48   |
| 1912 . | 27,850.18                                | —                    | 277,024.47          | 7,645.04               | —                                                 | 312,519.69   |
| 1913 . | 5,570.03                                 | —                    | 507,793.24          | 11,798.81              | —                                                 | 765,162.08   |
| 1914 . | —                                        | —                    | 454,568.54          | 76,109.58              | —                                                 | 603,678.12   |
| 1915 . | —                                        | —                    | 435,186.97          | 121,755.27             | 265,229.00                                        | 509,171.24   |
| Total  | 3,550,447.34                             | 4,125,000.00         | 1,674,573.22        | 311,557.15             | 265,229.00                                        | 9,926,806.71 |

## ANNUAL EXPENDITURE

| Year.       | Annual Expendi-<br>ture. | Interest on Con-<br>servancy Loan. | Interest on<br>Overdraft. | Grand Total. |
|-------------|--------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------------------|--------------|
|             | Shai. Tls.               | Shai. Tls.                         | Shai. Tls.                | Shai. Tls.   |
| 1906 . . .  | 109,992.93               | —                                  | —                         | 109,992.93   |
| 1907 . . .  | 527,795.52               | —                                  | —                         | 527,795.52   |
| 1908 . . .  | 2,273,877.25             | —                                  | —                         | 2,273,877.25 |
| 1909 . . .  | 1,856,570.59             | 65,625.00                          | —                         | 1,922,195.59 |
| 1910 . . .  | 1,819,191.72             | 170,625.00                         | —                         | 1,989,816.72 |
| 1911 . . .  | 642,151.24               | 269,062.50                         | —                         | 911,213.74   |
| 1912 . . .  | 284,957.82               | —                                  | —                         | 284,957.82   |
| 1913 . . .  | 758,474.28               | —                                  | 1,848.22                  | 760,322.50   |
| 1914 . . .  | 586,227.30               | —                                  | 16,696.75                 | 602,924.05   |
| 1915 . . .  | 488,215.24               | —                                  | 21,077.54                 | 509,292.78   |
| Total . . . | 9,347,453.89             | 505,312.50                         | 39,622.51                 | 9,892,388.90 |

## APPENDIX D

THE CUSTOMS' SERVICE:—THE SPIRIT THAT OUGHT TO ANIMATE IT,—THE POLICY THAT OUGHT TO GUIDE IT,—THE DUTIES IT OUGHT TO PERFORM; GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS AND SPECIAL RULES

CIRCULAR NO. 8 OF 1864.

INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF CUSTOMS,  
PEKING, 21st June, 1864.

SIR,

1. Various occurrences, which have attracted my attention during the course of the last three years, induce me to think, that it might prove of no little utility to all concerned, to place before the Commissioners of Customs sundry considerations, of a kind calculated to lead to more correct ideas of some of the principles by which they ought to be guided in the discharge of their duties, and suggestive of some points of view from which the Inspector General, as the responsible Agent of the Chinese Government, is necessitated to regard their action, more especially when that action provokes public criticism, or elicits marks of disapprobation, whether on the part of Foreigners or Chinese. It is with such an object in view, as well as to notify certain rules of the Service, that this Circular Despatch is addressed to the gentlemen in charge of the Offices of Customs at the various ports: and to its contents their particular attention is invited.

2. In the first place, it is to be distinctly and constantly kept in mind, that the Inspectorate of Customs is a Chinese and not a Foreign Service, and that, as such, it is the duty of each of its members to conduct himself towards Chinese, people as well as officials, in such a way as to avoid all cause of offence and ill-feeling. Whatever other Foreigners resident in this country may deem themselves entitled to do, whether from their position, or fancied superiority to the Chinese, or in the way of showing their superior enlightenment by riding rough-shod over prejudices, and by evincing a general contempt for customs differing from their own, it is to be expected from those who take the pay, and who are the servants of the Chinese Government, that they, at least, will so act as to neither offend susceptibilities, nor excite jealousies, suspicion, and dislike. In dealings, therefore, with native officials, and in intercourse with the people, it will be well for the Foreign employés of the Customs to remember, that they are the brother officers of the one, and that they have, to some extent, accepted certain obligations and responsibilities by becoming, in a sense, the countrymen of the others: the man who cherishes such an idea, will be led to treat the one class with courtesy, and the other with friendliness;—courtesy will smooth

his way in the transaction of official business, and the conduct that originates in a really friendly feeling will tend to do away with much of the dislike, in many places shewn to Foreigners generally.

3. While he is to keep in mind and act upon the hint contained in the preceding paragraph, it is not, of course, expected that any one will forget that he is a representative of a civilisation of a progressive kind, that differs in almost every respect from that of this country ; nor will he be expected, as such, to suppress the inclination that naturally will lead him to seek to awaken some interest in that civilisation, and to introduce such of its appliances as the experience of the West has shewn to be productive of generally beneficial results. But the action that such consideration involves, must be of a secondary kind : the first thing to be remembered by each is, that he is the paid agent of the Chinese Government for the performance of specified work, and to do that well should be his chief care ; subsidiary to that work must be those plans and that action which march in the train of progress, and they too, to be both beneficial and successful, must be guided by the good sense that patiently awaits its opportunity, that can suggest without affectation of superiority, that labors to convince rather than to dictate to, and that can introduce remedies without causing the irritation that attends the exposure of defects.

4. For sufficiently obvious reasons, the application of the broad principle, by which action ought to be guided, needs no further amplification or illustration. If properly appreciated, its influence will make itself felt in the most minute details of the individual's official work and private life in China. Each Commissioner has special duties to perform and responsibilities to meet, originating in the position in which he is placed at the port at which he is located. The official relations in which he stands to the Inspector General, the Superintendent of Customs, the Consuls, the Mercantile community, and the Service generally, demand his consideration, and not to understand them will render him liable to errors in the performance of the duties that accompany them. He is the delegate or deputy of the Inspector General,—the only one in the Service, it is to be remembered, held responsible by the Chinese Government, —and is appointed to take charge of the Foreign staff that aids the Chinese Superintendent in the collection of the Revenue, and in the transaction of Customs' business ; he is by position the head, under the Superintendent, of the executive, and, by courtesy, though not necessarily, he is the adviser of the Superintendent in all that concerns Foreign trade at the port in question. As head of the executive, his duties are simple, though important, and are such that a man of common sense can hardly fail to perform them satisfactorily and efficiently, guided as he is by Port Regulations, which provide for almost every ordinary contingency, and aided by an office routine that ought to make the transaction of business a matter of mechanical correctness. As the adviser of the Superintendent, his position becomes a different and more difficult one ; his speciality is—or at least is supposed to be—a correct knowledge of the regulations under which trade by Foreigners with China is carried on, and it is taken

for granted that that knowledge is accompanied by an accurate acquaintance with the habits, wishes, modes of thought, and ways of viewing occurrences, of those Foreigners, as well as by a greater familiarity than other Foreigners can have, with the nature, circumstances, and rights of the Chinese. The Commissioner is accordingly likely to be regarded by the Superintendent as being better qualified than he is himself to pronounce a correct opinion on every question that presents itself, and, however frequently he may fail to endorse his action after the event, the Superintendent will rarely otherwise than adopt his opinions and put forward his views beforehand. It is right and natural, too, that the Superintendent should appeal to the Commissioner for advice, for he will assume that the Commissioner has such a comprehension of the reciprocal obligations, rights, and modes of acting of both Chinese and Foreigners, as shall make him a safe counsellor; and, on the other hand, the Superintendent, if but newly appointed to his post, cannot but be as ignorant as the other ought to be well informed. It is, too, the corollary of his position, as the Inspector General's deputy, and it is in some respects his right, as the head of the Superintendent's executive, that the Commissioner should be the Superintendent's adviser; it is, however, only by the Superintendent's courtesy, that advice is on each occasion asked for or followed. Such considerations will naturally lead the Inspector General to expect the executive of each establishment to be thoroughly acquainted with its duties, and thoroughly efficient in every respect, and to the Commissioner will he look to see that it is so further, and as naturally, too, will the Inspector General expect the advice given to the Superintendent to be sound and correct, and nothing will cause greater surprise than to find that the Superintendent, in following that advice, has been placed in either an impolitic, inexpedient, or, more especially, *untenable* position. On this latter point, it is to be particularly pointed out, that any action taken, or advice tendered, by a Commissioner, which shall have the effect of placing a Superintendent in a false or untenable position, will be regarded as evidence that that Commissioner has not had sufficient experience, and does not possess that acquaintance with the more important parts of his duty, which—and which only—justifies his occupancy of such a position; and, however much to be regretted may be the necessity for such a step, it will be the Inspector General's duty, in the interests of the Chinese Government, of the Customs' Service, and of the Mercantile community, to remove from his post any individual who may, by such action as that referred to, give evidence of his unfitness to be at the head of an office. The good sense of each Commissioner will doubtless preserve him from such errors in judgment, as well as prevent him from allowing the warning this paragraph contains, to have the effect of inducing complete inaction through fear of responsibility.

5. While it is the Inspector General who is responsible to the Chinese Government for the efficiency and trustworthiness of the various Foreigners appointed to posts in the Customs' Service, and for the work generally as performed by the Foreign executive, it is the Superintendent of Customs at each port who is, in point of fact,

officially responsible for the proper discharge of the duties of that port. The position of the Commissioner is accordingly of necessity subordinate to that of the Superintendent, and, while, at the same time, personally, he differs from the Superintendent's subordinates, properly so called, it is not becoming for him to thrust himself needlessly forward, and, in the eyes of either Foreigners or Chinese, court or accept responsibilities other than those that properly attach to him ; it is injudicious, too, and likely to be attended with bad results, for the Commissioner to arrogate to himself the tone of the Superintendent, for, while such a proceeding is not unlikely to offend the Superintendent himself, it is calculated to lead the public to misapprehend the nature of the Commissioner's office, and to demand of him services, which, if rendered, in addition to being unauthorised, place him in a still falser and more difficult position for the future, and which, if refused, not only call forth, and to some extent give grounds for, the charges of caprice, favouritism and antagonism, but tend, too, to weaken and discredit the position to which he is in reality entitled. The more the Commissioners keep in the background, the better will it be for the duties they have to perform, and the less will be the chances of their becoming the objects of ill-feeling.

6. The Commissioner's position at the port will naturally bring him more or less into contact with the various Consuls, and, for the speedy adjustment of difficulties, as well as for the transaction of business generally, it is desirable that acquaintance with them—the non-mercantile more especially—should partake of the nature of intimacy, and that friendly relations should be always preserved. In whatever official correspondence or conversation the Commissioner may have with such Consular authorities, it will be still more advisable to bear in mind the fact of the Superintendent's official responsibility, and to refrain from adopting such a tone as shall tend to cause the Consuls to consider or treat the Superintendent as a nonentity, or lead them to transfer his responsibility to the Commissioner. However desirable it may be that ultimate decisions should be those that the Commissioner may advise, it must not be forgotten, that advice must be accepted by the responsible head of the local establishment—the Superintendent—before action can be taken, and that the decision come to on such advice is, *ex officio*, the Superintendent's decision ; care ought therefore to be exercised, to refrain from in any way interfering to the prejudice of the Superintendent's assertion of the dignity of his own position, and consequent responsibility :—and, to authorise it to be said that the decision rests with the Commissioner, would be such an interference. A judicious sinking of self will not in any way derogate from one's respectability or real influence ; whereas an undue amount of self-assertion, the more especially if it be of that unwarranted kind which is seen where the responsibility really rests with another, will sap the foundations of influence, and must, in the end, make the individual ridiculous.

7. With the members of the mercantile community, the Commissioner and the members of the establishment, come into daily

contact. Most of the merchants are said to entertain a deep-rooted dislike for the Inspectorate ; many of them are at no pains to conceal that dislike ; and all of them equally will cry out whenever regulations are enforced to their prejudice, or even when they are subjected to delays which, though necessary to enable the office to do its work, to them seem vexatious and uncalled for. It is to be regretted that such a feeling should exist, but it is a matter of congratulation that the virulence of the hostility shows signs, at some of the ports, of disappearing. The feeling referred to, originating in the exemption from the necessity to attend to Customs' business that merchants, generally, enjoyed a few years ago, has, it is to be confessed, been kept in existence, and on some occasions almost justified, by the unavoidable inefficiency of the Customs' staff, and by the antagonism, on the part of the Customs' people, that it itself called forth in return. The charge, too, that the Customs have been careless of the interests of the merchants, has in some respects been negatively not an ill-founded one. We, however, are not the masters of the likes and dislikes of other people, and with the feeling of the merchants, whatever may be our wishes, we can have but little to do ; it would, of course, be more pleasant for all, were the Inspectorate more popular, but that it will ever be so, in any very high degree, can hardly be hoped for, inasmuch as, in every place and age, the administration of the revenue has invariably provoked opposition and hostility. Nevertheless, we have positive duties to attend to, and it is as easy to get through them smoothly, as it is to make their performance vexatious. Antagonism to the merchants is not the principle that ought to guide a Commissioner, or his staff, in the conduct of Customs' business. It is when trade flourishes that the coffers of the revenue are most rapidly filled, and for trade to flourish, its operations should be as much facilitated, and as little fettered, as possible ; on the other hand, the interests of the Inspectorate itself require that work should be performed not only efficiently but smoothly, and, for office work to go on smoothly and to be performed efficiently, it is requisite that the rules and regulations should be of the least cumbrous and most intelligible kind,—that each individual in the office should be thoroughly acquainted with the work of his own department—that the merchants should know to whom, and in what way, to apply for the transaction of their business ; and above all, that the only display of feeling should be such as might be evinced in the desire—the more reciprocal the better—to oblige. To a public servant it will be quite a sufficient reward, to be conscious of the fact that the most disagreeable of duties is performed in the least disagreeable of ways ; whether the attempt to oblige is acknowledged, or not, need matter but little to him. From such a standing point, it will be seen to be the duty of the gentlemen in charge of offices, to study well, with a view to practical results, the condition and requirements of the several ports at which they are located ; with a proper regard to the protection of the revenue, the interests of the merchants should be their chief care ; they ought to see that useless rules are not enforced, and that such as are of an unnecessarily vexatious character are modified ; they ought, by constant personal supervision, to assure

themselves, that the members of their establishments understand their duties thoroughly, perform them carefully, and show themselves willing and obliging ; as public servants, they are bound to help the public in the transaction of the business that brings them to the office, and it should be their aim to demonstrate practically—not only that, given the present order of things, the arrangements made for the transaction of business are the best possible, but—that the present order, is, or may be made to be, superior to any other in its collateral benefits and advantages. No Commissioner need entertain the fear that his efforts to facilitate business, and, by so doing, to consult the true interests of trade and commerce, will be characterised by the Inspector General as truckling to the merchants ; a gentlemanly assertion of the dignity of one's own position, is by no means incompatible with a due and careful regard for even the most trivial, if honest and rightful, interests of others. The mercantile communities ought, therefore, to be encouraged to make such suggestions as to them—viewing business, to be transacted, from their side and their points of view—seem likely to tend to render work easier ; and, indeed, the more forcible the language with which they point to existing defects, the more intelligible will it be. Human institutions are seldom perfect : ours, however, is not fettered by the red-tape that clogs the action of other departments ; and it is our duty, as it ought, too, to be our pleasure, to aim at the perfect. Approaches to it, be they recognised or not, will in themselves, as points gained, sufficiently reward whatever trouble may be taken. Such being the Inspector General's views and wishes, it is confidently expected that the Commissioners will be guided thereby, and that they will coöperate cheerfully in carrying out a policy which will be found, in the end, to tend in the highest degree to lighten the work of the office, and to render most easy of performance the duties of the several heads of departments.

8. With a view to the greater efficiency of the Service, the Commissioners ought to endeavour by their counsel and example, to imbue their subordinates with such an interest in their work, and such an *esprit de corps*, as shall educe the knowledge and qualifications that fit juniors for taking the place of seniors, and inspire the heads of the Service with confidence in the capacity of its members. As many as can do so, ought to pay some attention to the study of the Chinese language ; it will be found to be not altogether uninteresting in itself, and while the acquisition of the language may subsequently prove as beneficial to the individual, as it will be useful to the Service, the study of it will, at all events, lead to some knowledge of, and create some interest in, the Government we serve, and the people among whom our lot in life has been cast. It is the Inspector General's aim to make the Service efficient : let it be the care of the Commissioners and their subordinates to make it respected.

9. The specific duties to be performed by the Commissioners, are those which arise from their connection with, and position in, the Chinese Customs. The full and efficient performance of their own duties, as Commissioners of Customs, will leave them but little time for engaging in work of any other kind, and indeed, generally speak-



ing, to engage in any other work is only too likely to be followed by, as a result, an inadequate attention to their duties proper. The Inspector General thinks it right accordingly to discourage as much as possible the acts of those who take part in other than Customs' affairs. Inasmuch, however, as the Commissioners, from their greater intimacy with Chinese officials, may in general be able to influence those officials more easily than can others, it might be unwise to issue an absolute prohibition against interfering with affairs beyond the province of the Customs ; for, the friendly advice of the Commissioner, if sound, may be attended with good results in many cases, which might otherwise result in unfortunate complications. The Inspector General, however, wishes it to be distinctly understood, that, while such matters must be left by him to the good taste and discretion of the Commissioners individually, he will not share the responsibility of such action ; and that instances of unwarranted or ill-advised interference, will be viewed as affording evidence of unfitness for a position of such trust as is that of a Commissioner. Moreover, whenever a Commissioner goes, or proposes to go, beyond the proper sphere of his duties as such, his neglect to report the action taken, or proposed to be taken, will be regarded as reprehensible in the extreme. Copies of correspondence with local or other officials, relating to matters not connected with the Customs, must be forwarded for the information of the Inspector General.

10. While the question of interfering with business other than Customs' at his port, is left to be decided by the exigencies of the occasion and the discretion of the Commissioner, it must be distinctly understood, that the Inspector General will totally disapprove of any interference, on the part of any Commissioner, with affairs of any kind, Customs' or other, at another port, or beyond the limits of the district, with the supervision of which the office he presides over is charged. In order that the various Commissioners may be fully aware of the limits within which each is authorised to act, and beyond which his action must cease, the Inspector General appends hereto the names of the places which form the boundaries of the several ports and stations. . . .

11. The Inspector General is not unaware of the fact that the ports differ from each other in respect of the numbers of resident Foreign merchants, in the amount of duties collected, and in other ways ; and that while at some there are Commissioners, at others there may merely be Acting Commissioners, or even Assistants in Charge, and that these classes, too, draw different rates of pay. It is to be clearly understood, however, that whatever be their titles, and whatever their rates of pay, the officers selected to take charge of the ports are regarded by the Inspector General as, for the time being, on precisely the same footing, and that, in the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, an Assistant in Charge, acting as such by the Inspector General's authority, is fully entitled to address the officers in charge at other ports on terms of perfect equality. . .

18. In the event of any insult offered to, or ill-treatment received

by, any Customs' employé, whether Native or Foreign, it will be the Commissioner's duty to move the Superintendent of Customs to punish the offender, if Chinese, or, if a Foreigner, to address an official complaint, calling for a formal and public investigation of the charge, to the Consul concerned. Should the Consul refuse to make the examination, or should he appear to act unfairly in the matter, to the detriment of the public Service, it will be the Commissioner's duty to report the occurrence, forwarding copies of all documents, to the Inspector General, and to move the Superintendent to address a similar report to the Tsung-li Yamên. If a person is prevented by stopping the working of a vessel, by forbidding the person to enter the office, or by any other similar act, take the law into his own hands.

19. The Inspector General is responsible to the Chinese Government, for the good conduct, honesty, and efficiency, of the various Foreigners employed in the offices of the Inspectorate, and he is liable to be dismissed from his post at a moment's notice, in the event of his services, or the services of those he recommends for employment, being deemed unsatisfactory by the Government. The Commissioners of Customs, the Assistants or Clerks, and the Foreign employés, generally, hold their positions so long as the Government requires their services, provided their general conduct, and the mode in which they perform their duties, are satisfactory to the responsible Agent of the Government, the Inspector General, with whom alone rests the right to employ or dismiss, to promote or degrade, or change from one port to another. Except in the cases of those who may hold letters of appointment, in which distinct provision of a different nature is made for such a contingency, a Commissioner, or an Assistant on the regular list, with whose services the Inspector General finds it expedient or requisite to dispense, is entitled to three months' notice, or, in default of notice, to three months' pay. . . .

24. From what has been written above, it will be evident to the Commissioners, that the object the Inspector General has in view is simply to give shape, efficiency and regularity to the Service, as well as to prevent misunderstandings and mistakes; and it will be equally obvious, that it will be as much for their interest as for his, to carry out cheerfully and faithfully the directions given, and to act up to the spirit of the suggestions made.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT HART,

*I.G.*

THE COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS.

CIRCULAR NO. 25 OF 1869.

INSPECTORATE GENERAL OF CUSTOMS,  
PEKING, 1st November, 1869.

SIR,

1. Having received replies to Circular No. 13, 1869, concerning port requirements and service re-organisation, and having compared the various suggestions, and carefully considered the

substance generally of those replies, I avail myself of the opportunity afforded by the publication of new rules for the service to make such remarks as seem most called for at this juncture.

2. In the first place, I have to thank the Commissioners generally for the attention they have given to the points on which their opinions were invited, and for the candour and freedom of speech with which they have expressed their views. Were my Cir. No. 13, 1869, to have no other effect, it will be found to have been useful, in one direction by inducing the seniors in the service to express their opinions freely, and in another by developing through that very expression of opinion a stronger feeling of unity and greater cohesion in all its ranks.

3. The replies, taken as a whole, place before me three sets of suggestions :

- 1°. Those affecting the strength of the staff required by each port.
- 2°. Those which refer to such rules for the regulation of the service as the Inspector General is competent to deal with ; and
- 3°. Suggestions requiring to be considered by a committee appointed by the service generally before being touched by the Inspector General himself.

The suggestions of the first class, having reference to individual ports, will be treated of in correspondence with the ports concerned, and those of the third class will probably be placed before a committee for re-consideration, after I shall have had the opportunity of conferring personally with the Commissioners from whom they emanated ; suggestions of the second class, necessitating nothing more than a careful comparison of the opinions of the writers, tested by the results of personal observation, and viewed in connection with the characteristic features of the service during the ten years it has existed, can at once be dealt with.

4. In 1854, when the Rebels held Shanghai, the Treaty Powers, England, France, and the United States, in view of certain difficulties which the peculiar state of affairs was originating at the chief treaty port, authorised a Foreign Inspectorate, in which each should be represented, to coöperate with the Imperialist officials in the management of that part of the Custom-house business which affected Foreign merchants. The first British Inspector Mr. WADE, previously vice-consul at Shanghai, was, after a few months, succeeded in the post by Mr. LAY, Interpreter in the British Consulate, and the Inspectorate, as then constituted,—except that, on the French side, Mr. EDAN succeeded Mr. SMITH, and on the American, Captain CARR was followed by Dr. FISH,—continued to transact the Foreign business of the Shanghai Customs from 1854 to 1858. In 1858 the Treaties of Tientsin were negotiated, and in the agreements subsequently signed at Shanghai, publishing a Tariff and the Rules appended to it, a clause was inserted to the effect that a uniform system should be adopted at every port, and that subjects of the treaty powers might respectively be selected by the Chinese Government to assist in the administration of the Customs' revenue, &c.

At that time, I was Interpreter in the British Consulate at Canton, and, being well known by the Governor General, LAO TSUNG-KUANG, and the Hoppo, HÊNG-CHI, [Hangki,] it was proposed by them to me, that I should establish such an office at Canton as was presided over by Mr. LAY at Shanghai; I declined however to do so, but telling Their Excellencies that doubtless Mr. LAY himself, if invited, would willingly visit Canton for that purpose, I furnished Mr. LAY with a lengthy memorandum on the state of affairs at Canton, and eventually left the Consular service at the end of June 1859, to fill the post of Deputy Commissioner at Canton. The local inspectorate at Shanghai had in the meantime changed its character: the French and American Inspectors had been paid off, and Mr. LAY, appointed Inspector General by Ho KWEI-TSING, the Imperial Commissioner for Foreign affairs (there was then no Foreign Board), had placed the late Mr. DAVIES, as Commissioner, in charge of the Shanghai Establishment. In October 1859, all preliminaries having been arranged, Mr. GROVER was placed in charge at Canton as Commissioner, and in January 1860 the Swatow office was opened with Mr. WARD in charge. In 1860, Mr. DAVIES went to England on sick-leave, and the late Mr. FRITZ-ROY took charge at Shanghai. Early in 1861, Mr. LAY was re-appointed Inspector General by the newly constituted Foreign Board, and in April of that year he went to England on leave:—at this point, I ought to explain, that Mr. LAY had not as yet visited Peking, and that the only member of the Foreign Board with whom he was at all acquainted was the former Hoppo of Canton, HÊNG-CHI; his departure for Europe at that moment was in opposition to strong remonstrances made by myself and others in what we conceived to be his own and the interests of the infant service. On Mr. LAY's departure, the duties of Inspector General were performed by Mr. FRITZ-ROY and myself conjointly: we held as our authority—not letters of appointment from Mr. LAY, but—despatches from HOÛEH HUAN and CH'UNG HOW, the Imperial Commissioner for the Southern, and the Commissioner for the Northern Ports, which again, the June following, were replaced by a formal commission from the PRINCE OF KUNG, the head of the Foreign Board. Mr. LAY did not return to China till May 1863, and, in the meantime, offices had been established during his absence at all the other treaty ports. After his return to China, and on the death of Mr. DAVIES, I was appointed by the Foreign Board to be Commissioner at Shanghai, and was charged also with the direction of the ports on the Yangtsze, and Ningpo. In November of the same year, when Mr. LAY's tenure of office ended, I became Inspector General by the appointment of the Foreign Board. During the months Mr. LAY spent in China in 1863, he was chiefly occupied with the affairs of the unfortunate flotilla, and thus it has come to pass that the service arrangements have been mainly controlled by myself since the spring of 1861. Of the hundred who now belong to the In-door staff, there are only some twenty persons who received their original appointments from Mr. LAY, and, of them, while two were made Commissioners by Mr. LAY, it was from myself that the others received the most of their promotions; the other eighty gentlemen now in the service—with the ex-

ception of three or four, nominated, in the first instance, temporarily by Mr. Fritz-Rox, have received their first appointments and subsequent steps from myself. What has been written will be sufficient for my purpose,—which is to record in a few words the history of the earlier days of the service, and to recall to your recollection how intimately I have been associated with it and its concerns from the very first, and how closely I am personally connected with the career of almost its every member.

5. From the brief historical sketch to which the preceding paragraph has been devoted, I now pass on to invite your attention to a few explanations, which it may be well to place before you, and which are intended more especially for those whose promotion has been relatively slow,—who have seen juniors of either their own or some other nationality pass over their heads,—and who, for these or other reasons, feel disappointment or discontent.

6. For reasons which may not have been apparent to all, but which nevertheless have existed, and could not be ignored, a peculiar caution has had to be exercised in the matter of appointments, and, more especially, in that of promotions to the higher grades: selection has, therefore, been necessitated. Now, to have to select must always place the individual who selects in the position of appearing to many to choose capriciously, arbitrarily, and unwisely. In a new service, composed even of men of but one nationality, no one would advocate the adoption of a mere seniority principle: it is only by special appointments and judicious selections, that efficiency can be brought to that standard, and a service fitted to do that work, which its originators and framers have in view; as time goes on, more weight can of course be given to the claims of seniority, but even such claims must be set aside where efficiency is not absolute, or where special requirements call for special qualifications, and extraordinary circumstances necessitate extraordinary action. Thus, in this service, which may be said only to date from the ratification of the treaties in 1860, while the service cannot be said to have existed long enough to free itself from those circumstances which necessitate special manipulation, and forbid attention to mere seniority; it is further to be remarked that, where individuals have only served longer than others by a few months or even a few years, any attempt to found claims for advancement on the mere merit of seniority would be to give undue importance to a very minor factor in the consideration of rights to promotion. At the outset, there may be said to have been no rights at all: each man's retention of position depended partly on the service proving itself to be so efficient as to be deemed worthy of continuance by the Chinese Government, and partly on its being made so thoroughly cosmopolitan as to recommend itself to Foreign powers, and thereby prevent their interfering to cut short its existence; to satisfy these conditions, the consideration of mere seniority had to be set aside, and the Inspector General had to seek for superior efficiency on the one hand, and aim at such an admixture of nationalities, in the various grades, as should prove acceptable on the other. At the same time, other things being equal, seniority has always had its just value accorded to it; that the

Inspector General personally should himself have to judge of the equality or inequality of other qualifications, and of the greater or less importance of other considerations, has been simply a fact to be met, and is but a natural part of the work of the chief of the service—for, in all services, the weighing of claims, and the selection of individuals to fill vacant appointments, have, in the end, to be attended to by some one individual. It is thus that seniority, during the past ten years,—the first decade of the existence of the service,—has been, as a rule, a secondary consideration, while individual efficiency, special qualifications, and nationality have been of primary importance.

7. It has been said that an exaggerated importance is attached to the knowledge of the Chinese language, and that their due value has not been given to other qualifications. In reply, it is to be remarked that other qualities have never been regarded as valueless : on the contrary, I have seen that a man may be an excellent Chinese scholar, and yet be, owing to certain disqualifications, unfit for a desk in a busy office ; but I did, and do, think, that there is no reason why men should not be to be ~~found~~ who are at once able to acquire Chinese, and also qualified, by being able to write legibly and figure correctly, to do clerk's work in an office. A man may write legibly and figure correctly, and yet have neither the training nor the qualities, which, where an exceptional aptitude for languages does not naturally exist, must be possessed in order to acquire Chinese : on the other hand, the man who is able to learn the language, is not likely to prove so wanting in power, as to be unable to school himself into the performance of a clerk's duties. I have accordingly done what I could to find men who would study Chinese, and to reward those who study it successfully : but in doing so, I have always endeavoured to make sure that Chinese was not the individual's only qualification, and that, while superior to his comrades in that, he was at all events their equal in other respects, and of unquestionable fitness for the post appointed to. Some advisers have been rather opposed to the study of Chinese by the members of the service generally, and have thought that Commissioners who did not, assisted occasionally by Interpreters who did, speak the language, would make things work more smoothly, and be preferable from many points of view. I always held, however, and continue to hold, an entirely different opinion ; and the reasons by which I have been actuated in forming a Chinese-speaking service have had amongst them the following considerations :—Employés under any Government ought to speak the language of the country they are employed in ; letters have been continually received from Chinese Superintendents, begging me not to send to their ports Commissioners who do not speak the language ; the acquisition of Chinese by all seems calculated to ensure the continued existence of the service, for, in that way, the service may hope to be able to commend itself, as of intrinsic value, to the approval of Chinese Officials ; the acquisition of Chinese by all frees the Inspector General from the invidious task of having occasionally to place juniors who can speak, over the heads of otherwise well qualified seniors who cannot speak, the language ; by

inducing all to study the language, there is given to each what is in itself capital in this country, and by the very fact of thus making the service, and the Chinese Government too, independent of myself, I again hoped to increase for the service its chances of existence ; experience had shown that, no matter what the rank of the individual who appears as principal, the Chinese authorities too readily look to the Chinese-speaking medium as really the person to be dealt with, and therefore the anomaly of employing non-Chinese-speaking Commissioners, and of yet giving the interpreter the command of the situation in all difficulties, appeared to me to be unworthy of support—however strong, temporarily, it might make the Inspector General ; students of Chinese are certain to form a truer estimate of the national character, and a truer appreciation of their position under, and of the work to be done for, the Chinese Government ; and, lastly, there are the possibility and hope of good, internationally speaking, springing from the study of the Chinese language by so many able and educated men in Chinese employ. The prominence given to Chinese studies has thus not been without its reasons, but it was never meant that other qualifications were being absolutely ignored.

8. A third point requiring a few words is that several members of the service persist in thinking themselves unjustly treated, either because their pay remains for a considerable time at the same rate, or because, having been issued for a while at an increased, it is, after a time, reduced to its original rate ; the former complainants forget that I have but a fixed annual sum for the support of the service, and that being thereby precluded from making increases of pay *ad libitum*, I can only authorise them when vacancies occur in a higher class, and the latter forget, that, when appointed to act for an individual of a higher rank absent on leave, the higher pay, they are entitled to draw while thus acting, is only acting pay, and, of necessity, reverts to its former rate, on the return to duty of the person acted for.

9. I consider the present a fitting occasion to make the few remarks which precede : and I think it well to add to them yet one other. Discontent, when justifiable, is allowable : but the man who complains, and the man who is complained of, to understand the true merits of a complaint, must start from the same point—both as regards circumstance and time. I therefore trust that in future any one who may think that he is not properly appreciated, or who may suppose he has ought to complain of, will at once acquaint me with it, setting forth his case in detail and forwarding his statement in the usual way through his immediate chief, the Commissioner at the port served at ; no one need fear to give offence by explaining himself in the way now indicated.

10. As it was in my Circular No. 8 of 1864 that the first Service Rules were notified, I think it well to refer to it here for a moment, partly to re-affirm, not so much its letter as its spirit, and partly to correct some few misapprehensions to which it has given rise.

11. It has been said that, by it, I deprived Commissioners of all power of initiative. To speak thus, is to misrepresent the object of

the cautions that Circular contained. I have ever only been too anxious to find the chiefs at the ports willing and able to initiate, whether improvements in their own offices or reforms in the neighbourhood. The Inspectorate, it must be remembered, is not a political institution : its mission is rather commercial and industrial ; but anything that any one can of himself do whether to widen the area of commercial interests, create industries, or even—though this last involves the possibility of an officious meddling with what had perhaps better be left alone—cause ameliorations in political conditions, will be recognised by no one more quickly, will be appreciated by no one more thoroughly, and will be supported by no one more warmly, than by myself. What I have been, and am, unwilling to do, is this : I am unwilling to accept the responsibility of action concealed from me or with which I have not been in due time and course made fully acquainted, and I object to any initiative which attempts to effect its ends by coercing or trying to coerce the local officials. Contemplated action should first of all be reported to me : but, to have to report it, does not imply either that it ought not to have been thought of, or that it will be disapproved of.

12. It has also been thought that I have not allowed Commissioners sufficient latitude in matters of office expenditure. The explanation is simple. Whatever strictness there has been, has been owing to the fact, that the Inspector General is only allowed a fixed annual sum for the support of the service, and that it has consequently been necessary, in turn, to limit the expenditure of each office to a fixed annual sum ; the amounts allowed have been so arranged as to secure a credit balance at the end of the year, from which the Inspector General may be able to meet expenses which do not appear in the accounts of any of the ports—such as those required for the support of the Inspectorate General at Peking, for vessels for preventive purposes, for houses, for retiring allowances—for all of which money must be provided and kept in reserve. I have not prohibited or refused to sanction any necessary expenditure ; but after authorising the issue of such and such amounts for salaries, wages, and miscellaneous expenditure, I do and must require each Commissioner to apply for special authority before he proceeds to incur liabilities, either beyond the common for ordinary wants, or to any extent whatever for special purposes ; and in order to have funds to meet ordinary general requirements, as well as to fall back on under exceptional circumstances, the Inspector General must naturally continue to require that expenditure, being before incurred, shall be known to, noted, and authorised by himself.

13. It has further been objected that that Circular did not show the consideration that is due to seniors, when it pronounced all in charge of offices to be equal. The object of the paragraph thus objected to, has been misunderstood. What it did mean was this : that any officer in charge, is, while in charge, not only responsible to the Inspector General, but is the only one responsible, for the administration of affairs at the port in question, and that no other officer—however much he may be senior, or more able—is to interfere with him, or give him instructions, or take action within the limits



of his port, or treat him for the time being as having any other than equal responsibilities.

14. It has besides been complained that that Circular went far to lower the position of Commissioners. In this connexion, I have simply to remark, that a Commissioner's position at any port will be very much what he makes it for himself, and that the object the Circular had in view, was to point out to each the line beyond which it might be dangerous for him to suppose his responsibilities extended, and to prevent each from undertaking responsibilities, which he had not reason to believe—from the position he had made for himself at the port—would be unobjected to by the Superintendent.

15. Having thus referred to the few points on which misapprehensions are said to exist, I shall now proceed to re-affirm, in brief language, the spirit of that Circular.

16. The burden of that Circular is the recommendation that pervades it from first to last, counselling all to be considerate and conciliatory. Each Commissioner is called on not to undertake undue responsibilities—not to trench on the duties of either Chinese or Foreign officials at his port—and is to cultivate friendly relations with his colleague, the Chinese Superintendent, with the Consuls, and with the community, both native and foreign: he is to exert himself to make his office a model for correctness and despatch in the transaction of business, and for facilities and encouragement given to trade: his conduct generally is to be marked by liberality in dealing with the public, and by allowance for circumstances in dealing with all who get into difficulties: and, just as the Inspector General aims at making the service efficient, so each individual member of it is called on to endeavour to make it respected. That Circular reminds all that they are serving the Government of China; it tells them, too, not to forget that they are the representatives of a Christian civilisation, and that—in that respect—while China's paid servants, they have other duties which are concurrent with the work for which they are paid.

17. In a preceding paragraph I have made a few remarks on the subject of initiative: I have now to give my views in connexion with a point somewhat akin to that of initiative, viz., the local settlement of Customs' cases. The Foreign Board would infinitely prefer to see questions settled, as they arise, quietly and fairly at the ports, rather than have them referred for solution to Peking. Where a Consul and Commissioner are agreed as to the course to be pursued, while the Superintendent persists in holding a different view, there is no help for it: reference is necessary. But in the beginning of any affair, and while it is still in his own hands, a Commissioner should weigh the matter well, and determine for himself whether it is one worth the trouble it may give, if brought to the Superintendent's notice, and thereby exposed to the possibility of becoming, by correspondence, so expanded as to assume the dimensions that necessitate reference. During the past ten years many things have occurred to show how mischievously it acts, if a question is *prematurely* placed before a Superintendent: a formal record once set up cannot be brought to an end except in the recognised, formal way,

and I have been frequently puzzled, on such cases coming to Peking; how to justify the action which had set such ponderous machinery in motion. In many instances, the differences which occur are of such a kind, that the merchant's explanation ought to be accepted at once: others are of so trivial a nature, that the rebuke implied in detaining goods or calling for an explanation ought to suffice both for punishment and warning: others again are of a kind to place the merchant so evidently in the wrong, that there ought to be no difficulty in arranging the action to be taken in a friendly way with the Consul:—in all such cases, provided the merchant does not claim a court for joint-investigation, the Commissioner is competent to act without reference to the Superintendent, and when a merchant does demand a joint enquiry, the Superintendent, nine times out of ten, will be only too glad to be represented by the Commissioner, and the latter will continue to have it in his power to come to such an understanding with the Consul as shall provide an adequate punishment for the offence and obviate all necessity for appeal to Peking. Consuls are not naturally less reasonable or less just than other men and, where they find the Commissioner desirous of arranging matters amicably, they will not, as a rule, object to assist in making things move smoothly at the port. It is fallacious to suppose, that, because action conflicts with the principle on which a rule is based, it therefore conflicts with *principle*, and must not be taken: it happens continually that cases do occur demanding exceptional action, and those in which Consuls intervene are generally the very ones which authorise such special treatment. Any matter can easily be talked over privately and unofficially in the first instance, and, that done, a mutual understanding can as easily be arrived at as to the action to be taken; on the other hand, to rush into writing and exchange official despatches,—to assume a high tone, and take up a formal position that cannot be abandoned save with the consciousness of defeat,—and worst of all, to drag the Superintendent prematurely into the arena,—will simply provoke hostility, superinduce weakness, and embitter personal relations. I write thus at length on this point in order to enforce attention to the dictates of common sense, and to show how expedient it generally is to sink the official in the man. Every allowance ought to be made for the circumstances under which any offence may have been committed, and every weight ought to be conceded to the Consular reasons for thinking such and such treatment would meet the case; interminable disputes about trifles ought to be carefully avoided, for, whether these pigmy battles are won or lost, they only tend to create difficulties for the transaction of other and more important business. Commissioners may rely on the support of the Inspector General, and the approval of the Foreign Board, whenever they effect local settlements of disputes that have originated in breaches, real or supposed, of laws for the protection of the Revenue; and while the Commissioners are thus left to exercise their own discretion in such matters, the only limitation put on them is that they will be expected, on the one hand, to act in accordance with the spirit of the foregoing remarks, and, on the other, to send to the Inspector

General full and detailed reports of the circumstances that characterised, and the settlement that terminated, each case, for necessary purposes of record and reference.

18. The subject of pay is one on which it may be well to offer a few remarks, more especially for the consideration of the junior members of the service. Somewhat erroneous views prevail, as is evident from more than one reply to my Circular No. 13, 1869: but the most curious is that which suggests, that pay and allowances ought to be such as to enable a man to leave China in comfortable circumstances "after *ten years'* service." The pay issued to all classes is fairly liberal, and some of the higher positions may be properly considered prizes; but the life is not the life of mercantile speculation—neither is it the life of an official in a badly paid service, which after long years provides scanty pensions. If it will not make a man suddenly rich to serve in the Customs, neither will it keep him on a starvation allowance and then give him, when he retires, a pension which dies with him: on the contrary, there is no class in the service in which the individual cannot save money, and, without either parsimonious frugality or excessive asceticism, any member of the staff ought to be able to retire after twenty-five or thirty years' service, and before the age of fifty, with a sufficient sum in hand to furnish him with a fair income at home,—a sum which, if, in point of view of the income it produces, inferior to the pensions drawn by high officials who have served as long in more regular services, is at all events immensely superior in another respect, and that is that it enables a man to leave money at his death for the support of those who depended on him in life. Juniors should therefore exercise both foresight and prudence; they should remember that they have neither pension nor retiring allowance to look forward to, and should, from the very commencement, arrange for the future, putting by ever so little month after month; they should, too, be prepared for and look steadily forward to a period of service extending over twenty-five years at the very least. Promotions will no longer be of so frequent or so rapid occurrence as they have been in the past, but each individual may carry with him the consciousness of the fact, that his pay is fairly liberal,—that it will be increased when his turn comes,—and that it may be regarded as of sufficiently certain duration to banish all uneasiness. Those who, with really good pay, spend all they earn, or even fall into debt, in their pursuit of gaiety, must be content with the return they get for their outlay: they cannot expect to have both that and such Governmental sympathy in addition, in the shape of allowances and pensions, as shall keep them gay in their declining years.

I am, &c.,

(Signed) ROBERT HART.

I.G.

THE COMMISSIONERS OF CUSTOMS,

## APPENDIX E

LIST OF THE HONOURS CONFERRED ON SIR ROBERT  
HART, INSPECTOR GENERAL OF CHINESE CUSTOMS  
AND POSTS

- CHINA . . . 1864. Brevet title of An-cha-sze (Provincial Judge).  
1869. Brevet title of Pu-cheng-sze (Provincial Treasurer).  
1881. Red Button of the First Class.  
1885. The Order of the Double Dragon, 2nd Division, 1st Class.  
1885. The Peacock's Feather.  
1889. Ancestral Rank of the First Class of the First Order for three Generations, with Letters Patent.  
1901. Brevet title of Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent (Kung-pao).  
1908. Brevet title of President of a Ministry (Shang-shu).
- BELGIUM . . . 1869. *Commandeur of the Order of Leopold.*  
1893. *Grand Officier of the Order of Leopold.*  
1906. *Grand Cordon of the Order of Leopold.*
- SWEDEN . . . 1870. *Chevalier of the Order of Wasa.*  
1894. *Grand Cross of the Order of the Polar Star.*
- AUSTRIA . . . 1870. *Commandeur of the Order of Francis Joseph.*  
1873. *Grand Cross of the Order of Francis Joseph.*
- FRANCE . . . 1878. *Commandeur of the Order of the Legion of Honour.*  
1885. *Grand Officier of the Order of the Legion of Honour.*  
1907. *Grand Cross of the Order of the Dragon of Annam.*
- GREAT BRITAIN 1879. *Companion of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.*  
1882. *Knight Commander of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.*  
1889. *Knight Grand Cross of the Order of St. Michael and St. George.*  
1893. *Baronet of the United Kingdom.*
- ITALY 1884. *Grand Officier of the Order of the Crown of Italy.*  
1906. *Grand Cross of the Order of the Crown of Italy.*

|               |       |                                            |
|---------------|-------|--------------------------------------------|
| HOLY SEE .    | 1885. | Commander of the Order of Pius IX.         |
| PORTUGAL .    | 1888. | Grand Cross of the Order of Christ.        |
| NETHERLANDS . | 1897. | Grand Cross of the Order of Orange Nassau. |
| PRUSSIA .     | 1900. | Order of the Crown, First Class.           |
| JAPAN .       | 1906. | Order of the Rising Sun, First Class.      |
| RUSSIA .      | 1907. | Grand Cross of the Order of Ste. Anne.     |
| NORWAY .      | 1907. | Grand Cross of the Order of St. Olaf.      |
| DENMARK .     | 1908. | Grand Cross of the Order of Dannebrog.     |

1853. A.B. and Senior Scholar, Queen's University, Ireland.  
 1875. A.M. (Hon. Caus.); Queen's University, Ireland.  
 1882. LL.D. (Honorary), Queen's University, Ireland.  
 1886. LL.D. (Honorary), Michigan University.  
 1908. D.C.L. (Honorary), Oxford.  
 1908. LL.D. (Honorary), Dublin.  
 1908. Freedom of the City of London.  
 1908. Freedom of the City of Belfast.  
 1908. Freedom of the Borough of Taunton.

Förderer of the Museum für Völkerkunde, Leipzig.

Honorary Member, North-China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, Shanghai.

Honorary Member of the Oriental Museum, Vienna.

Honorary Fellow of the Royal Statistical Society, London.

Honorary Member of the Institut de Droit International.

## APPENDIX F

### THE TUNGWEN COLLEGE

BY DR. W. A. P. MARTIN—ITS FIRST PRESIDENT

THE starting point of the new education which bids fair to renovate this ancient empire was the Tungwen College. Many affluents have contributed to swell the stream; but the original fountain was the Tungwenkwan, a small school for the study of Foreign Languages opened in Peking nearly fifty years ago.

When Sir Robert Hart became Inspector General of Maritime Customs he found it in existence, but so feeble was the infant that it had to be kept alive by a sort of artificial respiration. Rightly estimating its latent possibilities, he took it under his patronage and formed large plans for its development. Fortunate it was in coming under his care, for by him it was transformed from a glow-worm to a lighthouse.

#### ITS ORIGIN

It owed its birth to the necessity of providing interpreters to aid in carrying on the diplomatic intercourse imposed on China by the

compulsory opening of her capital to the residence of Foreign Legations in 1860. Something of the kind is implied in the British Treaty of Tientsin signed in 1858. But, as China did all in her power to prevent the Treaty going into operation, it is safe to affirm that without the campaign of 1860, which secured the right of residence instead of occasional visits, its location would not have been so near to the Imperial Throne.

In the fiftieth article of the Treaty there are three clauses, any one of which, without making it expressly obligatory, is sufficient to render indispensable a school for interpreters. It stipulates (1°) that all official communications addressed to the Chinese Government shall be written in English; (2°) that they will, *for the present*, be accompanied by a Chinese version; (3°) that in these documents and in the treaty itself the English text shall be accepted as the authoritative standard.

The Treaty was ratified in the Autumn of 1860; but a full year elapsed before any effective step was taken toward the creation of such a school as these terms appeared to require. In the meantime the Emperor Hienfung had died in voluntary exile; his infant son Tungehi had been proclaimed under a regency of two Dowager Empresses; and Prince Kung had succeeded by a bold stroke in making himself virtually a co-regent under the title of I-cheng Wang. He it was who organised the Board of Foreign Affairs known as the *Tsungli Yamen*.

Of this Council he was the active head, and to his memory it is due to say that his good sense and good feeling made progressive measures possible: but such measures were always suggested by others—not a few of them by the Inspector General Mr. Hart. The school of Interpreters was exceptionally fortunate in springing up under the shadow of this powerful Yamen, and in having the prince for its chief patron.

The Prince and Ministers say in a Memorial of October 1861, "That His Majesty had been requested to command the Viceroy at Canton and Governor at Shanghai to find natives well acquainted with Foreign Languages; and to send them, with a good supply of Foreign books, to the Capital. The Canton Viceroy had reported that there was no one whom he could recommend; and the governor of Kiangsu had replied that one candidate presented himself, but he was by no means deeply versed in the subject." This abortive effort to find competent natives, they add, "explains our long delay in carrying the plan into execution. Now, foreign nations at large expense employ natives of China to teach them our literature—yet China has not a man who possesses a ripe knowledge of foreign languages and letters! As therefore no native candidates were sent up, we have *no resource but to seek among foreigners* for men suitable to give instruction."

Humiliating, was it not? Yet the logic of events was destined to convince China that not only in languages, but in everything that makes a nation great and strong, she would have to accept the teaching of foreigners.

## FIRST ORGANISATION

The school, as at first organised, consisted of three classes, English, French, and Russian, with ten boys in each—the first treaties being in those languages. To these a German class was added when Germany had made herself a power and had made a treaty in her own tongue.

The English class, as of most urgent necessity, was opened in June 1862; the French and Russian in the following spring. In point of age the latter was the mother of them all—a school of Russian having been established in the Colonial office a century before this date; indicating that China had begun to recognise the importance of her Northern neighbour. That school was formally transferred to the Tungwenkwan; but it is not easy to perceive what there was to transfer; as it had neither teachers nor pupils. Its intangible assets were certain precedents and regulations. The latter were freely copied and the former constantly appealed to, to obviate objection, and to prove that the new departure was no novelty. It is curious how careful the Prince and Ministers were to report to the Throne every circumstance in connection with the new Institution—showing that they at least regarded it as an affair of state fraught with serious consequences.

The students were drawn exclusively from the ranks of the Bannermen, Manchu or Chinese. They were pensioners by birth, and this arrangement would save expense; it would also secure to the ruling race any emoluments or advantages that might accrue.

Is it not evident from the limitations thus imposed, that this school for interpreters formed no part of a scheme of national education? The fugitive court had been permitted to return by the victorious Allies, but forty years later it needed again to be put to flight and once more reinstated in order to convince China of the necessity for a change of base in her educational system. Yet nothing shows the importance of that early movement to better advantage than the fact that from those four classes have come many ministers to foreign countries and one Minister of Foreign Affairs; besides other members of the diplomatic and consular services.

## THE FIRST TEACHERS

Of the English class the first teacher was the Rev. J. S. Burdon—afterwards Bishop of Victoria, Hongkong. The next was Dr. John Fryer, who became translator at the Kiangnan Arsenal and is now professor of Chinese in the University of California. The third in succession was Dr. Martin, who being engaged at the Yamen in translating a work on International Law, was asked to fill temporarily the place vacated by Dr. Fryer.

Of the French class, the first teacher was the Rev. Smorrenberg, R.C. The first of the Russian class was Mr. A. Popoff, Interpreter to the Russian Legation, who continued to serve for more than five years.

## DEVELOPMENT

Timidly as the Prince and Ministers had entered on this experiment, they were not slow to perceive that China must borrow many things from the West, if she would not continue at a disadvantage in her intercourse with foreign nations. Their clearness of vision is surprising; but they had to content themselves with a very modest billet in the way of innovations; because they were opposed by the bigotry of the "frogs in the well," who were sufficiently powerful to throw obstructions in the way of every liberal measure. In 1865 it was decided to raise the school of Interpreters to the rank of a college; by adding a scientific department, and admitting students of a high grade in Chinese learning. New buildings were erected, and the Inspector General was instructed to engage the services of a competent corps of professors—a measure which he had no doubt been the first to suggest.

The scope and motive of this undertaking are set forth in two memorials addressed to the Throne, by the Prince and his colleagues.

In the first they say:—"The Machinery of the West, its steamers, firearms and military tactics, all have their source in mathematical science. Now China has commenced the building of steamers, but we fear that if we are content with a superficial knowledge, our efforts will not issue in success. We therefore propose after mature deliberation to establish an *additional department*, into which none shall be admitted but those who are over twenty years of age having previously gained a degree in Chinese letters. For we are convinced that if we are able to master the mysteries of mathematical calculation, physical investigation, astronomical observation, the construction of engines, and the engineering of water courses—this, and this only, will assure the steady growth of the power of the empire."

In the other memorial they defend their proposal against the denunciations with which it had been assailed. They say:—"We have to explain that in proposing these measures, we have neither been actuated by a love of novelty, nor fascinated by the arts of the West, but influenced solely by the consideration that an attempt to introduce arts without sciences would prove to be a useless expenditure of public funds. Those who criticise this proceeding object that it is not at present of pressing moment; that we are wrong in renouncing our own arts in favor of those of the West; and that it would be a disgrace for China to put herself under the instruction of men of the West."

Replying to these three objections, they cite with reference to the last the example of Kanghi, who admired the science of the West, and enrolled men of the West among the presidents of the Board of Astronomy. They add that "not only do the nations of the West learn from each other—daily producing something new—but even Japan has sent men from the Eastern ocean to England to acquire the language and science of that country. Now when a small country like Japan knows how to enter on a course of progress, what a dis-



grace for China to adhere to her ancient methods and never think of waking up ! ”

It is worthy of notice that this luminous vindication was written over forty years ago ; and that the argument from the example of Japan has since then been enforced by a sound thrashing which China has suffered at the hands of her island neighbour.

The Prince and Ministers go on to propose that—“ Members of the Hanlin Academy shall be required to enter the Tungwenkwan and apply themselves to the study of science.” The proposal was defeated through the opposition of Woin, Manchu president of the Academy and tutor to the Emperor. Other students of high grade were however enrolled, the contingent from the Eight Banners was doubled ; students were called from the schools in Canton and Shanghai ; and the whole number raised to one hundred.

In the summer of 1868 a Mathematical class was formed and placed under the charge of professor Li Shenlan ; a man of talent, who to a knowledge of all that China had to teach him, had added some acquaintance with Western methods, by working with Mr. Wylie at the translation of text books in Mathematics and Astronomy.

Of the Institution thus enlarged to the proportions of a college Dr. Martin was made president as well as professor of International Law, to the chair of which he had been appointed two years before. This two-fold position he continued to occupy for a quarter of a century.

During a visit to England in 1866, the Inspector General engaged a German for the Chair of Astronomy, and a Frenchman for that of Chemistry. The former proved a charlatan, who mistook notoriety for fame ; and sought to obtain money without earning it. The latter besides initiating many of our students into the mysteries of a science which eclipses the boasted Alchemy of China, gave the Chinese the first text book of Chemistry they ever possessed in their own language. Professor Billequin is the father of Chinese Chemistry, but Dr. Martin claims the honor of having christened the science by the name which it now bears, in a book on Natural Philosophy published prior to Mr. Billequin's work.

In 1871 a chair of Medicine and Physiology was established, with Dr. Dudgeon of the London Mission as its first incumbent.

In 1877 the Chair of Astronomy was filled by Mark Harrington, A.M., of Michigan. Resigning on account of health, he was succeeded *pro tempore* by Dr. Fritsche of the Russian observatory ; and in 1879 by S. M. Russell, M.A., of Queen's College, Belfast.

Mr. Oliver, who came from the same college in the same year under appointment to teach English, was subsequently made Professor of Physics ; and succeeded to the Presidency, when Dr. Martin resigned in 1894.

In 1876 a printing office, with seven presses and four fonts of moveable type, was attached to the college, and took the place of the Imperial Printing Office of the *Wuyingtien*.

In 1887 the number of paid scholarships was raised to 120.

## FIRST FRUITS IN DIPLOMACY

In the early days of the College, China possessed neither diplomatic nor consular service. She had been in the habit of receiving embassies from tributary states; but she sent none except such as were charged with honors or instructions for her vassals.

No wonder her rulers hesitated before breaking over a venerable precedent; and that it required no little persuasion to induce them to do so. The history of the Tungwenkwan connects itself with the crude beginning of their diplomatic intercourse; as well as with the maturer diplomacy of the present day.

The Inspector General, who never failed to seize an opportunity to overcome the prejudices or enlighten the ignorance of the Chinese authorities, having occasion to go home on leave in 1866, suggested that in order to get a glimpse of Foreign countries, a commissioner should be sent along with him and accompanied by some of our students. The students would test the value of their acquisitions and the report of their commissioner would be like seeing with their own eyes.

The choice fell on Pinchun, his Chinese teacher—a Manchu of affable manners and poetical talent. One of the results of the expedition was a volume of verse in which foreign life and the scenes of foreign travel are depicted in glowing colours. The students made such good use of their time that, when another mission was despatched, they were detailed to act as interpreters.

That second expedition, alike tentative—and similarly brought about by the exertions of the Inspector General—was the Burlingame Embassy of 1869; known as the oecumenical embassy because it bore credentials to half the universe. With Mr. Burlingame, Ex-Minister of the U.S., were associated a Manchu and a Chinese in the capacity of adjunct Ministers. To them were attached six students, nominally as interpreters for English, French, and Russian, though, as a matter of fact, the business of the embassy was managed by gentlemen from the Customs service. That embassy was hailed as the dawn of a new era; but it ended in misfortune and disappointment. Its distinguished chief found a grave among the snows of Russia; and his associates were politically buried on their return home—one in the wilds of Mongolia, one in the centre of China—where it was thought they could do no harm. As for the students, they had to wait long before receiving any considerable promotion.

Of late however they have been much in demand. Two have gone as Ministers to Japan; one to England; one to France; one to Germany; and a large number have found employment in legations and consulates; as well as in official posts in the provinces.

## EFFECT ON EDUCATIONAL PROGRESS

That the Chinese authorities were satisfied with the results of their experiment—however meagre in foreign eyes—is shown by a memorial of 1885, in which they review its history. They say:—“It is more than twenty years since we established the Tungwenkwan

and invited professors from abroad. These foreign professors have laboured with untiring diligence; and their students are daily manifesting the results of their teaching. Some have gone to legations in foreign countries; some have been appointed to office under provincial governments; and not a few to posts at various points on the seaboard—all of which must assuredly be admitted as proof of success."

They accordingly solicit Mandarin rank of the 3rd degree for the president and of the 4th for professors Billequin and Vapereau.

When the Emperor Tungchi was set to the study of English his teachers were chosen from the students of the Tungwen College; and when the Emperor Kwang-sü resolved to create a university, there can be no doubt that he was encouraged to do so, by the success of the Tungwen College. Dr. Martin was raised to the second rank and appointed to the presidency. The Tungwenkwan was then disbanded or merged in the university.<sup>1</sup>

*Lists unavoidably incomplete are hereto appended; one of professors; the other of books translated. My file of the College calendar was destroyed by Boxers; and I have not been able to obtain a copy later than 1888.*

W. A. P. M.

PEKING, June 19, 1907.

#### FOREIGN PROFESSORS

*Including Gentlemen of the Customs, who have acted ad interim*

|                                           |      |
|-------------------------------------------|------|
| Rev. J. S. Burdon, of English             | 1861 |
| Rev. Smorrenberg, of French               | 1862 |
| Mr. A. Popoff, of Russian                 | 1862 |
| Mr. John Fryer, of English                | 1863 |
| Dr. W. A. P. Martin, of English           | 1864 |
| Mr. A. Bellequin, of Chemistry            | 1866 |
| Mr. E. Lepissier, of French               | 1866 |
| Mr. M. J. O'Brien, of English             | 1867 |
| Dr. Martin, of International Law          | 1867 |
| Mr. Li Shenlan, of Mathematics            | 1869 |
| Dr. Martin, President                     | 1869 |
| Herr C. Waeber, of Russian and German     | 1870 |
| Messrs. d'Arnoux, Ristelhueber, of French | 1870 |
| Mr. C. Vapereau, of French                | 1870 |
| Herr Titoushkin, of Russian and German    | 1872 |
| Mr. E. McKean, of English                 | 1872 |
| Herr Hagen, of Russian and German         | 1873 |

<sup>1</sup> The Tungwenkwan, as frequently happens in China, appears to have been revived *nomine mutato* as the I-hio Kwan, or College of Interpreters.

<sup>2</sup> From the college calendar of 1888—the latest obtainable. No attempt has been made to ascertain changes in the staff that may have taken place in the next ten years. Mr. Oliver became President in 1894.

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|                                            |      |
|--------------------------------------------|------|
| Mr. J. P. Cowles, of English . . . .       | 1874 |
| Mr. A. Th. Piry, of French . . . .         | 1876 |
| Mr. L. Rocher, of French . . . .           | 1876 |
| Mr. Harrington, of Astronomy . . . .       | 1877 |
| Dr. Fritsche, of Astronomy . . . .         | 1877 |
| Mr. H. B. Morse, of English . . . .        | 1878 |
| Mr. C. H. Oliver, of English . . . .       | 1879 |
| Mr. S. M. Russell, of Astronomy . . . .    | 1879 |
| Herr Pander, of Russian and German . . . . | 1881 |
| Mr. Scherzer, of French . . . .            | 1883 |
| Mr. W. Hancock, of English . . . .         | 1884 |
| Dr. S. W. Bushell, of Physiology . . . .   | 1884 |

BOOKS TRANSLATED OR COMPILED BY PROFESSORS  
AND STUDENTS

|                                            |                                     |
|--------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Wheaton's International Law . . . .        | By Dr. Martin                       |
| Natural Philosophy . . . .                 | Ibid.                               |
| Chemistry for Beginners . . . .            | Mr. Billequin                       |
| Code Napoleon . . . .                      | Ibid.                               |
| Guide Diplomatique . . . .                 | Messrs. Lienfang and<br>Ching Chang |
| Woolsey's Int. Law . . . .                 | Messrs. Wang Fungtsuo<br>and Fungyi |
| English Grammar . . . .                    | Wang Fungtsuo                       |
| Fawcett's Polit. Economy. . . .            | Ibid.                               |
| History of Russia . . . .                  | Students of Russian<br>Class        |
| Outlines of the World's History . . . .    | Yangshu and Changsiu                |
| Advanced Chemistry . . . .                 | Mr. Billequin                       |
| Mathematical Physics . . . .               | Dr. Martin                          |
| Physiology . . . .                         | Dr. Dudgeon                         |
| Astronomical Almanac, 1877 . . . .         | Mr. Harrington                      |
| Astronomical Almanac, 1878 . . . .         | Dr. Fritsche                        |
| Astronomical Almanac, 1879 . . . .         | Mr. Russell                         |
| Bluntschli's Int. Law . . . .              | Messrs. Lienfang and<br>Ching Chang |
| Mathematical Exercises . . . .             | Messrs. Sikan and<br>Kweyung        |
| International Law in Ancient China . . . . | Dr. Martin                          |
| Elements of Astronomy . . . .              | Mr. Russell and Students            |
| Penal Code of Straits Settlements . . . .  | Mr. Wang Fungtsuo                   |
| Franco-Chinese Dictionary . . . .          | Mr. Billequin                       |

These books were mostly executed by professors and students conjointly.

## APPENDIX G

EXTRACTS FROM MEMORANDUM ON CHINA'S NEUTRALITY  
IN RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

(Prepared by Capt. W. F. Tyler, Coast Inspector, for presentation at the International Congress at The Hague)

SMITH and Silby (International Law as interpreted during the Russo-Japan War) say that "it appears from her actions during the present Russo-Japanese war that China has not even a rudimentary conception of the somewhat exacting obligations of the modern neutral state"; and this statement will be read by jurists with others of a similar kind, and create a prejudice against her.

But this statement is eminently unfair. From the beginning of the war China has been most anxious to act in a correct manner; as instanced by the promulgation of neutrality rules which if anything err on the side of strictness. If she has failed in some matters it is not surprising—others have done likewise—and she is willing to accept all responsibility for such lapses as may have occurred. It will be shown presently that such lapses are very few, if not confined to a single rather doubtful instance.

It will now be convenient to consider the several matters with which China as a neutral nation has been concerned. These are as follows:

1. War operations in Manchuria.
2. Infringement of neutrality outside the fighting zone.
3. Internment of Vessels.
4. Jurisdiction over interned men.
5. The *Mandjour* and *Askold* cases.
6. The *Rechitelni* incident.
7. The *Rasteropny* incident.
8. Interned destroyers at Chefoo.
9. Refugee vessels from Baltic Fleet.
10. Trade in contraband.
11. Japan's interference in neutrality duties.

## 1. WAR OPERATIONS IN MANCHURIA

The fact that practically all the military operations have taken place in territory that was nominally Chinese has been used by the Japanese in the *Rechitelni* incident to show that China's neutrality was imperfect, and that the condition of things was, as regards International Law, an anomaly and a contradiction. Such an expression, especially when used as an excuse for a gross violation of neutrality, is incorrect and unfair. A certain condition of

affairs existed in Manchuria anterior to the war. This condition was that the Russians were in military occupation of it without the consent of China. At the time when war commenced China was not exercising full sovereign functions in that part. How and why this condition existed has no bearing on the question of her neutral duties. The fact exists that, when war broke out, utterly insurmountable obstacles stood in the way of fully guarding her neutrality there. No law can lay an obligation on a subject which it is impossible for him to carry out. In any case the breach of neutrality was by both sides and, as in the *Florida* case, no complaint can lie.

The situation was further regularised by the practical agreement come to, consequent on Mr. Hay's note, concerning the area of nominally Chinese territory within which fighting might take place.

Under these circumstances the fact of military operations being carried on within her territory does not in any way detract from her status as a perfectly neutral state.

## 2. INFRINGEMENT OF NEUTRALITY OUTSIDE THE FIGHTING ZONE

This is a much more difficult matter to consider fairly. Undoubtedly China's desire was the strict performance of her duty as a neutral state as instanced by her neutrality rules and by her orders issued to her officers on the frontier.

The essence of neutrality duty is the non-helping of either side. A concomitant duty is active prevention of breach of neutrality. The former is one always possible to carry out. The latter may be impossible. China in this matter did her best with the means at her disposal. Moreover there was another important factor in the matter. China in this war had two distinct duties—one was the preservation of her neutrality; the other was the avoidance of being drawn into the war itself.

This latter duty was not a mere duty to herself, or perhaps it could not so well be used as an excuse for non-performance to their utmost of her neutrality obligations. It was an International duty—a duty which in a sense had been imposed on her by the world to such an extent as to make it an International Law. And in view of the importance attaching to its fulfilment it became the prior duty to which, if necessary, the other had to give way.

This again should not be allowed to affect her status as a neutral state. She had in fact neutral duties to perform in the face of unprecedented difficulties, and she performed them to the best of her resources and abilities.

## 3. INTERNMENT OF VESSELS

### 4. JURISDICTION OVER INTERNED MEN

So long as public vessels are taking refuge in neutral ports in accordance with the municipal laws of the neutral, the principle of extritoriality obtains, and the neutral power has no jurisdiction

over them. But, with internment comes into existence another state of affairs. Internment is an alternative to proceeding to sea, an alternative dependent on the will of the neutral, and therefore subject to the conditions imposed by it. China considered she had a right to say that the interned crews of Russian vessels were on the same footing as would be interned land forces. But then arose another question; Foreigners are by treaty extraterritorialised in China. What then from a jurisdictional point of view was the position of interned Russians? The view taken by China in this matter was as follows:

The Treaties in which the extraterritoriality of foreigners is provided for is in reference to conditions which are normal. With the existence of war on China's borders and with the high duties of neutrality devolving on her, conditions were no longer normal.

China in respect to neutrality was acting not only for herself, but Internationally. She became the constable of International Law. Having these high duties of sovereignty to perform, it was obviously requisite for her to have the corresponding high sovereign powers necessary to enable her to fulfil those duties. If interned men were free from her jurisdiction, how could she be responsible for them? And responsible she had to be under International Law. She therefore considered that the prior obligation held and that consequently extraterritoriality could not be allowed to interfere with her neutral functions. In the later cases of internment there was a formal submission by the officers and men to "the control which is customary in such cases."

But, while China maintained this attitude, she was quite aware that her juridical methods were entirely unsuited to meet the emergency. She therefore in effect delegated to the local Russian officials the power of disciplinary control to be exercised under her superintendence without, however, prejudice to her right to take any action in respect to jurisdiction which circumstances might render necessary.

For instance, men who refused to give parole were taken and kept as prisoners on board a Chinese man-of-war without reference to the Russian Consulate. To this procedure, so far as acts of a military precaution nature were concerned, the Russian authorities tacitly agreed, but in respect to ordinary criminal jurisdiction they claimed the right of full extraterritoriality.

In the one case that occurred, that of the Bund murder case (15th December, 1904) when a sailor from the *Askold* committed an unprovoked murder on a Chinese on the Bund, the Russian authorities refused to allow the superintendence of the Chinese Authorities at the trial, and the circumstances were such, the prisoner never being in Chinese hands, that it was very difficult for China to do more than protest.

China provided, however, that in any other case in which the prisoner was in their hands the case should be tried either at the Consular Court with a Chinese officer on the bench or on board a Chinese man-of-war by the Consul. The opportunity for vindicating her right in this did not occur.

## 5. THE "MANDJOUR" AND "ASKOLD" CASES

In regard to these vessels considerable delay occurred before they submitted to the disarmament which China ordered as an alternative to proceeding to sea. But when we realise the want of precedent for internment and disarmament, and the general misunderstanding of this question by most of those concerned, the delay that occurred is not surprising. However slowly and with whatever amount of fuss, China completely fulfilled her neutrality obligations in regard to them. The Russian vessels for a time were in effect interned vessels with refractory crews. They were infringing China's neutrality only in a disciplinary sense. On the other hand the consequent presence of Japanese war vessels at Woosung constituted a distinct breach of China's neutrality.

In this matter while China has a grievance against both, neither can have a grievance against her.

## 6. "RECHITELNI" CASE

On the 11th August, 1904, while a squadron of three Chinese cruisers commanded by Rear-Admiral Sah were in the port, the Russian *Rechitelni* entered Chefoo, and in the course of the day submitted to internment.

By dark the disarmament of the boat had proceeded to the extent of the removal of all breech blocks of guns and rifles, all war-heads, and the eccentrics of one engine, the other engine being completely broken down. The Russian officers and crew were still on board, but a guard boat in charge of a Chinese lieutenant was stationed close by. The Russian captain had given his parole for himself and crew.

Before dark two Japanese destroyers ran into port, reconnoitred and left. After dark these or others returned and anchored in the neighbourhood of the Chinese squadron and the *Rechitelni*. The Japanese destroyers were boarded by a Chinese officer who explained that the *Rechitelni* had surrendered for internment to Admiral Sah and that she had been dismantled. Admiral Sah himself visited the Japanese and told them that the *Rechitelni* was now under Chinese protection. In reply the Japanese commander said he would go away soon, probably that night.

About 3 a.m. in the morning the *Rechitelni* was boarded by a Japanese officer who demanded that she should either go outside and fight or surrender to him. The Russian captain replied that he was disabled and disarmed, and that he had given his parole not to fight again during the present war and that he was now under Chinese protection.

The Chinese guard officer came on board and confirmed this statement, then, seeing that the Japanese were taking possession of the vessel, he returned to his ship, the *Hai Yung*, for assistance. The *Hai Yung's* senior lieutenant at once started in a steam pinnace, but before he arrived two more Japanese boats had boarded the



*Rechtelini*, firing and hand to hand fighting were going on, and one of the Japanese destroyers had taken her in tow. The other destroyer steamed close to the Chinese flag ship *Hai Chi*, and on a signal from that vessel being made stopped and allowed communication. Admiral Sah then sent an officer to expostulate with the Japanese on their act in cutting out in Chinese waters a vessel under his protection, especially after the assurance they had previously given. The Japanese commander in reply said he would proceed and bring the boat back and then left.

The number of men killed in this affair is not known. One Japanese body, unwounded, and one Russian body shot through the heart, were recovered.

As regards the action, or want of action, of the Chinese Navy in this matter, the facts seem quite plain.

The cutting out was an absolute surprise. Considering the explanation that had been made, and the assurances given by the Japanese officers; considering the fact that the Russian had not even completed her twenty-four hours' refuge in a neutral port which in any case she was entitled to, Admiral Sah could have no reason to suppose that so gross an outrage could be in contemplation.

The Chinese guard officer should have remained at his post and should have resisted the cutting out at all costs, but once the surprise attack was made no action on the part of Admiral Sah would have saved the situation.

It was too late to fire on the Japanese with the object of preventing the cutting out. To have fired on the other destroyer could have no object except as a retaliatory measure. It was the Admiral's duty to consider not only the immediate result, but the possible ultimate result of such a procedure. In coming to the conclusion to refrain from retaliatory measures, and to leave this matter to be settled diplomatically, he acted with that due regard to all the circumstances of the case which was proper.

Nevertheless this is a case in which China's responsibility to Russia is quite clear. But what of Japan's responsibility to China?

In reply to the protests from China, Japan made a reply which is a model of casuistry. She commenced by contending that China's neutrality was not complete and applicable only to those places which are not occupied by the armed forces of either belligerent. This contention would reduce China's neutrality to an absolute nullity and would authorise Japan to seize Russian vessels in Shanghai Harbour.

She further said that Russia cannot escape the consequence of an unsuccessful war by moving her vessels into that portion of China which has by arrangement been made conditionally neutral. How and when Chefoo was made conditionally neutral is not stated nor what "conditional" means in that connexion.

That the neutrality of Chefoo should revert with the termination of the incident is a very naive statement and obviously points to the fact that it was neutral before.

The reference to the Russian vessels in Shanghai is entirely beside the point. For the preservation of her neutrality *vis-à-vis*

these vessels, China was responsible and she fulfilled her duty, with how much trouble has nothing to do with the case.

The case of the *Rechitelni* is said to be distinguished from that of the *Florida*, and with this we quite agree, for the cutting out of the former was a much grosser act, she being at the time under the protection of the Chinese flag ship and actually disarmed.

The case is further compared to that of the *General Armstrong*, but that vessel fired on the boats of the British squadron, whereas the *Rechitelni* exercised no force until possession was taken and then only manual force.

To this outrage on her neutrality China still takes the greatest exception. In view of the attitude of the Japanese Government on the matter, China considers the case one to be referred to the Hague Tribunal.

#### 7. THE "RASTEROPNY" CASE

In the morning of the 16th November, 1904, while the Chinese cruiser *Haichew* was in port, the Russian destroyer *Rasteropny* arrived at Chefoo, and in the course of the day her surrender for internment was notified to the Chinese authorities by the Russian Consul. Before, however, the Chinese officer had taken charge, her crew left her and shortly after she blew up and sank in the harbour. Her officers and men landed fully armed. After urgent representations these surrendered for internment and were sent on board the *Haichew* the same day.

In this connexion the U.S. Consul General was the medium of communication between the Japanese and Russian consulates, and bore a message to the latter that unless the *Rasteropny's* crew were sent at once to the *Haichew* the Japanese would land and take the Consulate.

The act of the Russian commander in sinking his vessel in a constricted anchorage where she became a danger to navigation was undoubtedly very improper. The object of the act is plain enough. He did not wish his vessel to suffer the same fate as that of the *Rechitelni*. But such a reason can form no valid excuse for what he did, still less can China be held responsible for the loss of his vessel.

It may be admitted that he had some reason to doubt China's power to protect him, but between taking reasonable precautions in that matter and doing what he did do there is a large gap.

#### 8. THE INTERNED DESTROYERS AT CHEFOO

In the morning of the 2nd January, 1905, four Russian destroyers and one launch entered Chefoo Harbour and during the forenoon their desire to surrender for internment was notified to the Chinese authorities. There being no Chinese war vessels in port, the Chinese authorities requested the Commissioner of Customs to take the necessary steps regarding the disarmament and dismantlement of these vessels. Accordingly the work was, under considerable difficulties, supervised by the Commissioner—a British subject.

In the afternoon several Japanese destroyers entered the port and anchored in the neighbourhood of the Russians, and there is no doubt that their intention was to seize the Russians in the event of their disarmament and dismantlement not being thoroughly and expeditiously effected.

In order to minimise the risk of a repetition of the *Rechtelini* incident, the crews of the Russian destroyers were removed and lodged on shore and the boats taken entire charge of by the Chinese authorities.

#### 9. REFUGEE VESSELS FROM THE BALTIC FLEET

These vessels for a time offered passive resistance to internment, and during this time they were in imminent danger of being cut out by the Japanese, who had a squadron for the purpose at the Saddles.

Had the Japanese attempted it China would have protested but not resisted.

China would have had a grievance against Japan, but Russia could have had none against China.

After they submitted the danger of being cut out at Woosung still existed in a lesser degree, but now China was prepared to defend them at all costs, and dispositions to that end were made.

#### 10. TRADE IN CONTRABAND

#### 11. JAPAN'S INTERFERENCE WITH NEUTRALITY DUTIES

Both Russia and Japan tried to take advantage of China's supposed weakness in neutrality affairs. The Russians chiefly by passive resistance to neutrality regulations, and Japan in her violation of Chefoo, but chiefly in her attempt to dictate what China's neutrality duties were in respect to herself.

The right of Japan to make such representations as she chose on neutrality matters and to exercise an espionage—within limits—on neutral trade is not questioned. But her attempt to dictate measures in detail was wrong and likely to affect detrimentally China's neutral status. It is only necessary here to state that no action beyond those considered necessary by herself were taken by China in consequence of Japan's representations, and to repudiate the idea that as a belligerent she had the right to interfere with the details of China's neutrality duties.

In regard to this matter China's attitude was as follows: In carrying out neutrality duties China is acting as the constable of International Law. She will listen to representations from either side, but she refuses to discuss her duties or to have pressure brought to bear on her. On her rests the responsibility for giving effect to International Law. If she makes a mistake remedy can be obtained by proper process. She does not discuss, she acts and accepts the responsibility for her action.

## APPENDIX H

## FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES

ACCREDITED TO THE COURT OF PEKING, 1517-1911

## PORTUGAL

## SPECIAL MISSIONS

1517. THOMÉ PIRES. (Died at Peking in 1523.)  
1667. EMANUEL DE SALDANHA.  
1726. ALEXANDRE METELLO DE SOUZA E MENEZES.  
1752. FRANCISCO XAVIER PACHECO SAMPAIO.  
1862. IZIDORO FRANCISCO GUIMARÃES (since created Visconde de PRAIA GRANDE).  
1864. JOSÉ RODRIGUES COELHO D'AMARAL.  
1887. THOMAZ DE SOUZA ROZA.

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

- |                       |                                                          |   |   |
|-----------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|---|---|
| 1862.                 | IZIDORO FRANCISCO GUIMARÃES.                             |   |   |
| 1864.                 | JOSÉ RODRIGUES COELHO D'AMARAL (also Governor of Macao). |   |   |
| 1867.                 | JOSÉ MARIA PONTE E HORTA                                 | " | " |
| 1869.                 | ANTONIO SERGIO DE SOUZA                                  | " | " |
| 1872.                 | Visconde de S. JANUARIO                                  | " | " |
| 1875.                 | JOSÉ MARIA LOBO D'AVILA                                  | " | " |
| 1877.                 | CARLOS EUGENIO CORRÊA DA SILVA                           | " | " |
| 1880.                 | JOAQUIN JOSÉ DA GRAÇA                                    | " | " |
| 1883<br>and<br>1887.) | THOMAZ DE SOUZA ROZA (also Governor of Macao 1883-1886). |   |   |
| 1886.                 | FIRMINO JOSÉ DA COSTA (also Governor of Macao).          |   |   |
| 1889.                 | FRANCISCO TEIXEIRA DA SILVA                              | " | " |
| 1891.                 | CUSTODIO MIGUEL DA BORJA                                 | " | " |
| 1894<br>and<br>1900.) | JOSÉ M. DE SOUZA HORTA E COSTA                           | " | " |
| 1897.                 | EDUARDO RODRIGUES GALHARDO                               | " | " |
| 1902.                 | JOSE AZEVEDO CASTELLO BRANCO.                            |   |   |
| 1908.                 | BARAO DE SENDAL.                                         |   |   |

## NETHERLANDS

## SPECIAL MISSIONS

1655. { PETER GOYER.  
JACOB KEYSER.  
1794. TITSING.  
1863. J. DES AMORIE VAN DER HOEVEN.

## MINISTERS RESIDENT

- 1872-1895. JAN HELENUS FERGUSON.  
1895-1901. F. M. KNOBEL.  
1903-1908. Jonkheer ADOLF JACOBUS VAN CITTERS.  
1909- Jonkheer FRANS BEELAERTS VAN BLOKLAND.

## RUSSIA

## SPECIAL MISSIONS

1675. NICOLAUS SPAFARI.  
1689. FEODOR ALEXIEVITCH GOLOVIN.  
1716. LANGE.  
1727. Count SAWA WLADISLAVITCH.  
1768. KROPOTOW.  
1851. KOVALEVSKY.  
1858. NICOLAUS MURAVIOW.

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

1858. Count EUPHIMIUS PUTIATIN.  
1859-1860. General Count N. IGNATIEFF.  
1861-1863. General L. DE BALLUSECK.  
1863-1873. General A. VLANGALY.  
1874-1878. EUGÈNE DE BUTZOW.  
1883-1886. S. POPOFF.  
1886-1891. ALEXIS COUMANY.  
1891-1897. Count A. P. CASSINI.  
1897-1901. M. N. DE GIERS.  
1901-1905. P. M. LESSAR.  
1905-1908. D. D. POKOTILOFF.  
1902-1912. I. J. KOROSTOVETZ.

## GREAT BRITAIN

## SPECIAL MISSIONS

- 1792-1794. { *Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary:*  
The Earl of MACARTNEY.  
*Secretary of Embassy and Minister Plenipotentiary in*  
*absence of the Ambassador:*  
Sir GEORGE LEONARD STAUNTON.

1816.

1902. Sir JAMES LYLE MACKAY (Baron Inchcape, of Strathnaver).

1857-1859 } JAMES BRUCE, Earl of ELGIN AND KINCARDINE.  
and 1860 }

|            |                                                 |     |
|------------|-------------------------------------------------|-----|
| 1841-1844. | Sir HENRY POTTINGER (also Governor of Hongkong) |     |
| 1844-1848. | Sir JOHN F. DAVIS                               |     |
| 1848-1851. | Sir GEORGE BONHAM                               | " " |
| 1853-1858. | Sir JOHN BOWRING                                | " " |
| 1858-1865. | Sir FREDERICK BRUCE.                            |     |
| 1865-1871. | Sir RUTHERFORD ALCOCK.                          |     |
| 1871-1882. | Sir THOMAS F. WADE.                             |     |
| 1883-1885. | Sir HARRY S. PARKES. (Died at Peking.)          |     |
| 1885.      | Sir ROBERT HART.                                |     |
| 1885-1892. | Sir JOHN WALSHAM.                               |     |
| 1892-1895. | NICHOLAS R. O'CONOR.                            |     |
| 1896-1900. | Sir CLAUDE M. MACDONALD.                        |     |
| 1900-1906. | Sir ERNEST M. SATOW.                            |     |
| 1906-      | Sir JOHN N. JORDAN.                             |     |

|            |                       |
|------------|-----------------------|
| 1843-1844. | CALEB CUSHING.        |
| 1845-1847. | ALEXANDER H. EVERETT. |
| 1845-1846. | Commodore BIDDLE.     |
| 1848-1850. | JOHN U. DAVIS.        |
| 1852-1854. | HUMPEREY MARSHALL.    |
| 1853-1854. | ROBERT M. McLANE.     |
| 1855-1857. | PETER PARKER.         |
| 1880.      | { JAMES B. ANGELL.    |
|            | { JOHN F. SWIFT.      |
|            | { WILLIAM H. TRESCOT. |
| 1900-1901. | WILLIAM W. ROCKHILL.  |

1857-1858. WILLIAM B. REED.  
1859-1860. JOHN E. WARD.  
1861-1867. ANSON BURLINGAME.

|            |                                      |
|------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1868-1869. | J. ROSS BROWNE.                      |
| 1869-1873. | FREDERICK F. LOW.                    |
| 1874-1875. | BENJAMIN P. AVERY. (Died at Peking.) |
| 1876-1880. | GEORGE F. SEWARD.                    |
| 1880-1882. | JAMES B. ANGELL.                     |
| 1882-1885. | JOHN RUSSELL YOUNG.                  |
| 1885-1898. | CHARLES DENBY.                       |
| 1898-1905. | EDWIN H. CONGER.                     |
| 1905-1909. | WILLIAM WOODVILLE ROCKHILL.          |
| 1910-      | W. J. CALHOUN.                       |

## FRANCE

## AMBASSADORS

|            |                |
|------------|----------------|
| 1844-1846. | M. DE LAGRENÉ. |
| 1857-1860. | Baron GROS.    |

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

|            |                           |
|------------|---------------------------|
| 1847-1850. | M. DE FORTH-ROUEN.        |
| 1851-1857. | } M. DE BOURBOULON.       |
| 1860-1862. |                           |
| 1863-1865. | M. BERTHEMY.              |
| 1866-1868. | M. DE LALLEMAND.          |
| 1872-1874. | M. DE GEOTROY.            |
| 1876-1879. | M. BRENIER DE MONTMORAND. |
| 1880-1883. | M. BOURÉE.                |
| 1883-1884. | M. TRICOU.                |
| 1884-1885. | M. PATENÔTRE.             |
| 1885-1886. | M. G. COGORDAN.           |
| 1886-1887. | M. CONSTANS.              |
| 1887-1893. | M. LEMAIRE.               |
| 1893-1897. | M. GÉRARD.                |
| 1897-1900. | M. PICHON.                |
| 1901-1902. | M. PAUL BEAU.             |
| 1902-1905. | M. DUBAIL.                |
| 1905-1909. | M. BAPST.                 |
| 1909-1912. | M. JACQUIN DE MARGERIE.   |

## BELGIUM

## SPECIAL MISSIONS

|       |                               |
|-------|-------------------------------|
| 1845. | LANNOY.                       |
| 1862. | L. BOLS.                      |
| 1865. | AUGUSTE T'KINT DE ROODENBEKE. |

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

|            |                                  |
|------------|----------------------------------|
| 1865-1871. | A. T'KINT DE ROODENBEKE.         |
| 1888-1895. | LEON VERHARGE DE NAEYER.         |
| 1896-1899. | Baron CARL DE VINCK DE DEUX ORP. |
| 1906-1909. | Baron A. GRENIER.                |
| 1910-      | E. DE CARTIER DE MARCHIENNE.     |

## SWEDEN AND NORWAY

## SPECIAL MISSION

Captain ANNERSTEDT.

ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER Plenipotentiary

1847. CARL FREDERIK LILJEVALCH.

## GERMANY

ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS Plenipotentiary

1861. GRAF ZU EULENBURG.  
 1864-1873. M. VON REHFUES.  
 1875-1893. M. VON BRANDT.  
 1893-1896. Freiherr SCHENK ZU SCHWEINSBERG.  
 1896-1899. Herr VON HEYKING.  
 1899-1900. Freiherr VON KETTLER. (Murdered in Peking.)  
 1900-1906. Freiherr MUMM VON SCHWARTZENSTEIN.  
 1906-1911. Graf VON REX.  
 1911-. Herr VON HAXTHAUSEN.

## DENMARK

## SPECIAL MISSION

1863. WALDEMAR RUDOLPH VON RAASLÖFF.

## SPAIN

ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS Plenipotentiary

1864. } Don SINIBALDO DE MAS.  
 1868-1870. }  
 1867. HERIBERTO GARCIA DE QUEVEDO.  
 1868. TIBURCIO FARALDO.  
 1869-1871. Don ADOLFO PAXOT.  
 1872. JUAN M. PEREYRA.  
 1876-1880. Don CARLOS ANTONIO DE ESPAÑA. (Died at Peking.)  
 1882. } Don TIBURCIO RODRIGUEZ Y MUÑOS.  
 1886-1889. }  
 1884-1885. Don LEOPOLDO DE ALBA SALCEDO.  
 1892-1894. Don JOSÉ DELAVAT.  
 1895-1902. J. B. DE COLOGAN.  
 1902-1910. Don MANUEL DE CARCER.  
 1910-. Don LUIS PASTOR Y DE MORA,



## ITALY

## SPECIAL MISSION

1866. Captain VITTORIO ARMINJON.

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

1871. Count FE D'OSTIANI.  
 1880-1889. FERDINANDO DE LUCA. (Died.)  
 1889-1893. ALBERTO PANSA.  
 1894-1898. ALESSANDRO BARDI.  
 1898-1899. RENATO DE MARTINO.  
 1899-1901. Marquis GIUSEPPE SALVAGO-RAGGI.  
 1902-1904. Count GIOVANNI GALLINA.  
 1904-1907. CARLO BAROLI.  
 1907-1910. Count GIULIO CESARE VINCI.  
 1910-1911. FEDERICO BARILARI.  
 1911- Count CARLO SFORZA.

## AUSTRIA AND HUNGARY

## ENVOY EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTER PLENIPOTENTIARY

1869. Rear-Admiral ANTON BARON VON PETZ.

## MINISTERS RESIDENT AND CONSULS GENERAL

1871-1874. HEINRICH Freiherr VON CALICE.  
 1874-1877. IGNAZ Freiherr VON SCHÄFFER.  
 1879-1883. Ritter MAX HOFFER VON HOFFENFELS.  
 1883-1888. KARL Graf ZALUSKY.  
 1888-1893. RÜDIGER Freiherr VON BIEGELEBEN.  
 1895-1896. CHRISTOPH Graf WYDENBRUCK.

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

1896-1905. MORITZ Freiherr VON CZIKANN.  
 1905-1911. EUGEN Ritter VON KUCZYNSKI.  
 1911- ARTHUR VON ROSTHORN.

## JAPAN

## SPECIAL MISSION

1873. SOYESHIMA (Minister of Foreign Affairs).

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENTIARY

1871. DATE MUNEKI.  
 1874. OKUBO.  
 1874. YANAGIWARA SAKIMITSU  
 1875-1878. MORI ARINORI.  
 1879-1881. SHISHIDO TAMAKI.

- 1882-1885. Admiral ENOMOTO TAKEAKI.  
1885. Count ITO HIROBUMI.  
1886-1889. SHIODA SABURO. (Died at Peking.)  
1889-1895. OTORI KEISUKE.  
1895-1896. HAYASHI TADASU.  
1897-1899. YANO FUMIO.  
1899-1900. Baron NISHI TOKUJIRO.  
1901. KOMURA JUTARO.  
1901-1906. UCHIDA YASUYA.  
1906-1908. HAYASHI GONSUKE.  
1908- IJUN HIKOKICHI.  
[N.B.—The family name is given first in this list.]

## PERU

## ENVOYS EXTRAORDINARY AND MINISTERS PLENIPOTENT.

1874. Captain Don AURELIO GARCIA Y GARCIA.  
1875. J. F. ELMORE.  
1882. EDUARDO CALLADO.

## BRAZIL

## SPECIAL MISSION

1880. { EDUARDO CALLADO (Envoy Ext. and Minister Plen.  
Admiral SILVEIRA DA MOTA (Plenipotentiary).

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
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




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